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Neural networks, AI, and the goals of modeling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 December 2023

Walter Veit Open the ORCID record for Walter Veit [Opens in a new window]  and
Heather Browning Open the ORCID record for Heather Browning [Opens in a new window]
Walter Veit
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK wrwveit@gmail.com https://walterveit.com/
Heather Browning
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK DrHeatherBrowning@gmail.com https://www.heatherbrowning.net/
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Abstract

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have found many useful applications in recent years. Of particular interest have been those instances where their successes imitate human cognition and many consider artificial intelligences to offer a lens for understanding human intelligence. Here, we criticize the underlying conflation between the predictive and explanatory power of DNNs by examining the goals of modeling.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e411
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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