Using Alabama as a case study of the beauty industry, this paper will demonstrate how licensing laws and regulations affected barbers and beauticians as they struggled to gain more clientele than their competitors. In the early twentieth century, white men dominated the market for cutting hair. Though the process started mid-century, by 1980, that relationship was inverted as women found themselves far outnumbering men. This research helps explain the gendered inversion of labor market trends while providing more general insights into the role of licensing laws in labor markets. Importantly, this work explores how race shaped labor market regulations, which affected and continue to affect labor markets and individual businesses in important ways.

The goal of this paper is to explain the multivariate causes of this important labor market reversal using an analysis of race, gender, and political economy. It will argue that the advocacy for restrictive licensing laws and regulations, the failure to innovate and adapt to new styles in hair, and the racial and gendered makeup of the Barbers, Beauticians, and Allied Industries (BBAI) led to the ultimate failure of the union and the overall decrease in barbers during the latter half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, the degree to which black women were represented on licensing boards and played a role in the unique structure of cosmetology groups and unions led and contributed to the proliferation of cosmetologists during the same period.

How has caste influenced entrepreneurship in India in the past and how does it do so in the present? Using the Industrial Census of 1911, this paper provides the first detailed caste-level mapping of firms in Indian business history and links it to the present by an analysis of the Economic Census of 2013–2014. It finds that while trading castes were dominant, there were significant regional variations and nontrading castes were far more important than usually posited in the literature. Over the course of a century, the social base of entrepreneurship has widened slowly but significant barriers remain. The paper argues that “caste embeddedness” through the nature of wealth distribution, social capital, and ritual purity affects entrepreneurial choices and presents a typology of “caste,” “caste-advantage,” “caste-restricted,” and “noncaste” businesses that characterize the economic life of India.

This paper demonstrates tensions between national environmental policies and international free trade rules and traces business reactions to environmentalism through a study of the Can War, a controversy over a Danish ban on beverage cans from 1970 to 2002. At its core was a conflict between Denmark and the European Economic Community (EEC, later the European Union, EU) over free trade versus environmental objectives. This study of the Can War demonstrates how environmental concerns were entangled with national and economic interests, but also how brewers, retailers, and packaging producers used environmental and economic arguments in pragmatic ways and adapted to changing political and economic environments. Thus, the paper adds to the literature on the formative years of environmental politics, with a focus on business interests and a conflict between a nation-state and the EEC in a period when environmental concerns gained political momentum yet remained contested in a system based on free trade. This study also adds to the literature on waste-handling by demonstrating how the Danish return system changed from one based on reuse to one based on recycling; it further shows how beverage cans went from banned to uncontested, everyday objects. Through a comparison with Sweden, the case shows how national businesses influenced the design of new deposit and return systems for single-use packaging, wherein refillable glass bottles became marginalized. Overall, the study offers an understanding of the intricate relationships between environmental policies, business interests, consumer habits, and competing container materials, with aluminum as the winner.

This article analyzes the Wallenberg family’s central role within Sweden’s neutrality-industrial complex (NIC) during the Cold War, highlighting their secret collaboration with the military intelligence service. Drawing on archival evidence from the Swedish War Archives and the family bank SEB, the study shows how the family’s uniquely dominant position in industry, banking, and national defense made them a close partner to the intelligence community. By applying the Resource Mobilization Model from the literature on military-industrial complexes, the article further argues that Sweden’s NIC mainly developed as a corporatist response to perceived Soviet threats, requiring close coordination between state, military, and business elites. The Wallenbergs’ cooperation with the military and economic intelligence services—specifically through their control of SEB and large Swedish exporting firms—had both business and nonbusiness-related reasons, including nationalism and elite consensus on total defense. This study adds to the sparse literature in business history on the relationship between the business and intelligence communities and demonstrates how elite business families can use access to senior decision makers and classified information in the service of both national security and to advance their own strategic positioning.

This paper examines Britain’s process of electrification following a disruptive stock market boom and bust in 1882. This is done by noting the companies that raise finance on British stock exchanges, the amounts raised, and the returns earned on that money. It also examines the impact of the Lighting Act of 1882, finding that the Act inhibited investment, but with important exceptions. We find the Act was not a barrier to entrepreneurs alert to the possibilities of electrification. However, the limited British electrical investment after the 1882 crash was more heavily and successfully concentrated on supplying electricity to end users than on developing electrical equipment. When electrification began in earnest after 1888, upon the amendment of the 1882 Lighting Act, there existed only a very weak engineering base to support it, leading to slow, expensive, and unimaginative electrification.

Until recently, much work on the process and impact of compensated emancipation in the British Empire tended to exclude the Cape Colony, instead focusing on Britain and the Caribbean. This analysis of the Cape Town agents who acted as intermediaries in the business of compensation reintegrates the Cape Colony into these discussions. Using Thomson, Watson & Co.’s account book, this article details how the Cape Town firm used its networks within the colony and in London to profit from the business of compensation. The firm handled over 800 claims from Cape Colony principals, purchased them on its own and others’ accounts, and remitted them to several associates in London for collection. This article contributes a new perspective to the growing literature on the process and impact of compensated emancipation and raises questions about the role of slavery and emancipation in the development of commercial and financial capitalism in South Africa.

During the 1920s, the newly formed American Legion used its unique placement as a nonprofit lobbying for veterans’ causes in a novel way—to enter movie distribution with the creation of its Film Service. The era was famously marked by the consolidation of Hollywood studios into conglomerates and the establishment of their powerful trade association, which moguls used to exert significant control over the emerging medium. Yet while big business was important in structuring the rise of motion pictures, small enterprises—including nonprofits like the Legion Film Service—still found ways to contribute to the sector’s growth by innovating and adapting complex operational strategies, becoming a surprising resource to their well-financed peers in the process. By taking these steps, Legionnaires’ civically minded playbills shaped the development of an industry that projected American cultural and economic influence for the rest of the century.

It is widely recognized that the hostile takeover is a key element of the UK’s shareholder value system of corporate governance. This article draws on archival evidence to offer a detailed account of the emergence of the hostile takeover and its acceptance within the media and government between 1952 and 1954. The existing literature claims that the takeover was not normalized until 1959, and that finance was restricted until then. This article shows that takeovers were accepted within government five years earlier, and that the Bank of England and Treasury knew that insurance companies were financing them, but did nothing about it.

The article begins with the legal and accounting changes introduced in Companies Act 1948, as well as the precarious financial position of shareholders. Together, they created an opening for hostile takeovers to emerge, which were driven by the desire of bidders to gain control of, and sell off, real property that was undervalued on corporate balance sheets. First emerging in 1952, the hostile takeover took the corporate and financial community, as well as the Government (the Bank of England, Board of Trade and Treasury) by surprise. The media led the way in cheerleading for the hostile takeover, while companies such as the Savoy Hotel Group and the Daily Mirror sought to defend themselves against unwelcome approaches. The Government ultimately settled for condemning “speculative” bids in public, but behind the scenes accepted the hostile takeover as legitimate. By 1954, it was recognized that: companies were under pressure to raise dividends and sell off assets in order to deter takeover bidders; that they only had limited options to defend themselves; and that there was little that could be done by Government. Managerialism had begun to give way to shareholder value.

This article investigates how British textile traders navigated Cuban markets when Spain, Britain, and the United States competed to maintain or gain access to Cuba’s commercial activity. Cuba was one of the largest textile consumers in the Americas and a loyal market for British textiles, a significance hitherto overlooked by existing scholarship on Anglo-Hispanic trading relations. The article fills this gap by examining the interplay between local dynamics and imperial rivalry through the case of the Manchester-based textile commission merchant, Stavert, Zigomala, & Co. Through the cross-examination of the company’s business records, visual, material, and other archival and primary printed sources this article contends that a successful engagement with the Cuban market required a nuanced approach transcending formal trading structures, challenging traditional assumptions about commercial predominance based on forms of imperialism. The article’s argument is divided into three parts: 1) it locates Stavert, Zigomala within Cuban consumer culture; 2) it examines how traders responded to Cuban demand; and 3) it situates the role of British textile merchants in the context of Cuba’s international relations between approximately 1860 until1914.

In March 1933, the United States Congress declared beer up to 3.2 percent alcohol by weight to be “non-intoxicating,” thus allowing it to be produced and sold while the nation was still under the 18th Amendment’s ban of intoxicating liquors. Brewers had long argued that beer was a temperance beverage that should be regulated with a lighter touch than harder liquor. In fact, the declaration that 3.2 beer was non-intoxicating opened several markets that would otherwise have been closed to brewers. In the decades that followed Repeal, 3.2 beer continued to be treated differently than stronger alcohol with respect to who, when, where, and how it was legally available. This paper explores the important—and continuing—role that 3.2 beer has played in the post-Prohibition United States.

Since the 1990s, growing interest in the relationship between clusters and economic growth has highlighted the importance of understanding their internal structures and life cycles. Still, the mechanisms underlying cluster emergence remain largely unknown, especially regarding the influence of public policies in this initial stage. This paper examines the emergence of a metalworking cluster in the Spanish steelmaking pole of Asturias, focusing on Francoist industrial policy and the regime’s relationship with regional firms.

Findings indicate that Asturias presented favorable conditions for cluster formation since the late eighteenth century. However, only the establishment of the national steelmaking champion Ensidesa in 1950 triggered the appearance of self-reinforcing dynamics, finally boosting the cluster’s emergence. This process resulted from the indirect externalities generated by the steel industry and was never part of the Francoist industrial agenda. Despite the recognized sector’s potential, the regime prioritized strategic base industries and systematically ignored calls for direct support for metalworking firms.

After World War II, Japan was severely degraded, and its people were generally devastated. For the country’s very survival, the beleaguered Japanese people sought to rebuild economically and reputationally. During this postwar period, Japanese business, union, and government leaders grappled with lagging progress and the necessary abandonment of prior transwar social and business arrangements. They sought new strategies to stimulate advancement in the wake of a governmental vacuum, labor unrest, and the threat of communism. In this context, Moral Re-Armament (MRA) took root in some areas of Japan during the period when Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew from $102 billion in 1945 to $420 billion by 1961. MRA introduced Western-oriented societal values, intended to help nurture individual and societal change, including collaborative relations between unions and management. Of the first eight Japanese prime ministers after World War II, six either worked openly with or endorsed the MRA movement.

This article examines how the ideological outlook of the British worker co-operative movement gradually assumed a neoliberal character. Drawing on methods from conceptual history, it traces the evolution of the movement’s key ideas and explores the changing language in which they were expressed. Central to this shift was the emergence of a social-enterprise discourse that reframed an earlier New Left commitment to pursuing worker control “in and against the market” as a conviction that such control could be achieved only “in and through” market participation. The study centres on the Industrial Common Ownership Movement (ICOM), a national federation of worker co-operatives active in Britain between 1971 and 2001. It uses items published by ICOM, material from numerous archives, and oral interviews conducted with some of those involved in the federation’s final years.

Commodity grades seem like innocuous measures of quality and thereby escape scrutiny as to their origin, purpose, and effect. Drawing on the National Live Stock and Meat Board’s executive meeting minutes and US Food Administration (USFA) records, this essay contextualizes and politicizes government beef grading. The USFA played a key role in the lead-up to government beef grading and in the creation of the Meat Board. USFA messaging as well as a post war depression curtailed consumption of feedlot-derived beef. In response, industry leaders formed a trade association called the Meat Board that acted as a liaison between industry and public sector scientists and helped bring about government beef grading. Beef grading emerged in the broader context of a campaign launched by the USFA to modernize meat retailers. At the same time, breeders, feeders, and western ranchers pushed for government beef grading in response to low prices and as a panacea. The Meat Board also cooperated with agricultural scientists in coordinating research to boost feedlot-derived beef. Rather than industry cooptation of science, this essay shows an alignment of vision in a mutually beneficial relationship. These actors, furthermore, used government beef grading to protect the feedlot system of production.

This article traces the origins of “big” tobacco, that is, international, multinational companies, in Cyprus during the British colonial period. It explores how the tobacco and cigarette industries developed from the 1920s until the end of colonial rule in 1960, and how “big” tobacco companies united and came to control these industries. The article shows that from the 1920s, and especially from the 1940s, the prevalence of smoking in Cyprus was exceedingly high. This corresponded to the large-scale importing of foreign-made cigarettes and the manufacture of cigarettes by local companies, before the first international company began to manufacture cigarettes in the island in 1951. The article explores how the British colonial governments and civil society did little to make the Cypriot people aware of the dangers of cigarette smoking, despite medical research linking cigarette smoking to the increase in lung cancer in 1950 and the debates and warnings in the UK. Ultimately, the origins and evolution of “big tobacco” companies in Cyprus had a profound impact on the local industry and the prevalence of cigarette smoking in Cyprus.

This article analyzes the evolution of banking supervision in Spain under Franco’s regime (1939–1975), highlighting how political and economic factors shaped oversight in an authoritarian setting. Two phases emerge. In the 1940s–50s, supervision—lodged in the Ministry of Finance—was weak, poorly staffed, and focused on enforcing banks’ oligopolistic interest rate agreements, reflecting regulatory capture. Following the 1959 Stabilization Plan, rising external pressure, domestic concerns about oligopolistic practices, and the 1962 Banking Law prompted reform. Supervision shifted to the Bank of Spain with the establishment of the Private Banking Inspection Service, resulting in more frequent inspections and gradual formalization of supervision. Archival records indicate that by the 1970s, inspections had become more frequent and rigorous, signaling a cautious shift toward risk-based oversight. However, the reforms remained incomplete. Persistent systemic vulnerabilities culminated in the severe banking crisis of 1977–1982, underlining the limitations of supervisory transformation under authoritarian rule.

This article examines American “capitalist feminism” as a type of “business feminism” through the lens of biography. To demonstrate crucial linkages between business culture and historical social developments, the article foregrounds an account of the first woman president of a major commercial bank, Mary G. Roebling. Roebling sought women’s collective uplift primarily through economic empowerment, forwarding her message through accommodationist tactics, such as presenting a “feminine” image, embracing capitalism, and espousing moderate politics. This essay briefly explores additional biographies to suggest that other professionally successful, elite white women held similar “capitalist feminist” views. The article also employs biographical and associational examples to illustrate how capitalist feminism is a distinct category of business feminism.

Following the recent resurgence of capitalism as a key subject in historical analysis, historians have highlighted the globally interconnected making and remaking of capitalism. Commodity-centered histories in global history have shown how to write locally grounded histories of global capitalism, emphasizing the complex and contingent relationship between the local and the global. In these accounts, however, businesses and global firms rarely appear as the analytical centerpiece. We argue that the globally active firm provides an ideal prism for writing locally grounded histories of global capitalism. Furthermore, drawing on recent usages of assemblage theory in economic history, we propose viewing “the global firm” as a “capitalist assemblage” in order to capture the spatiotemporally contingent processes through which capitalism and distinct ways of organizing business, labor, and life under capitalism emerged and evolved at specific sites and times. This approach will contribute to global studies and address limitations in business history’s treatment of the global firm.

During World War II, condom consumption increased in both belligerent and non-belligerent countries, including Sweden. Yet the relationship between state-led initiatives and commercial marketing in driving this trend has received little scholarly attention. The main sources in this article consist of wartime public health campaigns and condom advertisements. Applying the concepts of social and consumer engineering, the article examines how government interventions, specifically through public health measures, influenced condom marketing practices. The findings show that wartime campaigns sought to engineer citizens’ sexual behavior and that businesses strategically aligned their messaging with government propaganda. This convergence was instrumental in positioning condoms as essential tools for public health and facilitated a more permissive attitude toward condoms as prophylactics, bridging state-led public health efforts with commercial objectives. By examining this dynamic, the article contributes to understanding how wartime policies shaped consumer behavior and forged enduring connections between public health and market strategies.