Human beings are a highly social species, and there are neural systems that have a role in enabling human beings to function as the social animals they are. They connect people into smaller or larger social groups; and at least some of these groups have a unity that lets the united human beings function as one. That this is so has implications for an array of philosophical and theological issues, including the notion of a people, the concomitant notions of a people’s communal guilt and communal shame, the notion of the church as the body of Christ, the understanding of human perfection as a likeness to a triune God, and many other such issues. What is required to elucidate these issues is a metaphysics that can explain the nature of a united something-or-other that includes human persons as constituents. This article explores these issues and outlines the nature of the needed metaphysics.

Consider a simple argument that worshipping God is wrong. This world is not a nice place. Not only do humans persecute and inflict other evils on each other, but millions of people suffer and die every year from preventable poverty-related causes, and it seems that few, if any, deserve their plights. It is unclear that we should want to be associated with, never mind worship, a being with the capacity to make the world a much better place but whose beneficence (or knowledge) permits things to go on in the ways that they do. At first blush, contempt is a more fitting response to God than worship. But, assuming God exists, perhaps we have reason to accept, if not worship, him in any case. Humans are comparably limited. We do evil unto each other, and, insofar as millions of deaths are preventable, our failure to prevent them is a failure of humans as well as of God. If we could (and should) have saved many lives and have not, our moral failings present us with our own, human, problem of evil and suffering. So, if we should reject God because so many people suffer, then we should reject ourselves when we could avoid evil and help others too. However, this article argues that we have practical, moral, and epistemic reasons to accept rather than reject ourselves, and similarly we have reasons to accept God. And if we have reason to accept God, then we have some reason to worship God. Worship is a way of acknowledging our own limitations and can help us survive, flourish, and help others in the face of the problems of human evil and suffering.

Being deeply embedded in the mythological framework of old-school Christian angelology, the theodicy presented in this article outlines a thoroughgoing and unexpectedly simple solution to the problem of evil. Unlike other Satan-oriented theodicies, whose central idea is that natural evil is reducible to moral evil by taking the malevolent actions of demons into consideration, it accounts for both natural and moral evil in perfectly familiar deal-making terms. Of particular interest is that it makes no appeal to the overriding importance of free will nor to the inscrutability of God’s ways. Instead it envisions a primordial agreement on which everything depends. If it stands up to scrutiny, it offers an intriguing explanation for why God permits such an awful lot of badness.

I begin with the intuition that there is something wrong with praying for the past, for example, praying for a basketball team to win after the game has ended. My aim is to find a philosophical explanation for why this is wrong. I explore three explanations for the wrongness in praying for the past, reject the first two, and offer a third. The first is based on the idea that prayer for the past is inefficacious. This assumption turns out to be mistaken. The second relies on religious considerations; I reject this explanation since it is too narrow and does not explain the initial intuition. I then argue that prayer for past events is wrong in virtue of being an unwarranted response, similar to how emotions can be unwarranted. I use concepts from the philosophy of fittingness to articulate my explanation.

This article discusses the prospects and pitfalls of science-engaged theology (SET) – a new and growing movement in the science and religion discourse. The guiding question of this enquiry is why, when, and how theology should engage with the sciences. After introducing what I call the ‘source account’ of SET that has emerged in recent discussion, I show that this basic account often comes with additional commitments: the ‘no methodology’ and ‘locality and specificity’ theses, both of which address the ‘how’ question, and the ‘entanglement’ thesis, which addresses the ‘when’ question. I argue that accepting any of them as an essential feature makes SET methodologically flawed. To provide alternative answers, I then propose to interpret the sources of theology in terms of the so-called loci theologici. Recognizing the sciences specifically among the loci theologici alieni also helps to counter the view that SET may spell the end of the discipline of science and religion. The aim is, therefore, to show that the source account of SET, if taken in a minimal sense, is a valuable contribution to the science and religion discourse, without replacing it, whereas SET, if coupled with these additional assumptions, would and has considerably muddied the waters.

From the thought of mid-twentieth-century Mexican philosopher Jorge Portilla (1919–1964), I develop a three-prong existentialist response to the problem of evil. One prong is granting that a version of the problem of evil is successful: no theodicy is credible while beholding innocent suffering. A second prong involves an affective engagement with evil that facilitates a loving human flourishing grounded in solidarity with sufferers, compassion, loving self-sacrifice, and taking responsibility for one’s own culpability. The final prong is the capacity of this affective engagement with evil to permit a belief in God as an existential commitment to a suffering God as a transcendental ideal of self-sacrificing love that guides one’s perpetual project of self-creation.

In the philosophy of religion, ‘de jure objections’ is an umbrella term that covers a wide variety of arguments for the conclusion that theistic belief is rationally impermissible, whether or not God exists. What we call ‘modal Calvinism’ counters these objections by proposing that ‘if God exists, God would ensure that theistic belief is rationally compelling on a global scale’, a modal conditional that is compatible with atheism. We respond to this modal Calvinist argument by examining it through the lenses of probability, modality, and logic – particularly, we apply analytical tools such as possible world semantics, Bayesian reasoning, and paraconsistent models. After examining various forms of the argument, we argue that none can compel atheists to believe that serious theistic possibilities worth considering would involve the purported divine measure.

Although many contemporary theologians and philosophers of religion distinguish between ‘idolatry’ in a general sense and ‘conceptual idolatry’ as a distinct error, close attention to theorists of idolatry shows that ‘conceptual idolatry’ should not be considered distinct from idolatry proper. After discussing the relation between concepts and idolatry in key thinkers from the phenomenological and grammatical traditions, this article discusses analytic attempts to understand idolatry, showing how each falls short.

Ultimately, attention to the category of ‘conceptual idolatry’ shows the deficiencies present in contemporary framings of idolatry simpliciter. This article concludes with a proposal for a new framework by which to understand the dispute about idolatry: turning away from the question of whether we are worshipping the right God, towards the question of how God might (and might not) become apt to human thought and speech.

The famous Catholic pilgrimage site at Lourdes, France, until fairly recently displayed hundreds of discarded crutches as testament to miraculous cures. It has, though, never displayed a wooden leg. Hence the Wooden Leg Problem (WLP) for believers in miracles: if God can cure paralysis, why does He seem never to have given an amputee back their lost limb? The WLP is a severe challenge for believers in miracles and must be confronted head-on. Yet there does not appear to be any systematic analysis of the problem, at least as formulated here, in the literature on miracles or philosophy of religion generally. I discuss ten possible solutions to the WLP on behalf of the believer in miracles. Although some are stronger than others, all but the final one seem too weak to solve the problem. It is the final one – the ‘how do you know?’ solution – that I endorse and examine in some depth. This solution, I argue, shows that the WLP does not move the epistemological dial when it comes to belief or disbelief in miracles.

This article develops the problem of divine domination. Classical theism describes God as essentially all-powerful, sovereign, personal, omnipresent, and a se. If such a being exists, then he dominates humans in virtue of his essential properties. Since dominative relationships are unjust, the divine-human relationship is unjust. I reject solutions to this problem that appeal to humanity’s childlikeness or divine goodness, justice, or greatness. I conclude by gesturing towards what a solution to the problem might require.

While apophatic theology has been quickly dismissed by the vast majority of analytic philosophers, Samuel Lebens is among the few who has tried to show that such a theological position is tenable by appealing to two main philosophical moves. The first move is that many of our claims about God are false (or nonsensical). The second move is that such false (or nonsensical) claims about God are illuminating and/or therapeutic. This article presents Lebens’s account of apophatic theology, and defends it from the main criticisms. However, it also shows that, contrary to what has been suggested by Lebens himself, the disjunction which appears in the first move has to be understood as exclusive, that is, either many of our claims about God are false or many of our claims about God are nonsense. Tertium non datur. Moreover, this article argues that, in both cases, Lebens’s account of apophatic theology stumbles upon some important issues. For, if many of our claims about God are taken to be false or nonsensical, Lebens fails to explain how such claims can be illuminating and/or therapeutic.

This article is part of Religious Studies’ new initiative to publish a series of interviews with distinguished philosophers of religion. Each interview explores the personal and academic background of the interviewee and discusses their core philosophical views. The aim is to inspire students and scholars and to provide an overview of some of the most important works developed by contemporary philosophers of religion. In this interview, Tyler Dalton McNabb interviews Keith Ward, covering such topics as his upbringing, his first years of teaching, his view on natural theology, and his view on special revelation in the world religions.