Social scientists have long studied ideology and proposed myriad theories trying to explain differences along ideological lines. These differences have tended to paint one side in a positive light (usually the left side of the spectrum) and the other side in a negative light (usually the right side of the spectrum). The target article does not do this (thankfully). Rather, the target article remains value-neutral and summarizes a wide swath of literature showing that conservatives are more attuned to threats in their environments than liberals are. The authors state that the basic logic of their proposal is that: “Life is about encounters: sights, sounds, smells, imaginings, objects, and people. These encounters are indisputably physiological and psychological because the systems employed to sense, process, formulate, and execute a response to stimuli are psychological and physiological” (sect. 1, para. 6). Thus, if there are differences in the perception of these stimuli or in people's responses to specific environmental stimuli that map onto politics, then we can infer that there is something in this physiological–psychological system driving ideological preferences. These points are not to be disputed here.
Rather, we focus our comments on pushing this theory to its extremes and inferring that negativity bias is “a key factor in accounting for people's political predispositions” (sect. 6, para. 3). We would like to suggest a similarly extreme, yet related, theory; that the desire for cognitive coherence provides a broader explanation for much of the research discussed. For example, one line of research that the target article does not discuss is the liberal-conservative life satisfaction gap. Specifically, conservatives tend to be more satisfied with their lives (Napier & Jost Reference Napier and Jost2008; but also see Onraet et al. Reference Onraet, Van Hiel and Dhont2013). If negativity bias is the psychological variable that best distinguishes across ideological lines, it ought to be able to integrate the growing body of work on the liberal–conservative “happiness gap.” This life satisfaction difference has actually been explained by traits such as a positive outlook (Schlenker et al. Reference Schlenker, Chambers and Le2012), which directly contradicts the negativity bias hypothesis. In fact, the basis of the prevailing cognitive-behavioral therapeutic model helps people to recover by getting them to stop focusing on the negative, and generating new cognitions and behaviors that steer them away from the negative. People who wish to be happier go to therapy to reduce their fixation on negative stimuli. Why would people showing a strong tendency to fixate on negative stimuli also report greater satisfaction with life? Why would they be happier?
Models of cognitive coherence (Monroe & Read Reference Monroe and Read2008; Simon et al. Reference Simon, Snow and Read2004), which posit that our attitudes are a product of the simultaneous constraints of existing beliefs, dispositions, and identities can explain both the cited research and a variety of other phenomena related to liberal-conservative differences. The conservative predisposition toward negative emotions such as disgust (Graham et al. Reference Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik and Ditto2013; in preparation; Inbar et al. Reference Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer and Haidt2012b) and threat sensitivity (Oxley et al. Reference Oxley, Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Miller, Scalora, Hatemi and Hibbing2008) is clear, and a coherent response to these emotions is to distance ourselves from the sources of disgust (e.g., sexually explicit material) or potential threat (e.g., outgroups). In contrast, liberals may be more willing to suppress their initial emotional reactions and rationalize a dissonant state (Skitka et al. Reference Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson and Chamberlin2002; Wisneski et al. Reference Wisneski, Lytle and Skitka2009). However, this willingness to live in more dissonant states certainly has hedonic consequences. The liberal mindset could be regarded as contrary to what our natural psychological immune system (Gilbert et al. Reference Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg and Wheatley1998) does to keep us happy. Indeed, in some of our preliminary data, we find that conservatives who are primed with a threat report that they are better drivers than average, happier, and view themselves more positively, a finding which could either be interpreted as self-deception or as indicative of a functioning psychological immune system (Wojcik et al. Reference Wojcik, Ditto, Motyl, Iyer, Koleva, Graham and Haidt2013).
Coherence explains a variety of other findings that are unaccounted for by negativity bias as well (Iyer Reference Iyer2012). Conservatives are more likely to create coherence between their factual and moral beliefs, showing more consistency between their beliefs about the morality and effectiveness of capital punishment (Kesebir et al., under review; Liu & Ditto Reference Liu and Ditto2013). This desire for coherence may underlie observed differences in cognitive complexity (Tetlock Reference Tetlock1983; Tetlock & Mitchell Reference Tetlock, Mitchell, Mellers and Baron1993), a line of research that is orthogonal to negativity bias. Coherence also explains more of our current research where we seek to understand where liberals and conservatives are coming from. The communities where liberals and conservatives live differ in important ways, and these differences lead to widely different life experiences (Bishop Reference Bishop2008; Craik Reference Craik, Bruce, Craik and Price2000; Motyl et al. Reference Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter and Nosek2014; Rentfrow et al. Reference Rentfrow, Gosling and Potter2008). These diverse experiences contribute to the conflicting narratives that people craft as they try to craft a coherent understanding of their social realities. Conservatives do tend to reside in communities that prioritize safety and security, and in communities with relatively lower crime rates, perhaps in order to encounter fewer negatively valenced environmental stimuli than liberals do. In laboratory studies where they are presented with negative stimuli that is uncommon in their daily lives, conservatives may fixate more on that negative, threatening stimuli than liberals do, because they do have a stronger reaction to negative stimuli. Yet we also find that conservatives seek out neighborhoods that have more sports fans, which coheres with having a competitive worldview (Lakoff Reference Lakoff2002). If negativity bias were truly the defining feature of conservatism, conservatives should instead shy away from optional competitive situations, like sports, where losses occur half the time and all but one team fails to attain their goal of a championship in each season.
In conclusion, we think that negativity bias accounts for many ideological differences and is an encouraging step forward in thinking about what differentiates liberals from conservatives. At present, this account fits an impressive quantity of the data but a broader theory that considers models of cognitive coherence may be able to explain both negativity bias and seemingly contradictory findings, such as conservative life satisfaction.
Social scientists have long studied ideology and proposed myriad theories trying to explain differences along ideological lines. These differences have tended to paint one side in a positive light (usually the left side of the spectrum) and the other side in a negative light (usually the right side of the spectrum). The target article does not do this (thankfully). Rather, the target article remains value-neutral and summarizes a wide swath of literature showing that conservatives are more attuned to threats in their environments than liberals are. The authors state that the basic logic of their proposal is that: “Life is about encounters: sights, sounds, smells, imaginings, objects, and people. These encounters are indisputably physiological and psychological because the systems employed to sense, process, formulate, and execute a response to stimuli are psychological and physiological” (sect. 1, para. 6). Thus, if there are differences in the perception of these stimuli or in people's responses to specific environmental stimuli that map onto politics, then we can infer that there is something in this physiological–psychological system driving ideological preferences. These points are not to be disputed here.
Rather, we focus our comments on pushing this theory to its extremes and inferring that negativity bias is “a key factor in accounting for people's political predispositions” (sect. 6, para. 3). We would like to suggest a similarly extreme, yet related, theory; that the desire for cognitive coherence provides a broader explanation for much of the research discussed. For example, one line of research that the target article does not discuss is the liberal-conservative life satisfaction gap. Specifically, conservatives tend to be more satisfied with their lives (Napier & Jost Reference Napier and Jost2008; but also see Onraet et al. Reference Onraet, Van Hiel and Dhont2013). If negativity bias is the psychological variable that best distinguishes across ideological lines, it ought to be able to integrate the growing body of work on the liberal–conservative “happiness gap.” This life satisfaction difference has actually been explained by traits such as a positive outlook (Schlenker et al. Reference Schlenker, Chambers and Le2012), which directly contradicts the negativity bias hypothesis. In fact, the basis of the prevailing cognitive-behavioral therapeutic model helps people to recover by getting them to stop focusing on the negative, and generating new cognitions and behaviors that steer them away from the negative. People who wish to be happier go to therapy to reduce their fixation on negative stimuli. Why would people showing a strong tendency to fixate on negative stimuli also report greater satisfaction with life? Why would they be happier?
Models of cognitive coherence (Monroe & Read Reference Monroe and Read2008; Simon et al. Reference Simon, Snow and Read2004), which posit that our attitudes are a product of the simultaneous constraints of existing beliefs, dispositions, and identities can explain both the cited research and a variety of other phenomena related to liberal-conservative differences. The conservative predisposition toward negative emotions such as disgust (Graham et al. Reference Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik and Ditto2013; in preparation; Inbar et al. Reference Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer and Haidt2012b) and threat sensitivity (Oxley et al. Reference Oxley, Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Miller, Scalora, Hatemi and Hibbing2008) is clear, and a coherent response to these emotions is to distance ourselves from the sources of disgust (e.g., sexually explicit material) or potential threat (e.g., outgroups). In contrast, liberals may be more willing to suppress their initial emotional reactions and rationalize a dissonant state (Skitka et al. Reference Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson and Chamberlin2002; Wisneski et al. Reference Wisneski, Lytle and Skitka2009). However, this willingness to live in more dissonant states certainly has hedonic consequences. The liberal mindset could be regarded as contrary to what our natural psychological immune system (Gilbert et al. Reference Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg and Wheatley1998) does to keep us happy. Indeed, in some of our preliminary data, we find that conservatives who are primed with a threat report that they are better drivers than average, happier, and view themselves more positively, a finding which could either be interpreted as self-deception or as indicative of a functioning psychological immune system (Wojcik et al. Reference Wojcik, Ditto, Motyl, Iyer, Koleva, Graham and Haidt2013).
Coherence explains a variety of other findings that are unaccounted for by negativity bias as well (Iyer Reference Iyer2012). Conservatives are more likely to create coherence between their factual and moral beliefs, showing more consistency between their beliefs about the morality and effectiveness of capital punishment (Kesebir et al., under review; Liu & Ditto Reference Liu and Ditto2013). This desire for coherence may underlie observed differences in cognitive complexity (Tetlock Reference Tetlock1983; Tetlock & Mitchell Reference Tetlock, Mitchell, Mellers and Baron1993), a line of research that is orthogonal to negativity bias. Coherence also explains more of our current research where we seek to understand where liberals and conservatives are coming from. The communities where liberals and conservatives live differ in important ways, and these differences lead to widely different life experiences (Bishop Reference Bishop2008; Craik Reference Craik, Bruce, Craik and Price2000; Motyl et al. Reference Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter and Nosek2014; Rentfrow et al. Reference Rentfrow, Gosling and Potter2008). These diverse experiences contribute to the conflicting narratives that people craft as they try to craft a coherent understanding of their social realities. Conservatives do tend to reside in communities that prioritize safety and security, and in communities with relatively lower crime rates, perhaps in order to encounter fewer negatively valenced environmental stimuli than liberals do. In laboratory studies where they are presented with negative stimuli that is uncommon in their daily lives, conservatives may fixate more on that negative, threatening stimuli than liberals do, because they do have a stronger reaction to negative stimuli. Yet we also find that conservatives seek out neighborhoods that have more sports fans, which coheres with having a competitive worldview (Lakoff Reference Lakoff2002). If negativity bias were truly the defining feature of conservatism, conservatives should instead shy away from optional competitive situations, like sports, where losses occur half the time and all but one team fails to attain their goal of a championship in each season.
In conclusion, we think that negativity bias accounts for many ideological differences and is an encouraging step forward in thinking about what differentiates liberals from conservatives. At present, this account fits an impressive quantity of the data but a broader theory that considers models of cognitive coherence may be able to explain both negativity bias and seemingly contradictory findings, such as conservative life satisfaction.