The categories of “state” and “civil society” have too often been used as oppositional terms in the social sciences and in public discourse. This article aims to problematize the concepts of “state” and “civil society” when perceived as separate and distinct entities in the discourses of social scientists as well as of members of contemporary social movements in Turkey. Rather than readily using state and society as analytical categories referring to essential domains of sociality, the purpose is to transform these very categories into objects of ethnographic study. There has been a proliferation of discourse on “the state” and “the civil society” in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s. This article emerges out of an observation of the peculiar coalescence of social scientific and public usages of these terms in this period. It aims to radically relativize and to historically contextualize these terms through a close ethnographic study of the various political domains in which they have been discursively employed.

This paper will concentrate primarily on the current Alevi resurgence in Berlin. While exposing the principal driving forces behind the resurgence of Alevism, three crucial aspects will be underlined. Firstly, it will be argued that Alevi resurgence in Berlin partly derives from the institutional structure of Berlin, which has “minoritised” and ethnicised Alevis in time through Ausländergesetz (Foreigners’ Law) and an ideology of multiculturalism. Secondly, it will be claimed that this ethnic revival leading to the construction of a community discourse among Alevis also springs from Alevis’ attempt to speak from the margin in a way that could reverberate more in the public sphere. Finally, the radicalising momentum, which Alevi revivalism in the diaspora context has recently gained, will be touched upon in relation to Sivas and Gazi Mahallesi incidences in Turkey.

Turkey entered the 1990s under conditions of a truly “open economy”–a macroeconomic environment where its capital account was completely liberalized and the process of financial de-regulation was completed. In this setting, many of the instruments of macro and fiscal control have changed in nature, as the constraints of macro equilibrium have undergone major structural change.

In the early 1990s, the domestic economy witnessed a massive inflow of (mostly short-term) foreign capital. Furthermore, the so-called foreign exchange gap which had constrained the growth potential of Turkey for more than three decades seemed to have been alleviated. The ready availability of foreign exchange enabled the Turkish Lira to appreciate against the major currencies in real terms and led to a rapid expansion of import demand. Moreover, it made possible the financing of both the rapidly growing fiscal deficit of the public sector and the sudden rise of wage costs in the labor market.

The Turkish retail industry is experiencing a transformation towards larger-scale retailing. This restructuring has occurred at a time when an assertive corporate private sector has begun to look ready to take the leading role from the state in the development process; and when efforts (real and perceived) towards a cautious and gradual retreat of the state from economic activities have been intensified. This paper addresses the transformation and, because of the above mentioned simultaneity, places substantial emphasis on the role of the state in the development process and in the changes recently experienced in the distribution system. In the process, the paper compares the Turkish experience with those of other countries in which the role of the state has been far-reaching.

Of the many European states that interacted with the Ottoman Empire in the early modern era, few did so as extensively as the Most Serene Republic of Venice, La Serenissima. The two empires shared a lengthy border and a common historical trajectory for almost 500 years, during which time the political and economic fortunes of both were intimately intertwined. While occasionally interrupted by brief periods of open hostility, for the most part this relationship was characterized by peaceful coexistence. Venetian historiography at present, however, is unable to explain this reality. Rather, in painting the picture of Venice’s relations with the Ottoman Empire, scholars have relied on broad strokes that depict a series of rather simple, binary relationships—East/West, Muslim/Christian, Venetian/Turk. This dichotomy is readily apparent in the titles of important monographs on the topic: Islam and the West, Europe and the Turk, Venezia e i turchi.

Until recently, much of the discussion on globalization has been focused on trans- or supra-local forces at work, with relatively little attention paid to questions of locality—that is, people and groups situated in networks of social relations in a specific time and place. In most analyses, ‘the local’ was conceived in highly abstract and general terms, as the presumed site of reaction, resistance and opposition to the homogenizing forces of globalization. Today, mechanistic interpretations of globalization as an outside threat that engenders ‘local reactions’ has come under increasing criticism. The need to examine the specific socio-economic and cultural-ideological configurations, within which global flows are accommodated, in order to understand how people negotiate meaningful lives amidst changing power relations, has become apparent. The present study is an effort in this direction.