3.1. Logical empiricist origins of TV-EAST

Early explications of the idea that theoretical virtues are constitutive of EAST can be found in the works of logical empiricists. The following brief chronologically ordered discussion shows a gradual development and increasing clarity in understanding EAST in terms of theoretical virtues. A good starting point is Felix Kaufmann (Reference Kaufmann1943, 273–74), who holds that theoretical virtues, or as he calls them “the theoretical ideals of inquiry such as unity, simplicity, universality, [and] exactness of knowledge” are “intrinsically related to scientific goals.” Due to their intrinsic relation with the aims of science, theoretical virtues play an indispensable role in Kaufman’s account of theoretical significance of scientific problems. Briefly, Kaufman explains that not all scientific problems are equally significant. Rather, “[p]roblems the solution of which appears to be more conducive to the promotion of these ideals are regarded as more significant” by scientists. That is, a scientific problem is theoretically more significant than others when its solution results in a better balance of theoretical virtues.

Herbert Feigl (Reference Feigl1950, Reference Feigl and Cohen1981) offers a slightly more developed version of TV-EAST. In “Existential Hypotheses: Realistic versus Phenomenalistic Interpretations,” one of the earliest defenses of modern scientific realism against different strands of phenomenalism (e.g., positivism and operationalism), Feigl suggests different reasons for employing “theoretical constructions” that go beyond what is directly observable in science. His main arguments center on the theoretical virtues that such constructions confer on scientific theories, for example, “considerable formal simplification” (Reference Feigl1950, 38), “explanatory power,” “fruitful[ness] in suggesting further avenues of research,” “unification,” “derivability (predictability) of more directly confirmable consequences,” and “nomological (causal) coherence” (ibid., 39). Interestingly, however, Feigl points out that these characteristics do not distinguish realist interpretations of scientific theories from their phenomenalist foes. Rather, the two positions resemble one another regarding the desirability of theoretical virtues because they are constitutive of EAST and realism and phenomenalism are not two different ways of scientific theorizing but two different interpretations (existential vs. phenomenalist interpretations) of theoretical constructs.

Nagel (Reference Nagel and Morgenbesser1967) offers a yet clearer explication of TV-EAST. To clarify the nature and aim of science, Nagel contrasts scientific knowledge and common-sense knowledge. The aim of scientific knowledge is to overcome the “serious limitations” of commonsense knowledge, which include impreciseness, inconsistency, being highly fragmented, having a limited range of applications, and the inability to make reliable guides in novel situations. It is not difficult to see that such limitations can be addressed by instantiating theoretical virtues such as accuracy, consistency, unification, broad scope, predictive power, and fruitfulness. Furthermore, not only are theoretical virtues constitutive of the aim of science but also they are constitutive of the epistemic nature of science: “[I]t is a distinctive mark of science that it deliberately attempts to produce conclusions freed from the limitations of common sense, or possessing those limitations to a lesser degree” (Nagel Reference Nagel and Morgenbesser1967, 6; my emphasis).

The clearest explication of TV-EAST can be found in works of Hempel (Reference Hempel and Geraets1979a, Reference Hempel and James1979b, Reference Hempel1981), particularly in his contributions to the debate on the rationality of science following the publication of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Reference Kuhn1962). Hempel finds it “interesting, but also somewhat disturbing” that “Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others have made diverse pronouncements concerning the rationality or irrationality of science” without providing “a reasonably explicit characterization of the concept of rationality which they have in mind” (Reference Hempel and Geraets1979a, 50). Thus, he offers an instrumentalist account of scientific rationality as a general framework for this debate:

In this context, Hempel offers his construal of the aim of science in terms of theoretical virtues (or, as he calls them here, “desiderata”):Footnote ⁴

To sum up, early explications of TV-EAST can be found in the works of logical empiricists. I will later return to the following important themes in these versions of TV-EAST: Theoretical virtues are determinants of the significance of theoretical problems in science (Kaufman), the desirability of the theoretical virtues as constitutive of EAST is neutral to whether one adopts realism or antirealism (Feigl), and theoretical virtues are constitutive not only of EAST but also of scientific theorizing (Nagel).

3.2. Theoretical virtues and the problem-solving account

Kuhn and Laudan offered what is commonly known at the problem-solving account of EAST, according to which “the aim of science is to secure theories with a high problem-solving effectiveness” (Laudan Reference Laudan and Hacking1981b, 145; see also Kuhn Reference Kuhn1962; Laudan Reference Laudan1977). In this section, I show that a proper examination of the different types of problems (or puzzles) and problem-solving activities reveals the centrality of theoretical virtues in their accounts. This analysis shows that the greatest problem-solving ability is nothing beyond the best balance of theoretical virtues, which indicates that the problem-solving account is simply TV-EAST in disguise. Moreover, I show that in their later works, both Kuhn and Laudan set this disguise aside and fully embraced TV-EAST.

Kuhn (Reference Kuhn1962) famously argues that the aim of science is problem-solving but as his multiple examples show, problem solving can be always understood in terms of a theory’s instantiation of theoretical virtues. Here are some of Kuhn’s (ibid., ch. 3) examples of problem-solving activities and their corresponding theoretical virtues:

• • Empirical fit: “to bring nature and theory into closer and closer agreement” (23).

• • Accuracy and scope: “[A]ttempts to increase the accuracy and scope” (26) or “to display a new application of the paradigm or to increase the precision of an application” (30).

• • Predictive power: “[T]he use of existing theory to predict factual information of intrinsic value” (30).

• • Fruitfulness: “The success of a paradigm…is at the start largely a promise of success…. Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise” (24).

• • Internal consistency: providing “a logically more coherent version” of a theory (33).

• • Simplicity: “[M]any of Europe’s most brilliant mathematical physicists repeatedly endeavored to reformulate mechanical theory in an equivalent but logically and aesthetically more satisfying form” (33).

Due to Kuhn’s construal of the aim of science as problem-solving, it seems that Kuhn thought of theoretical virtues as methodological norms (or means) for achieving the aim of problem-solving. Hempel (Reference Hempel and Geraets1979a) criticized this approach and suggested that Kuhn can offer a stronger account of scientific rationality if he takes theoretical virtues as constituents of EAST rather than instrumental norms. Importantly, in his response to Hempel, Kuhn accepts Hempel’s view:

Something virtually identical can be seen in the development of Laudan’s problem-solving account, both regarding the centrality of theoretical virtues in his explication of problem-solving and his later embrace of TV-EAST. Laudan argues that there are two types of problems that scientists expect their theories to solve: empirical problems and conceptual problems. Empirical problems include anything that according to a theory is “in need of explanation” because it is “peculiar or “problematic” or questionable (in the literal sense of that term)” (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 15). To solve an empirical problem, a theory needs to expand its domain of application to cover and explain the problematic phenomenon or provide a model that matches it to the desired degree of accuracy. That is, the theory should broaden its scope, instantiate higher degree of explanatory power, and/or better empirical fit and accuracy. Conceptual problems are of two main types (Laudan Reference Laudan1977, 50–54): internal conceptual problems and external conceptual problems. The former includes the internal inconsistency of a theory and the ambiguity of its concepts. The external conceptual problems include three types of problematic relations that a theory might have with another scientific theory: They might be logically inconsistent; they might be logically consistent but jointly implausible; or, contrary to our expectations, one of them might fail to explain (or being explained by) another. It is easy to see that solving conceptual problems can also be described in terms of exemplifying different theoretical virtues. For instance, internal conceptual problems can be solved by exemplifying internal consistency or fruitfulness by opening new avenues of research to disambiguate fundamental concepts of a theory. Consider, for instance, the concept of “gene” as the basic unit of heredity passed from parents to their offspring. Disambiguation of this concept became a fruitful research program and ended up in the development of genetics as an independent scientific discipline. To solve external conceptual problems, a theory needs to instantiate external consistency and unification. In his Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate (Reference Laudan1984), Laudan also acknowledges that his problem-solving account can be better formulated in terms of theoretical virtues: “an attribute will count as a cognitive value or aim if that attribute represents a property of theories which we deem to be constitutive of ‘good science’” (xii).

3.3. Antirealism and TV-EAST

This historical overview might suggest an implicit antirealist orientation for TV-EAST. After all, most logical empiricists (apart from Feigl) as well as Kuhn and Laudan who eventually embraced TV-EAST are also united in their rejection of scientific realism. Two developments turned this implicit antirealist orientation into a strong association.

First, Hempel, Kuhn, and Laudan all proposed their accounts of EAST as alternatives to Truth-EAST. In his “The Irrelevance of the Concept of Truth for the Critical Appraisal of Scientific Theories” (Reference Hempel and Jeffrey1990), Hempel attacks the idea that science aims at “the attainment of true theories” (82) and offers “an alternative way of characterizing science as a goal-directed endeavor” (75) in which theoretical virtues are viewed “as reflecting, broadly speaking, the direction in which scientific research is headed, the objectives at which it is aiming” (77). In a similar vein, immediately after pointing out that a theory change happens only if the new theory has better problem-solving ability than its predecessors, Kuhn ties his problem-solving account to an antirealist approach about EAST: “We may…have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth” (Reference Kuhn1962, 170). Similarly, Laudan contrasts his problem-solving account with “a tendency to characterize the aims of science in terms of such transcendental properties as truth or apodictic certainty” and points out that a major benefit of his account is that “it assumes a goal which (unlike truth) is not intrinsically transcendent and hence closed to epistemic access” (Reference Laudan and Hacking1981b, 145). The same approach is adopted by Laudan (Reference Laudan1984, ch. 5), where he offers TV-EAST as an alternative to Truth-EAST.

The second development was introduced by van Fraassen (Reference van Fraassen1980). Following him, many adopted the idea that the realism versus antirealism debate can be understood in terms of two opposing views about the aim of science (see, e.g., Thagard Reference Thagard, Alfred and Rawling2004; Lyons Reference Lyons2005). According to realists, the aim of science is producing true theories while for antirealists, the aim of science is something other than truth, for example, saving the phenomena. As a result of these two developments, TV-EAST has become strongly associated with antirealism.

In the next section, I dissociate TV-EAST from antirealism. I argue that realists can adopt TV-EAST and still hold that science succeeds in finding true theories. Still stronger, I suggest that to adopt Truth-EAST, realists should aim for theories with the best balance of theoretical virtues because finding theories with an impressive balance of theoretical virtues is a requirement for attainment of true theories.

4.1. Detection, truth, and theoretical virtues

Semirealism distinguishes between two types of properties of unobservable entities described by scientific theories. First are detection properties, that is, the properties that are experimentally detected because they are causally related to our detectors through their normal behavior. This causal relation is a matter of degree. Sometimes we are just able to detect a property (e.g., when J. J. Thomson detected the negative charge of the electron) but sometimes we can use properties of an entity to manipulate other things (like using properties of electrons for electron microscopy). Second are auxiliary properties that are attributed by a theory to unobservables but we have not detected their causal relations with our detectors yet. This might have different reasons: Auxiliary properties might be fictions (dark matter might not exist), we might not know enough about the auxiliary properties to bring them into causal interaction with our instruments (as some physicists think is the case with dark matter), or we might not have a proper detector to detect them (as we could not detect the Higgs boson before building the Large Hadron Collider). Chakravartty suggests an in-principle way to make a distinction between these two types of properties:

Every property posited by a theory that is not a detection property is an auxiliary property.

According to semirealists, a theory’s claims about detection properties are trueFootnote ⁵ and these properties are most likely real. We can form different degrees of belief about these claims. The highest degree of belief goes to the properties that we can manipulate and a lower degree of belief goes to those that we can simply detect but not manipulate. No truth claim can be made regarding theories’ claims about auxiliary properties. Therefore, the boundary between claims qualified to be taken as true and claims that are not (yet) qualified as true is the boundary between claims about detection properties and claims about auxiliary properties. As science progresses, this border shifts and some auxiliary properties become detection properties. This increases the true content of our theories and gets us closer to the aim of finding true theories.

To show the relationship between a theory’s truth and its theoretical virtues, I focus on the process through which we realize that an auxiliary property has become a detection property, namely, our ability to detect and manipulate the property. I do this through studying a case of great mastery in the manipulation of properties of an unobservable entity, that is, electron microscopy. Imagine that we have a crude theory of electrons such that all (or nearly all) properties of the electron in this theory are auxiliary properties. According to semirealism, once these auxiliary properties become detection properties, we can say that the theory’s claims about the electron are true. This can be done by building a Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM), which demonstrates an impressive level of mastery in detecting and manipulating properties of electrons. How should our crude theory of electrons develop so we can use it to build an SEM?

To answer this question, first, let’s see how an SEM works. An SEM generates images by scanning a sample with a high-energy electron beam, produced by an electron gun in a vacuum tube. The electrons pass through electromagnetic lenses, which focus the beam before it interacts with the specimen. This interaction produces various signals, each revealing different specimen features:

• • Secondary electrons: Ejected from the sample’s surface atoms, they provide high-resolution images of texture.

• • Backscattered electrons: Reflected from deeper layers of the sample, their intensity depends on atomic number, aiding in compositional analysis.

• • Photons of characteristic X-rays: Emitted from deeper layers of the specimen, they enable elemental analysis.

• • Visible light: Produced by excited atoms of the specimen, it can generate color images in luminescent materials.

These signals collectively provide detailed structural and compositional information about the specimen. To collect each of these signals, different detectors should be used. After collecting the signals, through proper mediators they are sent to computers to produce the image and elemental analysis of the specimen.

How should a crude theory of electrons develop so it can be used for building an SEM? What characteristics should such a theory achieve? First, as Chakravartty points out, we generally describe the processes that connect detection properties to our instruments “in terms of mathematical equations that are or can be interpreted as describing the relations of properties” (Reference Chakravartty2007, 48). To deem a property real, the equations that describe it should be consistent with one another. That is, the theory should be internally consistent. Second, the theory should display impressive empirical fit and accuracy. The area of the specimen that an SEM scans is on the nanometer scale and thus we should be able to make very precise calculations about where the beam of electrons lands. Third, the theory should attain a high degree of explanatory power and a broad scope to cover all the relevant causal properties of the electron and the mechanisms of its interactions with the specimen, detectors, and electromagnetic lenses. In fact, generating a narrow, high-intensity electron beam with precise focusing, the role of electromagnetic lenses in shaping and controlling the electron beam, systematic scanning of the electron beam across the specimen’s surface, detecting variations in electron interactions with different regions of the specimen, and so forth are some of the major theoretical aspects of SEM mentioned in von Ardenne’s “The Electron Scanning Microscope: Theoretical Foundations” (Reference von Ardenne1938). Fourth, the theory should have predictive power. If it could not foresee the production of secondary electrons, backscattered electrons, X-rays, or visible light, and what aspects of specimen they reveal, we would likely not think of the possibility of different aspects of electron microscopy—in his discussion of signal detection, von Ardenne anticipates that different signals could be used to reveal surface morphology and material composition of the specimen in the future. Fifth, an SEM is a complicated device with many components such as an electron gun, electromagnetic lenses, transmitters, different types of detectors, specimen, computers, and screens. For instance, in his discussion of the resolution limit of SEM, von Ardenne needed to address issues as diverse as electron diffraction effects, aberrations in electromagnetic lenses, the balance between signal strength and damage to the specimen, the interaction of the electron beam with a photographic film, and so on. To address these challenges and to coordinate these components that are built based on different theories, consistency among these theories is needed. Thus, our theory of electrons should be externally consistent with other relevant theories. Sixth, as the examples provided from von Ardenne shows—and note that the challenges he addresses pertain to theoretical foundations of the earliest and much simpler SEM—the theory of electrons should prove “to have the imaginative resources…to enable anomalies to be overcome and new and powerful extensions to be made. Here it is the long-term proven ability of the theory…to generate fruitful additions and modifications” (McMullin Reference McMullin1982, 16). In other words, the theory should be fruitful.

In conclusion, for a crude theory of electrons to be elevated to such a level that we can use it for detection and manipulation of the properties that it posits, that is, for the theory to become true according to semirealism, it needs to exemplify an impressive balance of theoretical virtues. So, in the semirealist framework, a theory’s truth, detection of the properties that it posits, and its balance of theoretical virtues are closely connected. Now, let’s see what their exact relations are.

According to semirealism, we have proper epistemic justification to believe in a theory’s truth when the properties posited by the theory are detected. Detection of the properties posited by a theory has two necessary (and jointly sufficient) components: A theoretical component consisting of a proper theory of the to-be-detected properties and an experimental component that includes proper instruments to experimentally detect the properties. What makes a proper theory for detection? As the case study shows, if the properties that a theory posits are to be detected, the theory should have an impressive balance of theoretical virtues—that is, it should instantiate impressive number and degree of theoretical virtues. So, in the semirealist framework, the relations among a theory’s truth, detection of the properties that it posits, and its theoretical virtues are as follows:

1. a. Detection of a property posited by a theory is the epistemic justification for truth of the theory’s claims about the property (because detection is the necessary and sufficient condition for believing that a theory’s claims about the property are true).

2. b. An impressive balance of theoretical virtues by a theory is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for detection of the properties that are posited by the theory.

To put it more briefly, detection is the epistemic justification for truth; an impressive balance of theoretical virtues is a necessary condition for detection.

Now we can show that within the semirealist framework, if one commits to Truth-EAST, one should also accept TV-EAST. Let’s suppose that the epistemic aim of science is finding true theories. Because detection is the epistemic justification for a theory’s truth, we can say that the epistemic aim of science is finding theories that posit detection properties. Detection has two necessary (and jointly sufficient) components. The theoretical component of detection is finding a theory of the to-be-detected properties that has an impressive balance of theoretical virtues. The experimental component of detection is to conduct experiments to detect the properties posited by the theory. Therefore, corresponding to the two necessary components of detection, the epistemic aim of science is twofold. The epistemic aim of scientific theorizing (or EAST) is finding theories with an impressive balance of theoretical virtues and the epistemic aim of scientific experimentation is to experimentally detect the properties posited by scientific theories. Therefore, semirealists should be committed to TV-EAST.

4.2. Theoretical virtues and truth beyond semirealism

So far, I have argued that if a semirealist adopts Truth-EAST, she should also accept TV-EAST. But can TV-EAST be incorporated into realist frameworks other than semirealism? Given the diversity of scientific realism, a full discussion of this question goes beyond the scope of this article. Here, however, I offer two arguments to motivate a positive response to this question. These arguments are structured around the central role of theoretical virtues in responses to two major arguments against scientific realism.

First, consider the pessimistic meta-induction argument (PMA). Proponents of the no-miracle argument for scientific realism hold that it would be a miracle for our best scientific theories to be so successful if they were not true. In response, Laudan (Reference Laudan1981a) provides a list of past successful theories that eventually turned out to be false and uses it as a base for the inductive claim that we have good reason to think that our current successful theories will also turn out to be false. One major realist response to this argument is to weaken its inductive base by offering more demanding criteria for success and limiting the realist claim of truth to mature theories (McMullin Reference McMullin and Leplin1984a; Psillos Reference Psillos1999, ch. 5). These amount to claiming that only genuinely successful mature scientific theories are true. These realists claim that since most of the theories that are used to form PMA are neither genuinely successful (per their more demanding criteria) nor mature, they cannot be used to challenge scientific realism. Crucially, both qualifications used to address PMA, that is, success and maturity, are understood in terms of theoretical virtues. That is, through these qualifications, realists tend to limit their claim of truth only to those theories that have an impressive balance of theoretical virtues.

For example, according to Psillos, Laudan’s notion of success, which only includes empirical fit, accuracy, explanatory power, and broad scope as virtues of a successful theory, is too weak: “The notion of empirical success that realists are happy with is such that it includes the generation of novel predictions which are in principle testable” (Reference Psillos1999, 100). Through this notion of empirical success, Psillos (ibid., 100–2) adds two more theoretical virtues to the list of the virtues that a genuinely successful theory should instantiate: predictive power and non–ad hocness. Psillos also follows McMullin’s suggestion that the realist claim of truth is limited to mature scientific theories that show a long-term record of explanatory success (McMullin Reference McMullin and Rescher1987) and prove “continuously fertile and capable of increasingly further extension” (McMullin Reference McMullin and Leplin1984a, 17). Such theories, according to McMullin, should instantiate what he later calls “diachronic virtues” “that manifest themselves only over the course of time, as the career of the theory unfolds” (Reference McMullin, Psillos and Curd2008, 504). These include fertility (fruitfulness), consilience (unification), and durability (empirical fit over a long period and facing variety of tests). To sum up, one major realist strategy to address PMA is to limit the realist claim of truth only to those theories that instantiate an impressive balance of theoretical virtues. But then, if the realist aim of science is finding true theories, in scientific theorizing we should aim at finding theories that instantiate the best balance of theoretical virtues.

Second, according to the argument from underdetermination against scientific realism, all scientific theories have empirically equivalent rivals that agree with one another vis-à-vis the observable but differ vis-à-vis the unobservable. As a result, empirical bodies of evidence can support all these theories equally and hence we have no reason to distinguish one theory as true (van Fraassen Reference van Fraassen1980, ch. 3). One realist response to this argument is that besides empirical data, “other considerations—most prominently, explanatory considerations—play an evidential role in scientific inference” (Chakravartty Reference Chakravartty and Edward2017). These explanatory considerations are a subset of theoretical virtues, usually the ones that are not directly related to empirical evidence such as internal and external consistency, non–ad hocness, scope, unification, and simplicity (Lycan Reference Lycan1985; Lipton Reference Lipton2004, 122; Chakravartty Reference Chakravartty and Edward2017). According to this view, in addition to empirical theoretical virtues such as empirical fit, predictive power, and accuracy, those virtues that are commonly considered to be nonempirical are also deemed to be truth conducive (Day and Botterill Reference Day and Botterill2008; Schindler Reference Schindler2018, ch. 1; Bird Reference Bird2022, ch. 7). If these theoretical virtues are truth conducive and have evidential value in theory confirmation, then it makes sense to pursue the best balance of theoretical virtues in general.

If my arguments are sound, the seemingly strong association between TV-EAST and antirealism is merely a historical, contingent association and realists who hold Truth-EAST should adopt TV-EAST.

5.1. Giving content to “the aim of science” metaphor

Talking about the aims of science (simply “aims-talk”) has an odd character in the literature. On the one hand, many prominent philosophers of science such as Nagel, Feigl, Hempel, Kuhn, and Laudan engage in aims-talk—for more recent examples, see Kitcher (Reference Kitcher1993, 92) and Potochnik (Reference Potochnik2017). On the other hand, it is not very clear how we can make sense of “the aim of science.” Science is not an agent with intentions so we cannot talk about its aim in the same sense that we talk about my aim of traveling to Beirut. Moreover, science seems to be too complex and too diverse to have aim(s) in the sense that the aim of chess is to checkmate the opponent. Due to such difficulties, Resnik (Reference Resnik1993) and Rowbottom (Reference Rowbottom2014, Reference Rowbottom2023, sec. 2) have questioned the appropriateness of aims-talk in science. Resnik’s criticism is structured around the failure of aims-talk to provide acceptable content for “the phrase “aims of science” [that] must be taken as a metaphor” (Reference Resnik1993, 225). He offers different interpretations for this phrase and claims that none is promising. Echoing Resnik’s criticism, Rowbottom (Reference Rowbottom2023, 45–46) offers three “important considerations for deciphering the metaphor”:

1. (i). The aims of science involve or relate to the aims of some scientists.

2. (ii). The aims of science are characteristic of science.

3. (iii). For any X to be an aim of science, X must be a rational aim

Recalling that my discussion is not about the aim of science in general but the epistemic aim of scientific theorizing, in the following, I argue that TV-EAST successfully addresses Resnik’s and Rowbottom’s challenges.

According to Resnik’s first interpretation of “the aims of science,” “a scientific aim is an intentionally sought goal shared by scientists” (225). To see if something is an aim of science in this sense is an empirical question, and therefore Resnik demands “show me that set of aims and prove to me that most scientists have these aims” (226). Can TV-EAST satisfy this demand? Schindler’s (Reference Schindler2022) excellent quantitative study of natural and social scientists (and HPS scholars) shows promising results: Theoretical virtues are widely considered desirable characteristics of theories by scientists and this desirability is not simply pragmatic but epistemic. For most participants in the study, even simplicity, an otherwise low-ranked theoretical virtue, is not merely pragmatic and has epistemic value. Admittedly, this study does not offer direct empirical evidence that for scientists theoretical virtues are desirable as constitutive of EAST. Maybe they are only desirable as means of achieving a different aim (e.g., problem solving or truth). But, first, the study shows that theoretical virtues are of epistemic value for scientists and are not mere philosophical impositions that scientists do not care about. Second, as I have already argued, we have reasons to think that TV-EAST is an improvement on the problem-solving account and should be accepted by the proponents of Truth-EAST. Therefore, at the very least, Schindler’s study can be used to indirectly and partially address Rowbottom’s (i).

According to Resnik’s second interpretation, “scientific aims are like corporate aims in that they are goals achieved through cooperation and effective administration” (Reference Resnik1993, 227). In this sense, we can reasonably claim that a corporation’s aim is to maximize its profit even if most of its employees do not care about this aim. The drawback of this interpretation is that it requires a corporate-like hierarchical structure that science lacks. As Resnik puts it “though some aspects of science may be this way, e.g., compilation of data, undergraduate teaching, and experimentation, other aspects, e.g., theory evaluation, clearly are not. Theory evaluation involves the free-for-all debates” (Reference Resnik1993, 227–28). But contrary to Resnik’s claim, theory evaluations are not free-for-all debates but free-for-all debates only among scientists with shared standards of criticism (Longino Reference Longino1990, 76). Theoretical virtues constitute these shared standards of evaluation in scientific theorizing and “form that component of disciplinary matrix least subject to variation, both from scientific community to scientific community and over time” (Hoyningen-Huene Reference Hoyningen-Huene1993, 148). This claim is not a philosophical imposition on actual scientific practice either. Empirical and historical studies show that scientists invoke theoretical virtues, explicitly and implicitly, in their evaluation of scientific theories (Kuhn Reference Kuhn1977; Tulodziecki Reference Tulodziecki and Fairweather2014; van den Berg Reference van den Berg2020; Mizrahi Reference Mizrahi2022; Wolf and Duerr Reference Wolf and Duerr2023). In this regard, scientific community has a structure close enough to a corporate-like hierarchical structure that makes possible having this type of aim for scientific theorizing.

Furthermore, sometimes the standards of evaluation should be thought of as aims. Two notable cases are evaluations regarding scientific rationality and scientific progress. Many hold that scientific rationality is an example of instrumental rationality, that is, the rational adoption of means to reach an aim (Popper Reference Popper1979; Hempel Reference Hempel and Geraets1979a; Newton-Smith Reference Newton-Smith1981; Laudan Reference Laudan1990; Thagard Reference Thagard, Alfred and Rawling2004) and most understand progress in terms of achieving or getting closer to an aim (Bird Reference Bird2007; Shan Reference Shan and Shan2022). Therefore, what is appealed to for justifying the rationality of a theory choice or showing that a theory development is progressive can be thought of as an aim of scientific theorizing. And theoretical virtues do play such justificatory role. So, TV-EAST can satisfy this interpretation of the aim of science because theoretical virtues are the shared standards for evaluating whether a theory choice or a theory development is rational and/or progressive. This addresses Rowbottom’s (iii).

Finally, Resnik (Reference Resnik1993, 229) holds that something can be said to be an aim of science if it characterizes or is constitutive of scientific activity. This interpretation is also consistent with TV-EAST. I only focus on scientific theorizing and many agree that theoretical virtues are constitutive of this practice. Recall, for instance, that according to Nagel, theoretical virtues are constitutive not only of EAST but also of scientific theorizing in general because they distinguish scientific theories from common sense knowledge. Here are some other (implicit or explicit) examples of viewing theoretical virtues as constitutive of scientific theorizing (italics are mine): “[For Kuhn,] such features as learning from experience, insistence on consistency, adherence to the desiderata for theory choice, and, in consequence, rationality, are necessary characteristics of science” (Hempel Reference Hempel1983a, 571); theoretical virtues “constitute a piece of inquiry as science” (McMullin Reference McMullin1984b, 137), they are “the good-making features of theories” (Newton-Smith Reference Newton-Smith1981, 226), “constitutive of the knowledge and truth-seeking goals of the enterprise of science” (Rooney Reference Rooney1992, 14), “constitutive values of science” (Longino Reference Longino1990, 4), “constitutive of science in the sense that we cannot conceive of a functioning science without them” (Laudan Reference Laudan, Machamer and Wolters2004, 19), and “constitutive of what we understand by scientific knowledge” (Carrier Reference Carrier2009, 203). This addresses Rowbottom’s (ii).

5.2. Advantages of TV-EAST over Truth-EAST

The first advantage of TV-EAST over Truth-EAST is that it is a common core upon which many realists and nonrealists can agree. As we have seen before, many nonrealists (including Hempel, Kuhn, and Laudan) thought of TV-EAST as a competitor of or an alternative to Truth-EAST. But I argued that realists should commit to TV-EAST. This means that many realists and nonrealistsFootnote ⁶ can agree on TV-EAST. I consider this to be an advantage of TV-EAST, not because it solves a dispute between realists and antirealists about EAST, but, to begin with, because it shows that there should not have been such a dispute. For, assuming that scientific theorizing is an epistemic practice and hence its epistemic aim is (at least partially) constitutive of the practice, if realism and antirealism are two opposing views about EAST, then the realist’s and the antirealist’s judgments about different cases of scientific theorizing should diverge. For instance, they should make opposing judgments about whether such and such cases of theory choice or theory development are rational or progressive—recall that rationality and progress are commonly understood with respect to aims. If they end up making similar judgments about virtually all cases of theory choice and theory development, we have reason to think that their disagreement is not really about EAST. But realists and antirealists rarely (if at all) disagree about whether specific scientific theory choices or theory developments are rational or progressive. This suggests that the realism versus antirealism debate is not a disagreement about what constitutes scientific theorizing and its epistemic aim. So, we need an account of EAST that is neutral with respect to realism versus antirealism debate. Unlike Truth-EAST, TV-EAST satisfies this requirement (a point that was also highlighted by Feigl).

Note that I am not claiming that adopting TV-EAST resolves the realism versus antirealism debate. Rather, it puts it in its right place: The debate between scientific realism and scientific antirealist is not about scientific theorizing and its epistemic aim. It is an extra-scientific debate altogether. It is not a debate over whether EAST is finding theories with the best balance of theoretical virtues, but a debate over how (or whether) a theory’s impressive success in achieving this aim requires a metaphysical explanation. The “realist move,” so to speak, is to offer such a metaphysical explanation in terms of the truth of successful theories. Crucially, however, this “realist move” is not dictated by scientific theorizing (and hence it is extra-scientific). Nonrealists and antirealists do not dispute that our best scientific theories succeed in instantiating an impressive balance of theoretical virtues. They resist the realist move because they hold that this success does not require a metaphysical explanation (Fine Reference Fine and Leplin1984), truth does not explain it (Laudan Reference Laudan1981a), or realist explanations are no better than their constructivist foes (Turner Reference Turner2007).

Second, TV-EAST takes something that is internal to and constitutive of scientific theorizing as its aim. This is one important reason why TV-EAST could give proper content to “the aim of science” metaphor and address the challenges raised by Resnik and Rowbottom. As I showed in section 4, we have evidence to think that scientists find theoretical virtues desirable, scientists use theoretical virtues as shared standards of evaluation, and scientists invoke theoretical virtues in their assessments of scientific rationality and progress. To say the least, it is not clear that truth can satisfy these requirements. In fact, it clearly does not do so if scientists adopt an instrumentalist account of scientific theories. Empirical studies show that some scientists are antirealists and many scientists, although generally realists, are sometimes instrumentalists about the theories they rely on in their research (Beebe and Dellsén Reference Beebe and Dellsén2020; Henne et al. Reference Henne, Tomczyk and Sperber2024). In such cases, theoretical virtues can still function as constituents of EAST while truth cannot.

Finally, it is obvious that truth simpliciter is not a proper candidate for the aim of science. Imagine a group of geologists who carefully count, measure, and classify billions of grains of sand found in a small area on a beach such that we can be sure they form a huge pile of truths about those grains of sand. If truth is the aim of science, this should constitute great scientific progress. Yet, we hardly consider this progress and more likely think of it as an irrational waste of time.Footnote ⁷ The reason is that only some truths are significant enough to be incorporated into science. Therefore, if one adopts Truth-EAST, one needs to amend it with a theory of significance to clarify which truths are scientifically significant (Kitcher Reference Kitcher1993, ch. 4). Popper (Reference Popper1979, 191), for example, holds that science aims for the truths that provide ever deeper explanations. Explanation plays an important role in Kitcher’s theory of significance too (Reference Kitcher1993, ch. 4). But if EAST is finding true explanatory theories, then theoretical virtues, especially explanatory virtues, should be included within the aim of science. That is, Truth-EAST properly explicated should incorporate theoretical virtues such as explanatory power, unification (crucial for Kitcher), and non–ad hocness (underlined by Popper). Thus, Truth-EAST cannot be a standalone account of EAST. However, as Kaufmann argues, theoretical virtues are determinants of significance in science. Carrier (Reference Carrier2013, 2550–51) has developed this idea further, arguing that theoretical virtues “express requirements of significance […that] are influential on the choice of problems and the pursuit of theories in epistemic research” and thereby are “the essential yardstick of epistemic significance” in science. Thus, unlike Truth-EAST, TV-EAST contains within itself a theory of significance and, therefore, is a standalone account of EAST.