I suggest that converting economic history from a topic to a discipline requires three steps: economic theory and quantitative methodology must be relevant and required for writing and teaching good economic history; economic history and historical statistics must be relevant and necessary for writing and teaching good economic theory; and economic history must be relevant and required for writing and teaching good history. Over the past 50 years the first task has been accomplished and the second nearly so. The third task remains, but incorporating the life-cycle perspective into economic history would hasten its successsful completion.

What do economic historians do? I analyze quantitatively The Journal of Economic History's contents since its founding, showing subfields, nations, and periods studied, and which scholars and universities have contributed. The timing, extent, and participants of the cliometric revolution are investigated. New rankings of economic history programs are made.

The record of British and French finance during the Napoleonic wars presents the striking picture of a financially strong nation abandoning the gold standard, borrowing heavily, and generating inflation, while a financially weaker country followed more “orthodox” policies. This paradoxical behavior is explained by Britain's strong credibility that allowed more flexible policies, while France's poor reputation forced reliance on taxation.

Reliance on a “representative firm” approach in studying industrial behavior during the Great Depression obscures economically interesting patterns. A newly discovered data source lets us form and study an establishment-level panel dataset on the motor vehicles industry, one of the largest in 1929. Substantial intraindustry heterogeneity led to large composition effects in employment, output, and productivity: the large number of plants that shut down were unlike the continuing ones. Oddly, output does not seem to have shifted among continuing producers to the relatively low-cost ones. Reconciling these should illuminate links between industrial organization and macroeconomics.

Microeconomic evidence reveals that the incidence and duration of unemployment in the 1930s varied significantly within the labor force. Long-term unemployment, which was especially high by historical standards, may have been exacerbated by federal relief policies.

The usual picture of the medieval peasantry is based on nineteenth-century scholarship, which has proven difficult to dislodge from educated minds. This article continues the revision of an important detail in the picture, the scattering of plots in open fields. Some recent work on the subject by Robert Allen and Gregory Clark is midly disputed, and new evidence is presented that risk avoidance is the key to understanding peasant behavior. The reason for the scattering was not sentiment or socialism. Peasants were not perhaps rational in every detail; but they were prudent.

The Anglo-Irish Economic War of 1932 to 1938 was eventually settled on terms highly favorable to the Irish. This article uses a computational general equilibrium model of the interwar Irish economy to argue that the welfare costs of the war were not so great as has been thought, and that the dispute helped de Valera electorally. These considerations help explain the eventual Irish “victory” in the Economic War.

Britain's textile industry contracted sharply in the interwar period due to the growth of domestic industries in many of its export markets. Lazonick and Mass argue that, because this growth was inevitable, British entrepreneurs should not have focused on the less developed countries. This article questions whether the interwar growth of the Indian textile industry was inevitable. A quantitative study of Indian import demand and production techniques suggests that the rapid growth of the industry was due to exogenous events—postwar British inflation and change in the Indian political regime—rather than to the natural evolution of Indian productivity.

The continued importance of tenant plantations in some areas of the South since the Civil War suggests that there was some advantage to large-scale agriculture. One source of economies of scale was in the marketing of high-quality cotton.

We examine U.S. agricultural policy as an institutional choice. Price controls in World War I had demonstrated the government's influence in markets, and with falling crop prices in the 1920s, farmers appealed to the federal government. The federal government was large enough by then to intervene in variou ways. It could have assisted private cooperatives by providing antitrust exemptions, market information, and enforcement of cooperative rules or intervened directly with mandatory output reductions and targeted prices. The policies adopted were influenced by crop-specific characteristics and broader market conditions affecting the success of private cooperatives.

The broblem with recent historical debates over the segmentation and intergration of labor markets iis that they typically fail to sort out disequlibrium demand shocks from equlibrating migrant-supply responses. This article does so, by exploring the determinants of wage gaps between farm and city for eight countries over the century following 1860.

When labor markets are subject to large demand or supply shocks, as was the case in the late nineteenth-century United States, geographic wage differentials may not be an accurate index of market integration. This article uses a conceptually more appealing measure—the elasticity of local labor supply—to compare the integration of urban labor markets for a variety of occupations in 1890. According to this measure, markets, for unskilled labor and skilled metal-working trades appear relatively well integrated in comparison to those for the skilled building trades.

The ranching economies of California, southern Brazil, and Argentina resorted to different mechanisms of labor control in order to meet the growing demand for their products. Each area used different combinations of slave and wage labor as well as sharecropping arrangements, and these varied over time. I argue that this diversity cannot be explained by differences in the regions' modes of production or relative factor endowments. An alternative interpretive framework that incorporates social conflicts, civil strife, and the interaction between ranchers and the state is needed to explain the differences in modes of labor control.