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Enactive neuroscience, the direct perception hypothesis, and the socially extended mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 June 2015

Tom Froese
Tom Froese*
Affiliation:
Departamento de Ciencias de la Computación, Instituto de Investigaciones en Matemáticas Aplicadas y en Sistemas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, DF 04510, Mexico; Centro de Ciencias de la Complejidad, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, DF 04510, Mexico. t.froese@gmail.com http://froese.wordpress.com
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Abstract

Pessoa's The Cognitive-Emotional Brain (2013) is an integrative approach to neuroscience that complements other developments in cognitive science, especially enactivism. Both accept complexity as essential to mind; both tightly integrate perception, cognition, and emotion, which enactivism unifies in its foundational concept of sense-making; and both emphasize that the spatial extension of mental processes is not reducible to specific brain regions and neuroanatomical connectivity. An enactive neuroscience is emerging.

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Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 38 , 2015 , e75
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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