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Accommodating the continuum hypothesis with the déjà vu/déjà vécu distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 November 2023

Denis Perrin*
Affiliation:
Centre for Philosophy of Memory/Institut de Philosophie de Grenoble, Univ. Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France denis.perrin@univ-grenoble-alpes.fr https://phil-mem.org/members/perrin.php

Abstract

On Barzykowski and Moulin's continuum hypothesis, déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) share their underpinning neurocognitive processes. A discontinuity issue for them is that familiarity and episodic recollection exhibit different neurocognitive signatures. This issue can be overcome, I say, provided the authors are ready to distinguish a déjà vécu/episodic IAM continuity and a déjà vu/semantic IAM continuity.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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