The author regrets the inclusion of errors in the aggregated survey data underpinning the analyses in Claassen (Reference Claassen2020). In particular:

1. 1. The sample size that was used for the “strong leader” question in the 2010 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey in Canada is incorrect; in this particular survey only half the sample were asked the “strong leader” question.

2. 2. The “suitability of democracy” question in the second wave of the Asian barometer survey was aggregated using a different cutpoint compared with the first wave. The same method of aggregation should be used for both waves.

The author thanks Hu, Tai, and Solt (Reference Hu, Tai and Solt2022) for identifying these errors.

These errors have been corrected, democratic mood re-estimated, and the analyses employed in Claassen (Reference Claassen2020) rerun. The corrected (Tables 1 and 2) and Figures (1-6) are provided below. The corrected replication dataset is available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FECIO3, as is a corrected document with supplementary information and analyses.

Table 1. Testing the Effects of Democracy on Change in Mood

* p<.05. Arellano-White robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. Liberal democracy and mood are unit-normal standardized.

Table 2. Testing the Effects of Electoral and Minoritarian Democracy on Change in Mood

* p<.05. Arellano-White robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. Mood and democracy and support (electoral and minoritarian) are unit-normal standardized.

The corrected results are similar to those reported in the original article. For example, in model 1.1., Claassen (Reference Claassen2020) originally reported a thermostatic effect (change in liberal democracy) of −0.058 with a standard error of 0.023. In the corrected results, the corresponding coefficient and standard error are −0.061 and 0.024. As such, the corrected analyses confirm the conclusions drawn in Claassen (Reference Claassen2020).

Specific long-run effects were reported in the text of Claassen (Reference Claassen2020). The correct long-run effects are as follows:

• • Page 48: the long-run effect of a change in liberal democracy is an immediate decrease of 0.061 and 0.070, in the left and right figures respectively, not 0.058 and 0.067 as reported. The total decrease is furthermore 0.088 and 0.110, respectively, not 0.084 and 0.104.

• • Page 49: the long-run effect of change in electoral democracy based on Model 2.2 is an increase of 0.100 after ten years, not an increase of 0.110.

Figure 1. The Dynamics of Democracy and Mood: Established Democracies

Each plot shows V-Dem Liberal democracy (plotted using a black line) from 1988 to 2017 and estimates of democratic mood (plotted using a blue line). The shaded regions around the mood estimates indicate 90% uncertainty intervals. Vertical bars on the mood estimates indicate years in which survey data were available. Liberal democracy and mood are unit-normal standardized.

Figure 2. The Dynamics of Democracy and Mood: New Democracies

Figure 3. The Dynamics of Democracy and Mood: Autocracies

Figure 4. The Dynamics of Democracy and Mood: Transitioning Regimes

Figure 5. Simulated Effects of Change in Democracy on Mood

Simulated effects are estimated using coefficients from models 1.1 (without corruption; left) and 1.2 (with corruption; right). The solid lines indicate the mean simulated effect; the shaded regions indicate the 95% confidence intervals of these effects.

Figure 6. Simulated Effects of Changes in Electoral and Minoritarian Democracy on Mood

Simulated effects, estimated using coefficients from model 2.1 (without corruption; left) and model 2.2 (with corruption; right). Effects of a change in electoral democracy are shown in top row; effects of change in minoritarian democracy in the bottom row. The solid lines indicate the mean predicted effect; the shaded regions indicate the 95% confidence intervals of these predicted effects.