Tech innovations have the potential to disrupt traditional banking by unbundling banking, money, and payments; however, their impact on the cross-border payments system (CBPS) – which still relies on correspondent banking (CoBanking) networks – remains uncertain. This uncertainty is compounded by the literature’s tendency to distinguish between cash clearing and credit and to focus on the latter. Challenging this distinction, the article offers a historical perspective on the role of credit in CoBanking and international payments. It reveals the deep-rooted importance of credit in the CBPS and highlights correspondent banks’ role in providing it. But deep-rooted does not mean static. Indeed, changes in bank-intermediated trade finance practices during and after WWI reshaped the London-based CoBanking network. Furthermore, cash clearing and credit operations remained remarkably congruent until at least the 1980s, as reflected in banks’ internal organisation, reporting, and contemporaries’ descriptions of the payment system. The article argues that adopting a definition of payment systems that integrates both cash clearing and credit is essential to understanding the history of CoBanking and how it supports the CBPS. It suggests that relying on tech firms to provide the elastic payments infrastructure the economy requires could equate to jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire.

Discussing recent literature on online financial practices, this article argues that ‘finance becoming tech’ assumes the form of particular financial situations in the everyday, to be understood in terms of Erving Goffman’s concept of interaction order. While the interactionist strand in the social study of finance foregrounds the role of techno-social situations in the constitution of finance, this article suggests applying Goffman’s notion of the ‘interaction order’ to that debate and demonstrates the latter’s capability to reconstruct the techno-social mechanisms through which finance emerges in the everyday. Unlike the notion of ‘situation’, that of ‘interaction order’ addresses the constitution of situational boundaries through interactional procedures as they refer only partially and selectively to circumstances of their social contexts. Against this background, online financial practices are analytically contoured as techno-social situations that enable the emergence of finance as a matter of the everyday. It is argued that the enabling condition for this commingling of everyday and financial processes is a specific delimitation of the digital-financial interaction order from parts of its political economic context – in particular, the uncertainty that structurally characterizes the financial economy.

Based on a study of the Swiss mobile payment app Twint and its use as a tool for charitable giving, this article introduces a framework for studying redistributive imaginaries and examines donation ‘marketplaces’ and their implications. Engaging with literatures on socio-technical imaginaries, the platformization of payment, post-humanitarianism, and the digital-solutionist ethic, the article asks what happens when practices of giving are facilitated and enclosed by a tech-ified finance industry. Twint’s catalog-like platform for donating reconfigures digital giving and its relation to redistribution. We argue that donations platforms like Twint’s are introducing a new redistributive imaginary by interpellating users as donors, consumers and citizens who – given behavioral psychology – need guidance to exercise choice and become more ethical selves. On the basis of an interface analysis and interviews, we specify a ‘post-sovereign consumer-citizen redistributive imaginary’, characterized by a market frame and tech-solutionism. This imaginary relies on a bounded-rationality model of the human and promotes a post-political idea of democratic participation. The article notes a slippage between different semantics of ‘good’ and ‘better’ technology, which are relevant for a discursive-ideological analysis of the FinTech sector and its rhetoric more broadly. Analyzing them helps us better understand how platform operators are accruing power culturally, economically, and politically.

In this article, I examine how venture capital-driven hypergrowth is progressively reshaping political authority via an emergent Silicon Valley Consensus (SVC). Drawing on the political theory of Carl Schmitt, I argue that VC-backed firms are able to operate in a zone of exception that suspends or bypasses conventional regulatory boundaries, thus constraining the state’s competence to govern. By foregrounding disruptive innovation as a strategic maneuver that subverts political power while accelerating capitalist transformations, I ultimately characterize venture capital as an anti-politics machine – one that depoliticizes itself while trapping regulatory institutions and sovereign authority in a field of political necessity. Focusing on the United States while drawing global implications, I show how the SVC not only shifts decision-making power from public institutions to private actors, but also reconfigures the political necessity that compels governments to legitimize new forms of power in an era of rapid technological change.

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has introduced several policy measures to better align financial markets with sustainability goals. So far, these policies have mainly aimed to improve how information on the sustainability impacts of investments is collected and transmitted. Policymakers hope that adjustments to the epistemic infrastructure of financial markets will lead to a shift in investments that translates into transformational change in the real economy. The EU’s sustainable finance policies often follow a reflexive law approach and confine themselves to setting procedural and organisational norms. This article analyses the potential and limitations of this approach and argues that sustainable finance policies must be sufficiently detailed and binding to avoid the risk, associated with reflexive law policies, of granting too much discretion to agents with vested interests detrimental to the governance aims. However, detailed and binding policies do not fully realise the advantages in dealing with highly complex and dynamic situations that are often ascribed to reflexive law policies. While sustainable finance policies that address the epistemic infrastructure of financial markets are for various reasons still important, their potential and advantages compared to other governance approaches should not be exaggerated.

In a financialized world where we are all conscripted to be competitive players, the category of cheating takes on new political and cultural potency and has become key to reactionary ideology. This speculative essay moves beyond the conventional framing of cheating as the exceptional malfeasance of bad economic actors, as well as beyond the claim that capitalism’s drive to profit encourages dishonesty and manipulation (thought that is indeed true). Rather, it proposes we recognize cheating at capitalism’s ideological and operational core, not its periphery. By examining imperialism’s ‘Great Game’, the links between game theory and neoliberalism, and the role of recursive rule-breaking in the history of finance, we can triangulate the normalization of cheating within the dominant economic paradigm. This essay approaches cheating as a discursive formation entangled with financial power. Such an approach can help us recognize some elements of the rise of reactionary, far-right, and fascistic sentiment and politics today. These in many cases revolve around a rhetoric of cheating that misrecognizes the culprits, targeting poor and precarious minorities rather than those at the commanding heights of the economy.

AI’s growing role in finance challenges traditional expectations of transparency and theoretical understanding. While machine learning (ML) models enhance financial decision-making, they remain largely agnostic to established financial theories, producing knowledge and ignorance in ways that differ from traditional models like VaR, DCF, and Black-Scholes. This essay explores the decoupling of AI models from theoretical financial knowledge and the resulting forms of ignorance. Using 22 semi-structured interviews, we investigate how ML models generate epistemic uncertainties. We focus on causal ignorance: AI systems, including those supported by XAI, fail to provide genuine causal explanations. Because understanding causation is inherently theoretical, AI-driven finance remains theory-agnostic and marked by theoretical ignorance. We explore how this ignorance differs from that of traditional models and what it implies for the role of theory in finance. Finally, we present three possible scenarios for the future of theory in finance and outline directions for further research.

Adam Neumann surely ranks among the most disgraced corporate leaders of our time. The former WeWork founder and CEO, who was ousted from the company in 2019, became emblematic of the corporate excesses and hollow boosterism of post-dotcom Silicon Valley. In the public imagination his name is synonymous with failure and fraud. But to the outrage of many he is back on the scene, securing unprecedented backing from venture capital titan Andreessen Horowitz for his new real estate venture Flow. This essay unpacks the non-death of Adam Neumann, interrogating why someone seemingly so untouchable is being funded at the highest level by one of Silicon Valley’s most infamous VCs. I argue that, through his atypical ‘exiting’ of WeWork, whereby he extracted billions from the company without initial public offering or acquisition, Neumann attained a level of wealth and power that made him ripe for reinvestment. The case challenges the liberal ‘fake-it-till-you-make-it’ myth of Silicon Valley meritocracy. US tech today increasingly takes the form of billionaire VCs funding already-powerful, deceptive and ruthless repeat founders. It is this increasingly consolidated and cynical system that enables Adam Neumann to ‘fail up’; rewarded rather than punished for his extreme misdemeanors.

In this article, I place the blockchain within competing interpretations of the present as either an emerging technofeudal mode of production, or as a relatively unchanged capitalism. Drawing on a wide literature on zones – spaces in nation-states where the usual rules do not apply – I highlight three reconfigurations of territory, authority, and rights (TAR) associated with the blockchain today. These are: (1) the transnational expansion of crypto-related practices; (2) the national regulation and legitimation of cryptoassets; and (3) the reemergence of a liberal discourse linking human rights to the global exchange of private property. Through these examples, I demonstrate how the blockchain is part of a broader reshaping of accumulation and legal legitimation, mirroring the emergence of capitalism and the nation-state, but on a global scale. I conclude by arguing against the position that the reemergence of fascism is a red herring distracting us from the coming technofeudalism; instead, I claim that technofeudalism obscures the links between today’s techno-authoritarian shift and the enforcement of global corporate private property relations.

This article examines how the absence of physical branches and embodied oversight in fintech reconfigures financial life in Nigeria. Based on nine months of ethnographic fieldwork in Jimeta, it shows that the absence of physical infrastructures and the dominance of virtual ones is not merely technical but an active condition that reshapes moral obligation, trust, and accountability in borrowing. Branchless fintech enables users, mostly Muslims, to rationalise interest-bearing loans as private acts beyond communal or religious scrutiny – a process conceptualised as financial secularisation. Yet the same absence generates mistrust as users perceive fintech as intangible and unreliable. The article also shows how the impersonal nature of fintech borrowing encourages default, which fintech companies counter through coercive digital enforcement. These dynamics reveal a dialectic of absence and presence: physical absence weakens moral accountability while hyper-visible digital oversight reinstates coercion. The article contributes to debates on credit-debt relations and infrastructure by showing how digital finance transforms moral economies in the global south and reshapes financial subjectivities.

We examine the implications of tokenization for the transformation of things into financial assets. Framed as the ‘democratization’ of financial investment by its advocates, tokenization is a process whereby asset ownership is fractionalized and represented by a digital token to be sold to potential investors on blockchain-based platforms. Tokenization can be seen as an extension of securitization to illiquid real-world assets or digital assets; as such, tokenization is often framed as a technique to isolate risks, reduce financing costs, and generate returns without selling the underlying assets. For example, real estate security tokens offer fractionalized ownership to smaller investors through digital means lowering entry barriers, though such investors still typically lack exposure to diversified real estate token portfolios. Through an analytical and empirical investigation, we argue the governance claims made about tokenization obscure a key contradiction: tokenization is touted as a way to democratize financial markets, but the necessary adaptation of tokenization to prevailing financial market infrastructures undermines this democratization promise. Engaging with this contradiction, we unpack the governance of financial markets and assets through the techno-financial transformation of things into digital tokens, focusing on the promise of tokenization to democratize finance.

This essay coins and develops the concept of Longevity Capitalism, a biopolitical and financial regime in which both the condition of living longer and the pursuit of longevity are transformed into frontiers of accumulation. As financialisation extends into the domain of ageing, longevity – once a social and fiscal challenge – has been reframed as an investment opportunity. The essay traces a shift from collective welfare management to individualized risk-bearing, showing how uncertainty about life expectancy is converted into a new asset class. Drawing on examples such as financial instruments that profit from longevity risk, the rise of ‘age-tech’, and Silicon Valley’s ventures in life extension, it shows how biological time is increasingly treated as an economic resource. It also examines the speculative pursuit of ‘longevity escape velocity’, where technological innovation is imagined to outpace ageing and death itself becomes a technical problem. Together, these developments reveal a system in which longer life functions as a perpetually deferred investment cycle – an economy sustained by its own postponement. The essay argues that economic and biological time, wealth and health, are now fused within a single regime of managed futurity, reflecting new forms of power over who – and how – gets to live longer.

Is the formation of venture capital (VC) markets a national phenomenon? Against the common view that VC emerged in the US in the post-WWII period and later (yet independently) in Europe, we argue that the uneven relation between US and UK VC markets was crucial for British VC formation since the 1980s. Based on an empirical analysis of secondary literature and financial data, the article demonstrates that this relation is better understood through the lens of international financial subordination and identifies three types of dependencies to qualify this relation: the dependencies of UK VC on US start-up investments, US growth capital, and US exit deals. This type of financial subordination is specific to ‘alternative finance’, because highly profitable VC exits kick-started a flywheel effect in UK VC in the 2000s, and the subsequent expansion of British VC went hand in hand with a concentration of capital because UK VC followed a ‘winners-take-all’ logic that is characteristic of alt-finance in general. This suggests, counterintuitively, that after UK VC formed, the US economy benefitted more in financial, economic, and technological terms from the growing British VC market than its UK counterpart mainly because most large exit deals took place in the US.

With reference to Elon Musk’s FinTech strategy for X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter, this essay critically interrogates the evolution of North American and European FinTech economies toward what is typically called ‘embedded finance’; that is, the technological integration of monetary and financial services into discrete social interactions and economic transactions by nonfinancial companies. We argue that embedded finance furthers the disappearance of FinTech as an evident market domain of technologically facilitated monetary and financial relations. Specialist FinTech startup intermediaries are receding into the background of an institutional and digital landscape shaped by strong monopolization tendencies. FinTech economies are increasingly dominated by major platform firms with the assistance of banks. Relatedly, FinTech services have become ubiquitous to the extent that they are taken for granted by people who are configured as platform users that are ripe for rent capture, rather than as sovereign consumers searching for products. The disappearance of FinTech should not be confused with its demise, however. Disappearance is the fullest expression of the transformative appearance of FinTech in people’s everyday monetary and financial lives over the last quarter century.

Modern monetary theory (MMT) argues that all governments that issue their own currency have the same fiscal and monetary policy space. This paper argues against this position. For MMT’s assumptions to be valid, MMT must abstract from the gravitational force of the US dollar that stems from it being backed by a mass of securities – an influence transmitted through international investment flows. Once the dollar’s gravitational force is recognised, it becomes clear that the huge size disparity separating the US financial market from those of other markets, and most notably those of the emerging market economies (EMEs), translates into an equally huge disparity regarding fiscal and monetary policy capacities. The strategic implications of recognising this disparity are that EME governments should, where possible, join their financial markets into regional blocs of sufficient size to give their regional currencies enough backing mass to allow them to resist the gravitational pull of the dollar. Only by pooling their currency sovereignty can EME governments retain some scope for pursuing macroeconomic policies independently of those pursued by the US government. Without doing so, if EME governments in countries with small financial markets follow MMT’s advice to retain their local currencies, this will condemn these currencies to entrapment in the dollar’s gravitational field and possibly outright dollar colonisation.

Platform finance implies financial institutions’ growing dependence on the infrastructure and technologies of large tech firms. This reliance manifests itself most clearly in cloud services provision where American technological hegemony has triggered concerns about technological sovereignty in the European Union. In China, American Big Techs have not gained much of a foothold given the role of domestic Techfins in a wider attempt to install algorithmic governance. The observed interdependencies and segmentations of global digital technology networks warrant a further analysis of how cloud finance becomes enmeshed in wider geopolitical power struggles. Based on official document analysis, this article studies the geopolitical dimensions of cloud finance regulation in the EU, the US, and China. Given the fragmented nature of cloud regulation, it compiles insights from data protection, market competition, financial sector regulation, and cybersecurity to understand how cloud finance is governed in each macro-block. Our analysis shows how regulation in the three blocs supports US financial cloud hegemony, whilst producing financial cloud subordination of its geopolitical ally the EU and drawing China into financial cloud insulation.

In the near future, individuals and non-financial firms will use generative artificial intelligence (AI) to execute everyday financial tasks. Users may deploy ‘AI agents’ such as Apple’s Siri or Google’s Gemini to pay their bills, recommend financial products or manage investment portfolios, and perform myriad other financial activities. Although users may receive benefits from having AI agents offer financial services, these applications pose significant risks both to customers and to the financial system: they may fail to act in users’ best interests, engage in market manipulation, and cause financial instability. This essay argues that regulators are unprepared for technology firms to use open finance and AI architecture to provide individualized financial services without human interaction. It argues that AI agents are the next technological innovation in finance that should be regulated, but that US banking regulators lack authority to directly regulate deposit brokers, posing risks to financial stability and the general public.

This forum contribution explores the strengths and limits of Noam Yuran’s innovative call for a new political economy of sex and desire. It has three prongs. First, I discuss Yuran’s compelling focus on the curious durability of monogamy as an institution. Second, I examine his analysis of thinkers such as Mandeville and Weber. Finally, I turn to the question of love. I suggest that Yuran’s approach opens a pathway to a more loving and more realistic political economy of intimacy and familial love, one that I suggest is missing in much critical theory today, particularly in the rhetoric of family abolitionists.

Synthetic datasets, artificially generated to mimic real-world data while maintaining anonymization, have emerged as a promising technology in the financial sector, attracting support from regulators and market participants as a solution to data privacy and scarcity challenges limiting machine learning (ML) deployment. This article argues that synthetic data’s effects on financial markets depend critically on how these technologies are embedded within existing ML infrastructural ‘stacks’ rather than on their intrinsic properties. We identify three key tensions that will determine whether adoption proves beneficial or harmful: (1) data circulability versus opacity, particularly the ‘double opacity’ problem arising from stacked ML systems, (2) model-induced scattering versus model-induced herding in market participant behavior, and (3) flattening versus deepening of data platform power. These tensions directly correspond to core regulatory priorities around model risk management, systemic risk, and competition policy. Using financial audit as a case study, we demonstrate how these tensions interact in practice and propose governance frameworks, including a synthetic data labeling regime to preserve contextual information when datasets cross organizational boundaries.