5.1 Introduction
Kuan-Yew Lee,Footnote 1 then prime minister of Singapore, first visited China in May 1976. The visit was followed, some years later in 1990, by the establishment of diplomatic relations, and since that time relations between the two countries have been, for the most part, stable. Early on, there were a number of minor disputes, including one between the Suzhou municipal government and the Singapore government at the initial stage of the flagship Suzhou Industrial Park project, and another in which the Chinese government showed a degree of displeasure during the SARS outbreak in 2003. There was one more serious dispute, however, that turned the otherwise warm and friendly relations frosty almost overnight. The shift was precipitated by a private visit of then Deputy Prime Minister Hsien-Loong Lee (DPM Lee) to Taiwan.
Conflicts of core interest are bound to erupt from time to time even among friendly countries. No diplomatic relations can be completely smooth. Such is the reality of international relations. So even though Singapore–China bilateral ties have been good for quite some time, this does not mean that another, more serious dispute like the one described below could not break out in the future.
China is a major player in global geopolitics and is likely to become even more dominant in the future. It is, therefore, of paramount importance for Singapore to keep diplomatic relations with China on a sound footing. Kuan-Yew Lee said when he was Minister Mentor: ‘small countries also have core interests, and even if others feel we should not observe them, we feel sometimes it's necessary for us to defend these core interests' (Straits Times, 23 December 2004). Singapore has to be prepared to deal with disruptions in Singapore–China relations from time to time even as bilateral ties develop.
The Singapore–China diplomatic dispute over DPM Lee's visit to Taiwan not only demonstrated that there was a principled and fundamental political distinction between the Chinese of Singapore and those of China, but it also encouraged Chinese Singaporeans to ponder the question of their own ethnic identity – ‘who are we?’ It also clearly reflected a significant emotional division in predominantly Chinese Singapore between the Chinese-speaking Chinese community and the English-speaking Chinese community over attitudes to China. The problem may be termed the ‘China complex’. After fifty years of independence, it remains a pressing need to bridge the gap between these two distinct groups of Chinese in Singapore.
5.2 Background: The Singapore–China Diplomatic Dispute
5.2.1 DPM Lee on a Private and Unofficial Visit to Taiwan
The Taiwanese press reported that then Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance Hsien Loong Lee made a visit to Taiwan on 10 July 2004. He was welcomed at Chiang Kai-shek Airport by then Secretary-General to the Taiwan President, Tseng-chang Su. Both parties kept a low profile for the visit.
On 11 July 2004, Qiyue Zhang, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, issued the following statement:
On 10 July, Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister Hsien-Loong Lee made his so-called unofficial visit to Taiwan, regardless of solemn representations repeatedly made by China. The Chinese Government expresses its strong dissatisfaction with and protest against it. The Taiwan question bears directly on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are firmly opposed to official exchanges in any form between the Taiwan authorities and the countries that have diplomatic relations with China. Whatever pretext the Singaporean leader uses for his visit to Taiwan, the visit will damage China's core interest and the political foundation for China–Singapore relations and hurt the feelings of 1.3 billion Chinese people. The Singaporean side has to take all responsibilities for the consequences arising thereof.
On 11 July, a spokesman from the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a response:
DPM Lee is making a private and unofficial visit to Taiwan to meet with friends. He last visited them in 1992. Singapore has consistently maintained a ‘one China’ policy. We do not support independence for Taiwan. This is our fundamental position. DPM Lee's private visit does not in any way change this policy, nor does it represent any challenge to China's sovereignty or territorial integrity. Singapore values our close and extensive bilateral relations with China. It would be regrettable if bilateral relations were to be affected by this private visit.
The day afterwards, on 12 July, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) announced the cancellation of a lecture by the governor of the People's Bank of China:
The MAS Lecture, scheduled to be held on Wednesday, 14 July 2004 is cancelled. We have been informed that this year's speaker, Dr Xiaochuan Zhou, Governor of the People's Bank of China, has cancelled his trip to Singapore.
A spokesperson from the China Foreign Ministry, Qiyue Zhang, at a regular media briefing on 13 July 2004 confirmed that China central bank governor Xiaochuan Zhou had called off his trip to Singapore. He was replaced by the deputy governor, Ning Su, who turned down the invitation to attend the official dinner function hosted by then Deputy Prime Minister Lee on 15 July 2004.
Qiyue Zhang made clear China's position: ‘Mr Hsien Loong Lee, as Singapore Deputy Prime Minister, no matter what excuse he uses to visit Taiwan, it will be a serious violation of the Singapore Government's commitment to the “one China” policy and will harm the political foundation of Sino-Singapore relations.’ He added that ‘Mr Hsien Loong Lee has been in the upper echelons of the Singapore Government for many years. Hence his status cannot be changed by such a statement as “an unofficial and private visit”. For this reason, we believe Singapore's explanation does not accord with reality and cannot stand on its own feet.’
Ms Zhang also refuted the Taiwanese media's allegation that Mr Lee was acting as an intermediary between China and Taiwan. She reiterated that ‘the Taiwan question is China's internal politics. China has never needed and does not need any country, or anyone, to be a “messenger” for both sides.’
Asked by the Chinese media if China would recall the Chinese Ambassador to Singapore, she said: ‘We are following the developments and will adopt relevant measures.’
Scholars within China also criticised DPM Lee's trip. Some of their comments were aired in Jinri guanzhu (Today's Focus) on China Central Television 4 (CCTV-4) on 14 July 2004. Xuetong Yan, Director of the International Relations Research Institute at Qinghua University commented that ‘Singapore is attempting to raise its international stature by moulding itself as the “middleman” between global powers so that all parties need it.’ Yushan Wang, former APEC officer, said China should take more punitive action if Singapore failed to respond suitably to Beijing's expression of ‘strong dissatisfaction’.
On 16 July 2004, DPM Lee gave a written response to queries from the Singapore media about his Taiwan trip. He said: ‘Singapore informed the PRC Government as a courtesy before I left. They asked that the trip be cancelled. But to call off the trip at China's request would have undermined our right to make independent decisions, and damaged our international standing. As a small country, this is a vital consideration in our dealings with all countries.’ He added that ‘it would be regrettable if relations are affected, because both sides will stand to lose. If our relations cannot survive this episode then they must be shallow and brittle.’
He went on to note: ‘We are long-time friends of both the mainland and Taiwan, and conduct our relations with both in a way that is consistent with our “one China” policy. We have not allowed and will not allow ourselves to be used to further the cause of Taiwanese independence. My visit will therefore not affect the way we deal with the two sides.’
He also remarked that ‘the cross-strait issue is a potential flashpoint. A conflict across the strait will have dire consequences not just for the involved parties, but the entire region, and for many years.’ For this reason, he had decided to go to Taiwan in order to get a feel for the current situation there. As to his impressions of Taiwan after the visit, he noted: ‘Because of their preoccupation with domestic politics and winning votes, they have not adequately factored in the vast changes in the international situation. So we cannot rule out a miscalculation or mishap that would have serious repercussions on Singapore and the region.’
Despite Lee's official statements on the subject of his Taiwan trip, China continued to express its disapproval. For example, on 16 July 2004, the Chinese representative of the China–ASEAN Business Council, Ningning Xu, announced that China–Singapore FTA negotiations would quite definitely be affected by Lee's Taiwan trip. Then on 20 July 2004, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to delay the issuing of an official invitation to Singapore's National Development Minister, Bow Tan Mah, for his scheduled visit to Chengdu from 28 July 2004 to 30 July 2004.
5.2.2 The Singapore Government Follows Up
Prime Minister Hsien Loong Lee said in his swearing-in speech on 12 August 2004 that ‘We depend on a stable and peaceful Asia, and will have to stay alert for signs of danger in the region or the world. A mishap in cross-straits relations can derail growth throughout Asia.’
In his speech at the National Day Rally on 22 August 2004, Lee talked about the following questions: ‘Why I needed to visit Taiwan; why Singapore is not changing its one-China policy; and why I've become more worried about the cross-straits situation after my visit.’
Singapore's Foreign Affairs Minister, George Yeo, expressed his concerns over the cross-straits situation at the 59th Session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 25 September 2004. Part of his speech is quoted below:
The international community should also not allow the deteriorating relationship across the Taiwan Straits to get out of control. The push towards independence by certain groups in Taiwan is most dangerous because it will lead to war with mainland China and drag in other countries. At stake is the stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region.
5.2.3 The Taiwan Foreign Affairs Minister's Intemperate Remarks
When speaking to a group of pro-independence activists on 26 September 2004, Taiwan's Foreign Affairs Minister, Mark Chen, slammed his Singaporean counterpart George Yeo for his remarks on Taiwan at the UN General Assembly. He said that ‘Singapore is a “little piece of dried nasal mucus”, yet it tried to show off by criticising Taiwan and the former Taiwan President Teng-hui Lee at the UN.’ He even used a Hokkien expletive to accuse Singapore of currying favour with mainland China.
5.2.4 A Thaw in Singapore–China Bilateral Ties
PM Lee and China's President Jintao Hu met on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Santiago, Chile on 20 November 2004. A week or so later, on 28 November 2004, PM Lee and China's Premier Jiabao Wen met on the sidelines of the 10th ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos. Then, after meeting Singapore's Foreign Affairs Minister, George Yeo, in Beijing on 2 February 2005, Jiabao Wen called for an acceleration in the negotiations for a free trade agreement with Singapore and said the Prime Minister would be welcome to visit China whenever he could.
In response to questions raised by Members of Parliament who wanted an update on ties with China, George Yeo replied in parliament on 4 March 2005. He agreed with China's Ambassador to Singapore, Yun Zhang, who said in a media interview that Singapore–China relations were back on track.
5.3 Singapore Media's Responses: A Linguistic Interpretation
5.3.1 DPM Lee on a Private and Unofficial Visit to Taiwan
At the onset of the Singapore–China diplomatic dispute arising from Lee's Taiwan visit, the Singapore government kept a low profile, issuing only two short official announcements, one from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other from the Monetary Authority. It was not until 16 July 2004 that Lee gave an official written response to queries from the Singapore media pertaining to his Taiwan visit. Now we will consider whether there was any significant difference in the responses of the Singapore media before and after Lee's response.
5.3.1.1 Before DPM Lee Explained his Taiwan Visit
Lianhe Zaobao ‘United Daily’ (LHZB), a leading Chinese newspaper in Singapore, ran seven news reports before the deputy prime minister gave an official written response pertaining to his Taiwan visit. Three of them presented only the facts of the case:
i. ‘Li zongli siren fangwen Taiwan’ [DPM Lee makes a private visit to Taiwan]
ii. ‘2004 nian Jinguanju Jiangzuo quxiao’ [2004 MAS Lecture cancelled]
iii. ‘Zhang Zhixian bing wei fang Tai’ [Teo Chee Hean didn't visit Taiwan]
Four of the LHZB reports commented on the reactions of the Chinese government and of scholars in China:
i. ‘Li Xianlong siren fangwen/Zhongguo zhengfu qianglie bu man’ [Hsien Loong Lee's private visit/the Chinese government is deeply perturbed]
ii. ‘Li Xianlong siren fang Tai: Zhang Qiyue tan Zhou Xiaochuan quxiao fangxin/Zhongxin guanxi nanmian hui chansheng yanzhong houguo’ [Hsien Loong Lee's private visit to Taiwan: Qiyue Zhang comments on Xiaochuan Zhou's cancellation of his visit to Singapore/Serious consequences for China–Singapore relations are unavoidable]
iii. ‘Zhongguo xuezhe kouzhu bifa Li Xianlong fang Tai’ [China scholars denounce in speech and writing Hsien Loong Lee's visit to Taiwan]
iv. ‘Zhongguo zhu Ma dashi: Maguo buyao xiang Xinjiapo “xiang Taidu facuo xinxi”’ [China's Ambassador to Malaysia: Malaysia shouldn't ‘send wrong signals to the Taiwanese independence movement’ like Singapore did]
It is worth noting that the headlines of the latter four reports on China's reactions have a critical tone: ‘qianglie buman’ [deeply perturbed], ‘nanmian hui chansheng yanzhong houguo’ [serious consequences are unavoidable], ‘kouzhu bifa’ [denounce in speech and writing]. They lay stress on the negative effects of the Sino-Singapore dispute, which inevitably have an effect on readers' reactions.
As for the cancellation of the 2004 MAS Lecture, LHZB simply published the official announcement from the MAS. They made no attempt to analyse the reasons for, and consequences of, the last-minute cancellation of bank governor Xiaochuan Zhou's visit to Singapore.
It is clear, then, that at the onset of the Singapore–China dispute, rather than taking a clear position on the issue, LHZB chose to adopt the role of messenger, conveying the dissatisfaction of the Chinese government as well as scholars within China to Chinese-speaking readers in Singapore.
On the other hand, the Straits Times (ST), a leading English-language newspaper in Singapore, ran five news reports. Two of them provided little more than the basic facts of the case:
i. ‘DPM Lee on private visit to Taiwan’
ii. ‘DPM Lee's Taiwan trip’
But three included the reactions of the Chinese government:
i. ‘DPM in Taiwan: Beijing reacts’
ii. ‘How China views DPM's visit to Taiwan’
iii. ‘More harsh words for Singapore’
In the latter three headlines featuring the reactions of the Chinese government, the ST used two verbs with neutral tone, namely ‘reacts’ and ‘views’, and one noun phrase with a more critical tone, namely ‘harsh words’.
In sharp contrast to the quiescence exhibited by LHZB staff writers and readers, a ST staff writer – Chak Lim Tan – wrote a commentary entitled ‘What could have provoked China's stern rebuke?’ The ST Forum page also published three letters from local readers under the title of ‘No way to treat an old friend like Singapore’.
It can be seen that at the onset of the Singapore–China diplomatic dispute, through the provision of a series of neutral news reports and the publication of commentary and of reader's letters, the ST took a firm stand on the issue, adopting a Singaporean perspective. Besides remarking on the apparent brittleness of the Singapore–China relationship, the ST also highlighted the importance for Singapore of taking an independent position on foreign policy. The ST also expressed surprise and dissatisfaction about the harsh reactions from China.
5.3.1.2 After DPM Lee Fielded Questions from the Singapore Media concerning his Taiwan Visit
LHZB ran nineteen news reports, including five on responses of the Singapore government, viz:
i. ‘Li Xianlong: Ruo jingbuqi siren fang Tai kaoyan, Xin-Zhong guanxi shi qianbo he cuiruo de’ [Hsien Loong Lee: If Singapore–China relations can't pass the test of a private visit to Taiwan, then they must be rather shallow and brittle]
ii. ‘Ruguo zai Zhongguo yaoqiu xia quxiao fang Tai jiang sunhai women duli zuozhu de quanli’ [‘To call off the trip at China's request would have undermined our right to make independent decisions']
iii. ‘Zeng Shisheng: Jiaoyu jiaoliu yinggai bu shou Xin-Zhong guanxi bianhua yingxiang’ [Soo Sen Chan: Education exchanges shouldn't be affected by changes in China–Singapore relations]
iv. ‘Xin-Zhong jinhou guanxi fazhan Li Xianlong hui zhuoshou chuli’ [Hsien Loong Lee will have to take up the problem of the future development of Singapore–China relations]
v. ‘Zeng Shisheng: Laopengyou ye you chaojia de shihou’ [Soo Sen Chan: There are times when old friends quarrel too]
There was also one critical headline from a Singapore opposition party member:
‘Minzhu Jinbudang: Gaibianle zhengfu dui yi Zhong zhengce lichang’ [Singapore Democratic Progressive Party: This has changed the government position on the one China policy]
Two reports featured Singaporeans' reactions to the dispute:
i. ‘Shanghai Xinjiapo shanghui huizhang: Wo mei shuoguo fang Tai shi “yida shiwu”’ [Shanghai Singapore Business Association President: I didn't say that the visit to Taiwan was ‘a big mistake']
ii. ‘Xin-Zhong waijiao fengbo bu yingxiang guoren youxing’ [Singapore–China diplomatic dispute doesn't affect Singaporeans' urge to travel]
There were ten subsequent reactions from China:
i. ‘Shizhangban he gaoguanban Zhongguo bu pairen shangke’ [China no longer sending officials to mayors' and senior officials' courses]
ii. ‘“Xinjiapo jia'nianhua” wufa zai Pudong juxing’ [‘Singapore Fair’ won't be held in Pudong]
iii. ‘Zhongguo-Yaxi'an shangwu lishihui Zhongfang lishi: Kending yingxiang Zhong-Xin zimao tanpan’ [China–ASEAN Business Council's China member: Certain to affect China–Singapore FTA negotiations]
iv. ‘Zhongguo waijiaobu: Li Xianlong fang Tai sunhai Zhongguo hexin liyi’ [Chinese Foreign Ministry: Hsien Loong Lee's visit to Taiwan harms China's core interests]
v. ‘Zhongguo jueding “zanhuan” yaoqing; Ma Baoshan quxiao fangwen Chengdu’ [China decides to ‘temporarily delay’ invitation; Bow Tan Mah cancels his visit to Chengdu]
vi. ‘Yan Xuetong: tiaozhan Zhongguo zhuquan, Xinjiapo tu shenme?’ [Xuetong Yan: What is Singapore's motive in challenging China's sovereignty?], reprinted from 19 July 2004 Globe magazine.
vii. ‘Zhongguo dashi zhuanfang quanwen: Cong wei ba Xinjiapo kancheng “xiao” guo’ [Full text of the special interview with the Chinese Ambassador: We never viewed Singapore as a ‘small’ nation]
viii. ‘Zhongguo dashi Zhang Yun: Wang wuyun jinkuai xiaosan dan “jieling haixu xilingren”’ [China Ambassador Yun Zhang: Hope the dark clouds disperse soon, but it's those who caused the problem who should fix it]
ix. ‘Zhongguo waijiaobu fayanren Kong Quan: Wang Xinjiapo “yi shiji xingdong quxin yu Zhongguo renmin”’ [China Foreign Ministry spokesperson Quan Kong: Hope Singapore ‘can regain the confidence of China's people through concrete actions']
x. ‘Shen Guofang: Zhong-Xin yixie hezuo xiangmu hui shoudao yanzhong yingxiang’ [Guofang Shen: some collaborative projects between China and Singapore will be seriously affected]
Lastly, one article in LHZB dealt with Taiwan's response:
‘Taiwan baozhang kending Li Xianlong dui Tai guancha’ [Taiwan press agrees with Hsien Loong Lee's observations on Taiwan]
Despite the Singapore government's explanations for DPM Lee's Taiwan visit reported in LHZB, the Chinese government remained dissatisfied and continued to mount a series of protest actions against Singapore. In order to lay stress on the seriousness of the situation, LHZB provided wide-ranging coverage of China's ‘retaliatory actions’. There were comparatively fewer news reports on the responses to these actions from Singapore and Taiwan.
In addition, LHZB ran six commentaries from its staff writers:
i. ‘Sun Chuanwei: Fanying guoji wuyi Beijing xingxiang’ [Chuanwei Sun: Intemperate reactions are not beneficial to Beijing's image]
ii. ‘Cai Shenjiang: Biyao de jianchibuxia’ [Shenjiang Cai: No way out of the deadlock]
iii. ‘Li Huiling: Xiaoguo zhi xiao’ [Huiling Li: The smallness of a small nation]
iv. ‘Bai Shide: Xin-Zhong ying baochi duihui qudao changkai’ [Shide Bai: Singapore and China should maintain open channels of communication]
v. ‘Wu Jungang: A Bian bushi Jiang Jingguo’ [Jungang Wu: Ah Bian (= Chen Shuibian) is not Chiang Ching-kuo]
vi. ‘Yan Mengda: “Dashi-dafei de kaoyan”’ [Mengda Yan: The challenge of ‘big rights and big wrongs']
The six staff writers looked at the dispute from multiple viewpoints and responded accordingly. Chuanwei Sun criticised China's strong negative reaction and emphasised China's need to uphold its international image, Shenjiang Cai stressed the core interests of the two nations and concluded that conflicts were inevitable and essential, Huiling Li elaborated on the constraints faced by Singapore as a small nation, Shide Bai advocated keeping an open channel for Singapore–China dialogue, Jungang Wu reminded readers that times had changed and that Taiwan was no longer what it used to be, and Mengda Yan drew attention to the challenges for Singapore's relations with China that were exposed by the cross-straits issue. LHZB also ran the following letters from four Singaporean readers:
i. ‘Wu Jinjiang: Ying dashihuaxiao’ [Jinjiang Wu: Major issues should be reduced to minor ones]
ii. ‘Liu Xuming: Xin-Zhong guanxi huhui huli’ [Xuming Liu: The Singapore–China relationship is mutually beneficial]
iii. ‘Peng Shizhuo: Xin-Zhong waijiao fengbo, yige xiaoshimin de guangan’ [Shizhuo Peng: The Singapore–China diplomatic dispute, impressions of an ordinary citizen]
iv. ‘Zheng Congde: Hua zong gaiyou shuowan de shihou’ [Congde Zheng: There's a time to bring things to an end]
They also printed commentary from Taiwan:
‘Hu Zhongxin: Li Xianlong kan Taiwan zhengju’ [Zhongxin Hu: Hsien Loong Lee observes Taiwan's political situation]
In the hope that the Singapore–China diplomatic dispute would gradually subside, the letter writers cited above took conciliatory positions, arguing that a win-win situation could only be achieved if the two nations worked hand-in-hand to ‘turn major issues into minor ones’.
The ST (in English) ran fifteen news reports, including three on the responses of the Singapore government:
i. ‘DPM Lee responds to China's protests’
ii. ‘Taiwan trip doesn't change or contradict “one China” policy’
iii. ‘Singapore–China friendship remains “strong”’
There was one critical note from a Singapore opposition party leader:
‘Bad move, says Singapore opposition party’
There were also seven reports featuring China's subsequent reactions:
i. ‘Shanghai scraps fair organized by Singapore firm’
ii. ‘Chinese officials put off study plans here’
iii. ‘China delays invitation for minister's visit’
iv. ‘China responds to DPM Lee's answers’
v. ‘Let those who tied knot untie it, says Chinese ambassador’
vi. ‘China rejects DPM Lee's reasons for Taiwan visit’
vii. Interview with China Ambassador – ‘I hope the dark clouds in relations will disperse soon’
There were two articles on Taiwan's responses:
i. ‘Taiwan reaching out to the world, insists DPP’
ii. ‘Media agrees with DPM Lee's remarks on Taiwan politics’
And there were two commentaries translated from the Chinese into English:
i. ‘Yan Xuetong: Singapore must rethink its Taiwan links’
ii. Lee Huay Leng (Li Huiling): ‘It's a tightrope walk for small Singapore’
In the ST, there were altogether three news reports on the responses of the Singapore government and seven stern rebukes made by the Chinese government, which was more or less the same ratio as seen in LHZB's news coverage. However, the news reports in the ST on Chinese diplomatic actions directed towards Singapore were moderate in tone, and very little was reported about the reactions of Singaporeans and Taiwan people to the Chinese actions. It is worth noting that the ST made the effort of translating two commentaries into English to allow English-speaking readers to be exposed to the positions of both a scholar from China and a LHZB staff writer.
The ST ran one commentary from a staff writer:
‘Janadas Devan: Beijing noises a test for DPM and Singapore’
The ST also ran a commentary from Singaporean scholars at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University:
‘Joseph C.Y. Liow and See Seng Tan: A step back in China's “charm offensive”’
In addition, they also printed three letters from local readers:
i. ‘Gerald Giam Yean Song: No truth to Chinese don's remarks’
ii. ‘Beng Chong Tan: Inaccurate China, Taiwan reports fanned fire’
iii. ‘Sin Tub Goh: Stand shoulder to shoulder with DPM’
In response to Xuetong Yan's strong verbal attacks against DPM Lee's Taiwan visit, ST readers ‘besieged’ Xuetong Yan with criticism: ‘one does not expect that from a respected senior scholar’, as one reader said. That was in spite of the fact that LHZB staff writers (Mengda Yan and Jungang Wu) and several of their readers (Shizhuo Peng and Congde Zheng) had already commented on the attacks in their articles and letters.
5.3.2 The Intemperate Remarks of the Taiwan Foreign Affairs Minister
LHZB ran fifteen news reports including nine ‘direct’ news reports on ‘the Mark Chen Incident’:
i. ‘Tai yanpi Xinjiapo waizhang Taihai xingshi Lian-Da fayan’ [Taiwan strongly criticises the Singapore Foreign Affairs Minister's comments at the UN General Assembly on the Taiwan Strait situation]
ii. ‘Wuyan-huiyu pi Xinjiapo/Tai waizhang “shenbiao qianyi”’ [Using foul words to criticise Singapore/Taiwan's Foreign Affairs Minister ‘expresses profound apology']
iii. ‘Chen Tangshan bu xiang Xinjiapo daoqian’ [Mark Chen not apologising to Singapore]
iv. ‘LP cuo tingcheng “LV” [Mishearing LPFootnote 2 for ‘LV’Footnote 3]
v. ‘Lü Xiulian liting Chen Tangshan’ [Lü Xiulian (Annette Lu) strongly supports Mark Chen]
vi. ‘Kangyi Yang Rongwen Lian-Da fayan/Taidu zhichizhe shao Xinjiapo guoqi’ [Protesting George Yeo's statement to the UN General Assembly/Taiwan independence supporters burn the Singapore national flag]
vii. ‘Huashi shishi jiemu laibin fayan/yao zhengfu zhongzhi Xinjundui zai Tai xunlian’ [A guest on a Chinese Television Station's current affairs programme suggests/asking the government to terminate Singapore's military training in Taiwan]
viii. ‘Chen Tangshan shiyan fengbo’ [Mark Chen's verbal flap]
ix. ‘Lü Xiulian: “LP” shi shangdi gei de liwu’ [Annette Lu: ‘LP’ is a gift from god]
LHZB also ran three ‘indirect’ reports on ‘the Mark Chen Incident’:
i. ‘Chen Tangshan/He xu ren ye?’ [Mark Chen/Who is he?]
ii. ‘Chen Tangshan cuhua “shuowen jiezi”’ [‘An etymological explanation’ of Mark Chen's expletive]
iii. ‘Shuohua de yishu’ [The art of speaking]
There were two Singapore government responses in LHZB:
i. ‘Xinjiapo: Koushe zhizheng wufa huanhe dui Taidu youlü’ [Singapore: Resorting to intemperate language cannot assuage the concerns about Taiwan's independence movement]
ii. ‘Chen Tangshan shiyan fengbo/Yang Rongwen: yanxing wuxu zheyang pianji’ [George Yeo on Mark Chen's verbal flap / Words and actions need not be so intemperate]
There was also one response from the Taiwan government:
‘Tai waijiaobu huiying benbao shelun: Chen Tangshan “jue wu eyi”’ [Taiwan Foreign Ministry replies to this newspaper's editorial: Mark Chen ‘had no ill intentions']
In addition to using pejorative terms and critical content like ‘yanpi’ [strongly criticise], ‘wuyan huiyu’ [expletives], ‘bu xiang Xinjiapo daoqian’ [not apologising to Singapore], the headlines of LHZB also employed a range of rhetorical devices, such as using classical Chinese writing style (‘He xu ren ye?’ [Who is he?]) and an etymological explanation (‘shuowen jiezi’) to produce attention-getting and impression-making effects in order to make fun of Mark Chen's intemperate behaviour.
LHZB ran six commentaries from staff writers:
i. ‘Wu Jungang: Cong xiaohongdian dao xiaobishi’ [Jungang Wu: From a small red dot to a bit of nasal mucus]
ii. ‘Shelun: Huiyu waijiao ziquqiru’ [Editorial: Expletives in diplomacy bring misfortune upon the speaker]
iii. ‘Yan Mengda: Lao xiangqin de yuyan’ [Mengda Yan: Language of the village folk]
iv. ‘Zhou Zhaocheng: Cusu de gaoxia zhifen’ [Zhaocheng Zhou: The high and the low of vulgar language]
v. ‘Cai Shenjiang: Bie zai yi luan ai Taiwan’ [Shenjiang Cai: Don't bet everything on Taiwan]
vi. ‘Zhou Zhaocheng: Zhengzhixing yu xing zhengzhi’ [Zhaocheng Zhou: Political versus sexual politics]
Whether from the viewpoint of territorial size or language, diplomacy or politics, LHZB staff writers harshly criticised Mark Chen's language without attempting to smooth over the issues with Taiwan. In fact, Zhaocheng Zhou, a LHZB staff writer from China, wrote two successive commentaries very critical of Mark's Chen remarks.
LHZB ran six letters from Singaporean readers:
i. ‘Ling Qingrong: Waijiao de cuhua jiao ren yanwu’ [Qingrong Ling: Expletives in diplomacy are offensive]
ii. ‘Liang Mingguang: Taiwan de yuyan wuran’ [Mingguang Liang: Taiwan's language pollution]
iii. ‘Wu Yimei: San-liang ju fei jiang buke de minjian tongkuai shengyin’ [Yimei Wu: A few gratifying remarks from the people that need to be heard]
iv. ‘Hong Pingqiang: Xinjiapo yaowu yangwei le ma?’ [Pingqiang Hong: Has Singapore flexed its muscles?]
v. ‘Chen Xiaochuan: liang'an wenti shao shuo wei miao’ [Xiaochuan Chen: Cross-strait issues: the less said, the better]
vi. ‘Peng Shizhuo: Guoqi bei fenshao keren, shubukeren?’ [Shizhuo Peng: If we can tolerate the burning of our national flag, what can't we tolerate?]
It also ran three commentaries from Taiwan:
i. ‘Cai Wei: Qi zhi yinyu-shiyi eryi?’ [Wei Cai: Is it just a matter of quoting phrases to undermine rectitude?]
ii. ‘Feng Ruijie: Taiwan waijiao ye neng bentuhua?’ [Ruijie Feng: Can Taiwan's international relations also be localised?]
iii. ‘Hu Zhongxin: Taiwan daodi zenme le?’ [Zhongxin Hu:What's the matter with Taiwan?]
One commentary from Hong Kong also appeared:
‘Chen Zibo: Taihai jushi wei pianli hetong guidao’ [Zibo Chen: The Taiwan Strait situation didn't deviate from the path of reunification]
Besides publishing the above letters from local Chinese-speaking readers, LHZB also selected commentaries from Taiwan's pro-unification independence Pan-Blue Camp, who seized the golden opportunity to make attacks on the pro-independence Pan-Green Camp represented by Mark Chen, thus intensifying Mark Chen's embarrassment.
The ST ran nine news reports, including seven news reports on ‘the Mark Chen Incident’:
i. ‘Taiwan minister slams George Yeo's comments’
ii. ‘Taiwan minister apologises to Singapore for rude words’
iii. ‘Taiwan FM says Singapore a “friend”’
iv. ‘Taipei minister says he didn't mean to criticise Singapore’
v. ‘Taiwan minister's Hokkien expletive spawns raunchy jokes’
vi. ‘Taiwanese protesters burn Singapore flag’
vii. ‘Demonstrators in Taiwan burn Singapore flag’
There was one Singapore government response:
‘George Yeo “saddened” by remarks’
And there was one Chinese government response:
‘George Yeo's UN speech: China responds to remarks’
The language and tone used in the ST headlines were relatively neutral and unbiased. Despite the fact that Taiwanese demonstrators had burned the Singapore flag, the ST did not publish a single letter from their English-speaking readership. The closest thing to a letter in English was the commentary from staff writer Lawrence Chung headlined: ‘What made Taiwan minister lose his cool?’ Chung took a broader view of events and reasoned that Mark Chen's rash acts had a lot to do with earlier working experience in the United States and his engagement in Taiwan's political activities. Chung's article was representative of the local English-speaking Chinese, who had little interest in Mark Chen's verbal faux pas.
5.3.3 Summary
5.3.3.1 Number of Texts
Table 5.1 summarises texts published by the Chinese and English language newspapers.
Table 5.1 Number of texts
| Types | LHZB | ST | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Before | After | Taiwan FM | Total | Before | After | Taiwan FM | Total | |
| Reports | 7 | 19 | 15 | 41 | 5 | 15 | 9 | 29 |
| Commentaries | - | 6 | 6 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Letters | - | 5 | 10 | 15 | 3 | 4 | - | 7 |
| Total | 7 | 30 | 31 | 68 | 9 | 20 | 10 | 39 |
The table shows clearly that the ST had marginally more published texts than LHZB before DPM Lee fielded questions from the Singapore media on his Taiwan visit, but that LHZB had 1.5 times more texts than ST after DPM Lee fielded questions. In sharp contrast, LHZB had 3 times more published texts, particularly from staff commentaries and reader letters, than ST on the Mark Chen incident. In total, the number of published texts in LHZB was 1.74 times more than ST.
5.3.3.2 Interpreting the Published Texts
5.3.3.2.1 News Reports
On DPM Lee's private visit to Taiwan, LHZB highlighted the negative effects as well as China's persistent protests. The ST, on the other hand, provided neutral news reports and offered considerable support for Singapore's position. As for the Mark Chen incident, LHZB used direct and indirect news reports to capture the reader's attention while the ST only offered neutral news reports.
5.3.3.2.2 Commentaries
In reporting DPM Lee's private visit to Taiwan, LHZB staff commentaries sought sympathy from China for Singapore's awkward position, stressing the challenges faced by Singapore in its relations with China. The ST staff commentaries were much more critical of China's rebukes against Singapore, which they argued underscored the brittleness of Singapore–China relations. As for the Mark Chen incident, LHZB staff commentaries were critical of the Taiwan foreign minister himself, as well as the pro-independence movement, whereas the ST staff commentaries attempted an explanation, arguing that his rough language was based on his particular background and experience.
5.3.3.2.3 Letters
In reader letters to the newspaper on the issue of DPM Lee's Taiwan visit, LHZB reader letters expressed hope that Singapore–China tensions would gradually subside. The ST reader letters emphasised the importance of Singapore's independent position on foreign policy and attacked Xuetong Yan for his unsound and baseless accusations against DPM Lee. As for the Mark Chen incident, LHZB reader letters were heavily critical of Mark Chen's behaviour while the ST reader letters paid no particular attention to his remarks.
5.4 The China Complex of Chinese in Singapore
5.4.1 Singapore's Independent Position
History brought Chinese, Malays and Indians together in Singapore and they developed a way of life distinct from that of their respective homelands. As an independent country with its own national interests, Singapore is not China, Malaysia, Indonesia or India, even though it shares the same languages and cultural heritage as these societies.
Singapore is well aware of the need to avoid being seen in simple terms by other countries. Just because the majority of its population is Chinese does not mean it is reflexively pro-China; nor should it be viewed as China's ‘kin country’. To make its position clear, Singapore has adopted English as the official medium of communication since independence, meaning that all government-to-government meetings, including those with China, are conducted in English. It is thus clear that Singapore has to maintain an independent position in foreign policy in order to safeguard its core interests for the future. Chinese Singaporeans need to understand that they are ultimately Singaporeans, and that it is impossible for China to protect them and safeguard Singapore's core interests simply because they happen to be of Chinese ancestry.
5.4.2 Singapore's ‘One China’ Policy
Singapore is fully aware that ‘one China’ is a core interest of China and has always upheld a ‘one China’ policy. This was policy even before there were official exchanges with China. In October 1971, Singapore's permanent representative to the United Nations, when voting for the admission of China, said, ‘There is one China and that Taiwan is a part of China … It follows therefore that the Taiwan question is an internal matter to be settled by the Chinese peoples including those of Taiwan’ (Lee Reference Lee2000:639).
Because Singapore is a city-state, with very limited air, sea and land space, it has to conduct its military exercises outside its territory. Since 1975, such exercises have also been conducted in Taiwan. Since then, Singapore has established unique and important ties with Taiwan. Singapore pays Taiwan for the use of its facilities, but does not conduct training in conjunction with the Taiwan military. When it established diplomatic relations with Singapore in 1990, China was fully aware of Singapore's relationship with Taiwan. Since training the military in Taiwan remains of vital importance to Singapore's national security, DPM Lee argued that Singapore's ties to Taiwan had to remain as they were and that, for this reason, his visit reflected no change in Singapore's one China policy.
With regard to the cross-straits issue, which is a potential flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region, the Singapore government does not favour Taiwan's independence and has expressed concerns about the rise of Taiwan's independence movement, fearing it could lead to war with mainland China and bring about disastrous consequences in the region. To make an impartial assessment of this issue for the well-being of Singapore, DPM Lee had therefore decided to make a personal trip to Taiwan to get a first-hand feel of the current situation there.
5.4.3 Different Degrees of ‘China Complex’ among the Chinese of Singapore
Prior to independence in 1965, Singapore's educational system consisted, for the most part, of schools that differed in medium of instruction. There were English-medium schools, Chinese-medium schools, Malay-medium schools and Tamil or other Indian language-medium schools. Save for a limited number of English-medium schools which trained people for government posts, the British colonial administration did not undertake responsibility for providing general education to immigrants. It expected the various ethnic communities to establish their own schools without financial support from the government. Because the different ethnicities were taught in their own languages (actually, standard versions of their ancestral languages – Mandarin for Chinese, Tamil for Indians and so on), their emotional attachment to their respective homelands remained deep.
Within the Chinese community, participation in either Chinese or English education produced two distinct classes, namely the Chinese-educated and the English-educated. With distinctive cultural, intellectual and economic perspectives, these two groups found it difficult to integrate.
After Singapore's independence in 1965, all schools were gradually integrated into a unified national system of education, with English as the medium of instruction. English was chosen both for its utilitarian value as the language of world commerce and for its role in facilitating inter-ethnic communication. Chinese, Malays, Tamils and others could converse or communicate with each other in English, for them an emotionally more neutral language. Students were also required to learn their respective ethnic mother tongues as a subject to help maintain their ethnic distinctiveness and strengthen their identity as part of an Asian society.
Today, the Chinese community in Singapore can be categorised into two groups based on their educational background. The first group consists of the old generation of English-educated Chinese and the majority of the new generation of English-educated Chinese. They tend to be pro-Western in their outlook and are the core readership of the ST. The other, smaller group is made up of older Chinese immigrants who were born and received their education in China, and the generation of middle-aged Chinese who grew up in Singapore but received their education in Chinese-medium schools. Because they have been unable to master English, they have been disadvantaged in the job market. They are loyal readers of LHZB and tend to be pro-China.
According to information published in 2004 from Singapore Press Holdings, the ST's daily average circulation (380,197) was higher than that of LHZB (184,445). However, according to Media Corp statistics (2002), the average TV rating for Chinese TV channels (Channel 8, 12.1; U Channel, 11.1) was much higher than that of English TV channels (Channel 5, 3.1; TV Works, 0.9). Thus, English is dominant in newspapers and the press in general, but Chinese is dominant in broadcast news.
5.5 Beyond the Singapore–China Diplomatic Dispute
5.5.1 Strong China Complex within the Chinese-Speaking Community
When encountering China's protests against DPM Lee's Taiwan visit, the Chinese-speaking community, with its strong China complex, failed to propose constructive strategies from the Singaporean perspective. From their emotional reaction to Taiwan's independence movement, we can see that they support the concept of a Greater China. The Singapore government and the ST readers also opposed Taiwan's independence, but on grounds of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Straits and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
The China complex of Chinese-speaking Chinese in Singapore can also be seen from their attitude towards Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations. As noted by Bhavani, Press Secretary to the Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts on 9 March 2005 in the forum pages of the ST and of LHZB, the editorial and the two commentaries on these issues that were published in the LHZB on 22 February 2005 were written from a Chinese rather than a Singaporean perspective, taking Japan and the United States to task for conspiring to restrain China. All three LHZB staff writers failed to consider Singapore's position in the dispute.
5.5.2 Strong Singapore Identity within the English-Speaking Community
Having generally developed a strong Singapore identity, the English-speaking community places great emphasis on the importance of national interest. One wonders which community and identity will prevail. One social trend provides a hint, namely that there has been a clear generational shift in language use at home over recent decades. According to the Ministry of Education's annual survey of parents at Primary One registration, the number of Chinese students entering Primary One who come from English-speaking homes has risen from 26.3 per cent in 1990 to 49.8 per cent in 2004. In 2009, the percentage increased sharply to 60 per cent. In particular, parents with higher educational qualifications are more likely to use English at home. Survey results also indicate that there is increasing use of English by younger students when they speak to their siblings and classmates or friends. The gradual generational language shift in the Chinese community from Chinese to English as a main household language suggests that English is likely to emerge as the ethnic Chinese's lingua franca in place of Chinese. That is to say over the next few decades, the impact of Chinese-speaking readers with a strong China complex will gradually diminish. The gap between the Chinese-educated and the English-educated within the Chinese community in Singapore will likewise diminish and a Singapore identity will become more entrenched.
5.5.3 China's Re-emergence as a World Power: Challenges and Opportunities
It can be expected that the Chinese in Singapore will develop a stronger Singapore identity in the coming years. However, the younger generation of English-speaking Chinese may lose interest in or adopt too simplistic an attitude towards Chinese matters. With China's active participation in regional cooperation mechanisms, its increasing role in international affairs and the closer bilateral ties between Singapore and China, Singapore needs to cultivate a core group possessing a good mastery of Chinese and a deep understanding of contemporary China. This core group can assist in analysing the diplomatic relation with China from a Singaporean perspective, for the Singapore government and for all Singaporeans.
