This is an introduction to the special issue that presents new research on the state and its links to economic and social development. The special issue focuses on the processes of institutional transformation of the state, looking at how fiscal states arise in the developing world. The resulting set of articles presents a variety of approaches, ranging from case studies (at state and regional level), to comparative historical analysis and to macro-quantitative (country and cross-country level) perspectives. The overarching message is that historical, political and institutional factors are key to understanding the process of fiscal states formation and change around the developing world.

We argue that tax revenues and political institutions placing constraints on the executive power may reinforce each other over time and so co-evolve in the long run. This may also bring a shift in the composition of revenues, from taxes levied on a narrow base to broadly levied taxes. To test these hypotheses, we use historical cross-country data covering 31 countries for 1800–2012 and panel time series methods allowing for different forms of country-specific heterogeneity and cross-section dependence. The results offer three main findings. First, executive constraints, whether they are judicial or legislative, and tax revenues are cointegrated. While in the short run they can drift apart, this will be temporary because there is a long-run relationship between the two. Second, evidence of cointegration is strongest for revenues from direct taxes, suggesting that the existence and nature of a long-run relationship may be mainly related to the emergence of broad-based taxation. Third, long-run causality runs mostly from executive constraints to taxation. This is most evident for income taxes. Our findings link Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17, implying that the goal of promoting inclusive and accountable institutions may work in synergy with that of generating internal resources to finance development goals.

This paper contributes to research on the institutional determinants of tax capacity using annual data from 39 sub-Saharan African countries from 1985 to 2018 to construct a measure of tax capacity for each country based on the trend component of the ratio of actual to potential tax revenue. Potential revenue is estimated by a parsimonious tax performance specification, including only variables found to be robust determinants of the tax/GDP ratio. The results show that, on average, tax capacity is high (given potential) and has improved over time (especially for low-income countries). The final stage of analysis selects, from a wide variety of economic and institutional variables, the most important determinants of cross-country variation in tax capacity. Equal distribution of resources is the most important institutional factor associated with greater capacity, consistent with perceptions of equity supporting the fiscal bargain; corruption is associated with lower capacity, consistent with undermining trust in government. Private consumption and resource rents are associated with greater capacity. Other institutional factors are indirectly associated with greater capacity, such as accountability and elements of democracy associated with equity in the allocation and use of public resources.

This paper contributes to the debate on domestic revenue mobilization and state-building in the Global South by exploring the concept of fiscal states and the common assumption that such states are present in sub-Saharan Africa. We systematically review the diverse understandings of the fiscal state across relevant literatures to revisit its conceptualization. On that basis, we define the fiscal state as a state whose public revenue base is dominated by tax revenue and loans, and where the relationship between taxation and external and domestic borrowing is balanced and thereby sustainable and characterized by interdependence. We distinguish the fiscal state conceptually from the tax, debt, and rentier states and present a typology of these ideal state types, discussing illustrative empirical examples of different states in sub-Saharan Africa. These illustrate that not all sub-Saharan states can be categorized as fiscal states. This is important because when African states are regarded as fiscal states, assumptions are made about their economic structures; yet, to the extent that these are absent, fiscal policy reforms are unlikely to carry long-term positive effects.

Fiscal capacity is regularly linked to warfare and democratization. However, the majority of income taxes – a cornerstone of government finance – were introduced by non-democratic states in peacetime. This paper is concerned with how autocratic politics shape the adoption and expansion of income taxes. Political institutions help overcome a commitment problem related to investments in taxation. To avoid being deposed by his or her elite supporters, a ruler needs to guarantee that new taxes will not be used opportunistically (e.g. expropriating the elite). If the elite supporters can effectively monitor the government, any transgressions will be detected and punishable. Institutions such as legislatures solve this commitment problem when they allow oversight and monitoring over the executive branch. The empirical implications are straightforward: in places with strong institutional oversight, which allows the elite to monitor the executive, we should observe higher fiscal capacity. I find support for this by analyzing newly available historical datasets over tax revenues, tax introduction dates, and political institutions.

The paper examines the legacy of pre-colonial centralization on tax compliance norms of citizens in contemporary Uganda. Using a regression discontinuity analysis on neighboring ethnic homelands with different levels of pre-colonial centralization, we find that pre-colonial centralization is correlated with stronger norm for tax compliance. The result is explained by the legacy of location-specific capacity of centralized states in upholding authority and a strong social cohesion exhibited through higher interpersonal trust but not through trust in public institutions.

We argue that the effectiveness of Rwandan governments, both at implementing the 1994 genocide and inducing the current growth miracle, illustrates that the state has high capacity. Yet this capacity is not captured by conventional Weberian concepts, with their focus on taxation and formal bureaucracy. Rather, the capacity of Rwanda's state relies on its ability to leverage dense social networks which connect it to society. The origins of these networks lie in the construction of the historical state which expanded by merging with local lineages and kinship groups. Using data on the historical expansion of the Rwandan state as a proxy for the strength of state–society social networks we show they are uncorrelated with measures of Weberian state capacity. In a fieldwork exercise, we show that rule compliance today is positively correlated with our proxy, but uncorrelated with Weberian state capacity.

This article combines cross-national statistical analysis and in-depth historical case studies of Argentina and Chile to explore the relationship between two crucial dimensions of state capacity. We show that information capacity contributes to the development of fiscal capacity. When states have accurate information about their subject populations, territories, and economies, they are more effective at mobilizing revenues. In developing this argument this article makes three broader contributions. First, while existing scholarship either treats distinct dimensions of state capacity as separate entities, or simply assumes that they complement each other, our findings urge scholars to treat state development as sequential and to further investigate how multiple dimensions of state capacity are interrelated. Second, the paper suggests a broader underlying set of mechanisms – economies of scope – which connect these dimensions, and explores them in the specific context of how information capacity facilitates fiscal capacity. Third, we join the scholarship on the importance of societal compliance in the creation of the fiscal state, but with a focus on elite cooperation with the state's information collection efforts, which we show to be crucial to tax state development.

The arguments that property rights and taxation positively affect development are well established in separate literatures, but the link between property rights and taxation is under-studied. To address this gap, we theorize, in the fiscal contract tradition, that property rights assigned and upheld by the state, as opposed to other political authorities, increase individual assent to taxation. We apply this argument to property rights on land in sub-Saharan-Africa, where the majority of land is governed by traditional authorities. Empirically we examine (1) the link between the state-assinged property rights on land and assent to taxation using individual-level data from Afrobarometer, and (2) the effect of state-led formalization, measured through novel data on state-produced cadastral records, and revenue from taxes on individuals in a panel of 37 sub-Saharan African countries across 35 years. We find support for our argument that there is no taxation without state-assigned property rights.