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The imaginary fundamentalists: The unshocking truth about Bayesian cognitive science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 August 2011

Nick Chater
Affiliation:
Behavioural Science Group, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom. Nick.chater@wbs.ac.ukhttp://www.wbs.ac.uk/faculty/members/Nick/Chater
Noah Goodman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. ngoodman@stanford.eduhttp://stanford.edu/~ngoodman/
Thomas L. Griffiths
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1650. tom_griffiths@berkeley.eduhttp://psychology.berkeley.edu/faculty/profiles/tgriffiths.html
Charles Kemp
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213. ckemp@cmu.eduhttp://www.charleskemp.com
Mike Oaksford
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, University of London, London WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom. m.oaksford@bbk.ac.ukhttp://www.bbk.ac.uk/psychology/our-staff/academic/mike-oaksford
Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139. jbt@mit.eduhttp://web.mit.edu/cocosci/josh.html

Abstract

If Bayesian Fundamentalism existed, Jones & Love's (J&L's) arguments would provide a necessary corrective. But it does not. Bayesian cognitive science is deeply concerned with characterizing algorithms and representations, and, ultimately, implementations in neural circuits; it pays close attention to environmental structure and the constraints of behavioral data, when available; and it rigorously compares multiple models, both within and across papers. J&L's recommendation of Bayesian Enlightenment corresponds to past, present, and, we hope, future practice in Bayesian cognitive science.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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