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Representing utility and deploying the body

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

David Spurrett Open the ORCID record for David Spurrett [Opens in a new window]
David Spurrett*
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban4041, South Africa. spurrett@ukzn.ac.zahttps://www.researchgate.net/profile/David_Spurrett
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Abstract

Comprehensive accounts of resource-rational attempts to maximise utility shouldn't ignore the demands of constructing utility representations. This can be onerous when, as in humans, there are many rewarding modalities. Another thing best not ignored is the processing demands of making functional activity out of the many degrees of freedom of a body. The target article is almost silent on both.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e24
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020

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