The argument for the human problems of evil and suffering

There are many straightforward reasons to endorse the Argument for the Human Problems of Evil and Suffering’s first premise. Namely, that most people could and should have prevented much avoidable suffering and death and refrained from many evil acts but have not.

First consider why most people could and should have prevented much avoidable suffering and death. Since the 1970s, Peter Singer has argued, for instance, that everyone should help end preventable suffering and early death, from lack of adequate food, water, shelter, healthcare, and so forth, whenever doing so does not require sacrificing too much (Singer Reference Singer1972). He does not think our distance from those who are suffering nor the fact that others could (but will not) help undermines this obligation. Although one might quibble about how much each of us is required to do, millions suffer and die every year from preventable poverty-related causes, and it is hard to deny that most people should have done more to help when we have good evidence that aid programmes often work and that some kinds of aid are generally effective (Murphy Reference Murphy2000; Cullity Reference Cullity2004; Hassoun Reference Hassoun2010; Miller Reference Miller2010; Hassoun Reference Hassoun2012).

Some philosophers reject the view that we have any positive obligations to aid because, for instance, they believe such obligations are too demanding, but, even if this is right, we argue that we have failed in our negative duties of justice (Melnyk Reference Melnyk1989). Some claim that our institutions and our practices have caused great preventable suffering and death (Pogge Reference Pogge2008). Thomas Pogge (Reference Pogge2008) argues, for instance, that we should compensate the victims of our shared and violent history of colonialism, slavery, and oppression as well as those unjust institutions currently impoverish. Market rules (e.g. governing trade, aid, and property rights) systematically disadvantage poorer segments of the global population. Any despot who manages to gain power in a poor country has the right to sell the country’s resources, acquire loans, and enter into agreements binding future generations (Hassoun Reference Hassoun2015b). And many people in poor countries still suffer from the legacy of colonialism from which many of the global rich have benefitted immensely. If Pogge (Reference Pogge2008) is correct that people in past and present generations have caused considerable suffering and death in developing countries, it seems that we have failed to adequately address this suffering and failed to save many of the lives we could have saved by implementing different rules and institutions. In any case, we believe it is obvious that most people could and should have refrained from many evil acts but have not. Most of us have not only contributed to electing governments supporting poor international policies that impoverish people but contribute to terrible disasters like climate change. Few have never stolen or hurt another human being and most of us unjustifiably and intentionally hurt friends or family members on a regular basis in at least small ways. In short, humans often do evil unto each other, and many of those who are victims of evil do not deserve their fates.

So, we should accept the first premise of the Argument for the Human Problems of Evil and Suffering: Most people could and should have prevented much avoidable suffering and death and refrained from many evil acts, but we have not.

The second premise of the Argument for the Human Problems of Evil and Suffering is straightforward: Given that most people could and should have prevented much avoidable suffering and death and refrained from many evil acts but have not, there is a human problem of evil and suffering. Let us reflect first on the divine problems of evil and suffering before explaining and defending this premise.

Traditionally, many have used the problem of evil and suffering to question God’s existence, but here the question is whether the problems of evil and suffering give us some reason to reject (as opposed to accept) God if he exists. As we use the term, acceptance is roughly belief without a global negative judgement – a stance ‘toward the evaluative facts’ or a Reference Calhoun‘practical or quasi-practical attitude’ that inclines us not to resist ‘the imperfections of our condition’, but still allows us to try to improve upon them (Calhoun Reference Calhoun2017, 331–332). If we accept God, then we acknowledge his existence and the existence of the evil and suffering he allows in the world. However, we do not believe God is only worthy of contempt, even if we nonetheless try to improve things by alleviating the evil and suffering in the world. We reject God when we do not accept him but overall judge him (including his existence and perhaps the means by which he achieves his designs for humanity) negatively. We assume, for the sake of argument, that God exists in what follows and will leave this qualification implicit. So, on the divine version of the problems of evil and suffering, if God exists, we have reason to reject him given that he, in his beneficence, power, and knowledge allows (if not causes) such evil and suffering. Overall, we do not view God in a positive or even neutral light. Rather, the divine problems of evil and suffering give us some reason to reject God and view him with contempt.

Consider, then, the human problems of evil and suffering. Insofar as millions of deaths and much suffering from poverty-related causes are preventable, our failure to prevent them is a failure of humans as well as of God. How should we respond to these failures? If God’s failure to prevent evil and suffering provides a reason to reject God, then our failure to prevent avoidable suffering and death and our evil acts provide reason to reject ourselves. If we reject ourselves, we take our common humanity to be a proper object of contempt on the basis of the evil and suffering we inflict and allow to persist in the world.Footnote ³

The Argument for the Human Problems of Evil and Suffering’s first sub-conclusion therefore follows from its first two premises: there are human problems of evil and suffering. The next section will lay out the second sub-argument, which concludes that there is greater reason to reject ourselves than to reject God.

The argument for unequal rejection

Consider then the first premise of the Argument for Unequal Rejection, namely that the human problems of evil and suffering are worse than the divine problems of evil and suffering. Many philosophers hold that inflicting evil and suffering is worse than merely allowing it, even in cases where one creates agents who then go on to inflict harm (henceforth, we will sometimes refer to inflicting evil and suffering as harming) (Bennett Reference Bennett and McMurrin1981; Foot Reference Foot1967; Hanser Reference Hanser1995; Reference Hanser1999; Quinn Reference Quinn1989a, Reference Quinn1989b; Woollard Reference Woollard2012a, Reference Woollard2012b). An agent inflicts harm when she acts, rather than fails to act, so as to bring about harm, while an agent allows harm when she fails to act so as to prevent some harm from occurring. One’s positive agency must be involved in inflicting harm.Footnote ⁴ I inflict a harm if, for instance, I push someone off a cliff. I merely allow harm if I fail to catch someone before they stumble off a cliff. Although the person who falls off the cliff is harmed in either case, many think pushing the person off of the cliff is worse than allowing the person to stumble off the cliff. Counterfactually, the person who stumbles off the cliff probably would have experienced the very same harm regardless of my presence. However, the person who I push off the cliff probably would not have experienced any such harm. So, by inflicting a harm, I bring about a harm that counterfactually would not have occurred if I had not so acted.Footnote ⁵

One might object that because God created humans, he thereby inflicts the evil and suffering perpetrated by humans. If God is the first cause of everything, perhaps God is inflicting all the harm that follows from his act of creation. If so, we have more reason to reject God than humans.

Plausibly however, God only allows the evil and suffering inflicted by us. At least many of those who acknowledge the existence of God also hold that God endowed humans with free will. On this view, God does not bring about everything occurring in the world. At least some human agents bring about events in the world. Even if God has inflicted some notable harms, such as in his test of Job, humans are inflicting an even greater number of harms (Kellenberger Reference Kellenberger2005; Loke Reference Loke2018; Lim Reference Lim2017; Torrance Reference Torrance1961).

At least those who believe inflicting is worse than allowing harm should agree that the human problems of evil and suffering are worse than the divine ones. After all, we are the ones who inflict evil on each other and we also fail to prevent, and sometimes inflict, suffering on others.

One might object that God’s greater power or knowledge make the divine problems of evil and suffering worse than the human ones, as humans lack that power and knowledge. If God is omnipotent and omniscient, he can both foresee the possibility of forthcoming harms, and he can prevent them.

Although greater power and knowledge often make inaction worse, in this case allowing harm is not plausibly as problematic as inflicting harm. Consider a version of Bernard Williams’ (Reference Williams, Smart and Williams1973) case of Jim and the soldier. Suppose a soldier holding six people hostage tells a bystander, Jim, that he must kill one hostage to save five others (otherwise the soldier will kill them all). If Jim kills the one, Jim may bear some responsibility for the death, but the soldier bears more responsibility. If Jim does not kill the one and if all six die, again he may bear some responsibility for the resulting deaths as he could have done something to prevent the soldier’s actions, but not as much as the soldier. The soldier’s intentional agency is involved no matter what Jim does and the soldier could stop the killing simply by refraining from coercing Jim into doing so (and refraining from murder himself) – everyone would then be spared. So, what the soldier does is much worse than what Jim does, even if Jim acts wrongly.

One might initially think that God is like the soldier in that he puts humans in a world in which they will inevitably make decisions that cause evil and suffering, but God is not like the soldier because he does not create the dilemma itself. That is, God does not create the conditions that lead to the problems of human evil and suffering – humans do. He only allows for the conditions to arise in which the dilemma occurs, which makes God only indirectly responsible for bringing about that suffering.

Instead, God is like a parent who raised a child who inflicts some terrible harm. While the parent may bear some responsibility for creating the conditions in which the child ultimately inflicts this harm, the parent does not typically bear direct responsibility for the child’s harmful actions (at least, not when the child is an adult). A person is directly responsible for a harm (or benefit) when no other agent mediates their involvement. A person is indirectly responsible for a harm when their involvement in bringing about the harm is mediated by another individual’s involvement in the harm in such a way that the involvement of the former is dependent on the involvement of the latter but not vice versa. This dependency relation makes it so that the former would not be responsible for a harm if the latter refrained from harmful activities. So, if the child refrained from inflicting any harm, then the parent would bear no responsibility because no harm would have occurred.

If humans are like the child who inflicts evil or suffering, then it may instead initially seem as though humans are like Jim, who must make the choice of whether or not to kill, but we hold that humans are, instead, more like the soldier. This is because humans often have the ability to refrain entirely from inflicting harm. If humans, like the soldier, refrained from inflicting harm in the world, then, like Jim, God would not be contributing to those harms in any way. God would not have any obligation to prevent the evil and suffering we inflict were it not that we wilfully inflict it. We involve God in our harmful plans and not the other way around.

One might still be concerned that we have not done enough to defend against the claim that God is better placed to prevent or eliminate evil and suffering than humans. We have argued that, while God is only indirectly responsible for evil and suffering, human beings are directly responsible when they inflict or fail to prevent it. Assuming direct responsibility for inflicting or failing to prevent evil and suffering is worse than indirect responsibility, it follows that the problem of human evil and suffering is morally worse than the problem of divine evil and suffering. A critical reader might reply that this argument shows that human evils are worse than divine evils only in one respect, since the extent to which an agent is morally responsible for some harm is not entirely a function of whether the agent was directly or indirectly morally responsible for the evil. Other kinds of considerations, such as the psychological state of the agent or the likelihood of an agent succeeding in preventing some harm, can mitigate an agent’s moral responsibility. Moreover, one might hold that such considerations overwhelmingly favour humanity over God. After all, God, like the parent, is far more rational than humans and far more powerful, so God can always succeed in preventing harm while humans (like the child), are much more fallible, and may find it much more difficult to do so. So, one might contend, an all-powerful and omniscient God bears more responsibility for the evil and suffering in the world than humans, and therefore we have more reason to reject God than to reject ourselves.

Compare the situation with that of a responsible adult who intentionally refuses to stop a child from ingesting cyanide when stopping the child is an easy task. It seems much worse for the adult to refuse to act than for the child (with limited judgement, due to her young age) to intentionally give the cyanide to her friend. In this example, humans are like the child giving a friend cyanide to drink whereas God is like the adult, and the example shows that allowing a harm is sometimes worse (other things equal) than doing something harmful when the ‘doer’ is less rationally competent or otherwise more limited than the ‘allower’.

As a point of clarification, we are open to the claim that allowing a harm is sometimes worse than doing something harmful, which is well demonstrated by this example, but our argument for why God is less worthy of rejection than humans also relies on a different distinction, namely direct versus indirect responsibility for bringing about some harm. Our claim is that direct responsibility for a harm is worse than indirect responsibility for a harm. This is because the involvement of a person indirectly responsible for some harm is always mediated by the intentional agency of another moral agent. If the other individual were to refrain from harmful activities, then no-one would be responsible for bringing about the harm. If the other individual proceeds, then both agents bear some responsibility for the harm. But, when the harmful outcome – regardless of whether it was executed as a doing or an allowing – is primarily intended by only one of the agents, then that agent bears the bulk of the moral responsibility (regardless of whether the outcome was the result of a doing or an allowing).

The question is whether God’s indirect responsibility is greater than humanity’s direct responsibility in light of our limitations. In the cyanide example, both the child and the adult are directly responsible for the harmful outcome – just as long as we are willing to grant that the child can bear any responsibility at all. Though, presumably, the child’s responsibility is mitigated by their limitations whereas the adult’s responsibility is not. Still, humans are not analogous to the child in the cyanide scenario. Humans are not perfect moral agents who are fully morally responsible for all of our actions. Still, humans, despite our limitations, do bear full moral responsibility for our actions most of the time. This is a central tenet of modern moral philosophy. To compare humanity to the child, from the moral standpoint, is simply to deny that we bear these burdens. Meaning, the question is whether God is more morally responsible for the evil and suffering we inflict on each other when his involvement in bringing about these evils is wholly dependent on the activities of full-fledged moral agents. We have contended that this is unlikely. So, we are not merely arguing that God is indirectly responsible for anthropogenic harms. We are arguing that God’s responsibility is mediated and mitigated by the involvement of other moral agents and that God is, correspondingly, less morally responsible for bringing about evil and suffering than humanity. Importantly, humanity’s dirtying of God’s hands (as Bernard Williams might put it) might very well count as a moral trespass against God – one for which humans are susceptible to additional moral criticism.Footnote ⁶ From the Judeo-Christian standpoint at least, this could speak quite poorly of humanity in the overall moral calculus of who is most worthy of rejection.

Our previous reflections suggest that there is greater reason to reject humans than God even if an all-powerful God could eliminate all of the evil and suffering in the world while no individual human could. We further note that, if humans have free will, then our powers are roughly equal to God’s in the ways that matter morally. That is, we could refrain from inflicting evil – even if it is very difficult for us to do so because we are more limited than God. Even though humans are fallible and limited compared to God, human limitations cannot be so extensive that they interfere with our free will. Meaning, if humans indeed have free will then each of us must be in a position to overcome those limitations and act in a way that makes us fully morally responsible for our actions. So, even if human limitations sometimes mitigate how morally responsible we are for causing evil and suffering, God has endowed us with the freedom to refrain from causing evil and suffering in the face of those limitations. Therefore, one might think there are additional moral criticisms that make humanity worthy of rejection, which can be levied against us when we freely choose to not overcome our limitations and prevent evil. Presumably, God is never subject to these additional criticisms because he never suffers these limitations, while humanity continually amasses additional blame for failing to overcome its limitations. If so, then humans may yet be more worthy of rejection than God.

In conclusion, this subsection has argued that the reason humans are at least as criticizable and worthy of rejection as God, if not more so, is that we directly inflict evil and suffering, and, while we may sometimes be less morally responsible for causing evil and suffering due to our limitations, we are criticizable for failing to overcome our limitations while God is never the subject of these criticisms.Footnote ⁷ We hope some readers will find our arguments compelling but acknowledge that some readers will not accept the arguments for C3. Even so, the overall conclusions of this article, regarding the claim that there are some prudential and so forth reasons to worship God, may stand independently as we will argue for each using empirical evidence. In any case, we believe the above arguments present sufficient evidence to proceed on the conditional assumption that this premise is correct.

We therefore propose that there is greater reason to reject ourselves than to reject God. This is because, if the divine problems of evil and suffering give us reason to reject a seemingly irredeemable God, then the human problems of evil and suffering, which are greater, give us as much, if not more, reason to reject ourselves.Footnote ⁸ Often people bear more responsibility for doing evil and causing avoidable suffering than God, and we cannot reasonably accept those whose failings are greater without accepting those whose failings are less.Footnote ⁹

So, it should follow that we have more reason to reject ourselves than God. Note also that the reason we might reject God in light of the divine problems of evil and suffering is that God’s good attributes (e.g. his beneficence, power, and knowledge) are not good enough to make accepting him reasonable. So, if we have reason to reject God, we have reason to reject ourselves with our inferior beneficence, power, and knowledge.

The next sub-section defends the Argument Against Rejecting God. According to this argument, we should not reject ourselves and since there is a greater reason to do so than to reject God, we should not reject God.

The argument against rejecting god

The first premise of the Argument Against Rejecting God states that we should not reject ourselves but rather that we should accept ourselves for moral, prudential, and epistemic reasons.Footnote ¹⁰ Again, acceptance is, roughly, belief without global negative judgement. Self-acceptance, then, is a belief that we are not irredeemably bad. If we accept ourselves, we can acknowledge our limitations and even desire to change them, but cannot deem ourselves worthy only of contempt. And, we have prudential, moral, and epistemic reasons to accept ourselves.Footnote ¹¹

Consider, first, some prudential reasons for self-acceptance. Failure to accept oneself is correlated with low self-esteem, depression, anxiety, perfectionism, and narcissism (Chamberlain and Haaga Reference Chamberlain and Haaga2001a, Reference Chamberlain and Haaga2001b; Flett, Besser, Davis and Hewitt Reference Flett, Besser, Davis and Hewitt2003; Hoffman Reference Hoffman2006; Loiacano Reference Loiacano1989; Lundh Reference Lundh2004; McKenna and Bargh Reference McKenna and Bargh1998; Walters and Simoni Reference Walters and Simoni1993). Such negative psychological traits are associated with poor overall physical and psychological well-being. For example, perfectionists often suffer from a sense of ‘contingent self-worth’ (MacInnes Reference MacInnes2006). This sense of self-worth can be undermined by negative events, including negative feedback. Those whose self-acceptance is unconditional, on the other hand, have more robust senses of self-worth.Footnote ¹² Like self-acceptance, self-forgiveness is a complex phenomenon, which includes one’s willingness to give up negative self-assessments and corresponding negative emotions despite recognizing one’s personal failures. Yet, it goes farther than self-acceptance in aiming to cultivate positive self-assessments and corresponding positive emotions to replace the negative ones (Enright Reference Enright1996). Self-forgiveness, which requires self-acceptance, is associated with a number of positive health outcomes (Lavelock et al. Reference Lavelock, Griffin and Worthington2013, Reference Lavelock, Snipes, Griffin, Worthington, Davis, Hook, Benotsch, Ritter, Toussaint, Worthington and Williams2015; Worthington et al. Reference Worthington, Berry, Parrott, Plante and Sherman2001; Worthington and Scherer Reference Worthington and Scherer2004; Worthington et al. Reference Worthington, Witvliet, Pietrini and Miller2007). For example, Worthington et al. (Reference Worthington, Berry, Parrott, Plante and Sherman2001) and Lavelock et al. (Reference Lavelock, Snipes, Griffin, Worthington, Davis, Hook, Benotsch, Ritter, Toussaint, Worthington and Williams2015) show that self-forgiveness is associated with an increase in positive experiences, such as empathy and compassion, and various measures of well-being. In contrast, rumination and tension associated with shame and guilt are negative consequences of denying oneself self-forgiveness.

Consider, next, some tentative moral reasons for self-acceptance. People who accept themselves are more likely to accept others, which is good for building social support networks (Omwake Reference Omwake1954). More importantly, self-acceptance appears to mitigate prejudice (Masuda et al. Reference Masuda, Hayes, Fletcher, Seignourel, Bunting, Herbst, Twohig and Lillis2007; Rubin Reference Rubin1967a, Reference Rubin1967b). So, acceptance may well help prevent or alleviate suffering. In addition, people demonstrating self-acceptance tend to do a better job of appreciating their role in, and responsibility for, negative events without significant psychological distress (Leary et al. Reference Leary, Tate, Adams, Batts Allen and Hancock2007). If that is right, there is some moral reason to accept ourselves.

Moreover, there is some reason to think self-acceptance will improve our epistemic abilities. Self-acceptance is associated with fewer irrational beliefs, which are defined as beliefs inconsistent with reality (Davies Reference Davies2006, Reference Davies2008a, Reference Davies2008b). From a therapeutic perspective, irrational beliefs are problematic because they can lead people to develop dysfunctional emotional responses and behaviours, as well as psychological distress. People demonstrating self-acceptance also do a better job of accepting negative feedback (and may thus be more willing to accept their own failings) (Chamberlain and Haaga Reference Chamberlain and Haaga2001b; Leary et al. Reference Leary, Tate, Adams, Batts Allen and Hancock2007; Taylor and Combs Reference Taylor and Combs1952). So, self-acceptance may help one arrive at accurate beliefs about oneself.

Finally, there is evidence that accepting ourselves (and our limitations) can help us care for others. Romantic partners who have more self-compassion are described by their partners as more accepting, autonomy supporting and less controlling or verbally aggressive. Self-compassion involves selecting self-kindness over self-judgment (Neff and Beretvas Reference Neff and Beretvas2013; Neff and Lamb Reference Neff and Lamb2009). Those with self-compassion are also more likely to compromise when in conflict with friends and family. Moreover, caregivers who show self-compassion experience less burnout and are more satisfied as caregivers (Raab Reference Raab2014). In short, self-compassion and acceptance can help us care for others as well as ourselves.

The empirical evidence supports the following argument for self-acceptance: we have prudential, moral, and epistemic reasons to accept ourselves because acknowledging our own limitations often promotes survival, flourishing, and can help people help others, in the face of the problems of human evil and suffering. We must often accept our failings to survive and flourish despite them and acknowledge our failings to do better in the future. Understanding that we ourselves are limited in our understanding, power, and beneficence can help us to distinguish between the things that we, with our limited knowledge, power, and beneficence cannot change and those that we can. We may not be able to appropriately care for others without accepting our own limitations (we need to know what it is we can do, and what we cannot do, in order to do what we can). The evidence that self-acceptance can help us arrive at more accurate beliefs (Davies Reference Davies2006) and accept negative feedback (Chamberlain and Haaga Reference Chamberlain and Haaga2001b; Taylor and Combs Reference Taylor and Combs1952) suggests that it can help us acknowledge our failings (Leary et al. Reference Leary, Tate, Adams, Batts Allen and Hancock2007). And, we have seen that people who accept themselves are more likely to form better relationships and to survive and flourish (Hawton Reference Hawton1987; Blair-West et al. Reference Blair-West, Cantor, Mellsop and Eyeson-Annan1999; Rihmer Reference Rihmer2007; Hawton et al. Reference Hawton, Comabella, Haw and Saunders2013; Vazire and Funder Reference Vazire and Funder2006; Stucke and Sporer Reference Stucke and Sporer2002; Luyckx et al. Reference Luyckx, Soenens, Goossens, Beckx and Wouters2008; Zuckerman and O’Loughlin Reference Zuckerman and O’Loughlin2009; Sirois and Molnar Reference Sirois and Molnar2016; Davies Reference Davies2006, Reference Davies2008a, Reference Davies2008b; Taylor and Combs Reference Taylor and Combs1952; Chamberlain and Haaga Reference Chamberlain and Haaga2001b; Leary et al. Reference Leary, Tate, Adams, Batts Allen and Hancock2007; Neff and Lamb Reference Neff and Lamb2009; Neff and Beretvas Reference Neff and Beretvas2013; Raab Reference Raab2014).

We can allow that some people may not be better able to survive, flourish or help others if they accept themselves and that there are cases in which we should not let ourselves off the moral hook even to help others. Psychopaths, and other people with significant psychological deficits, may have no prudential, epistemic, or moral reasons to accept themselves (though perhaps self-acceptance can help such people take more responsibility for their bad behaviour). We similarly acknowledge that people who can avoid evil even when they despise themselves might not benefit morally from self-acceptance. We only argue that there are often prudential, epistemic and moral reasons for self-acceptance.

The second premise of the Argument Against Rejecting God says that since we should not reject ourselves, given the previously established sub-conclusion that there is greater reason to reject humanity than to reject God, we should not reject God. We take this premise to be self-evident. So, we should not reject God. The next sub-section defends The Argument for Accepting God.

The argument for accepting god

Consider the first premise of The Argument for Accepting God: if we should not reject God (and he exists), we should accept him. This is true by the definition of acceptance and rejection since rejection is just the absence of acceptance. So, given that the last section established that we should not reject God (if he exists), The Argument for Accepting God conclusion follows directly: we should accept God (if he exists).

Let us put this another way: given that we have at least as much reason to accept God as we do to accept ourselves in light of the human problems of evil and suffering and given God’s superior capacities, accepting God if we accept ourselves appears to be a requirement of consistency – we should not treat those who are more deserving as if they were less deserving. Moreover, given that prudential, moral, and epistemic reasons exist for accepting ourselves (as doing so can help us survive, flourish, and better care for others), then we have similar reason to accept God if similar prudential, moral, and epistemic reasons to accept God (if he exists).Footnote ¹³

The empirical literature does indeed some additional such reasons to accept God. Religiosity has been documented to help us come to terms with our limitations in part by helping us distinguish between what we can and cannot control. When God is perceived as a partner or collaborator, rather than an external force, people sometimes develop a sense of ‘collaborative control’ (Pargament et al. Reference Pargament, Kennell, Hathaway, Grevengoed, Newman and Jones1988; Krause Reference Krause2010; Fiori et al. Reference Fiori, Brown, Cortina and Antonucci2006). In such cases, people cede their sense of control over external factors to God, their partner, and take increased control over managing their internal qualities, such as how they cope with external factors. For example, a person suffering from cancer, which is outside of her control, might ask God to give her the strength to manage it (Fiori et al. Reference Fiori, Hays and Meador2004).

In summary, we are proposing that prudential reasons in favour of accepting God sometimes outweigh the moral reasons against doing so. Recall that the moral reasons against accepting God derive from the amount of evil and suffering produced. Some will object that the prudential benefits of accepting God cannot justify doing so as the idea that God is good enough to accept flies in the face of our moral intuitions. However, we believe that we should not hold others to a higher standard than we hold ourselves. Moreover, we should sometimes accept others even when given weighty considerations against doing so. Consider, for instance, how supporting a friend or romantic partner may require overlooking their faults. In fact, trust may often require at least withholding judgement that one’s friend has done something unforgivable. Importantly, we should emphasize that this is not an argument that prudential reasons in favour of accepting God outweigh epistemic reasons against believing that God exists. That would be a different sort of argument. Accepting God, which is belief without global negative judgement where we deem God valueless or unworthy of redemption, is not the same thing as believing that God exists. We are arguing that, assuming God exists, we have some reason to similarly overlook the faults we might perceive in God and accept him in order to obtain various prudential, moral, and epistemic benefits.

Of course, we understand that many religious people may prefer theological or moral reasons to worship God to prudential ones but given that prudential reasons can be more important, all things considered, than moral reasons and that prudential reasons can supplement moral and theological reasons, we believe that they may welcome these additional arguments instead of rejecting them as some who would not otherwise be inclined to worship God may find good reasons to endorse these arguments while remaining somewhat sceptical of other arguments for worship.

There is a difference, however, between acceptance and worship. Recall that acceptance is, roughly, belief without a global negative judgement. If we accept ourselves, we can acknowledge our limitations and even desire to change them. We should not deem ourselves unworthy of redemption nor hold ourselves in contempt. People use worship in many ways. On some accounts of worship, it is a kind of respect (Burling Reference Burling2018). On other accounts, worship requires complete submission or obedience to an entity one views ‘as absolutely worthy of worship’, as well as the performance of ‘rituals or communicative acts’ expressing this obedience (Aikin Reference Aikin2010). Some believe worship ‘involves affective and emotional attitudes such as awe (a type of fear) … judging that the object of worship is more powerful in some respect than oneself… reverence – a form of humility and respect … more straightforward emotional attitudes like love [and/or] … aesthetic attitudes – admiration, marvel of existence, wonder and adoration’ (Bayne and Nagasawa Reference Bayne and Nagasawa2006, 300). Others suggest worship is ‘related to the notions of holiness and sanctity’ and involves attributions of moral superiority (Bayne and Nagasawa Reference Bayne and Nagasawa2006, 301). They may also claim that it is ‘an attitude that one can take only towards agents’ that is distinct from veneration and hero-worship and comes in degrees (Bayne and Nagasawa Reference Bayne and Nagasawa2006, 30). Finally, some argue that God is the only appropriate object of worship (Bayne and Nagasawa Reference Bayne and Nagasawa2006; Lewis Reference Lewis1983).

Some of these views pose problems for other common monotheistic commitments, but our argument is compatible with many accounts of worship and, in this section, we have only argued that there is reason to accept, not that we must worship, God. Some views of worship may suggest we can legitimately worship things other than God and others are incompatible with many exercises of free will (e.g. if worship requires unconditional acceptance) (Aikin Reference Aikin2010; Cray Reference Cray2011). We will suppose, here, that worship at least requires honour or exaltation. We hold those we worship in high esteem and see them as worthy of emulation in at least some important respects. However, our argument may work with a different account of worship that is compatible with free will and entails that God is the only appropriate object worthy of worship. In any case, thus far we have only argued that we have prudential, moral, and epistemic reasons to accept God, not that we must worship him. The next sub-section defends the final part of this article’s argument – The Argument for Worship.

The argument for worship

There are many compelling reasons to worship God. If we accept the existence of an all-powerful, knowledgeable and beneficent ruler, then perhaps that is grounds itself for worship (Cray Reference Cray2011).Footnote ¹⁴ Moreover, some suggest that if God has provided us with the good things it involves, then perhaps we have a duty to worship him (Burling Reference Burling2018, 488). Or, if God is perfect, that might be grounds for worship (Lewis Reference Lewis1983).Footnote ¹⁵

On the other hand, some insist that even an all-powerful, knowing, and beneficent ruler merits contempt if he allows evil and suffering to persist (Lewis Reference Lewis1983; Hassoun Reference Hassoun2015a). After all, despite the good things God contributes to human lives, it often appears that he allows great evil and suffering in our lives as well. So, just as the good things in human life might ground a duty for thankful worship, the evil and suffering in human lives might give us reason to despise God.

But the Argument for Worship’s key premise is the narrow claim that if we have prudential, moral, and epistemic reasons to accept ourselves and should accept God, then we have some reason to worship him based on similar justifications (if he exists).Footnote ¹⁶ Given God’s comparative greatness, and given that we have prudential, moral, and epistemic reasons to accept ourselves, it seems God merits more than mere acceptance. In fact, the same kinds of prudential, epistemic, and moral considerations used to defend the claim that we should accept ourselves provides some reasons for some people to worship God (despite the evil and suffering he allows), especially if doing so can help us survive, flourish, and better help others.Footnote ¹⁷ Recall that as we use the term, worship at least requires honouring those we worship.Footnote ¹⁸ We hold those we worship in high esteem and see them as worthy of emulation in at least some important respects.Footnote ¹⁹ Worship may be a good way of acknowledging our own limitations.Footnote ²⁰ For example, cultivating one’s religiosity is associated with increased self-forgiveness, which can help people come to terms with personal failures (Krause Reference Krause2010; Webb et al. Reference Webb, Toussaint and Conway-Williams2012, Reference Webb, Hirsch and Toussaint2017). Some scholars have found empirical evidence that seeking forgiveness from God and feeling forgiven promote self-forgiveness (Hall and Fincham Reference Hall and Fincham2005; McConnell and Dixon Reference McConnell and Dixon2012; Lavelock, Snipes, Griffin, Worthington, Davis, Hook, Benotsch and Ritter Reference Lavelock, Snipes, Griffin, Worthington, Davis, Hook, Benotsch, Ritter, Toussaint, Worthington and Williams2015). Recall, moreover, that self-forgiveness, which requires self-acceptance, helps us to survive, flourish and/or help others (Chamberlain and Haaga Reference Chamberlain and Haaga2001a, Reference Chamberlain and Haaga2001b; Lundh Reference Lundh2004; Neff and Beretvas Reference Neff and Beretvas2013; Neff and Lamb Reference Neff and Lamb2009; Raab Reference Raab2014).Footnote ²¹ Consider that therapeutic pastoral care often works by helping people understand their limitations and forgive themselves. Behaviours, such as drug and alcohol use or infidelity in a relationship, often lead people to feel guilt or shame. When people perceive these as acts that alienate them from the sacred or the divine, therapeutic pastoral-care can help them seek forgiveness from God and themselves in order to better understand and overcome their personal failures (Worthington, Berry, and Parrott III Reference Worthington, Berry, Parrott, Plante and Sherman2001).

Perhaps it is even by worshiping God that many people can find the humility necessary to get the help they need to accept themselves. Many researchers have found a correlation between self-reported religiosity and humility, which may help improve well-being and promote self-acceptance (Weiss and Knight Reference Weiss and Knight1980; Bollinger and Hill Reference Bollinger, Hill and Plante2012; Krause Reference Krause2010; Sapmaz et al. Reference Sapmaz, Yıldırım, Topçuoğlu, Nalbant and Sızır2016).Footnote ²² Existing studies suggest that religious people are more humble, self-forgiving, and report having better health and well-being (Krause Reference Krause2010, Reference Krause2015; Krause and Hayward Reference Krause and Hayward2014).Footnote ²³

We acknowledge that this is not a definitive argument for worship, as some may maintain that the proper ways of relating to God require more than acceptance, and yet does not amount to worship. Perhaps some will insist, for instance, that God merits praise but should not be held in high esteem or emulated.

Moreover, whether worship is a good way of acknowledging our own limitations and will help us get the help we need to accept ourselves, survive, and flourish probably depends on individual, and perhaps group, differences. We do not argue that accepting God is the only path to self-acceptance, which allows people to overcome their shortcomings and promotes well-being. We only argue that our proposal offers one such course, which may be more beneficial to some individuals and groups than others (Gibbs and Goldbach Reference Gibbs and Goldbach2015; Strawbridge et al. Reference Strawbridge, Shema, Cohen, Roberts and Kaplan1998).Footnote ²⁴

Of course, many develop the self-acceptance necessary for flourishing without worship. Some do not think that most people have wrongly failed to prevent or caused much suffering. Others do not seem to take our failings to provide reasons to reject ourselves. Yet others have found that self-acceptance can be achieved through various forms of individually driven self-development programmes, especially in the case of ‘self-help’ driven mindfulness activities like meditation. (Cavanagh et al. Reference Cavanagh, Strauss, Forder and Jones2014). Cultivating mindfulness may, for instance, help people accept themselves (Carson and Langer Reference Carson and Langer2006; Jimenez et al. Reference Jimenez, Niles and Park2010).

Whether worship will help us may also depend on how we worship. Mindfulness practices are at the centre of many forms of non-western religions (Bodhi Reference Bodhi2011). Psychologists have begun utilizing mindfulness practices from these traditions to combat addiction and other negative psychological phenomena, so integrating mindfulness practices into monotheistic religious worship could be an alternative route to cultivating self-acceptance (Dryden and Still Reference Dryden and Still2006, Kang and Whittingham Reference Kang and Whittingham2010; Khanna and Greeson Reference Khanna and Greeson2013). Among Christians in some geographical regions, researchers have found some religious practices and denominations increase well-being more than others (Koenig et al. Reference Koenig, George, Meador, Blazer and Ford1994). The latter forms of worship may help less with developing the kind of self-acceptance or self-forgiveness needed to improve well-being.

One might object that our argument is inconsistent with the right account of worship or that we are presenting the wrong kinds of reasons for worshipping God because God should be worshipped out of duty, love or respect. Some believe, for instance, that worship is a relationship developed with God or hold that when we worship God, we fulfil our obligations with the expectation that God will fulfil his (whatever they are) (Luhrmann Reference Luhrmann2004; Pollner Reference Pollner1989). In doing so, we love, respect, and act out of duty to God. On our account, our reasons to worship are prudential, epistemic, and moral but do not capture the importance of developing this relationship.

The view that we propose is compatible with the relationship account of worship as well as many others and, moreover, provides new reasons to worship God beyond those suggested above. On our account, worship at least requires honour or exaltation, viewing those we worship as worthy of esteem and emulation (in at least some respects) and shaping our lives accordingly. But, worship may also require developing a relationship with God, and some of the evidence we offer suggests that it could help to develop a relationship with God. In some cases, religious individuals are better able to manage life stressors and acknowledge their own limitations when they perceive God as an ally or collaborator who helps to manage the life events outside of the individual’s control (Pargament et al. Reference Pargament, Kennell, Hathaway, Grevengoed, Newman and Jones1988; Schieman 2003; Krause Reference Krause2010; Fiori et al. Reference Fiori, Brown, Cortina and Antonucci2006). Part of loving, respecting, and fulfilling our duty to God may be to have this relationship as well as to honour, exalt and view God as worthy of emulation, shaping our lives accordingly.

Assuming an all-powerful, knowing, and beneficent God exists, and given our arguments that we have prudential, moral, and epistemic reasons to accept ourselves and him, we have some reason to worship God. At least when worshiping God can help us survive, flourish, and/or help others, in the face of the problems of human evil and suffering, we have some reason to worship God (especially given God’s comparative greatness).