Defining science-engaged theology

In their Cambridge Element, Science-Engaged Theology, Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 2) introduce SET ‘to remind theologians that science ought to count among the sources of Christian theology’. The sources of theology they have in mind are primarily the so-called Wesleyan Quadrilateral (Perry and Leidenhag Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 50). According to this Methodist teaching, there are four sources of theology: (1) Scripture, (2) tradition, (3) experience, and (4) reason. Accordingly, theological statements need to be ‘revealed in Scripture, illumined by tradition, vivified in personal and corporate experience, and confirmed by reason’ (The Book of Discipline 2016, 103).

The source in question here is an epistemic source – and perhaps we can even specify the epistemic source as a source of theological knowledge, as I have suggested elsewhere (Kopf Reference Kopf2024, 2).Footnote ⁴ In any case, if science is an epistemic source of theology but is not used as such – if the source is not tapped into, as it were – it will not qualify as SET, nor will it count as SET if science is made use of but is not in fact a source of theology. Both are therefore necessary requirements: that science is an epistemic source of theology, and that it is used as an epistemic source of theology. I shall call this the ‘source account’ of SET.

Leidenhag (Reference Leidenhag and Wolfe2024b, 5) considers (SET₁) to be one among five interpretations of SET. The reason for this claim is that Harris (Reference Harris and Harris2024a, 16–22) has pointed out a development in the way in which Perry and his coworkers have conceived of SET. In their initial publication, Perry and Lane Ritchie (Reference Perry and Lane Ritchie2018, 1087–1088) speak of SET as analogous to (1) a Swiss Army Knife, which contains multiple well-defined tools for different problems, suggesting that SET comes into play whenever theological problems need multiple tools, including specific scientific tools. In their second publication, Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2021, 247) introduce SET as (2) solving theological puzzles, by which they mean ‘narrowly-focused theological questions that are already entangled with scientific theories and findings’, suggesting that SET identifies such entangled questions which, again, require multiple tools to solve the theological puzzles, including specific scientific tools. In their Cambridge Element, Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 1, my emphasis) view SET as (3) ‘a reminder to theologians that the local tools and products of the sciences ought to be sources for theological reasoning’.

In light of this, Harris (Reference Harris and Harris2024a, 22) concludes that there is an evolution of the SET movement in which

In view of this three-stage model, it might seem that the question of the sources of theology is only of transitory importance and non-essential to the SET movement. In other words, the source account of SET was proposed and advocated by Perry and his coworkers only in stage two.

Despite the outlined differences, however, there is a consistent and continued focus on ‘sources’ of theology, except in their earliest publication, where Perry and Lane Ritchie (Reference Perry and Lane Ritchie2018, 1085) talk about Scripture, tradition, experience, and reason as ‘principles of verification’ instead – a terminology they later drop. Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2021, 248) speak already of the sciences as ‘a source for theology alongside Scripture, tradition, reason and experience’, in line with the terminology used in their Cambridge Element and later writings.Footnote ⁵ What is more, even though they admittedly do not speak of sources in their first publication, the context is also and consistently the Wesleyan Quadrilateral, as the quotations above show. Therefore, (SET₁) appears to be an accurate rendering of SET, as envisioned by Perry and his coworkers. Put differently, the source account of SET is not just a transitory suggestion, as might appear from Harris’s model of the evolution of SET, but the permanent core of SET as conceived by Perry, Lane Ritchie, and Leidenhag.

Five definitions of science-engaged theology?

Building on Harris’s three-stage model, Leidenhag (Reference Leidenhag and Wolfe2024b, 3–7) claims that by now five main metaphors have been proposed to define SET, suggesting that (SET₁) falls into option (iii):

(i) SET as a Swiss Army Knife

(ii) SET as solving theological puzzles

(iii) SET as using science as a source for theology

(iv) SET as a mindset/mental attitude/disposition/reminder

(v) SET as a discipline

Harris’s stages (1) and (2) correspond to Leidenhag’s metaphors (i) and (ii), respectively. Leidenhag adds (iii) as a separate option, which Harris connected with (2), in keeping with the fact that the source terminology has, as pointed out above, been consistently used by Perry and his coworkers – and continues to be used especially by Leidenhag herself (Leidenhag Reference Leidenhag2024a, Reference Leidenhag2025). Harris’s stage (3) is (iv), which Leidenhag contrasts with Harris’s conclusion that SET seems to turn into a discipline for a few, rather than a mindset for many, if not all, theologians.Footnote ⁶

Leidenhag (Reference Leidenhag and Wolfe2024b, 3–7) now advances two claims: first, that metaphors (i) to (iii) are complementary. She reasons that while (ii) the puzzle metaphor emphasizes that the questions raised need to be local and specific, (i) the Swizz Army Knife metaphor shows that the answers must be found in an interdisciplinary manner. Speaking of (iii) sources of theology, she explains, is in turn meant to emphasize that the questions themselves are theological in nature. By contrast, she acknowledges that (iv) and (v) are in tension with each other, but argues that Perry and his coworkers have made increasingly clear that what they have in mind is (iv) and not (v): SET is meant as a task for all theologians asking relevant questions, and not simply for a few specialized ones – although it might for practical reasons require a few to specialize to help others in doing SET. In short, SET is a mindset, not a discipline. The second claim is that these five metaphors are ‘definitions’ of SET.Footnote ⁷ But a metaphor is not a definition. A metaphor cannot ‘define’ SET. At best, it serves to illustrate SET.

I take it that a better way of approaching the matter is as follows: (i) and (ii) are prominent metaphors proposed to illustrate the nature of SET. Although not being metaphors, (iv) and (v) are helpful to distinguish approaches to SET that would highlight that SET is relevant for theology in general or that it is only a specialized subdiscipline. By contrast, (iii) contains the actual definition of SET – at least of what I called the source account of SET. For this reason, I do not agree that (SET₁) should be grouped among five ‘definitional metaphors’ of SET – metaphors cannot be used as a definition – but is rather at least one way, and I would argue a broadly acceptable way, of defining SET. At least it is an accurate rendering of the influential source account of SET.

Now it might be objected that the suggested definition is too narrow, if we consider engaging with philosophy of science to be sufficient in some cases to count as SET. At least some science-engaged theologians would allow for such a philosophical mediation between theology and science.Footnote ⁸ The corresponding view of SET could be rendered as follows:

Here, theology’s engagement with the sciences would be indirect. Theology would engage directly with philosophy of science in order to indirectly tap into the source of science, so to speak. Although this engagement is thus mediated, the source of theology would have to be science itself. On the one hand, such a suggestion might look at first sight like a form of philosophy-engaged theology rather than science-engaged theology. On the other hand, engaging with some scientific insights might call for philosophical interpretation. In other words, theology might engage with the sciences in a mediated form: through the mediation of philosophy. Immediate SET would then be characterized by (SET₁), mediate SET could perhaps be characterized by (SET₂). To count as SET, however, (SET₂) would need to allow for the source still to be science in some relevant sense, even though mediated by philosophy of science. To allow for such mediated engagement with the sciences, we could stipulate the following basic definition:

What emerges from the publications of Perry and his coworkers is then a general account of SET – the source account of SET – that can be variously illustrated. And (SET_1*) can be regarded as a general definition of SET thus conceived. In the following, I will focus on this source account, to address the central question of why, when, and how theology should engage with the sciences. I will do so in reverse order: how, when, and why. If SET is to be successful, it must provide a compelling answer to all of these questions. While there is some agreement on the why question, there is considerable disagreement on the when and how questions. In this context, I will identify three prospects and two pitfalls of SET.

The no methodology thesis

The no methodology thesis (NM) states that SET must set aside questions of methodology, at least initially; if needed, a methodology can be developed ad hoc along the way. In their initial publication, Perry and Lane Ritchie (Reference Perry and Lane Ritchie2018, 1086) set up the very project of SET thus: ‘But what would happen if we set aside methodology, just for a minute, and start with some particular claim that is at home in one or another specific subdiscipline, and then work out, as needed, points of methodology on an ad hoc basis. This would be Science-Engaged Theology.’ And Davison (Reference Davison2022c, 2) confirms: ‘a desire to demote matters of methodology to second place is perhaps the definitive hallmark of this approach’. Thesis (NM) includes two proposals: first, to set aside methodology and start engaging with the sciences without any explicit methodology, and second, to provide a methodology ad hoc if needed. But setting aside methodology in any explicit manner means adopting a methodology implicitly. For, arguably, one cannot do theology – or any other scientific discipline, for that matter – be it science-engaged or otherwise without any methodology altogether. And it seems preferable to acknowledge openly one’s methodological commitments, especially in an interdisciplinary dialogue, rather than to assume a methodology implicitly without any reflection. What is more, if one acknowledges the general need for methodology, at least at some point, as even the ad hoc approach does, then it seems more reasonable to establish one’s methodology in a reflected, coherent, and consistent manner, fit for purpose, and not simply ad hoc – which is not to say that some of the methodology cannot potentially be developed or adjusted along the way.

What Perry and Lane Ritchie presumably meant by (NM) is to suggest that we do not need to work out the general, abstract relation between ‘science’ and ‘religion’, or ‘science’ and ‘theology’, before we can engage in meaningful particular work on specific questions. The S&R discourse, Perry and Lane Ritchie (Reference Perry and Lane Ritchie2018, 1089) claimed, would finally make progress if we ‘temporally set aside questions of methodology and see where we get’. Their ‘professed exhaustion with discussions of methodology’ (Leidenhag Reference Leidenhag and Wolfe2024b, 21), however, has not been taken lightly in the debate. Carmody Grey (Reference Grey2021), Peter Harrison (Reference Harrison2021), and Harris (Reference Harris and Harris2024a) – to name just a few – have all protested against thesis (NM), emphasizing that methodology and broader metaphysical questions cannot possibly be sidestepped, not even temporarily.

In reply to this criticism, Leidenhag favours a two-fold strategy. On the one hand, she claims that at least a ‘granular view of methodological reflection has always been a part of science-engaged theology’ (Leidenhag Reference Leidenhag and Wolfe2024b, 22). In other words, what needs to be set aside is not a fine-grained ad hoc methodology but a general and grand methodology. On the other hand, while acknowledging that the general and grand methodology of at least the particular sciences may affect the fine-grained outcomes of these disciplines, she suggests that a theology of science could remedy this drawback. Leidenhag’s refined no methodology thesis could be stated as follows:

As the discussion below will show, however, methodology matters for SET, including the question of whether science is a source of theology, and especially how it can be used as such. This requires more than a granular methodology. Methodology matters, then, specifically for the interdisciplinary work SET is supposed to do, not least because we have to be clear on how we can use and appropriate scientific findings in theology. Methodology also matters for the interpretation of scientific findings – everything else would be a naïve engagement with the sciences. It goes without saying that every discipline, including the various sciences and theology, needs and operates with a specific methodology. And the methodology will affect its findings. When dealing with these findings, reflecting on the way these findings were obtained matters, not only in a granular but also in a grand manner. Methodology seems to be particularly relevant for a theology that aspires to be a systematically coherent and consistent reflection on the whole of reality. For these reasons, even setting aside ‘only’ a grand methodology but retaining a granular methodology will not work. Therefore, (NM) should neither be accepted nor built into the definition of SET. Nor does (NM*) seem much more promising, not least because the grand methodology will affect the specific questions asked as well as the findings, in both the sciences and theology. What is more, a granular methodology should ideally flow from, but be at least consistent with, the grand methodology. So, methodology cannot be sidestepped, not even temporarily – neither granular nor grand methodology. And it is at least an open question how a future theology of science is supposed to remedy all of this. Perhaps something like the following would be a more nuanced way of putting the matter:

Be that as it may, the refined methodology thesis (NM**) would in fact not be a ‘no methodology’ thesis and would by no means imply a sidestepping of methodological issues in SET.

The locality and specificity thesis

The locality and specificity thesis (LS) states that SET must stay local and specific. SET ‘forces theologians engaging with the sciences to stay local and specific’ (Perry and Leidenhag Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 36). On the one hand, SET must stay specific: ‘science-engaged theology must, by definition, always be specific’ (Leidenhag Reference Leidenhag2024a, 402). Staying specific in this context means asking narrowly-focused theological questions. As Harris (Reference Harris and Harris2024a, 15) explains: ‘SET is uncompromisingly theological and deals with specific and well-defined problems rather than the essentialised and grandiose claims of “science” versus “religion”’. On the other hand, SET must stay local. Staying local means here that in asking ‘specific’ questions, theology must engage with particular scientific disciplines in a small-scale fashion, in a highly ‘localized’ manner, to find concrete answers. Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 48) explain: ‘When theologians engage the sciences, they cannot engage them all at once, nor even a whole sub-discipline (biology), perhaps nor even a sub-area of subdiscipline (mood disorders).’ Or to use the words of Harrison (Reference Harrison2021, 477), SET deals with ‘bite-sized chunks of individual sciences’. Thus, Leidenhag (Reference Leidenhag and Wolfe2024b, 8) concludes: ‘the only way forward for theologians to engage the sciences is “to stay local and specific”’.

A focus on locality and specificity can certainly help in doing the work of SET. But the question is whether SET can afford to stay local and specific. I concede that as ‘science-engaged’ theology, SET may start local and specific. But I would contend that as ‘theology’ it cannot stay local and specific. Theology has a holistic task, reflecting on God and the whole of reality as it relates to, and is revealed by, God. Only part of this reality is accessible through science. Otherwise, SET would turn into scientism, to which proponents of SET vehemently object (Leidenhag Reference Leidenhag and Wolfe2024b, 16–19). SET may paradigmatically deal with specific and well-defined theological problems and seek answers by engaging with ‘bite-sized chunks of individual sciences’. Such a commitment to a fine-grained activity, however, must not exclude a scientific, philosophical, and theological interpretation of these specific findings in light of this bigger picture, nor an integration of these localized and specific findings into an overall and holistic picture. SET may engage the sciences at a local level, but as part, and not at the expense, of a larger theological project. Otherwise, SET is in danger of turning into what Ignacio Silva and Gonzalo Recio (Reference Silva and Recio2025, 191) call a ‘piecemeal’ approach, ‘solving particular and concrete theological puzzles without a greater theological project in mind’. Such a piecemeal approach without a theological rationale carries the risk of giving way to an eclectic bundle of particularized and atomized views that shows little coherence and consistency. In short, the methodological advice should read: ‘start local and specific’, not ‘stay local and specific’.

But even turning this refined methodological advice into a necessary requirement seems too strong, as there are arguably cases of SET that we can approach differently. We should not exclude cases on methodological grounds that can, as it were, be approached top-down rather than bottom-up.Footnote ¹⁰ Nor should we exclude cases that address more general theological problems or need more than ‘local’ scientific insights in order to develop answers. Even the requirement to ‘start local and specific’ would then be too strong. Perhaps the following would work instead:

In any case, (LS) should not be considered essential to SET. We now turn from the how question, addressed in theses (NM) and (LS), to the when question.

The entanglement thesis

The entanglement thesis (E) states that SET is appropriate precisely in entanglement cases. Two interpretations are possible: SET is appropriate (i) only or (ii) paradigmatically in entanglement cases. Although I am not certain that Perry and his coworkers would want to commit themselves to (i), as they seem to allow for other appropriate cases as well, they appear to be committed at least to something like (ii).Footnote ¹¹ As we noted above, they introduce SET as solving ‘theological puzzles’, which they define as ‘narrowly-focused theological questions that are already entangled with scientific theories and findings’ (Perry and Leidenhag Reference Perry and Leidenhag2021, 247, my emphasis). Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 57) then argue that entanglement cases can be of two kinds: (a) conjunctive entanglement, where the entanglement results from the conjunction of two or more non-entangled concepts from different disciplines; and (b) concept entanglement, where the entanglement stems from a single concept that entails a claim about another discipline, or claims about other disciplines. In the former case, the claim is entangled; in the latter case, the concept is entangled. The latter Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 13) define as follows: ‘Entangled concepts are concepts that cannot be understood as either scientific or theological in meaning and origin, but only as both.’ By contrast, conjunctive entanglement they define as cases of ‘entanglement, where a claim requires the tools of more than one discipline to understand’ (Perry and Leidenhag Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 57). Put differently, SET is appropriate precisely in the case of so-called entangled questions; that is, questions concerning (a) entangled claims or (b) entangled concepts. The argument is that if and to the extent to which theology deals with entangled questions, an engagement with the sciences is appropriate: ‘whenever theologians make claims about … empirical realities, they should incorporate the insights of empirical investigation into their analysis’ (Perry and Leidenhag Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 1).

Two points call for further discussion. The first concerns the distinction between (a) conjunctive and (b) concept entanglement. Although conjunctive entanglements may arise in at least some relevant cases, it is less clear under what conditions concept entanglements would occur. Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 57) explain that ‘concept entanglement’ means that ‘the base concepts being used are entangled in multiple disciplinary conversations, even when they are (in any given moment) being used in a single discipline’. This seems to presuppose, however, that these base concepts have a univocal meaning, which is not necessarily the case. In fact, some of the examples they give for entangled concepts, such as ‘matter’ or ‘person’, seem to indicate otherwise; they do arguably not have a univocal meaning in the various disciplinary conversations in which the terms are employed.Footnote ¹² At least some of these base concepts are used analogically or could even be used equivocally. If they have analogical meanings, then the entanglement cannot simply be assumed, but must be explicated; if they have equivocal meanings, then they refer to different and entirely unrelated things, so that there is no entanglement.

In addition, further complications may arise regarding the supposedly unambiguous meaning of terms used within a single scientific discipline to express scientific concepts and the potential dependence of their semantic content on scientific theories. First, one and the same term used at a given time in a single scientific discipline may express different scientific concepts. For example, although biologists largely agree on paradigmatic examples of species, they arguably operate with a variety of different species concepts. Consequently, the meaning of ‘species’ may vary depending on the species concept the term expresses. As a consequence, not only does the concept of species in traditional metaphysics or theology not easily map onto biological species, but the term ‘species’ may also express different species concepts that exist in biology itself. Second, and closely related, the meaning of the term expressing a scientific concept may change, or so some have argued, if the scientific theory to which it belongs changes. The question arises, for example, whether the term ‘mass’ means the same in Newtonian mechanics and in the special theory of relativity. Third, some have pointed out cases where even the reference of the term expressing a scientific concept changes when the scientific theory to which it belongs changes. For example, the term ‘planet’ in the Ptolemaic theory refers to the sun but not to the earth, whereas in the Copernican theory it refers to the earth but not to the sun. Some even went so far as to suggest that a strong dependence of the meaning or reference of scientific terms on the theories to which they belong leads to some sort of incommensurability of scientific concepts, theories, or traditions.Footnote ¹³ We need not go that far to see that there are probably some further questions that would have to be addressed in order to uphold the notion of concept entanglement in the sense of Perry and Leidenhag. The disputed question in philosophy of science as to whether the semantic content of scientific concepts, or the meaning (intension) of the terms expressing them, and perhaps even their reference (extension), depends at least in part on the scientific theories to which they belong, and related questions, seems to have a certain relevance here, in addition to the remarks made above. So, there is not only a question as to whether terms have the same meaning across different disciplines, but perhaps also as to whether and to what extent the meaning of central terms within a single discipline is variable and theory-dependent. Therefore, establishing concept entanglement needs more than showing a term to come up in multiple disciplinary conversations.

The second point concerns the very notion of entanglement. The concept of entanglement would seem to imply a two-way relationship or some sort of symmetry between the involved disciplines. If there are questions that are ‘entangled’, then there would seem to be a two-way relation: one is entangled with the other, and the latter is in turn entangled with the former. To understand entangled claims or concepts, then, theology needs other disciplines, and these other disciplines also need theology to understand these claims or concepts. But this need not be the case.Footnote ¹⁴ There could be cases, and arguably a considerable number of relevant cases, where the relationship is one-way only: to understand ‘entangled’ claims or concepts, theology needs other disciplines, but these other disciplines do not need theology to understand these claims or concepts. At present, it seems to be at least an open question how many cases would qualify as an entanglement, even in the sense of a conjunctive entanglement.

At least for the purpose of SET,Footnote ¹⁵ I suggest the notion of entailment is more helpful than the notion of entanglement. Entailment implies only that one discipline makes claims about, or uses concepts that have an entailment relation to, another discipline, or other disciplines. Some theological claims or concepts entail scientific claims; that is, have empirical implications. An engagement with the sciences might also be appropriate if scientific claims or concepts entail theological claims; that is, have theological implications. But in both cases, there may only be an asymmetrical one-way relation. It seems to me that such cases of entailment would suffice for SET.Footnote ¹⁶ If this broad picture about entailment is accurate, then thesis (E) is probably – depending on the interpretation – asking too much. There may indeed be relevant cases where there is not only an ‘entailed’ one-way but also ‘entangled’ two-way relation. But to count as paradigm cases, it would have to be shown that these are the majority of relevant cases. For this reason, (E) may turn out to be too restrictive, even if read as indicating (ii) a paradigmatic case, also due to unresolved questions surrounding the nature of entanglement. In any case, if (E) is understood to posit entailment as (i) a necessary requirement for SET, (E) is methodologically flawed: SET is appropriate not only in entanglement cases. Thus, we could reformulate (E) as follows:

It seems, however, that even showing that an alleged entailment (or entanglement) is in fact not an entailment (or entanglement) after all would qualify as SET. Consider, for example, the claim that the doctrine of original sin entails monogenism. Here a theological claim is said to entail a scientific claim. But what if the scientific claim is invalidated? Then we would either have to reject the doctrine of original sin thus conceived, as indicated by conclusion (3), or revisit the entailment claim, namely, premise (1) – assuming, for the sake of the argument, that (2) is sufficiently established on scientific grounds.

(1) If the doctrine of original sin holds, then monogenism holds.

(2) Monogenism does not hold.

(3) Therefore, the doctrine of original sin does not hold.

This argument could lead to a revisiting and reformulation of the doctrine of original sin. But it could also give reason to deliberate the entailment relation: is it a real or only an alleged entailment? That is, someone might argue, having studied both the theological doctrine of original sin and the science of the human origin, that original sin is compatible with both monogenism and polygenism. If this is true, then, even if it was initially assumed, there is no real entailment. By an engagement with the sciences, a supposedly entailed (or entangled) claim or concept would be shown to be only an alleged but not a real entailment (or entanglement) – be it that theology is thought to entail (or be entangled with) scientific claims or science (with) theological claims. At least concerning some topics, I would argue, it may take a considerable, if not deep, engagement with the sciences to determine whether a supposed entailment (or entanglement) is an actual entailment (or entanglement). Hence, I would argue that showing that a supposed entailment of a claim or concept does not hold, as well as the disentanglement of supposedly entangled claims or concepts, would count as SET. If this is so, then even (E*) would have to allow for more cases:

But even this suggestion, one might object, appears to be too strong if we assume that scientific insights can concretize theological doctrine, as I will propose below. It could be that theology gains from the sciences by enabling it to spell out the details of certain theological doctrines, including the ones concerning God’s creation or history. By consequence, the modes of engagement would be manifold, including cases where science merely supplies further details, without theological claims necessarily entailing scientific claims, or vice versa. Due to the above-mentioned unresolved difficulties, I suggest refraining from making thesis (E) an essential feature and part of the definition of SET, especially if entanglement is taken as a necessary condition of SET. Perhaps (E) could be replaced by (E*) or (E**), but even these broader requirements could turn out to be too restrictive, especially if we read them as a necessary requirement instead of paradigm cases. To avoid these difficulties, we could instead stipulate something along the following lines:

A first pitfall would therefore be to include theses (NM), (LS), or (E) in the definition of SET, or to regard them as essential parts of SET. None of these theses should be accepted. If the analysis is correct, then the how and when question must not be answered in terms of theses (NM), (LS), and (E). An alternative answer is needed.

The source account and its interpretations

On the source account of SET, the answer to the why question appears straightforward: theology should engage with the sciences because the sciences are among the epistemic sources of theology. But there are different views of what a source of theology is, how many there are, and why science is to be counted among the sources of theology.

A first proposal advanced by Perry and Leidenhag, as previously mentioned, is to interpret the sources of theology by means of the Wesleyan Quadrilateral. There are four sources of theology: (1) Scripture, (2) tradition, (3) experience, and (4) reason, and none of them is science. Rather than adding science as an additional source of theology, or identifying it with any of the listed ones, Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 50) dismiss the question of where science fits among the sources of theology as ill-formed. Doing so, they argue, would wrongly assume that sources of theology are ‘discrete pots of information’, that they are ‘natural kinds’. For Perry and Leidenhag, there is no objective way of identifying the sources of theology. Consequently, Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 51) explain, ‘our preferred answer to the question of where science fits among the sources is to say that sometimes it is helpful to view the sciences as an extension of one particular source, sometimes as implicated in all four Wesleyan sources, and sometimes as something a bit different from any’.

Thus, Perry and Leidenhag posit that science is a source of theology, without specifying what source it is. As such, they feel the need to motivate the use of the posited source. Perry and Leidenhag (Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 49) argue that theologians ought to make use of science as a source of theology because doing so increases epistemic virtues such as coherence and consistency, but most of all empirical accountability. Empirically accountable theology, they claim, is ‘better theology … because the authors write in such a way that they can be held accountable’ (Perry and Leidenhag Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 55). But theology can be held empirically accountable only for empirical claims, or claims that have empirical implications. Empirical accountability then means that when making empirical claims, theology is to be held accountable for these claims; that is, the relevant empirical facts need to be checked, and erroneous claims revised, in order to ‘prune wrong or idolatrous ideas’ (Perry and Leidenhag Reference Perry and Leidenhag2023, 54). To increase the virtue of empirical accountability, theology needs to engage with the sciences. On their view, then, theology should engage with the sciences because SET maximizes empirical accountability. This is why, on their view, science is needed in addition to the other sources of theology to increase the disciplinary, epistemic virtues of theology.

By contrast, I would like to suggest understanding the statement that theology should engage with the sciences because the sciences are among the epistemic sources of theology in terms of the loci theologici: theology should engage with the sciences because the sciences are among the theological places. There is a long tradition of considering different theological sources that has been formative for at least Western, and especially Catholic, theology: the so-called loci theologici.Footnote ¹⁸ What is important for the present purpose is not so much the original list proposed by Melchor Cano, but rather his distinction between proper and foreign theological places. Both are places where theological arguments can be discovered, or sources from which theological arguments can be derived. Whereas the proper theological places (loci theologici proprii) are places specific to theology, foreign theological places (loci theologici alieni) are places that theology shares with other disciplines. There are, then, sources of theology unique to theology, and other sources that theology shares with other disciplines. The former are theology’s primary sources, the latter secondary sources; even though both are sources of theology, the proper are more central than the foreign theological places.

Now if, following Peter Hünermann (Reference Hünermann2003a, 207–51; Reference Hünermann2003b) and in accordance with at least the argument I will present below, we include the sciences among the sources of theology, they must be a foreign theological place – a source of theology shared with other disciplines. Thus, we can specify:

The distinction between proper and foreign theological places is, I would argue, highly relevant for the contemporary debate. If the distinction is not made, it looks like specifying science as a source of theology somehow subsumes the sciences under theology, thus challenging their autonomy and independence. Making science a source of theology, it is objected, leads to an ‘incorporation’ or ‘integration’ of science into theology (Harris Reference Harris and Harris2024a, 18). Leidenhag (Reference Leidenhag and Wolfe2024b, 5) seems to agree with this objection, stating that ‘theology provides the larger context within which empirical investigations are conducted’. Questioning the independence and autonomy of the sciences would result, however, only from placing science among the proper theological places, which is a nonstarter. Hence, SET, according to (SET_1*), especially if interpreted in the sense of (SET₃), does by no means imply, as Leidenhag (Reference Leidenhag2024a, 402) claims, that, as a consequence of science being a source of theology, ‘science-engaged theology sees all knowledge-seeking practices as in some sense already (proto-)theological’. If we qualify science as a foreign theological place, this claim is a non sequitur. What follows from (SET_1*), especially if interested in the sense of (SET₃), is only that other sources of knowledge are theologically relevant. Put differently, SET does not render other disciplines, including science, part of the discipline of theology, but maintains that other disciplines are relevant for the conduct of theology.

Above, I argued that to count as SET, science must be a source of theology and be used as such. If the sciences are introduced as a distinct source of theology, then the why question can be answered with reference to this epistemic source of theology. If the sciences are a place, although not specific to theology, where nonetheless theological arguments can be discovered, or a source, in common with other disciplines, from which theological arguments can be derived, then theology will profit from the sciences. For example, science may support a given theological conclusion by providing relevant premises, or it may help to interpret theological statements and derive correct conclusions from given premises, which may be adjudicated. In these and other ways, science can help theology in appropriate cases to develop sound arguments. The question, then, is not so much why make use of an epistemic source in appropriate cases, but rather why the sciences are an epistemic source of theology, and what the appropriate cases are.

By outlining these two models of the sources of theology, I do not mean to suggest that theses (NM), (LS), and (E) are a necessary implication of the Wesleyan Quadrilateral. Nor does the rejection of the criticized theses necessarily require an interpretation of the sources of theology in terms of an updated version of Cano’s loci theologici. What I wanted to show is that, on the source account of SET, much depends on the interpretation of the sources of theology in question. And although I do not defend the loci theologici model here, but only present it as a potential alternative, some of the advantages of the loci theologici approach will become apparent as we proceed to discuss the prospects of SET.

Why should theology engage with the sciences?

A first prosect of SET is that it may help, or at least provide an occasion, to address the question of why theology should engage with the sciences. The why question hinges, as just pointed out, on the much-debated topic of the sources of theology, which in turn is embedded in the question of the nature and scope of theology in general, and specifically the relation and relevance of the sciences to theology thus understood. Admittedly, there is no single, commonly accepted approach to, and understanding of, Christian theology across the various theological traditions and denominations. Consequently, there is probably no single argument as to why the sciences need to be considered an epistemic source of theology and hence why theology should engage with the sciences. Rather, it is to be expected that different understandings of theology call for different arguments.

In reply to the question of why the sciences ought to count as an epistemic source of theology, different responses have been given. Some would refer to the metaphor of the Book of Nature, which is often contrasted with the Book of Scripture – both are, it is argued, given to us to read, interpret, and gain knowledge about God (Harris Reference Harris and Harris2024b). Others would allude to the role of the whole of creation in coming to understand God. For example, Leidenhag (Reference Leidenhag and Wolfe2024b, 1) writes: ‘Science-engaged theology affirms the idea that the study of God (theology) must include the study of God’s creation, as conducted by the natural and human sciences.’ Karl Rahner (Reference Rahner, Marmion and Hines2005, 306) expressed a similar view: ‘If as a theologian I inquire not about an abstract concept of God, … then absolutely nothing of what God has revealed as Creator of the world, as Lord of history, should be uninteresting to me.’ Davison has attempted an answer in more Thomistic terms. He writes:

Traditionally, all of reality was considered a potential subject of theology, as its material object. The formal object of theology, the aspect under which potentially everything could be considered, was sub ratione Dei – that is, insofar as it is related to God. God is the primary ‘object’, or subject, of theology and everything else, insofar as it is related to God, its secondary object. To differentiate (revealed) theology from philosophy, which also reflects on how created things are related to God, one would then traditionally have added that philosophy advances by natural reason, but theology is based on divine revelation (which exceeds natural reason). Elsewhere, I presented the following argument for SET, in line with definition (SET_1*):

1. (1) The subject matter of theology is not limited materially but only formally, including God and everything insofar as it relates to, and is revealed by, God.

2. (2) The sciences cover materially part of the subject matter of theology, although under a different formality.

3. (3) Understanding the subject matter of theology under a different formality provides a source for theology.

4. (4) Therefore, to the extent that the sciences cover, and provide an understanding of, the same subject matter as theology materially, but under a different formality, the sciences provide a source for theology.

5. (5) If the sciences provide a source for theology, then theology should engage with them.

6. (6) Therefore, theology should engage with the sciences to the extent that they cover, and provide an understanding of, the same subject matter materially, but under a different formality. (Kopf Reference Kopf2024, 7)

The argument is based on the assumption that the subject matter of theology is not only God but also all of created reality insofar as it is related to, and is revealed by, God. The clause ‘is revealed by God’ is meant to clarify that theology, in contrast to philosophy (and other disciplines), is based on divine revelation. Such an understanding of theology implies that part of the subject matter of theology overlaps with the subject matter of the sciences materially, but not formally – the method of investigating the overlapping subject is notably different. The decisive point for SET is that at least some of the content of the sciences, despite their difference in methodology, is relevant to theology: science is a source for theology because it helps to concretize theological doctrine. Hünermann (Reference Hünermann2003a, 275, my translation) expresses the point well when he argues that the sciences, among other disciplines, are essential for theology and the act of, and reflection on, faith, to the extent that the reality described in these points of reference gives additional, concrete content to doctrinal statements: ‘Only by including the reality of science and philosophy, society and culture, religions and history with their respective truths does faith prove itself in its infallibilitas as a participatio in God as first truth.’Footnote ²⁰ And as such, science should be viewed as a source of theology – an epistemic source of theology shared with other disciplines. On this view, science is also a critical corrective for theology. If the sciences are employed to help concretize the content of doctrinal statements, then science becomes a critical corrective in the sense that points of inconsistency, incoherence, or simply a lack of applicability to experience more generally become apparent, allowing for the necessary adjustments.

On the source account, then, theology should, in specific cases, engage with the sciences because the sciences are an epistemic source of theology, and different reasons have been offered for why science should be considered a source of theology. If theology should, in appropriate cases, engage with the sciences because the sciences are an epistemic source of theology, the question arises as to when and how such an engagement is appropriate.

When and how should theology engage with the sciences?

A second prospect of SET is that it may contribute to clarifying both when and how theology should and can engage with the sciences. We have seen that Perry and his coworkers have answered the how question in terms of theses (NM) and (LS), and the when question in terms of thesis (E). But we have also seen that these answers are problematic, for the reasons given above. In building on the previous discussion but also moving beyond these restrictive and questionable theses, it might as a first step help to take recourse to the relationship between faith and reason. If one holds that (a) faith and reason cannot contradict each other, and that (b) faith and reason complement, or mutually enrich, each other, then the task of SET will be both to (a) avoid contradictions and (b) seek complementation, or mutual enrichment, between theology and science – if, of course, theology is based on faith, and reason can be taken to include, or rather extend to, the sciences. Traditionally, the relationship of faith and reason was important to spell out the relation of theology and philosophy. But the sciences have historically developed from philosophy into distinct disciplines – and both are related to, and forms of the exercise of, human reason. What prior to the so-called Scientific Revolution would have been considered philosophy (or history) of nature, are now considered independent and separate disciplines. To reflect this change, Hünermann (Reference Hünermann2003a, Reference Hünermann2003b, 207–51) has updated the list of theological places, now including among the foreign places not only philosophy and history, but also the sciences, as well as culture, society, and religions – rather than natural reason, philosophy, and history, as in Cano’s original list. Be that as it may, the point is that the sciences are arguably also an exercise of human reason – acknowledging that reason itself is a complex phenomenon. Consequently, theology will have to engage with the sciences (a) whenever its consistency with the sciences is in question. This could be because theology faces a challenge arising from the sciences or because one wants to explore or actively show theology’s coherence and consistency with the sciences. Theology will also engage with the sciences (b) whenever it seeks complementation, or mutual enrichment, either in form of the sciences complementing theology or theology complementing the sciences, or both. As John Paul II (Reference John Paul II1988) notes in a much-quoted statement, this mutual service could include, for example, a mutual purification along the following lines: ‘Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes.’

There is another way of putting the suggested answer to the when question. We have established that according to (SET_1*) and (SET₃), theology should engage with the sciences because they are a source of theology, namely, a foreign theological place, that is, a source of theology shared with other disciplines. Above, I suggested that an engagement with the sciences is appropriate at least in real or alleged entailment cases, including potential real or alleged entanglement cases. Here we may add cases of concretization of theological doctrine, filling in, as it were, the details by recourse to the best of our scientific knowledge. Take for example the theological claim that God is the Lord of history. If I know nothing of history, the claim is somewhat empty. Likewise, if we state that God is the Creator of the world, but I know very little about the actual world, then the theological statement is shallow. These statements can be filled with content, however, by recourse to what we know about history and the world by means of other disciplines. Doing so will not only show harmony and complementarity between theology and these disciplines but also potential points of tension or conflict. For example, if one assumes the world to be less than 6,000 years but then, filling out the scientific details, learns that the world is billions of years old, an apparent conflict arises that needs to be resolved by reconsidering the theological or scientific side. Or, conversely, in understanding and filling in the details of an evolutionary view, one may see that it harmonizes well with a theological outlook – that it appears theologically fitting. Therefore, the appropriate cases of SET are arguably not even limited to real or alleged entailment cases. Rather, SET may be appropriate also in cases where specific theological and scientific statements are merely suggestive of each other; where they dovetail well, but, say, less with alternative views; in cases where there is no strong empirical or theological implication but only a weaker fittingness. For example, given a scientific assumption, a certain theological assumption might appear fitting, or vice versa. Although consistency and coherence are important, the connectedness between theological and scientific assumptions appears to be not merely based on entailments, let alone potential entanglements.

So, when is it appropriate to engage the sciences? According to the understanding proposed above, it is appropriate to engage with the sciences at least (1) when theological claims or concepts have real or alleged empirical implications, or scientific claims or concepts have real or alleged theological implications – be it that (a) theological claims or concepts entail, or merely appear to entail, scientific claims or concepts, or vice versa, in one-way relation, or perhaps even (b) that theological claims or concepts are somehow entangled, or merely appear to be entangled, with scientific claims or concepts in a reciprocal relation. But an engagement would also appear appropriate in cases (2) where the content of theological doctrine can be ornamented and amplified by scientific details, even before a link between theological and scientific statements may support or put into question the theological (or scientific) statement. And it is hard to predict and specify the exact ways in which connections between theological doctrines and scientific theories, between theological statements and scientific findings, may emerge. Yet, once these respective statements are brought into relation, the various cases can show areas of apparent conflict, to be resolved by reconsidering the results of theology or the sciences, but also areas of complementarity and (mutual) enrichment.

The crux of the matter is, of course, how to achieve such an engagement of theology with the sciences, which is a hard and daunting task. How might such an engagement take shape? Without going into further detail, I would at least like to distinguish between modes, levels, and depths of the science-engagement. As Silva and Recio (Reference Silva and Recio2025, 188–91) have shown, it is to be expected that there are a variety of modes of engagement as well as different levels of engagement. The modes of engagement may vary considerably, from shaping and informing the theological questions asked to various forms of shaping and informing the theological answers given. For example, the scientific dimension of the monogenism versus polygenism debate may shape the way the doctrine of original sin is approached, or how the theological question of original sin is raised, but it may also inform the theological answer given – for example, in form of a polygenetic revision of the classical doctrine of original sin. Both basic modes of engagement – that theology engage with the sciences (a) by letting the very questions it asks be informed, at least partly, by the sciences, and (b) by letting the answers be informed by the sciences – are, in principle, legitimate forms of engagement. The former mode may include reformulations of the traditional questions asked; the latter mode may vary from mere fact-checking and the avoidance of a contradiction between theology and science to concretizations or even development and reformulations of traditional doctrinal answers. As evidence of this complexity, Silva and Recio (Reference Silva and Recio2025, 189) use historical examples to draw attention specifically to cases in which an answer to a theological problem: is informed by, and at least partially drawn from, a scientific statement; is supported by a scientific statement, where the answer itself is initially drawn from other sources of theology; is comparatively related to a scientific statement (for example, by drawing analogies), aiming at a deepened understanding of at least one, if not both or all, of the relata; or involves further philosophical reflections about the nature, scope, and justification of the scientific statements under discussion. In many of those cases, it may help to start local and specific, without being restricted to locality and specificity. The levels of engagement can therefore range from local, to mid-sized, to grand levels. And all of these levels are legitimate levels of engagement. But methodology cannot be sidestepped, as argued above. And finally, the depths of the engagement at any level and mode of engagement can vary from a rather superficial to substantial engagements, as needed and fitting for the task at hand.

The replacement thesis

The second pitfall I will address is the idea that SET could somehow replace, and be a successor to, the entire discipline of S&R or T&S. In one of her most recent publications, Leidenhag (Reference Leidenhag2024a, 408) argues that SET should be viewed not so much as a ‘monastic order’ within the church but rather as a ‘reformation’ of that church – as a substitution of that church by another, reformed church. The traditional church – the field of S&R – should be left behind because of ‘deeply entrenched mistakes’ – namely, the idea that ‘we can easily identify what we mean by “science”, “religion” and “theology”’. Leidenhag (Reference Leidenhag2024a, 402) thus concludes that the development of SET will, in all likeliness, ‘spell the end of [the discipline of] science-and-religion’.

Here is the rub with the replacement thesis. SET, in the sense discussed above, is immanent to, and arguably a form of, theology, and as such cannot be a substitute for the whole discipline of T&S, let alone S&R – a discipline that is much broader and richer. As I understand it, the discipline of S&R has been a melting pot of different disciplines, methodological approaches, and perspectives that are united to what appears to be a single field of studies by their shared interest in matters pertaining to science and religion. Appropriating the octopus analogy of Niels Henrik Gregersen (Reference Gregersen2014), Harris (Reference Harris and Harris2024a, 26–27) describes the nature and status quo of S&R thus:

The main disciplines (which Harris states are more than eight) include at least history (particularly history of science, history of religion, but also what is now considered history of science and religion), philosophy (particularly philosophy of science and philosophy of religion), the study of religion, or religious studies, theology, and the various sciences.

If this broad picture is roughly accurate, then SET cannot stand in for the whole discipline of S&R. SET is a theology-centred approach. What about the other disciplines?

Let us start with the sciences first. SET may help to clarify the relation of the sciences to (Christian) theology. But precisely because SET relates the sciences to theology – namely, as a source of theology – it leaves unresolved the involvement of other disciplines of the S&R discourse, including history and philosophy. Moreover, if the distinction between entailment and entanglement is valid, it might not even affect the relation of theology to the sciences.

Some would see theology-engaged science as a counterpart specifying this relation. But it is by no means clear that either theologians or scientists could possibly be happy with such a specification: even though science may be a source of theology, it is highly doubtful that theology is a source of science. Science (in the modern sense) cannot be based on revelation; science may indeed profit from an engagement with philosophy or history (of science), but not in the same way from (revealed) theology. But even if one were to disagree about this point, SET would arguably still qualify the relation between theology and the sciences one-way. Otherwise, no complementation would be needed. Thus, SET appears as part of a bigger picture.

Others have suggested theology of science – analogous to the disciplines of philosophy of science, history of science, and so on – as a helpful way forward. This suggestion raises the question of what presuppositions and commitments of science cannot possibly be shown by the history and philosophy of science? Admittedly, various philosophical presuppositions and commitments are built into scientific theorizing, and historically, even theological assumptions were used in the ‘sciences’. But the philosophical presuppositions and commitments are elaborated in the philosophy of science, and the historical as well as the theological presuppositions and commitments are shown in the history of science. The question, then, is what genuinely theological presuppositions and commitments are today part of science, of the very way in which scientists do their job qua scientists, that are not subject to the history and philosophy of science? In any case, theology of science also does not specify as such the relation of theology to philosophy, history, and other relevant disciplines.

Turning to history and philosophy, then, precisely because the reappraisal of the history has been so successful and thorough in the field of S&R, it is important to keep alive this dimension of the interdisciplinary discourse. History has been an essential part of S&R and should continue to be so. But by its very specification, SET relates the sciences to theology, thereby setting aside other disciplines traditionally part of S&R. SET has had little to say about the historical disciplines and cannot possibly take over their vital task.

What is more, advancing the claim that SET will replace the S&R discourse is peculiar, considering that the background of SET is deeply connected with the history of science and religion that is an integral part of the very S&R discourse that SET is supposed to end. To understand the replacement thesis – and Leidenhag’s accusation that the field of S&R is plagued by ‘deeply entrenched mistakes’ – it is helpful to highlight a certain ‘anti-essentialist turn’ in the S&R debate. The very concept of SET has its roots in Harrison’s (Reference Harrison2015, Reference Harrison and Wolfe2022) influential historical thesis that the central terms of the debate – namely, ‘science’, or ‘theology,’ and ‘religion’ – are not analogous to natural kinds. If their meaning has substantially changed, however, and the terms are now in danger of concealing the different activities associated with and denoted by them, this makes absolute claims about the relation of science and religion, or theology and science, historically dubious. To avoid typologies of the relation of science and religion committing this fallacy, then, SET is proposed as a way forward. Instead of asking about the absolute relation of ‘science and religion’, or ‘theology and science’, the task for S&R scholars, at least the theologians among them, is said to be to engage with specific sciences.

Although this proposal may indeed change the focus of the specific work done, the concept of ‘science-engaged theology’ still relates science to theology – namely, I argued, as a source for theology – thus positing and presupposing that there are methodologically distinct disciplines or well-defined entities – ‘theology’ and ‘science’, or rather, as proponents of SET would not cease to emphasize, ‘the sciences’ – one engaging the other(s). It does so especially in a localized form, relating local scientific explanations to specific theological explanations. But if science(s) and theology are an essential part of the project of SET, then even ‘science-engaged theology’ can be essentialized, just as ‘science and theology’ – or ‘theology of science’, for that matter – can be essentialized: even in ‘science-engaged theology’, ‘science’ and ‘theology’ could be understood as analogous to natural kinds. But they need not be essentialized. The various labels and approaches do not as such commit one to an essentialist or an anti-essentialist position. Other grounds, including history and philosophy, are needed to decide the question.

Therefore, the proposal of SET arguably does not by itself prevent what Leidenhag takes to be the deeply entrenched mistake of S&R – nor can it even by itself raise the issue. To put it in the words of Leidenhag, if the mistake is to assume that ‘we can easily identify what we mean by “science”, “religion” and “theology”’, at least transhistorically, this would mean not only that we cannot easily identify the relation of science and religion, or theology and science, but also that we cannot easily identify what SET is, at least transhistorically. Hence, if we cannot speak about ‘science and theology’ across history, then we could also not speak about ‘science-engaged theology’ across history. But one could assume otherwise and thus commit the same mistake – assuming, of course, that it is a mistake. The question, however, of whether or not the basic terms are analogous to natural kinds needs to be determined and solved on other grounds, including historical analysis, which is not part of SET.Footnote ²¹

And turning to philosophy, like in the case of history, SET has had little to say about philosophy, and it is hard to see how SET could possibly take over this task – unless one deems the role of philosophy replaceable. What is left unspecified by all the above-mentioned proposals is the explicit role of philosophy in the S&R discourse, thus perpetuating the underrepresentation of philosophy that has at times plagued the debate.

Therefore, SET cannot possibly replace S&R. If it were to end the S&R discourse as we know it, something essential would be lost, including the vital historical and philosophical dimensions of the debate. If SET has value, it does so as a theological discipline. As such, SET should be seen as part of, and a contribution to, the bigger field of studies of T&S or S&R.

Science-engaged theology as a contribution to the science and religion discourse

A further benefit of the approach in terms of the loci theologici is that it guards against disregarding the relative unity of the foreign theological places, thus helping us to see the place and role of SET within the wider debate. Doing so also holds the promise to make progress in the field of T&S or S&R more generally. The way forward, in my view, is not for SET to replace the field of S&R, but by considering SET as a theological contribution to the interdisciplinary field that emphasizes the connectedness of theology not only with the sciences in all their variety but also with the foreign theological places more generally, including philosophy and history – and potentially also other fields listed above, such as the study of religions, society, or culture. Such a move should be seen as an integral part of, and be embedded in, the T&S or S&R discourse.

SET is a form of x-engaged theology, where x denotes the source that theology taps into, or the place where, or source from which, theological arguments can be discovered or derived. A theology that uses science as a source of theology can then be called SET, just as a theology that uses Scripture as a source of theology could be called Scripture-engaged theology – the difference being that the former would tap into a foreign theological place, while the latter would tap into a proper theological place.

The interpretation of these sources in terms of the loci theologici may serve as a reminder, on the one hand, that although science is among the sources of theology, it is, as a foreign theological place, not among the primary sources of theology. SET should thus be embedded in, and seen as a part of, a form of theology based on other theological sources, especially the proper theological places. Analysing SET in terms of the loci theologici thus helps to show that even though science is and should be recognized among the sources of theology, it is not among the first and most important theological sources. Science is embedded in a web of theological sources, and at least all the proper theological places would come first in hierarchy. In other words, science can never be the sole or even main source of theological theorizing. And history can also remind us that including the sciences in theological modelling can cut both ways. Much of the ‘science’ of the past – be it science in the modern sense, or what was back then considered philosophy (or history) of nature – is dated. What was back then considered support for a theological position may now, if the connection was too tight, be seen as weakening or distorting it. For this reason, Silva and Recio (Reference Silva and Recio2025, 191) emphasize the importance of embedding appropriated scientific findings properly: an engagement with the sciences specifically on the local level should be part of, and integrated into, a larger theological project that is rooted in, and tapping into, sources other than the sciences, namely, particularly the proper theological places unique to theology.

SET interpreted in terms of the loci theologici is a reminder, on the other hand, to see SET connected with all the other foreign theological places, including philosophy and history. To do SET properly, it must be in line not only with theology in general, but also with philosophy-engaged and history-engaged theology. History and philosophy – to name just two foreign places – form a relative unity as foreign theological places. As pointed out above, in the S&R discourse, history has featured prominently, while philosophy perhaps less so, at least in certain theological traditions. But both are important and vital dialogue partners for theology as well as the sciences. Considering the role philosophy and history can play in the engagement with the sciences might help to sharpen the focus of SET. The concept of foreign theological places may therefore help to refocus the current debate, by indicating the importance not only of the sciences, but also of history and philosophy, and all other disciplines to be counted among the foreign theological places. Thus interpreted, SET serves as a reminder to take into consideration the foreign theological places, including science, philosophy, and history, not only in isolation but also in their entirety. Whether the label ‘SET’ proves helpful in this endeavour, the future will tell.