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Strong reciprocity is not uncommon in the “wild”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

W. G. Runciman
Affiliation:
Sociology, Trinity College, Cambridge CB2 1TQ, United Kingdom. wgr@wgrunciman.u-net.comhttp://www.trin.cam.ac.uk/index.php7pageid=538

Abstract

Guala is right to draw attention to the difficulty of extrapolating from the experimental evidence for weak or strong reciprocity to what is observed in the “wild.” However, there may be more strong reciprocity in real-world communities than he allows for, as strikingly illustrated in the example of the Mafia.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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