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FINITIST AXIOMATIC TRUTH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2022

SATO KENTARO*
Affiliation:
INSTITUTE OF COMPUTER SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF BERN BERN, SWITZERLAND
JAN WALKER
Affiliation:
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA GENEVA, SWITZERLAND and INSTITUTE OF COMPUTER SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF BERN BERN, SWITZERLAND E-mail: walker.jan@bluewin.ch
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Abstract

Following the finitist’s rejection of the complete totality of the natural numbers, a finitist language allows only propositional connectives and bounded quantifiers in the formula-construction but not unbounded quantifiers. This is opposed to the currently standard framework, a first-order language. We conduct axiomatic studies on the notion of truth in the framework of finitist arithmetic in which at least smash function $\#$ is available. We propose finitist variants of Tarski ramified truth theories up to rank $\omega $, of Kripke–Feferman truth theory and of Friedman–Sheard truth theory, and show that all of these have the same strength as the finitist arithmetic of one higher level along Grzegorczyk hierarchy. On the other hand, we also show that adding Burgess-style groundedness schema, adjusted to the finitist setting, makes Kripke–Feferman truth theory as strong as primitive recursive arithmetic. Meanwhile, we obtain some basic results on finitist theories of (full and hat) inductive definitions and on the second order axiom of hat inductive definitions for positive operators.

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Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Association for Symbolic Logic