This chapter describes and discusses the pragmatic argument. Whereas the previous chapters have generally served to develop and defend sufficientarianism, this chapter primarily debunks a familiar argument that is increasingly, but mistakenly, taken to speak in favour of sufficientarianism. This argument, called the pragmatic argument, says that the ideal of sufficiency is more easily achieved and more feasible than the ideals of equality and priority, and that this pragmatic advantage speaks in favour of a sufficientarian theory of justice. The chapter argues against both these claims. First, once we understand the substantial requirements of the sufficiency threshold in reference to a rather demanding multiple-threshold view such as the umbel view, we understand that sufficiency is not necessarily more feasible than other ideals of justice. Second, even if the ideal of sufficiency was easier to achieve than other ideals, this is not a relevant theoretical advantage of a sufficientarianism theory of justice. Hence, we have strong reasons to reject the pragmatic argument. Upon this conclusion, the chapter reflects on what sufficientarianism implies for public policy.