3.1 Lookism is Unfamiliar

The first reason that lookism is neglected might simply be a lack of familiarity with the term, coupled with a lack of awareness of how impactful lookism is. While we – policymakers, academics, the public – are vaguely aware that the halo effect and pretty privilege exist we are likely unaware of how profoundly this impacts on what we can be and do. If we understood the impact of lookism we would behave differently. For example, we would campaign and complain about lookism far more than we do. Complaints about poor treatment as a result of lookism are growing, but they are still infrequent and even where laws exist they are rarely used.Footnote ⁵ Similarly, if the advantage of good looks were understood we would prioritise appearance more systematically and routinely. If it was widely known that good looks significantly improve employment prospects, isn’t it likely we would value them for our children in a similar way to education (Widdows, Reference Widdows2022)? Arguably, in some places good looks are beginning to be valued like this. For example, in South Korea and the US women report a key reason for having cosmetic surgery is to be competitive in the job market (Gimlin, Reference Gimlin2012; Park et al., Reference Park, Myers and Langstein2019). But the choice to have surgery is always framed as a matter of individual choice, rather than an essential good to which people have a right.Footnote ⁶

If lookism’s neglect is due to a lack of awareness, then philosophy has a role to play. The philosopher and legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon was instrumental in defining sexual harassment as a form of sexual discrimination. Like lookism now, sexual harassment then was extremely prevalent to the point of being normalised. But as form of wrongful discrimination and systematic injustice it was largely invisible. In the forward of MacKinnon’s best-selling book Sexual Harassment of Working Woman, Thomas Emerson writes that the ‘sexual harassment of working women has been one of the most pervasive but carefully ignored features of our national life’ (Reference MacKinnon1979, p. vii). This description exactly describes the place of lookism in contemporary society. We know it exists, we are vaguely aware of it, but we studiously ignore it.

Crucial to addressing sexual harassment was defining it, naming it. Before sexism was named it was hard to call out sexist comments and behaviour. Without the conception and terminology to capture the injustice, it was difficult, even impossible, to recognise it. The catcall in the street, or the sexist comment in the office, could be reframed, described as banter, a compliment or a joke. But once the action could be named as sexism the wrongful discrimination could be recognised. Defining it, naming it, was more important than the legislation to prosecute it. As, MacKinnon says

It seems then that ‘calling it what it is’, defining it, naming it, is a crucial step in recognising wrongful discrimination. If so, the first step in recognising and addressing lookism is naming it ‘lookism’, using the term, and raising awareness of the phenomenon. This could be done by regulating to recognise it, as was done with sexual harassment, or through education in schools, public education campaigns run by governments or NGOs and workplace training. Increased awareness might begin the process of addressing lookism, as employers, teachers and other professionals become more self-reflective in their practice. Accordingly, the first reason for our neglect of lookism might simply be a lack of awareness.

3.2 Looks Don’t or Shouldn’t Matter

The second possible reason for neglecting lookism, is the belief that looks are, or should be, trivial and unimportant. This is not the claim that lookism is trivial – the evidence discussed in Section 3 shows lookism is both significant and impactful – but rather a view that looks should not matter, lookism should not exist, and therefore a blanket refusal to recognise it. There are two versions of this type of rejection.

First, a wilful denial that lookism exists, perhaps accompanied by a belief that meritocracy is robust. For example, a person might believe they are not swayed by appearance when making judgements about people’s competences and characters. They might believe they are ‘looks blind’. However, given the prevalence of lookism to think that individuals are immune, simply because they think they are, is naive at best. Research on bias and implicit bias should make us wary of blanket denials that bias affects our judgements. Implicit bias is well documented and widespread, with early work focusing on racism and sexism (Greenwald & Banaji, Reference Greenwald and Banaji1995). Such bias is unconscious, automatic and involuntary, operating below the level of conscious awareness. Significantly, ‘the theorised ordinariness of implicit stereotyping is consistent with recent findings of discrimination by people who explicitly disavow prejudice’ (Greenwald & Banaji, Reference Greenwald and Banaji1995, p. 1). Accordingly, exactly those people who believe they are not making lookist judgments, might be most likely to make such judgements.

Second, some might recognise lookism exists, but think that acknowledging it, talking about it and taking it seriously might make it more prevalent and impactful than it already is. Those who think this neglect lookism deliberately to avoid undesired consequences, believing that recognising lookism effectively endorses the view that looks matter. They worry recognising lookism would serve to intensify the attention paid to appearance and incentivise increased activity to improve appearance. Ultimately, the argument goes, this will result in appearance being valued more and make lookism more prominent. The opposite of the effect they desire. Whether or not this is the case is an empirical question. However, ignoring lookism has not proved an effective way of reducing the importance of appearance. For example, the annual Girls Attitude Survey, has repeatedly reported that pressures to look perfect fall heavily on young women, with 80% feeling anxiety as a result of such pressures (Girlguiding, 2024).Footnote ⁷ Appearance pressures are not limited to young girls. A third of adults in the UK report feeling anxious or depressed because of their body image and one in eight have experienced suicidal thoughts (Mental Health Foundation, 2019). The importance of appearance has grown rather than reduced over recent decades, and appearance is valued more than ever before. Yet, a wish that lookism did not exist, might be a reason that lookism is neglected.

3.3 Lookism is Natural

The third possible reason for neglecting lookism, and in tension with the second, is that people think lookism is not wrong. That it is normal and natural – and perhaps even morally justified – to treat those who are more attractive better than those who are unattractive. Evolutionary accounts of beauty suggest this preference is innate: physical attractiveness is associated with youth, health, and reproductive fitness, making it an adaptive trait in mate selection. As Nancy Etcoff states:

It is well evidenced that we routinely make judgements about character based on appearance. Attractive people are assumed to have positive personality traits, such as friendliness, competence and intelligence (Eagly et al., Reference Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani and Longo1991). Conversely those who are unattractive are judged negatively, as lazy or less trustworthy. However, what is less well known is that we make such judgements so from as young as three (Harriger, Reference Harriger2015). As the beauty ideal becomes global, it is no longer necessary to endorse an evolutionary framework to argue that conceptions of attractiveness are universal (Hamermesh, Reference Hamermesh2011; Widdows, Reference Widdows2018). Claims that physical beauty is subjective have always been overexaggerated; perhaps as a way to dismiss or trivialise beauty as something peripheral and changeable, a mere matter of taste or fashion. But, as the beauty ideal converges such claims are demonstrably false.Footnote ⁸ The four features of the beauty ideal – thinness, firmness, smoothness and youth – are evident across cultures, and while there is not a single ideal, these four features are required in one combination or another (Widdows, Reference Widdows2018). As the ideal becomes global social construction and evolutionary accounts converge making what is attractive normalised, naturalised and universalised.

Yet, even if human beings are hardwired to value appearance and lookism is natural, this gives us no reason to accept lookism as appropriate in complex civilized societies. Even on evolutionary accounts of development human beings are profoundly social animals, trained and socialised to live in certain ways. We routinely train children not to behave naturally, to conform to social norms, to make judgements based on values that society endorses and to act in ways that society requires. Moreover, when it comes to what we think is morally right or wrong, to claim something is natural gives us no good reason to endorse a particular view. Indeed, it could be argued that we teach morality precisely to counter natural tendencies that we deem immoral. Again, analogy with other forms of discrimination is illuminating. Both sexism and racism have been defended as natural. For example, all major religions regard the natural order as one in which women are inferior to men and scientific theories, such as Darwinism, were once used to support racial hierarchies (Jeynes, Reference Jeynes2011).

Some might go further and think that at least some forms of lookism are not only natural and to be expected, but beneficial or justified. That it is right that the attractive are rewarded with better treatment. That some hold such views is evident in the way fat people are treated. For example, as Aubrey Gordon recounts in her book What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About Fat lookism is not only treated as normal, or expected, but justified. She states:

The extent to which body shaming is acceptable, whether fat-shaming, shame of body hair, or of any other body part, points towards an acceptance of lookism.Footnote ⁹ Rosalind Gill talks about the ‘red circles’ used in magazines, to highlight bodily flaws in celebrities, for entertainment. (Gill, Reference Gill2007). This view, that lookism is acceptable, is also evident in how we talk about appearance. Our ordinary language assumes that people can control their appearance and have a moral responsibility to do so. For example, phrases like, ‘she should have made an effort’, ‘she let herself go’, ‘what is she wearing?’, are underpinned by lookist assumptions. That, at least some people, some of the time, make such assumptions, is a third possible reason for neglect.

3.4 Appearance is Not a Protected Characteristic

A fourth reason why lookism might be neglected is that it is not recognised in law as a protected characteristic, meaning that discrimination based on looks is not illegal, so hiding its wrongfulness. Discrimination is regulated in a number of ways, most obviously in the UK in the Equality Act 2010. The act sets out nine protected characteristics under which people are legally safeguarded from discrimination: those of age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. Some argue that appearance should be added to this list. For example, Mason and Minerva argue that the ‘act should be extended to include appearance as a protected characteristic’ (Mason & Minerva, Reference Mason and Minerva2022, p. 426). In particular, they wish ‘to prohibit discrimination that occurs on the basis of selectors’ preferences concerning appearance when the appearance of candidate has nothing to do with their ability to do the job competently or well’ (Mason & Minerva, Reference Mason and Minerva2022, p. 439). To them this is necessary because meritocracy, the principle behind the act, is undermined by lookism. On their interpretation the aim of the act is to protect ‘the meritocratic principle, that is, the principle, when during a recruitment or promotion process, a person’s qualifications are given less weight (or discounted altogether) as a result of possessing some characteristic that is irrelevant to satisfying the job requirements’ (Mason & Minerva, Reference Mason and Minerva2022, p. 428). They argue that ‘direct appearance discrimination in the context of employment is both systematic and consequential’ (Mason & Minerva, Reference Mason and Minerva2022, p. 434).

A number of difficulties have been raised with this proposal. First there is no single or simple protected characteristic for the law to protect. Protected characteristics usually identify a distinctive group who are vulnerable. All the protected characteristics in the equality act are properties of an identifiable group who suffer from the relevant form of discrimination, and individuals are largely protected as members of that group, rather than as individuals as such.Footnote ¹⁰ This is most obviously true of discrimination around sex, race and religion and sometimes sexual orientation, gender reassignment and disability. It is not always true, for example, disability includes so-called ‘invisible disability’, and neither sexual orientation nor marital status is immediately visible unless advertised, for example, by wearing a wedding ring. When it comes to appearance there is no clearly identified ‘in group’ or ‘out group’, or at least not one that is widely recognised or acknowledged. William Corbett suggests that the lack of a clearly identifiable group would make any legislation unworkable, as deciding who should be covered by such legislation would dominate any litigation (Corbett, Reference Corbett2007). Second, most – though not all – of the protected characteristics connect to identity. Being a member of the group is important for how people understand themselves, being a certain race or religion is core to people’s self-identity, as – often – is sex, sexual orientation and disability. Not all protected characteristics fit this model, most obviously age, is not usually a feature of identity. Looking good or looking bad may feed into self-esteem, but it has not standardly been regarded as a core identity; although, as we move to a more visual and virtual culture and appearance matters more, appearance might become intertwined with identity.Footnote ¹¹ Third, and perhaps most importantly, to use litigation claimants would have to state publicly that they had been discriminated against because they were deemed unattractive. Effectively, to use the law, you would have to call yourself ‘ugly’. As will be discussed in the next section, publicly stating that you have been subject to lookism is something few people would do. Nonetheless, even if it were not used, there might still be reasons to include appearance in the act. For example, adding appearance to the protected characteristic list is symbolically important. It states that lookism is wrongful discrimination, so raising awareness and putting the onus on employers, and others, not to treat people in lookist ways. The lack of legal recognition, irrespective of whether the law is used, might suggest that lookism is unimportant and so explain its neglect.

3.5 Lookism and Shame

A final possible reason for why we neglect lookism is that we are ashamed. In the last section it was noted that legislation will only be used if we are willing to state publicly that we have been discriminated against because of how we look. To do this we must feel angry that injustice has been done to us, we must be willing to draw attention to the wrongful discrimination we have suffered and seek redress. However, when one is subject to lookism, whether a lookist action (for example, not being appointed to a job, or being ignored or passed over in class) or a lookist comment (such as fat-shaming), it is likely that the last thing we wish to do is to draw attention to ourselves. The most common emotion that the victim of lookism experiences is not anger at the injustice, but shame of the self. Shame that they have been found wanting in the appearance stakes, shame they are not good enough, not normal, not passing. They are flawed and ugly. Shame is ubiquitous in beauty discourse and practice. Fat-shaming is common, and sometimes, as discussed above in §4.3, regarded as acceptable, so too is shaming for wrinkles, cellulite, body hair, bingo wings, cankles, and the list goes on. Indeed, almost any bodily feature can be a source of shame.Footnote ¹² To illustrate consider some of the Everyday Lookism stories:Footnote ¹³

Overwhelmingly, when one experiences lookism, it is accompanied by feelings of shame. Shame is a powerful emotion, understood by philosophers in different ways. A dominant contemporary view is to think of shame as a response to moral wrongdoing, or moral wrongdoing found out. On such accounts for someone to feel shame ‘is for X to construe herself as having done, or being, something bad’ (O’Brien, Reference O’Brien2020, p. 546).Footnote ¹⁴ Lucy McDonald describes this form of shaming as a form of blaming, as ‘holding an individual morally responsible for some wrongdoing or flaw’ (McDonald, Reference McDonald2020, p. 1). McDonald differentiates between this type of shame, where one is morally responsible (agential shame) and shame where one is not responsible (non-agential). She puts body shame in the non-agential category, whereas the experience of those who suffer lookism suggests that people do feel responsible, however wrongly, and experience agential shame. The bodily responses shame induces are well recognised. Shame leads people to blush, to avert their gaze, to shrink and compress their body and it is ‘consistent with wanting to disappear or to hide’ (Lewis, Reference Lewis1995, p. 24). So consistent is this behaviour that it is reliable enough to be used by psychologists to systematically measure shame. If lookism induces shame and makes people want to hide, to disappear, to become invisible, then it is hardly surprising that we ignore it. Feeling shame is a particularly effective silencing tool, providing a final reason why lookism might be neglected.Footnote ¹⁵

If we are to address lookism, we need to change how we feel when we experience it. To act, we need to feel anger, not shame. Again, we can look to other forms of discrimination for guidance on changing emotional responses to discrimination. MacKinnon’s work defining sexual harassment not only made it visible, it also made it wrong. Defining sexual harassment as a form of sexism, automatically defined it as wrongful discrimination, unjustified and unjust. This was an important first step in changing how people felt about it. Before sexual harassment was named, the emotion that attached to it was shame. The woman who was harassed felt shame: Had she led the man on? Had she dressed or acted too provocatively? Was it her fault? Naming sexual harassment as sexist discrimination made it plain that the wrong lay with the perpetrator not the victim. Such naming is powerful, helping to transform shame to anger, and to shift the blame from the victim to the perpetrator. In the case of sexual harassment, gradually women felt less ashamed of themselves, their clothes and their behaviour. This freed them to condemn the perpetrator for their inappropriate comment or misbehaviour. That shame now attaches to the perpetrator not to the victim is clearly shown by the willingness of people to share their #everydaysexism stories and their #MeToo experiences openly and in their own names. The belief that the problem is not the woman’s is palpable. Women do not feel shame but rage that these things happen. As Sarah Brown writes in the forward of Everyday Sexism: ‘This book provides plenty of stories and evidence that will shock and enrage you. But it will also, I hope, reaffirm your belief that change can happen and we can win if we try’ (Bates, Reference Bates2014, pp. 8–9). When women suffer sexism they feel anger, they believe they have been treated wrongly, they no longer, as they once did, feel shame. A similar change is needed if lookism is to be addressed. That lookism invokes shame in its victims provides a final reason for its neglect.