This article critically evaluates three attempts to overcome the problem of fit between international human rights law (IHRL) and the digital ecosystem, through an expansion of the existing IHRL framework to big tech companies. The attempted expansions considered here include standard-setting initiatives involving the imposition on states and companies – large technology companies and other business enterprises – of certain duties to apply IHRL in connection with potentially rights-infringing business practices. As I discuss below, most of the duties identified and/or developed in this regard within the context of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Business and Human Rights (BHR) agenda constitute soft law for the time being. Negotiations for a Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) designed to strengthen the applicable legal framework are ongoing, but their prospects of success remain unclear. Another attempted expansion involves self-regulation by big tech companies through corporate policies aimed at incorporating certain IHRL norms into their business practices. The efforts of Meta to incorporate IHRL into its corporate policies and to offer an IHRL grievance mechanism through the operation of the Meta Oversight Body (focusing mainly on protecting freedom of expression, as articulated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) represent a key case study in this regard. A third attempt to address the aforementioned problem of fit that I consider below involves efforts by special procedures of the Human Rights Council to exercise its standard-setting and monitoring functions in connection with the practices of large technology companies. The work of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression in this area is particularly noteworthy. These three examples of expansion attempts provide useful insights into the potential of IHRL to serve as a legal framework to govern the operations of large technology companies, as well as about the limits of its potential.

The article starts by discussing recent developments in the BHR agenda, including efforts to conclude an LBI. The extent to which this agenda represents a promising avenue for holding large technology companies accountable to IHRL norms is then considered in the second and third parts of the article, which discuss two normative initiatives that derive largely from the BHR agenda: this section specifically examines Meta’s espousal of IHRL as part of its corporate BHR policy, and considers attempts by Human Rights Council special procedures to apply IHRL to technology companies.

The Gaza war, which started on 7 October 2023 through the horrendous attack by Hamas on Israel, has caused a depressing measure of human suffering on all sides. As far as Israel’s use of force is concerned, this war also constitutes a challenging case for the application of the jus contra bellum. This chiefly arises from the genuine legal uncertainty concerning the applicability of the right of self-defence when an armed attack by a non-state organisation emanates from the territory of a state that has proven unable to prevent said armed attack. Arguably, the situation in the Gaza Strip on 7 October 2023 presents the rare variation of such an ‘unable host state scenario’ where the non-state armed attack (by Hamas) against a state (Israel) has originated from a territory (the Gaza Strip) destined for the realisation of the right to self-determination of a people (the Palestinian people). In such a case, the dilemmatic conflict that underlies the uncertainty about the applicability of the right of self-defence is between the legally protected interests of the state that is the victim of the armed attack and those of the ‘host people’ of the non-state attacker.

This article discusses the potential influence of the existence of an underlying armed conflict in Gaza on the applicability and application of jus ad bellum. It rejects the Israeli ‘displacement’ approach whereby jus ad bellum does not play a role during an ongoing armed conflict as it finds no support in the sources of international law, in particular state practice. The article then provides possible explanations for the Israeli reliance on ‘displacement’ regardless of its shaky foundations: namely, the preference to provide overall justification for the operation, to avoid difficult political topics, and to allow Israel freedom of action in other arenas (such as Lebanon and Syria). Regardless of such findings, the article acknowledges that jus ad bellum faces challenges to its application during hostilities. It analyses the right of self-defence, as Israel has relied on such right to justify its use of force in Gaza, addressing relatively briefly jus ad bellum necessity while focusing on the various approaches to jus ad bellum proportionality, and the differences between such approaches when it comes to the legality of the use of force in self-defence in Gaza. Ultimately, the article argues that states must provide clear pronouncements on this issue to prevent the adoption of an overly permissive approach to the regulation of jus ad bellum during hostilities.

The West Bank, also referred to as Judea and Samaria, has been subject to belligerent occupation since 1967, and its legal framework is grounded primarily in international law. This legal foundation of belligerent occupation emanates from the international law of occupation, which regulates the legislative, judicial and executive powers of the occupying state in the occupied territory. However, the utilisation of international law in adjudicating criminal matters within military courts in this region is sporadic. The underlying reasons for this practice call for inquiry and prompt a reconsideration of the optimal configuration of the legal regime.

This article contends that despite a recent uptake in integrating international law into military court decisions, its effectiveness in addressing criminal issues within these courts is limited. Moreover, in most cases presented before military courts, international law lags behind domestic legal doctrines, including Israeli criminal law. Despite its overarching authority, international law falls short of providing a pragmatic solution to the challenges confronted by military courts. Consequently, these courts are compelled to turn to alternative legal sources. The article proposes an integrated model, advocating reliance on international law for fundamental, constitutional-level issues while deferring to the Israeli criminal justice system for specific practical criminal matters.

Children’s weekly magazines in Israel’s first decade offer a unique arena for legal research, since they provide a broad field for learning about the nature of the effort made by their curators to instil legal consciousness in children. These publications, as prominent educational materials and popular leading leisure resources, mediated to their young readers the current events, and they are a barometer of values, including the rule of law. Accordingly, the article presents some of the values that the weeklies stressed for coping with the challenges of the time from a legal perspective. The article also describes how cultural heroes in Israel were presented in the magazines and defined the concept of the rule of law of the period. It shows that along with the weeklies’ general commitment to the rule of law and the appreciation of law-abiding figures who strived for good, the magazines, including their editorials and op-eds, featured in their literature, illustrations and other elements, a deeper layer of acceptance and even encouragement of some types of behaviour that were inconsistent with the principle of upholding public law and human rights in a broad sense. This is especially apparent concerning the conduct surrounding border security.

This article examines whether states may use force in self-defence against non-state actors operating from the territory of another state. It first maps the prevailing approaches to self-defence in response to non-state armed attacks, focusing on attribution, Article 3(g) of the United Nations General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression, and the ‘unable or unwilling’ doctrine. It argues that these approaches give rise to normative, methodological and practical difficulties and often leave states without an effective right to defend themselves. The article then goes on to explain the morphology of the right of self-defence. It contends that self-defence is a primary rule of international law permitting the use of force in response to an armed attack as a factual occurrence, irrespective of its perpetrator. It further argues that self-defence is neither an exception to Article 2(4), nor a legal sanction. On this basis, the right of self-defence extends to armed attacks by non-state actors, even when they operate from within the territory of another state. In such cases, self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness excuses the responsibility of the defending state for incidental violations of the territorial state’s sovereignty in the course of defensive action.

This article seeks to detail what Israel owes the people who live in the Gaza Strip with respect to water. It also highlights the opportunity for Israeli security presented by the provision of reliable water resources and infrastructure to the Gaza Strip. I argue that continued provision of water is required by both international law and ethics; additionally, it is the most prudent policy choice. This was true before the terrorist attacks of 7 October 2023, during the armed conflict that followed, and will be true after the armed conflict ends. It also asserts that Israel’s actions that damage the water infrastructure of the Gaza Strip are legally restricted. Further, it is in Israel’s interest to build a sustainable water solution for the people of the Gaza Strip. Once that self-interest is realised and internalised, the demands of law and ethics may become politically possible as well. Realising that self-interest requires overcoming the powerful dehumanising discourse that is currently dominating ‘pro-Israel’ and ‘pro-Palestine’ communities, humanising action (such as the provision of water security) is the best way to overcome such dehumanising narratives.

This article discusses the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional energy organisation formed in 2020. It highlights the organisation’s significance in promoting cooperation in the East Mediterranean energy sector but notes the absence of a robust legal framework, governance structure and binding rules. The lack of mechanisms for enforcing decisions among members is also a concern. To address these shortcomings, the article proposes the adoption of a regional energy treaty.

The suggested treaty holds the potential of transforming the EMGF into a potent and legally binding energy organisation. By establishing a comprehensive legal foundation, the treaty could foster energy cooperation, promote sustainable energy initiatives, and create a secure investment environment, thereby stimulating economic growth across the Mediterranean region. Moreover, implementation of the treaty could play a crucial role in ensuring energy security within the East Mediterranean. It has the capacity to help in mediating and resolving disputes concerning maritime boundaries, transit and political issues that pose threats to the stability and effectiveness of the EMGF.

For a regional energy treaty to be effective, it should encompass provisions concerning transit, trade, investment and environmental protection. The inclusion of decision-making bodies and robust dispute settlement mechanisms is essential to encourage investment, facilitate unhindered transit and consolidate the stature of the EMGF as a pre-eminent energy organisation.

This article examines how the obligation to take precautionary measures to verify targets under international humanitarian law (IHL) can be applied with artificial intelligence decision support systems (AI-DSS). It uses the reported deployment of systems like ‘Lavender’ and ‘Where's Daddy?’ by Israel in the Gaza War as an illustrative example, breaks down the use of AI-DSS into stages – legal qualification, classification, and identification/location – and evaluates how precautions to verify can reduce the risk of false positives in each of these stages. It argues that precautions to verify must be applied at all stages, and discusses factors that affect their feasibility. The article concludes that while human oversight remains essential, precautions specific to AI-DSS outside the realm of the human operator are possible, and at times, necessary to ensure compliance with IHL.

This article critiques the assessment by exporting states of assurances that exported arms will not be misused by recipient states, with a focus on the Gaza conflict. First, the article develops a transferable framework for evaluating assurances. Building on the arms export obligations in the Geneva Conventions, and the implementation of those export obligations in the Arms Trade Treaty and EU Common Position, the article synthesises a due diligence test. It also draws on assurance assessment in another field where assurances are routinely given to overcome risk: when assurances attempt to address the risk of mistreatment to an expelled person implicating non-refoulement. The methodology for assurances assessments in risk prediction has been developed extensively in that area and closely resembles a similar approach emerging for arms exports. The article articulates the relevant criteria for assessing assurances when completing a due diligence risk assessment for arms exports and then applies that framework to the US arms exports in relation to the Gaza conflict. Under National Security Memorandum 20, the United States released a public report on its assurances assessment, offering a rare partial glimpse into the use of assurances in arms exports and an opportunity to examine whether assurances are being assessed in alignment with international practice. The result of the article is a clear practical checklist for lawful reliance on assurances and a tentative conclusion that the assessment by the US was not in compliance with international standards.

This article analyses the October 7th 2023 Hamas attack on Israel through the lens of the Genocide Convention, arguing that these actions constitute genocide under international law. Drawing on international case law, the analysis demonstrates how Hamas’ actions meet both the physical element and specific intent requirements for genocide, evidenced by its ideology, systematic policies and leadership statements. The article also examines how reverse accusations of genocide against Israel have functioned as a rhetorical shield to deflect recognition of Hamas’ own genocidal actions. It analyses the legal implications for state parties and the international community.

The article demonstrates that the orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip are highly problematic from a legal perspective. There are strong indications that the ICJ acted outside the scope of its authority by adopting a very vague but progressive interpretation of the Genocide Convention combined with a novel application of Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, which allowed the ICJ to adopt specific interim measures in the first, second and third orders. Finally, an overall analysis indicates that the ICJ has begun to act as the ultimate genocide prevention body in attempting to enforce a general duty to minimise human suffering in Gaza. While this might be seen as a laudable exercise to protect civilians, it seems to be beyond the scope of the Genocide Convention and the judicial authority of the ICJ.