Research Article
The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992–2003
- Ian Hurd
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 09 August 2005, pp. 495-526
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The UN's sanctions against Libya became an issue of great controversy in the Security Council in the 1990s owing to competing interpretations of the central legal norms of international relations. The norms of due process, the presumption of innocence, and respect for international organizations (IOs) were defended by both sides, but for opposite ends. I use the contestation over norms and law at the Council to argue three broader themes about international politics: first, that states' perceptions about the legitimacy of international institutions is important in influencing state behavior; second, that this legitimacy creates powerful symbols in international relations that are strategically useful to states in the pursuit of their interests; and third, that the distribution of material power among states does not necessarily parallel the distribution of symbolic power, and so it is not uncommon for apparently strong states to be defeated by apparently weak ones when they fight over symbolic stakes. The norms of liberal internationalism are intersubjective resources useful in the strategic competition among states.
For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I wish to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of this journal, as well as Jose Alvarez, Stephen Brooks, Michael Doyle, Daryl Press, Henry Shue, Benjamin Valentino, Jennifer Welsh, William Wohlforth, and seminar participants at Columbia Law School, Dartmouth College, Oxford University, and ISA Montreal 2004.
Making and Keeping Peace
- Suzanne Werner, Amy Yuen
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- 17 May 2005, pp. 261-292
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Recent efforts to explain why some peace agreements last while others fail have focused on the strength of the agreement itself. Maintaining peace, even if both belligerents want peace, can be difficult if there are temptations to defect or there are reasons to fear that one may be played for the sucker. Strong agreements that can increase the costs of defection, enhance monitoring, or reward cooperation help to solve this enforcement dilemma and generally increase the former belligerents' incentives to remain at peace. Although we agree that such carrots and sticks can facilitate cooperation, we argue in this article that such measures will often be inadequate if the belligerents themselves are no longer committed to keeping the peace. If the belligerents believe that a renewed war can lead to better terms, peace will be precarious. We demonstrate that getting (and keeping) the terms right may be more important than any carrots and sticks incorporated into the document to enforce those terms. In particular, we show that “unnatural” ceasefires that come about as a consequence of third-party pressure are significantly more likely to fail. We also show that ceasefires negotiated after wars with consistent battle outcomes are more likely to last than those where the “right” terms of settlement are less apparent.
We would like to thank Virginia Page Fortna, Dani Reiter, Nicholas Sambanis, and the anonymous reviewers and editors of International Organization for their many suggestions and insightful comments on previous versions of this article.
International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework
- Jeffrey T. Checkel
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- 18 October 2005, pp. 801-826
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International institutions are a ubiquitous feature of daily life in many world regions, and nowhere more so than contemporary Europe. While virtually all would agree that such institutions matter, there is less agreement on exactly how they have effects. This special issue brings together European Union specialists and international relations theorists who address the latter issue. In particular, we explore the socializing role of institutions in Europe, with our central concern being to better specify the mechanisms of socialization and the conditions under which they are expected to lead to the internalization of new roles or interests. Drawing on a multifaceted understanding of human rationality, we consider three generic social mechanisms—strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion—and their ability to promote socialization outcomes within international institutions. This disaggregation exercise not only helps consolidate nascent socialization research programs in international relations theory and EU studies; it also highlights points of contact and potential synergies between rationalism and social constructivism.
For comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to two anonymous referees, IO editors Lisa Martin and Thomas Risse, as well as to John Duffield, Alexandra Gheciu, Liesbet Hooghe, Peter Katzenstein, Ron Mitchell, Frank Schimmelfennig, Martha Snodgrass, and Michael Zürn. More generally, thanks are owed to all the project participants for numerous and valuable discussions on the themes addressed in this volume.
The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?
- Kenneth A. Schultz
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- 15 February 2005, pp. 1-38
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This article explores the politics of risking international cooperation with a distrusted adversary. It develops a model in which two states attempt to learn over the course of two periods whether or not mutual cooperation is possible given their (initially unknown) preferences. In one of the states, the government is engaged in domestic political competition with an opposition party. One party is known to have more hawkish preferences than the other, on average, and voters must decide which party to elect after observing the international interaction in the first period. The model shows that, when trust is low but continued conflict is costly, cooperation is most likely to be initiated by a moderate hawk—a leader with moderate preferences from the more hawkish party. Moreover, while dovish leaders are better at eliciting cooperation in the short run, mutual cooperation is most likely to endure if it was initiated by a hawk. Some empirical implications and illustrations of the model are discussed.
I gratefully acknowledge thoughtful comments received from Andrew Kydd, James Morrow, Brett Ashley Leeds, T. Clifton Morgan, Kenneth Scheve, Deborah Larson, Bruce Russett, Alex Mintz, and the anonymous reviewers. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 43rd annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 2002.
Power in International Politics
- Michael Barnett, Raymond Duvall
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- 15 February 2005, pp. 39-75
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The concept of power is central to international relations. Yet disciplinary discussions tend to privilege only one, albeit important, form: an actor controlling another to do what that other would not otherwise do. By showing conceptual favoritism, the discipline not only overlooks the different forms of power in international politics, but also fails to develop sophisticated understandings of how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates. We argue that scholars of international relations should employ multiple conceptions of power and develop a conceptual framework that encourages rigorous attention to power in its different forms. We first begin by producing a taxonomy of power. Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate. This general concept entails two crucial, analytical dimensions: the kinds of social relations through which power works (in relations of interaction or in social relations of constitution); and the specificity of social relations through which effects are produced (specific/direct or diffuse/indirect). These distinctions generate our taxonomy and four concepts of power: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. We then illustrate how attention to the multiple forms of power matters for the analysis of global governance and American empire. We conclude by urging scholars to beware of the idea that the multiple concepts are competing, and instead to see connections between them in order to generate more robust understandings of how power works in international politics.
This article was first presented at a conference, “Who Governs in Global Governance?” at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. We thank the participants at the conference, including Emanuel Adler, Alex Wendt, Neta Crawford, Kathryn Sikkink, Helen Kinsella, Martha Finnemore, Jutta Weldes, Jon Pevehouse, Andrew Hurrell, John Ruggie, and especially Duncan Snidal, Robert Keohane, and Charles Kupchan. Other versions were presented at the University of Minnesota and the International Studies Association meetings in Budapest, Hungary in June, 2003. We also want to thank Kurt Burch, Thomas Diez, Tom Donahue, William Duvall, Ayten Gundogdu, Stefano Guzzini, Colin Kahl, Amit Ron, Latha Varadarajan, Michael Williams, Anne-Marie Slaughter, the editors of the journal, and two anonymous reviewers. We also acknowledge the bibliographic assistance of Emilie Hafner-Burton and Jonathan Havercroft.
Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics
- Colin Elman
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- 17 May 2005, pp. 293-326
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Explanatory typologies are powerful tools in the qualitative study of international politics. They are likely to be most valuable when scholars systematically apply shared techniques. This article provides an account of analytic steps used in working with typologies, and an accessible vocabulary to describe them. These analytic steps are illustrated with concrete examples drawn from prominent versions of offensive structural, defensive structural, and neoclassical realism. Five forms of cell compression—rescaling and indexing, as well as logical, empirical, and pragmatic compression—are considered, along with the drawbacks associated with each. The expansion of a partial typology and the rediscovery of deleted cells are also discussed. Finally, the article considers the potential drawbacks of a typological approach, and argues that scholars must be mindful of the risks of reification and of relabeling anomalies.
I am especially grateful to David Collier for extensive critiques of several drafts of this article. Stephen G. Walker, Miriam Fendius Elman, James Mahoney, Gary Goertz, Reilly O'Neal, John Gerring, Bear Braumoeller, Lisa Martin, two anonymous reviewers, and the participants at the January 2004 Institute for Qualitative Research Methods at Arizona State University provided valuable comments. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Ryan Davis, Michael Jensen and Mallory Hutchison provided greatly appreciated research assistance. Templates for dichotomous and trichotomous four-variable property spaces are available from colin.elman@asu.edu.
The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force
- Erik Voeten
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- 09 August 2005, pp. 527-557
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Since, at least, the Persian Gulf War, states have behaved “as if” it is costly to be unsuccessful in acquiring the legitimacy the UN Security Council confers on uses of force. This observation is puzzling for theories that seek the origins of modern institutional legitimacy in legalities or moral values. I argue that when governments and citizens look for an authority to legitimize the use of force, they generally do not seek an independent judgment on the appropriateness of an intervention but political reassurance about the consequences of proposed military adventures. Council decisions legitimize or delegitimize uses of force in the sense that they form widely accepted political judgments on whether uses of force transgress a limit that should be defended. These judgments become focal points in the collaboration and coordination dilemmas states face in enforcing limits to U.S. power while preserving mutually beneficial cooperation. In this article, I discuss the implications for the Council's legitimacy and theories of international legitimacy.
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2003 International Studies Association Conference, Portland, Ore., 1 March; the 2003 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 29 August; Columbia University International Politics Series, New York, 29 September 2003; and the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, Cambridge, 6 October 2003. I thank the participants in these seminars, the editor, and anonymous referees of International Organization; and I also thank Bob Axelrod, Bruce Cronin, Michael Dark, Monica Duffy Toft, Nisha Fazal, Jim Fearon, Martha Finnemore, Page Fortna, Stacy Goddard, Macartan Humphries, Ian Hurd, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Andrew Kydd, Edward Miller, Katia Papagianni, Rita Parhad, Holger Schmidt, Arturo Sotomayor, and Joel Westra for useful comments, suggestions, and corrections. As usual, remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author.
Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe
- Frank Schimmelfennig
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- 18 October 2005, pp. 827-860
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This article uses a rationalist approach to explain the international socialization of Central and Eastern Europe to liberal human rights and democracy norms. According to this approach, socialization consists in a process of reinforcement, and its effectiveness depends on the balance between the international and domestic costs and benefits of compliance over an extended period of time. EU and NATO accession conditionality has been a necessary condition of sustained compliance in those countries of Central and Eastern Europe that violated liberal norms initially. The pathways and long-term outcomes of international socialization, however, have varied with the constellations of major parties in the target states. Whereas conditionality has been effective with liberal and mixed party constellations, it has failed to produce compliance in antiliberal regimes. In the empirical part of the article, these propositions are substantiated with data on the development of liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and case studies on Slovakia and Latvia.
For useful comments on earlier versions, I thank the participants of the IDNET workshop seminars, especially Jeff Checkel, Matthew Evangelista, Judith Kelley, Thomas Risse, and Marianne van de Steeg. In addition, the anonymous reviewers and the editors of IO made excellent suggestions for improving and clarifying the argument. The research for this article was supported by a grant of the German Research Foundation (DFG), 2000–2002.
Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council
- Jochen Prantl
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- 09 August 2005, pp. 559-592
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This article discusses the dynamics between informal groups of states and the UN Security Council. First, I argue that informal groups have proliferated in response to systemic change. Second, these groups serve as a mechanism that allows for exit from structural constraints of the Security Council and voice for stakeholders in a conflict. In effect, they may narrow the operational and participatory gap growing out of the multiple incapacities that prevents the Council from formulating an effective response to crisis situations. Third, the processes of diplomatic problem solving and its collective legitimation have become increasingly decoupled. The former tends to be delegated to informal groups or coalition of states, while the Council provides the latter. I illustrate how these findings affect one's understanding of power, legitimacy, and change in the theory of international relations.
This article is the extensively revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System in 2003. The project received financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council, United Kingdom (Grant No. R42200024335), and the Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford. The UN Studies Program at Yale University was a frequent host and home over recent years. I would like to express my gratitude for the long-term support and advice of Karl Kaiser, Bruce Russett, James Sutterlin, and especially Neil MacFarlane. I also wish to thank Mats Berdal, Richard Caplan, Sam Daws, Kurt Gaubatz, Marrack Goulding, Jean Krasno, Edward Luck, David Malone, Lisa Martin, James Mayall, Joseph Nye, Adam Roberts, Avi Shlaim, Ngaire Woods, and two anonymous referees for comments and criticism.
Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective
- Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie, Dan Slater
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- 17 May 2005, pp. 327-361
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Scholars of development have learned a great deal about what economic institutions do, but much less about the origins of such arrangements. This article introduces and assesses a new political explanation for the origins of “developmental states”—organizational complexes in which expert and coherent bureaucratic agencies collaborate with organized private sectors to spur national economic transformation. Conventional wisdom holds that developmental states in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore result from “state autonomy,” especially from popular pressures. We argue that these states' impressive capacities actually emerged from the challenges of delivering side payments to restive popular sectors under conditions of extreme geopolitical insecurity and severe resource constraints. Such an interactive condition of “systemic vulnerability” never confronted ruling elites in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, or Thailand—allowing them to uphold political coalitions, and hence to retain power, with much less ambitious state-building efforts.
Authors listed alphabetically. We are grateful to the following for helpful comments: Cliff Carrubba, Eric Hershberg, Dave Kang, Stephan Haggard, Linda Lim, Greg Noble, Kristen Nordhaug, John Ravenhill, Eric Reinhardt, Dani Reiter, Tom Remington, Michael Ross, Randy Strahan, Judith Tendler, and two anonymous reviewers. Special thanks to David Waldner, whose book inspired this article and who graciously provided important insights.
Rationality and Psychology in International Politics
- Jonathan Mercer
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- 15 February 2005, pp. 77-106
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The ubiquitous yet inaccurate belief in international relations scholarship that cognitive biases and emotion cause only mistakes distorts the field's understanding of the relationship between rationality and psychology in three ways. If psychology explains only mistakes (or deviations from rationality), then (1) rationality must be free of psychology; (2) psychological explanations require rational baselines; and (3) psychology cannot explain accurate judgments. This view of the relationship between rationality and psychology is coherent and logical, but wrong. Although undermining one of these three beliefs is sufficient to undermine the others, I address each belief—or myth—in turn. The point is not that psychological models should replace rational models, but that no single approach has a lock on understanding rationality. In some important contexts (such as in strategic choice) or when using certain concepts (such as trust, identity, justice, or reputation), an explicitly psychological approach to rationality may beat a rationalist one.
I thank Deborah Avant, James Caporaso, James Davis, Bryan Jones, Margaret Levi, Peter Liberman, Lisa Martin, Susan Peterson, Jason Scheideman, Jack Snyder, Michael Taylor, two anonymous reviewers, and especially Robert Jervis and Elizabeth Kier for their thoughtful comments and critiques. Jason Scheideman also helped with research assistance.
Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission
- Liesbet Hooghe
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- 18 October 2005, pp. 861-898
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Can an international organization socialize those who work within it? The European Commission of the European Union is a crucial case because it is an autonomous international organization with a vocation to defend supranational norms. If this body cannot socialize its members, which international organization can? I develop theoretical expectations about how time, organizational structure, alternative processes of preference formation, and national socialization affect international socialization. To test these expectations for the European Commission, I use two surveys of top permanent Commission officials, conducted in 1996 and 2002. The analysis shows that support for supranational norms is relatively high, but that this is more because of national socialization than socialization in the Commission. National norms, originating in prior experiences in national ministries, loyalty to national political parties, or experience with one's country's organization of authority, decisively shape top officials' views on supranational norms. There are, then, several roads to international norms.
For comments and advice, I am grateful to Jeffrey Checkel, Gary Marks, Donald Searing, and the editors and two anonymous reviewers for International Organization. An earlier draft was presented at the Center for European Studies of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This project received funding from the Center for European Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and from two grants by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (1996–99, 1999–2002). Gina Cosentino, Erica Edwards, Michael Harvey, and Moira Nelson provided research assistance.
Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression
- Emilie M. Hafner-Burton
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 09 August 2005, pp. 593-629
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A growing number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have come to play a significant role in governing state compliance with human rights. When they supply hard standards that tie material benefits of integration to compliance with human rights principles, PTAs are more effective than softer human rights agreements (HRAs) in changing repressive behaviors. PTAs improve members' human rights through coercion, by supplying the instruments and resources to change actors' incentives to promote reforms that would not otherwise be implemented. I develop three hypotheses: (1) state commitment to HRAs and (2) PTAs supplying soft human rights standards (not tied to market benefits) do not systematically produce improvement in human rights behaviors, while (3) state commitment to PTAs supplying hard human rights standards does often produce better practices. I draw on several cases to illustrate the processes of influence and test the argument on the experience of 177 states during the period 1972 to 2002.
I would like to thank Mike Colaresi, Dan Drezner, David Lake, Lisa Martin, Walter Mattli, John Meyer, Mark Pollack, Erik Voeten, Jim Vreeland, and two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and thoughtful comments on various drafts of this manuscript, as well as the many other people who have helped me by asking hard questions along the way. I would also like to thank Michael Barnett, Charles Franklin, and Jon Pevehouse for advice during the dissertation research that supports this article, and Alexander H. Montgomery for assistance in data management. All faults are my own. For generous assistance in the collection of data, I thank the National Science Foundation (SES 2CDZ414 and SES 0135422), John Meyer, and Francisco Ramirez. For support during the writing of the article, I thank Nuffield College at Oxford University, and most importantly, Lynn Eden and Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.
Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism
- Xinyuan Dai
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- 17 May 2005, pp. 363-398
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Why do countries comply with international agreements? While scholars have done rigorous work to address compliance and enforcement in an international game, less analytical attention has been paid to domestic mechanisms of compliance. However, because international agreements have domestic distributional consequences, there exist domestic sources of enforcement. In this article, I develop an analytical framework of domestic accountability, where I identify specific channels of influence through which domestic constituencies can influence national compliance. Using a game theoretic model, I show that a government's compliance decision reflects the electoral leverage and the informational status of domestic constituencies. This framework further provides a theoretical rationale for why and how international institutions may influence states' compliance through domestic mechanisms. The European acid rain regime offers an empirical illustration of the domestic constituency argument.
I have benefited from the generous help of many colleagues and friends in the course of this research. I would particularly like to thank the editor-in-chief of IO, anonymous reviewers of this article, as well as William Bernhard, Paul Diehl, Daniel Drezner, James Fearon, Robert Keohane, Charles Lipson, Ronald Mitchell, Robert Pahre, Duncan Snidal, Detlef Sprinz, Milan Svolik, and Pieter van Houten. Nazlı Avdan provided valuable research assistance. MacArthur Foundation, the U.S. Institute of Peace, Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, and the Research Board at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign sponsored various phases of this research.
Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries
- Helen V. Milner, Keiko Kubota
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- 15 February 2005, pp. 107-143
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Rising international trade flows are a primary component of globalization. The liberalization of trade policy in many developing countries has helped foster the growth of these flows. Preceding and concurrent with this move to free trade, there has been a global movement toward democracy. We argue that these two trends are related: democratization of the political system reduces the ability of governments to use trade barriers as a strategy for building political support. Political leaders in labor-rich countries may prefer lower trade barriers as democracy increases. Empirical evidence supports our claim about the developing countries from 1970–99. Regime change toward democracy is associated with trade liberalization, controlling for many factors. Conventional explanations of economic reform, such as economic crises and external pressures, seem less salient. Democratization may have fostered globalization in this period.
We wish to thank the editors at International Organization, David Baldwin, Jim Fearon, Geoffrey Garrett, Barbara Geddes, Tim Groseclose, Robert Kaufmann, Robert Keohane, David Laitin, Jean Leca, Edward Mansfield, Jim Morrow, Ronald Rogowski, B. Peter Rosendorff, Alex Segura, Mike Tomz, Robert Trager, Romain Wacziarg, and Greg Wawro, for their very helpful comments on versions of this article. We also received helpful comments from seminar participants at the University of Michigan, Stanford University, the University of Pennsylvania, Syracuse University, Princeton University, Rutgers University, Yale University, and the University of California at Berkeley. Ben Judkins, Robert Trager, Megumi Naoi, and Tom Kenyon provided invaluable research assistance. An earlier version was presented at the 2001 APSA meeting in San Francisco.
Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials
- Jan Beyers
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 18 October 2005, pp. 899-936
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Neofunctional, supranationalist, and constructivist scholars studying European integration hypothesize that social interactions cutting across national borders lead individual actors to shift their allegiance toward the European level. This strong socialization hypothesis presumes that, as a result of prolonged exposure and interactions, individuals adopt role conceptions that promote a sense of “we-ness” and that fit into a view of the European Union (EU) as an autonomous level primarily designed for finding policy solutions in the interest of a common, European, good. In contrast, this article offers an institutional understanding of role enactment that argues that socialization—that is, the adoption of role conceptions—is considerably shaped by actors' embeddedness in multiple European and domestic contexts. Based on quantitative interview data, I demonstrate that, in contrast to the strong socialization hypothesis, extensive exposure to the European level does not necessarily lead to supranational role playing. On the contrary, domestic factors, rather than European-level conditions, positively affect the adoption of supranational role conceptions.
Thanks to Ambassador Frans Van Daele and Ambassador Philippe de Shoutheete de Tervarent, who allowed interviews on aspects of this article. I also express my gratitude toward the ISPO-team of the University of Leuven, Belgium, for their help in doing the fieldwork, and to Jan De Bock and Vincent Mertens de Wilmars for the crucial information they provided. Data collection was made possible by a grant from the Fund for Scientific Research–Flanders (Belgium) and was supervised by Guido Dierickx (University of Antwerp, Belgium). Special thanks go to the participants in the various IDNET-workshops and the ARENA research seminar (April 2002), to IO editors Thomas Risse and Lisa Martin, two anonymous reviewers, and Karen Anderson, Morten Egeberg, Jeff Checkel, Alexandra Gheciu, Jeffrey Lewis, Marianne van der Steeg, Mark Rhinard, Jarle Trondal, and Maarten Vink for their extensive and constructive comments.
The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision Making in the European Union
- Jeffrey Lewis
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 18 October 2005, pp. 937-971
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This article examines the European Union's Committee of Permanent Representatives, or COREPER, a group composed of the EU permanent representatives (permreps) and responsible for preparing upcoming ministerial meetings of the Council. As the heart of everyday decision making in the EU, COREPER is a key laboratory to test whether and how national officials become socialized into a Brussels-based collective culture and what difference this makes for EU negotiations. The key scope conditions for COREPER socialization are high issue density/intensity and insulation from domestic politics. COREPER also displays a range of socialization mechanisms, including strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. Based on extensive interview data and a detailed case study of negotiations for a controversial EU citizenship directive, this article documents a socialization pathway in COREPER marked by adherence to a set of norm-guided rules and principled beliefs in collectively legitimating arguments and making decisions. COREPER socialization does not indicate a pattern of national identities being replaced or subsumed; rather, the evidence points to a socialization process based on a “logic of appropriateness” and an expanded conception of the self.
For feedback on earlier versions, I am grateful to the project participants and especially Jeffrey Checkel, Matthew Evangelista, Iain Johnston, and Michael Zürn. I thank the editors and two anonymous reviewers for comments that greatly improved the final product. I also acknowledge generous support from the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies and the American Political Science Association's Small Grant Program, which funded portions of field research associated with this project.
Economic Globalization, the Macro Economy, and Reversals of Welfare: Expansion in Affluent Democracies, 1978–94
- Alexander Hicks, Christopher Zorn
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 09 August 2005, pp. 631-662
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A key question in debates over globalization is its effect on the welfare states in particular on welfare “retrenchments”: programmatic retractions of the scope and coverage of social programs. We conceptualize such retrenchments as discrete policy events; and we offer a comprehensive model of their occurrence that integrates domestic economic, political, and institutional factors as well as those related to the global economy. Our analysis of all such retrenchments in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations between 1978 and 1994 indicates that the effects of globalization are complex, with trade openness and financial liberalization clearly operating against such retrenchments but outward foreign direct investment perhaps pressuring for them. In addition, we uncover support for a dynamic of “self-limiting immoderation”: economic and demographic pressures for costly welfare expenditures provoke actions to roll back eligibility and benefit rates that link increasing numbers of unemployed and retired persons to increased social spending. In short, the same demographic pressures that gave often been noted to substantially drive welfare spending may trigger welfare cutbacks.
Our thanks to A. A. Alderson, Bob Jackman, Lane Kenworthy, Joakim Palme, Duane Swank, John Stephen, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and discussions, as well as to Kendralin Freedman for her work preparing the final manuscript. All remaining errors are our own. Previous versions of this article were presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association and the American Sociological Association. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions of the National Science Foundation or the U.S. government. All data and commands necessary to replicate the analyses presented here are available at our Web site 〈http://polisci.emory.edu/zorn/HZ/index.html〉.
Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence
- Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 15 February 2005, pp. 145-176
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What causes the increase in terrorism that reportedly often follows government concessions? Given this pattern, why do governments ever conciliate terrorists? I propose a model in which terrorist organizations become more militant following concessions because only moderate terrorists accept them, leaving extremists in control. Governments nonetheless are willing to make concessions because their counterterror capabilities improve because of the collusion of former terrorists. Former terrorists undertake this collusion to insure the credibility of government promises. The model also yields hypotheses regarding the level of government investment in counterterror, when moderates accept concessions, the terms of negotiated settlements, the duration of terrorist conflicts, incentives for moderate terrorists to radicalize their followers, and incentives for governments to encourage extremist challenges to moderate terrorist leaders. The model is illustrated with an application to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
Professor Ehud Sprinzak, who died an untimely death on November 8, 2002, first introduced me to the study of terrorism. He is greatly missed. I received valuable comments from Scott Ashworth, Bob Bates, Mia Bloom, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Charles Cohen, Eric Dickson, Amanda Friedenberg, Orit Kedar, David Lake, Macartan Humphreys, Matthew Price, Todd Sandler, Ken Shepsle, David Andrew Singer, Alastair Smith, and Matthew Stephenson.
Legal Integration and Use of the Preliminary Ruling Process in the European Union
- Clifford J. Carrubba, Lacey Murrah
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 17 May 2005, pp. 399-418
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Scholars agree that the preliminary ruling system of the European Court of Justice has been instrumental in promoting European integration; however, no consensus has been reached as to why the system is used. Although many explanations have been posited, there has been no systematic comparative test among them to date. In this article, we perform this test. We find evidence that transnational economic activity, public support for integration, monist or dualist tradition, judicial review, and the public's political awareness influence use of the preliminary ruling system.
We would like to acknowledge Matthew Gabel, Eric Reinhardt, Georg Vanberg, and Christopher Zorn for helpful comments. We would also like to acknowledge the support of NSF grant #0079084.