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Contempt, like any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2017

Roger Giner-Sorolla
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP, United Kingdom. R.S.Giner-Sorolla@kent.ac.uk https://www.kent.ac.uk/psychology/people/ginerr/
Agneta H. Fischer
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology University of Amsterdam, 1001 NK Amsterdam, The Netherlands. a.h.fischer@uva.nl http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/a.h.fischer/

Abstract

Gervais & Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude) but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, like many other emotions, can be both an emotion and a sentiment.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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