Recently multiple attempts have been made to argue in favor of powerful unconscious processes affecting decision making, including recommendations to let the unconscious guide one's decisions (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren Reference Dijksterhuis and Nordgren2006). Newell and Shanks (N&S) have done a commendable job questioning the efficacy of seductive claims regarding unconscious processing. We focus on the Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) and paradigms used to argue for deliberation-without-attention. Although we agree with the broad claims made in the target article against UTT, N&S do not directly address the role of attentional mechanisms involved in distracted or supposedly unconscious thought. The role of attentional processes in the lens model discussed by N&S is also not clear, although they point to attentional or top-down mechanisms influencing processes such as motion perception. We think the role of attention is extremely critical for the debate on conscious and unconscious thought, and that it requires further elaboration. We suggest rethinking the core assumptions of UTT, the very definition of unconscious thought and the nature of processing during distraction.
A critical assumption of UTT is that the powerful unconscious is not constrained by limited capacity attentional processes (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren Reference Dijksterhuis and Nordgren2006). We have questioned the unlimited capacity and optimal weighing assumptions of UTT using simulations that were performed on data sets employed in the UTT paradigms (Srinivasan & Mukherjee Reference Srinivasan and Mukherjee2010). The simulations clearly showed that a small subset of information is sufficient to produce performance that is seen in UTT tasks. Experimental results (Ashby et al. Reference Ashby, Glöckner and Dickert2011) confirm our concern with the fundamental assumptions of UTT (the capacity and weighting principles). The use of a generic “sub-sampling” heuristic can enable people to “select” a small set of dominant attributes during distracted thought (hypothesized to elicit “unconscious thought”) and can partly explain other related findings based on consideration sets even during conscious thought (Mukherjee & Srinivasan Reference Mukherjee and Srinivasan2013). This is consistent with suggestions made by N&S to explain earlier findings on decision making (Wilson & Nisbett Reference Wilson and Nisbett1978). Even intuitive or affective processing (Usher et al. Reference Usher, Russo, Weyers, Brauner and Zakay2011; Kahneman Reference Kahneman2011) could be utilizing a subset of attribute information along with quickly recovered cues from memory that would result in decently good solutions because many choice scenarios require attending only to a subset of the information. For example, in Usher et al.'s (2011) data set consisting of 12 attributes and four alternatives, choice based on the two best attributes creates a tie between the best and second best option, and selecting 7 out of the possible 12 attributes results in the selection of the best alternative. These results indicate that attention plays an important role in selecting specific attributes based on prior experience to make satisfying decisions.
A critical problem in many decision making studies is the lack of proper treatment of attentional processes, possibly linked to graded differences in consciousness. For example, attention is used to operationalize “unconscious thought,” which we believe conflates attention and consciousness and treats attention as a dichotomous variable (Mukherjee & Srinivasan Reference Mukherjee and Srinivasan2013; Srinivasan & Mukherjee Reference Srinivasan and Mukherjee2010), thereby limiting the construct of attention. Attention can vary as a resource (more versus less) and perceptual scope (focused versus distributed) that involves differences in selection resulting in differences in perception, memory, and awareness (Baijal & Srinivasan Reference Baijal and Srinivasan2009; Srinivasan et al. Reference Srinivasan, Mukherjee, Mishra and Kesarwani2013).
Given that people are performing a distractor task during “unconscious thought,” the nature of the distractor task – and more specifically the attentional mechanisms employed during distraction – can potentially influence processing either during or after distraction. The changes in (perceptual or conceptual) scope of attention under different situations enable us to sample and process information differently leading to differences in processes involved in memory and decision making. Using the UTT paradigm, we manipulated the distraction task using global or local processing (associated with changes in scope) at low and high levels of cognitive or working memory load (Srinivasan et al. Reference Srinivasan, Mukherjee, Mishra and Kesarwani2013). We found that global processing during distraction resulted in stronger preference for the chosen item irrespective of cognitive load. In addition, we found better incidental memory for attributes with global compared to local processing during distraction only when the distractor was an easy low load task.
Therefore we propose that the putative “unconscious thought” is constrained by differences in the attentional processes employed during distraction (Mukherjee & Srinivasan Reference Mukherjee and Srinivasan2013; Srinivasan et al. Reference Srinivasan, Mukherjee, Mishra and Kesarwani2013) and to differences in selection (e.g., information sampling; Srinivasan & Mukherjee Reference Srinivasan and Mukherjee2010). Theorizing about the causal effects of conscious versus unconscious processes is critically dependent on a proper treatment of attention (like the global workspace theory discussed in the target article). Conflating both attention and consciousness would add more confusion to this critical debate on the role of consciousness in decision making.
More generally, attention could influence judgment and decision making at multiple points such as cues and their utilization – points C and D in the lens model. Selective attention mechanisms (e.g., subsampling) can affect the number of cues selected for processing depending on the weights of the cues and past experience of their validity. Sometimes not attending to part of the information or relying on small samples can prove useful (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier Reference Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier2011). The differences in selection (changes in scope of attention) could also affect utilization of the cues and would be consistent with results showing that changes in scope of attention can affect preference strengths and memory (Srinivasan et al. Reference Srinivasan, Mukherjee, Mishra and Kesarwani2013).
The information that we attend to gets privileged access in working memory (McElree Reference McElree and Ross2006) and the access can be related to graded levels of consciousness as attention and working memory interact (Baars & Franklin Reference Baars and Franklin2003). A clear understanding about the role of different attentional processes is crucial for debates on the role of consciousness in decision making including the current analysis about causally effective unconscious processes. Much of the published literature in UTT and other areas of decision making (see Mukherjee & Srinivasan Reference Mukherjee and Srinivasan2013) need to be reevaluated through the lens of attentional mechanisms and their role in conscious or unconscious thought.
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Recently multiple attempts have been made to argue in favor of powerful unconscious processes affecting decision making, including recommendations to let the unconscious guide one's decisions (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren Reference Dijksterhuis and Nordgren2006). Newell and Shanks (N&S) have done a commendable job questioning the efficacy of seductive claims regarding unconscious processing. We focus on the Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) and paradigms used to argue for deliberation-without-attention. Although we agree with the broad claims made in the target article against UTT, N&S do not directly address the role of attentional mechanisms involved in distracted or supposedly unconscious thought. The role of attentional processes in the lens model discussed by N&S is also not clear, although they point to attentional or top-down mechanisms influencing processes such as motion perception. We think the role of attention is extremely critical for the debate on conscious and unconscious thought, and that it requires further elaboration. We suggest rethinking the core assumptions of UTT, the very definition of unconscious thought and the nature of processing during distraction.
A critical assumption of UTT is that the powerful unconscious is not constrained by limited capacity attentional processes (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren Reference Dijksterhuis and Nordgren2006). We have questioned the unlimited capacity and optimal weighing assumptions of UTT using simulations that were performed on data sets employed in the UTT paradigms (Srinivasan & Mukherjee Reference Srinivasan and Mukherjee2010). The simulations clearly showed that a small subset of information is sufficient to produce performance that is seen in UTT tasks. Experimental results (Ashby et al. Reference Ashby, Glöckner and Dickert2011) confirm our concern with the fundamental assumptions of UTT (the capacity and weighting principles). The use of a generic “sub-sampling” heuristic can enable people to “select” a small set of dominant attributes during distracted thought (hypothesized to elicit “unconscious thought”) and can partly explain other related findings based on consideration sets even during conscious thought (Mukherjee & Srinivasan Reference Mukherjee and Srinivasan2013). This is consistent with suggestions made by N&S to explain earlier findings on decision making (Wilson & Nisbett Reference Wilson and Nisbett1978). Even intuitive or affective processing (Usher et al. Reference Usher, Russo, Weyers, Brauner and Zakay2011; Kahneman Reference Kahneman2011) could be utilizing a subset of attribute information along with quickly recovered cues from memory that would result in decently good solutions because many choice scenarios require attending only to a subset of the information. For example, in Usher et al.'s (2011) data set consisting of 12 attributes and four alternatives, choice based on the two best attributes creates a tie between the best and second best option, and selecting 7 out of the possible 12 attributes results in the selection of the best alternative. These results indicate that attention plays an important role in selecting specific attributes based on prior experience to make satisfying decisions.
A critical problem in many decision making studies is the lack of proper treatment of attentional processes, possibly linked to graded differences in consciousness. For example, attention is used to operationalize “unconscious thought,” which we believe conflates attention and consciousness and treats attention as a dichotomous variable (Mukherjee & Srinivasan Reference Mukherjee and Srinivasan2013; Srinivasan & Mukherjee Reference Srinivasan and Mukherjee2010), thereby limiting the construct of attention. Attention can vary as a resource (more versus less) and perceptual scope (focused versus distributed) that involves differences in selection resulting in differences in perception, memory, and awareness (Baijal & Srinivasan Reference Baijal and Srinivasan2009; Srinivasan et al. Reference Srinivasan, Mukherjee, Mishra and Kesarwani2013).
Given that people are performing a distractor task during “unconscious thought,” the nature of the distractor task – and more specifically the attentional mechanisms employed during distraction – can potentially influence processing either during or after distraction. The changes in (perceptual or conceptual) scope of attention under different situations enable us to sample and process information differently leading to differences in processes involved in memory and decision making. Using the UTT paradigm, we manipulated the distraction task using global or local processing (associated with changes in scope) at low and high levels of cognitive or working memory load (Srinivasan et al. Reference Srinivasan, Mukherjee, Mishra and Kesarwani2013). We found that global processing during distraction resulted in stronger preference for the chosen item irrespective of cognitive load. In addition, we found better incidental memory for attributes with global compared to local processing during distraction only when the distractor was an easy low load task.
Therefore we propose that the putative “unconscious thought” is constrained by differences in the attentional processes employed during distraction (Mukherjee & Srinivasan Reference Mukherjee and Srinivasan2013; Srinivasan et al. Reference Srinivasan, Mukherjee, Mishra and Kesarwani2013) and to differences in selection (e.g., information sampling; Srinivasan & Mukherjee Reference Srinivasan and Mukherjee2010). Theorizing about the causal effects of conscious versus unconscious processes is critically dependent on a proper treatment of attention (like the global workspace theory discussed in the target article). Conflating both attention and consciousness would add more confusion to this critical debate on the role of consciousness in decision making.
More generally, attention could influence judgment and decision making at multiple points such as cues and their utilization – points C and D in the lens model. Selective attention mechanisms (e.g., subsampling) can affect the number of cues selected for processing depending on the weights of the cues and past experience of their validity. Sometimes not attending to part of the information or relying on small samples can prove useful (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier Reference Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier2011). The differences in selection (changes in scope of attention) could also affect utilization of the cues and would be consistent with results showing that changes in scope of attention can affect preference strengths and memory (Srinivasan et al. Reference Srinivasan, Mukherjee, Mishra and Kesarwani2013).
The information that we attend to gets privileged access in working memory (McElree Reference McElree and Ross2006) and the access can be related to graded levels of consciousness as attention and working memory interact (Baars & Franklin Reference Baars and Franklin2003). A clear understanding about the role of different attentional processes is crucial for debates on the role of consciousness in decision making including the current analysis about causally effective unconscious processes. Much of the published literature in UTT and other areas of decision making (see Mukherjee & Srinivasan Reference Mukherjee and Srinivasan2013) need to be reevaluated through the lens of attentional mechanisms and their role in conscious or unconscious thought.