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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2025

Lasse Nielsen
Lasse Nielsen
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University of Southern Denmark
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A New Theory of Sufficientarian Justice , pp. 212 - 220
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2026

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  • Bibliography
  • Lasse Nielsen, University of Southern Denmark
  • Book: A New Theory of Sufficientarian Justice
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009531467.010
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  • Bibliography
  • Lasse Nielsen, University of Southern Denmark
  • Book: A New Theory of Sufficientarian Justice
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009531467.010
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  • Lasse Nielsen, University of Southern Denmark
  • Book: A New Theory of Sufficientarian Justice
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009531467.010
Available formats
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