24.1 Introduction
That which we propose to our selves, is, to examin the present State of the Language, to fix what is right by Grammars and Dictionaries, to fill up what is wanting, streighten what is crooked, and make it easy to be learnt by Youth and Strangers.
So pontificated Thomas Wilson, one of a growing crop of vocal pedants in eighteenth-century Britain (see C. Jones Reference Jones2006:11), convinced the English tongue was being eviscerated, and keen to remedy it. Prescriptivist thinking was a burgeoning fashion then (Bailey Reference Bailey1991 is a trove of examples), but the roots of this punctilious perfectionism stretched back centuries further. For Irish – Europe’s third oldest literary language after Greek and Latin (Ellis Reference Ellis1987:6) – normative prescription grew from eighth-century monastic schools, codifying an orthography to rival Latin (Ó Muircheartaigh Reference Ó Muircheartaigh2015:221–2), and has continued on since.Footnote 1 In England, in 1440, Augustinian friar Osbern Bokenham’s Mappula Angliae bemoaned the Viking and Norman influence on English and imposition of French in schools: ‘þis corrupcioun of Englysshe men yn þer modre-tounge’ led them to speak ‘neythyr good Frenssh or good Englyssh’ (cited in Leith Reference Leith1997:193–4). In 1615, a similarly joyless John Green whinged: ‘before the Conquest by Bastard William … our English tongue was most perfect … [but] the French … corrupted it’ (cited in Bailey Reference Bailey1991:48). So, prescriptivism has a long history, fluffed by egos bridling at more powerful languages. In the last few centuries, this began to take normative form, aiming to actively influence language use. In time this grew into evermore concerted action, and ultimately into language policy and planning (LPP) as we know it.
Instead of exhaustively cataloguing policies across Britain and Ireland, we aim instead to give a broad economic and political account of how LPP emerged and evolved in these two countries. But we pretend no expertise in economics or politics. Our purpose is only to invite readers to dabble similarly. If novices like us could find these links, so too could others. In turn, this will enable researchers to perceive new possibilities, and hopefully pursue positive change (see Lawson and Sayers Reference Lawson and Sayers2016 for a range of linguists engaged in such pursuit).
We begin with a kind of pre-history of events and decisions that prefigured the identifiable beginnings of LPP in the 1970s. We then focus on developments from then on.
24.2 Brief Historical Review
This section flits across medieval and early modern Britain and Ireland. We trace the gradual genesis of LPP to two broad developments: Bible translation and universal education.
Irish had the first centres of scholastic prestige in the Gaelic world, developing a standard for Irish centuries before English (O’ Muircheartaigh Reference Ó Muircheartaigh2015:220–30). Still, in ninth-century England, King Alfred of Wessex famously translated a series of books ‘most necessary for all people to know, into that language that we all can understand [English] … . One may then instruct in Latin those whom one wishes to … promote to a higher rank’ (Anlezark Reference Anlezark2017:760). This subservience to Latin lasted centuries more. A sixteenth-century textbook for teaching Italian pokes merciless fun at English, for example, with a little invented dialogue (cited in Edwards Reference Edwards2001:4):
‘… What thinke you of this English tongue, tel me, I pray you?’
‘It is a language that wyl do you good in England, but passe Douer [Dover], it is woorth nothing.’
English then was just one among a rich mix of languages and varieties in Britain and Ireland. One chronicler, Andrew Boorde, in 1542 noted in England
many sondry speches beside Englyshe: there is Frenche vsed in England, specyally at Calys, Gersey, and Jersey: In Englande, the Walshe tongue is in Wales, The Cornyshe tongue in Cornewall, and Iryshe in Irlande, and Frenche in the Englysshe pale. There is also the Northern tongue, the whyche is trew Scotyyshe; and the Scottes tongue is the Northern tongue. Furthermore, in England is vsed all maner of languages and speches of alyens in diuers [diverse] Cities and Townes, specyally in London by the Sea syde.
Boorde perhaps confuses Breton for French, and misses out Manx, but intriguingly also nods to the already multicultural and multilingual capital area.
LPP nowadays typically has expansive goals to influence language use across society. Historical policies on language may appear equally broad, but were typically more constrained. While the Statute of Kilkenny 1367 banned English descendants in Ireland from speaking Irish, this was a minority of landed gentry (albeit therein quite the topic of opprobrium: ‘the speaking of Irish among the English … is unnaturall … and the cause of many other evills’, Spenser Reference Spenser1596:111). And although sixteenth-century laws banned Irish in court, it was not laws or policies killing Irish but the gradual grinding ‘settlements … by various English overlords’ (Ó Baoill Reference Ó Baoill1988:110). Similarly, the Laws of Wales Act 1535 made courts use English only, but this was socially constrained and motivated more as a political pre-emptive manoeuvre against the ‘Auld Alliance’ of Catholic Scotland and Catholic France (Guy Reference Guy and Morgan1993:289), not to affect everyday Welsh use. In Cornwall, the fifteenth–seventeenth-century uprisings and persecutions (Ellis Reference Ellis1974:52–69) mostly concerned political and religious freedom. All these things certainly had knock-on linguistic effects down the ages; but actual political interest in language was highly circumscribed.
Focused efforts to influence language use (prefiguring modern LPP) can be traced to two historical developments: religious preaching in vernacular languages (alongside or instead of Latin), and the rise of universal education. The former received a boost from the Black Death in the mid twelfth century, which killed Latin-speaking clergy just as eagerly as non-Latin-speaking parishioners. This motivated subsequent translation of scripture to English, especially among John Wycliffe’s ‘Lollards’ in fourteenth-century England (Greider Reference Greider2013:124). This was highly controversial, though; Wycliffe was condemned, and even after death his body was ‘removed from consecrated ground … and destroyed’ (Reference Greider2013:124). Even Tyndale’s first full English New Testament in 1526Footnote 2 was illegal; he was gruesomely executed in 1536. But plague-induced vernacular translations gathered pace, and there is a fascinating progression thence to the Protestant Reformation (1517–1648) – breaking away from not only Roman Catholicism but also Latin (Griffiths Reference Griffiths and Morgan1993:245). Pandemics have very long-term effects.
Brittonic Bible translations emerged later. First came Welsh in 1567–88, despite Irish having earlier literary traditions (Khleif Reference Khleif1979:62) – spurred by English political motives to foster Protestantism and stymy Catholic dissent (as above), Scotland having only recently converted to Protestantism in 1560. A full Irish Bible would not appear until 1685, led by clergymen (Abbott Reference Abbott1912:42). On the Isle of Man, translations of individual gospels began in the eighteenth century, followed by the New Testament in 1767 and Old Testament in 1772. A Scottish Gaelic Bible appeared in 1767 (Abbott Reference Abbott1912:43), updated and corrected in 1801 and 1807. This was also to fortify Protestantism: by this time the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge was hard at work, ‘by which near 16,000 children … are annually instructed in the principles of the Protestant religion … . That Society is … printing, for the benefit of the poor, a large impression of the Bible in Gaelic (… spoken by 300,000 people)’ and ‘applying for aid to a generous and benevolent public’ (The Times, 5 May 1803). So, there were diverse motivations and supports for translation: political/military strategy, church investment, and public donation.
For Cornish, eighteenth-century interest in Bible translation came too late. The language had already largely died. There was no Bible until 2002 following its reconstruction (see Davies-Deacon and Sayers, this volume; Sayers and Renkó-Michelsén Reference Sayers and Renkó-Michelsén2015).
On to the second major influence noted above: universal education. In the later middle ages (c. 1350–1500), official/clerical attitudes to translation shifted from hostility to tolerance to a kind of resigned, acquiescent exasperation. For example in Wales the eighteenth-century ‘Anglican rector of Llanddowror, Griffith Jones … recognized that … it was futile to make the Welsh drag through their devotional exercises in English. So he trained schoolmasters … to teach pupils to read the Welsh Bible’ (Ward Reference Ward, Brown and Tackett2006:343; cf. Ball Reference Ball and Britain2007:249; Khleif Reference Khleif1979:62–3). Similar impatience underlay Manx Bible translation: ‘The Manks people … would be … extremely fond of perusing the scriptures … in their own tongue’, but in English ‘they scarce understand the meaning of a single sentence; nay, I might say … a single word!’ (Butler Reference Butler1799:422, cited in Sebba Reference Sebba1998:7).
In Ireland, by 1851, Irish speakers were already only 23 per cent of the population, mostly illiterate. Amid ‘an English-medium education system … the decline of the language continued’ (Ó Baoill Reference Ó Baoill1988:110).
Scots is a language descended from Northumbrian Old English which spread into Scotland from the sixth century and diverged thereafter (Johnston Reference Johnston and Britain2007:105; Leith Reference Leith1997:129–30). Scots gradually surpassed Scottish Gaelic in official prestige (C. Jones Reference Jones and Hickey2010:222), including in trade and diplomacy abroad (Nihtinen Reference Nihtinen2005:119–20). But union with England in 1707 amplified pressures towards English (C. Jones Reference Jones and Hickey2010:221). ‘The undermining of Scots was not the result of decrees and proscriptions, but of the gradual weakening of independent Scottish institutions’ (Leith Reference Leith1997:312). Scots remains a vibrant vernacular, in fact the most populous indigenous language of the UK, with twice the speakers of Welsh. Irish has comparable numbers to Scots.Footnote 3
Literature in Welsh saw something of a renaissance after the Welsh Bible, but new pressures against Welsh emerged with a Royal Commission into education in Wales (in three volumes, 1847–48) – digitised by the National Library of Wales.Footnote 4 English was patronisingly touted as a solution to the social immobility of Welsh speakers: ‘[T]he Welsh workman never … becomes either clerk or agent … [in] the administering class. … [H]is language keeps him under the hatches, being one … of old-fashioned agriculture, of theology, and of simple rustic life, while all the world about him is English’ (Vol. 1, p. 4). (Note the ‘all the world about him’, a possible nod to the growing global import of English.) In time, this led on to more coercive measures like the infamous ‘Welsh Not’.Footnote 5 It seemed the Commission did consider more inclusive methods, quoting, for example, Rev. David Charles, Principal of the College of Trevecca, Brecknockshire, who recommended ‘that the Welsh receive their knowledge of the English language through the medium of their own at first, by means of Welsh-English books. The want of this mode of instruction has been a great drawback’ (Vol. 2, pp. 354–5). Nowadays that would be termed additive bilingualism (Skutnabb-Kangas Reference Skutnabb-Kangas2002). But it was not to be. Welsh gradually faded from the classroom, and thereafter in the wider community (Ball Reference Ball and Britain2007:249).
So, the seeds of LPP – focused action to influence widespread language use – grew alongside concerns to bolster liturgical obedience, consolidate power, and (putatively) aid social mobility. Modern nationalism, following the French Revolution, saw a huge international blossoming of monolingual mindsets (Gibson Reference Gibson and Britain2007:258). Soon ‘all of the Gaelic languages became minoritised’, with English ‘the common “ceiling language” of power’ (Ó hIfearnáin Reference Ó hIfearnáin2015:102). The ascendency of English was assured as the British Empire evolved from international state-licensed looting to fuller colonial smothering, and as American independence spawned a new axis of linguistic power.
Lastly, the early modern period also saw the proliferation of official language academies, standardising national languages and policing those standards: Academia della Crusca in Italy, 1582; Académie Française in France, 1635; Real Academia Española in Spain, 1713; and many others from Iraq to Sweden, from Ethiopia to Russia. But there was, and remains, none for English. English only gradually replaced Latin and Norman French in official contexts, largely without fanfare. The same in the USA: de facto dominance. Ireland also shrugged the vogue for academies: despite a medieval ‘descriptive grammar’ for poetry, superseded after 1600 by a ‘literary form influenced by … the speech of the common people’ (Ó Baoill Reference Ó Baoill1988:109), only in 1958 was an official standard published, an Caighdeán Oifigiúil, and only in 2013 was this enshrined in law as the Houses of the Oireachtas Commission (Amendment) Act 2013.Footnote 6
So, some proto-components of LPP emerged over centuries across these islands. The ‘Celtic renaissance’ of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw learned societies fostering indigenous Celtic languages, for example the Gaelic League for Irish (Ó Baoill Reference Ó Baoill1988:110) and Celtic-Cornish Society (Ellis Reference Ellis1974:147). Gradually thereafter, during the twentieth century, language came more prominently to the fore in government policy, ushering in the era of contemporary LPP in Britain and Ireland.
24.3 Three Political Eras That Shaped LPP
In this section we discuss political developments behind three broad categories of LPP:
• modern foreign languages
• ‘indigenous languages’ (minority languages originating in Britain and Ireland)
• ‘community languages’ (minority languages that originated abroad).
These categories are based on policy differences, not linguistic criteria. And our list is missing signed languages, because our chapter is about LPP, whereas governments tend to treat sign more as an inconvenient disability provision (Conama Reference Conama, De Meulder, Murray and McKee2019; Downes Reference Downes2021; Schembri, Rowley and Leeson, this volume).
Pool dates the emergence of LPP as a distinct field to the late 1970s. ‘A few years ago’, Pool (Reference Pool1979) begins, the term language planning ‘would have been novel … The attempts of governments to manipulate these phenomena would have seemed too unsystematic … or too nefarious to merit the word “planning”’ (1979:5). So, what were the conditions into which LPP was born then, and grew subsequently? We outline here three political eras which indelibly shaped LPP:
• neoliberalism from the late 1970s to the mid–late 1990s
• New Public Management from the mid–late 1990s to the late 2000s
• austerity following the 2008 worldwide financial crisis.
As Otto van Bismarck put it (Reference van Bismarck1895:248), ‘politics is the art of the possible’ – thrashed out amid competing ideologies, and constrained by finite resources. Measures of those resources include a country’s GDP, credit rating, debt-to-GDP ratio, and so on. Figure 24.1 shows UK and Irish GDP (and OECD averages) across our periods of interest.

Figure 24.1 GDP in Ireland, UK and OECD (USD) 1971–2022.
The late 1970s saw decisive shifts in policymaking across Britain and Ireland: in the UK, the mortifying 1976 International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout drove politics from post-war Keynesianism to Hayek’s vision of an etiolated welfare state; in Ireland, shocks too from the global oil crisis, and cuts over the same broad historical era, falling below the UK by the mid 1990s (Figure 24.2).

Figure 24.2 Public social spending as % of GDP in Ireland, UK and OECD, 1980–2022.
Into this tectonic wrench from Keynesian investment to Hayekian retreat, LPP was born (see Ó Ceallaigh Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019:26). LPP evolved in subsequent decades as political winds changed further. In the next three sub-sections, we outline each era in more detail. We then relate the evolution of each of our three areas of LPP according to the specific political conditions of each era.
24.3.1 Era 1: Neoliberalism
Hayek (Reference Hayek1944) developed neoliberalism, sanctifying private capital and the free market. But his theories languished for decades, until soaring inflation in the 1970s swiftly increased their appeal (Desai Reference Desai, Bellofiore and Vertova2014:57). In 1976, the UK faced government insolvency and bailout by the IMF. Chancellor Denis Healey controversially accepted the IMF’s terms (Kerr Reference Kerr1981), retrenching welfare and abandoning full employment goals. As Lenin’s (probably apocryphal) remark goes, ‘there are decades where nothing happens and then there are weeks where decades happen’ (Scheppele Reference Scheppele, Shaffer, Ginsburg and Halliday2019:189). But really that suddenness distracts from a longer-term international confluence around neoliberalism (Bates Reference Bates2014:389). ‘The prolonged period of stagnation and recession during the 1970s and 1980s ushered in a powerful swing to the right in European politics … pursuing neoliberal economic programmes involving the dismantling of the welfare state’ (Breathnach Reference Breathnach2010:1182).
In Ireland, following independence in 1921, industries were nationalised (Barrett Reference Barrett2004:6) and ‘economic crises … prohibited extensive welfare development’ (Dukelow Reference Dukelow2011:409). The 1950s–60s saw rises in state investment, national debt (p. 412), and (gradually) foreign investment (McMahon Reference McMahon, Fox, Cronin and Conchubhair2021:60). After the 1970s global oil shocks, politicians favoured cuts, but political instability helped maintain social spending into the 1980s, albeit more from increased issuance of unemployment benefits than rising GDP (Dukelow Reference Dukelow2011:411). The 1980s saw declining state ownership (sold into private hands) and increasing neoliberalism – all cheered on by the OECD (Barrett Reference Barrett2004:1–11). ‘Possibly the most significant retrenchment measure during the 1980s crisis … was … to reduce pay-related benefits in 1983 which paved the way for their eventual abolition in 1994’ (Dukelow Reference Dukelow2011:418). By the 1990s, Ireland’s social spending dropped below the UK’s (Figure 24.2) amid fears of ‘fully-fledged Thatcherism’ (Mjøset Reference Mjøset1992:382; cited in Dukelow Reference Dukelow2011:419).
As opposed to an ideologically informed project [as] implemented by Thatcher in the UK … Irish neoliberalism was produced through a set of short-term … deals brokered by the state … which cumulatively restructured Ireland in unsustainable and geographically ‘uneven’ ways.
In this short sub-section we have outlined how Ireland and the UK followed similar and roughly contemporaneous trajectories in the 1970s–80s, pivoting from public debt to putatively corrective cuts. In Section 24.4 we show how these political conditions shaped LPP in its early years.
24.3.2 Era 2: New Public Management
In the 1980s–90s, a new form of governance spread across the world. ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) loosened neoliberal purse strings (D. Wilson Reference Wilson2001:293) but required close scrutiny of outcomes, ‘to impose the competitive logic of the private sector’ (Bates Reference Bates2014:390). Le Grand (Reference Le Grand2007) uses the evocative term ‘the other invisible hand’. NPM ‘increasingly dominated public governance and public service delivery in most Western democracies’ (Martin Reference Martin, McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie2002:129), becoming ‘a standard international model for public administration reform’ (Schedler and Proeller Reference Schedler, Proeller, McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie2002:163).
In the UK, the Local Government Acts of 1988 and 1992 enshrined market-inspired ‘compulsory competitive tendering’ of public services; and the incoming ‘New Labour’ government in 1997 introduced a suite of catchy new terminology to signal fresh governance. A large corpus analysis of New Labour-era press coverage finds recurrence of choice, global, and reform, thoroughly embodying NPM (Jeffries and Walker Reference Jeffries and Walker2017).
Meanwhile Ireland’s transformation into the ‘Celtic Tiger’ came in two stages: 1993–2002, led by exports and foreign investment; and 2002–07, involving a property boom (Kitchin et al. Reference Kitchin, O’Callaghan, Boyle, Gleeson and Keaveney2012:1303). Of this period the OECD noted ingratiatingly: ‘Ireland is now … moving … to a more output- and outcome-oriented system … in keeping with … most OECD countries … . Ireland has significantly advanced along a “New Public Management” continuum’ (OECD 2008). Boyle (Reference Boyle2014:23) found 80 per cent of Irish civil servants agreeing on the transformation towards NPM in their policy areas. Privatisation of public services was in vogue (Ó Ceallaigh Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019:32), albeit less so than the UK due to Ireland’s more consensual policymaking style (Hyndman and McGeough Reference Hyndman and McGeough2008).
As we show in Section 24.4, LPP in this time evolved precisely according to these tenets of NPM: significant growth in activity, but tightly measured according to targets. We argue that this myopic fixation on highly circumscribed targets led to a series of deeply problematic unintended consequences.
24.3.3 Era 3: Austerity
The rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s–80s embodied a historic worldwide shift, a wholesale subduction of collectivist statism under the accreting prism of atomistic self-determination. This bonfire of state intervention was quenched somewhat during NPM in the 1990s–2000s, but in 2008 the panicked horror of a global economic meltdown poured fuel back on those embers. Desai (Reference Desai, Bellofiore and Vertova2014) connects the 2008 financial crisis to the original rise of neoliberalism. In the intervening decades, as developed economies deindustrialised into services and high-tech manufacturing, household savings withered (Desai Reference Desai, Bellofiore and Vertova2014:58). Emerging economies took on lower-value industries, building foreign exchange reserves from exports to developed economies (Desai Reference Desai, Bellofiore and Vertova2014:59). The ‘sub-prime’ implosion of 2007–08 came when house values refused to continue rising forever, and Western consumers saw the ground beneath disappear as their mortgages suddenly became mathematically impossible. International money markets baulked at Keynesian remedies, and austerity hoved into view. For a highly accessible account of post-2008 austerity, see Tooze (Reference Tooze2018).
In the UK, a Conservative-led coalition elected in 2010 set about eliminating the GDP budget deficit (Desai Reference Desai, Bellofiore and Vertova2014:51). The spectre of 1976 loomed large, and from 2010 to 2018, local council budgets UK-wide fell on average 60 per cent (LGA 2018). Devolution of the UK nations offered little relief as it enabled only modest taxraising powers, not borrowing powers, so the pain was largely shared. Education is the workhorse of LPP, and education spending fell steadily UK-wide from 2010 (for example, Sibieta Reference Sibieta2018 compares similar declines in England and Wales).
Ireland imposed austerity from 2008 but by November 2010 faced bankruptcy, and agreed an €85 billion IMF-EU bailout (Kitchin et al. Reference Kitchin, O’Callaghan, Boyle, Gleeson and Keaveney2012:1303) strictly tied to austerity. This fuelled inequality and poverty (Coulter and Arqueros-Fernández Reference Coulter and Arqueros-Fernández2020:3; Ó Ceallaigh Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019:33). Ireland’s GDP superficially recovered by the mid 2010s (Figure 24.1), but it was ‘investment’ from tax-shy multinationals, adding little to the public coffers (Coulter and Arqueros-Fernández Reference Coulter and Arqueros-Fernández2020:5; Ó Ceallaigh Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019:34). Representation without taxation. This explains Ireland’s confusing divergence in Figures 24.1 and 24.2.
Ireland’s 2013 budget cuts axed 30,000 public sector jobs and dramatically reduced welfare (Figure 24.2). This ‘(re)commitment to neoliberal policies’ (Kitchin et al. Reference Kitchin, O’Callaghan, Boyle, Gleeson and Keaveney2012:1320) was seen by Irish senior civil servants as ‘more about cost cutting and savings than about service improvement’ (Boyle Reference Boyle2014:24).
At the end of Section 24.3.2 we noted that NPM led to expansion of LPP activity in both countries. Did austerity see widespread gutting of LPP endeavours? Yes and no. In Section 24.4 we show how the many new LPP strategies and organisations remained in place, but were increasingly starved of resources.
24.4 LPP as It Evolved through the Three Political Eras
Linguistic ‘competence’ has a specifiable economic value, and requires state investment. It has therefore found a place in the policy discourses of all three of our political eras, in areas from national curricula to immigration policies. Emphasising the economic value of languages helps increase their uptake in education, but it also perpetuates an atomistic and transactional conceptualisation of language. This can hollow out its identity or heritage value, and encourage perverse competition.
In this section we chart the changing political winds behind our three categories of LPP (foreign, indigenous, and community languages) in each of our three historical eras.
24.4.1 Modern Foreign Languages (MFLs)
MFL is, broadly, formal instruction in ‘foreign’ languages of particular economic value. Less bankable ones are ‘community languages’ (of immigrants), which we discuss separately. LPP for MFL (hereafter MFLPP) has historic and cultural motivations (McLelland Reference McLelland2018) but the politics of the day also influence which languages to teach, and recently whether to bother at all.
24.4.1.1 MFLPP under Neoliberalism
Prior to the comprehensivisation of schools in England in the 1960s, MFL was a relatively elite affair constrained to private and selective schools. From late-1970s to 1980s Britain, right-wing ‘traditional authoritarianism … individualism, and a populist appeal to the ordinary person’ were ascending (Ager Reference Ager and Britain2007:388). Introduction of per-capita funding magnified an emerging marketisation (Beauvallet Reference Beauvallet2015). Plans for a national curriculum widened access to MFL (McLelland Reference McLelland2018). Devolution allowed some procedural variance – direct laws in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, a non-statutory mechanism in Scotland – but these all tilted in the same neoliberal direction, to serve global capital with relocatable school leavers (McKendry Reference McKendry2016).
In the UK, MFLPP ‘within the so-called National Curriculum’ took place ‘not explicitly and overtly, but in a fragmented and uncoordinated way’ (Stubbs Reference Stubbs and Coulmas1991:217; cf. Ricento and Hornberger Reference Ricento and Hornberger1996:402, on covert and unplanned LPP). Similarly in Ireland, although MFL provision had expanded since the 1960s, in the 1980s it was still markedly haphazard (Ó Riagáin Reference Ó Riagáin2009), though arguably less than in the UK (Gasiorowska Reference Gasiorowska2020). In both countries, MFLPP was closely aligned with overarching EU objectives for language competence, later to be codified as the 1+2 model (Dobson Reference Dobson2018; Ó Riagáin Reference Ó Riagáin2009).
24.4.1.2 Changes to MFLPP under New Public Management
By 2000, around 80 per cent of students aged fifteen–sixteen in the UK and Ireland studied an MFL (Dobson Reference Dobson2018). In the UK, a Nuffield Foundation report in 2000 urged NPM-esque quantifiable targets. England’s ‘Languages for All: Languages for Life’ (DfES 2002) duly tied increases in MFL funding to specified targets (Driscoll, Earl and Cable Reference Driscoll, Earl and Cable2013:148, after King Reference King2011). In Wales, NPM proceeded ‘at a faster pace than in England’ (Boyne et al. Reference Boyne, Gould‐Williams, Law and Walker1999:68), and proposals for a Northern Ireland Languages Strategy (DE 2012) resonated with NPM themes of global employability, enthusiastically citing the 2000 Nuffield Report. This mirrored European-level linking of language proficiency to economic benefits and individual career progression, foregrounding quantifiable measurement and comparison (CoE 2009).
Even Scotland’s historically distinctive education approach quickly succumbed. A Curriculum for Excellence (Scottish Executive 2004) reflected ‘a supranational trend for … an instrumental business friendly approach to education’ (Smith Reference Smith2018:32). Ironically, despite headline advocacy for the value of languages, a prevailing monolingual mentality and inaccuracies in target-setting actually led to reduced provision (Doughty and Spöring Reference Doughty, Spöring and Kelly2018).
In 2000, Ireland expanded MFL at secondary schools through the ‘Post-Primary Languages Initiative’ (PPLI) (CoE 2005). A key buzzword was ‘choice’, redolent with NPM (Jeffries and Walker Reference Jeffries and Walker2017). Ireland had lagged EU norms in MFL, but in this period MFLPP developed significantly. However, in keeping with NPM, this was to be monitored by the increasingly familiar framework of targets.
So MFLPP followed the NPM trend: increased provision but checked against managerialist targets friendly to global capital. Meanwhile, however, NPM’s ideological sanctification of ‘choice’ proved more toxic for MFLs. In 2004, the UK Labour Government made GCSE Modern Languages non-compulsory (McLelland Reference McLelland2018), mirrored in Northern Ireland with the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 2006. That optionality greatly diminished parents’ and children’s views of MFL, spurring a UK-wide decline in enrolment (Henderson and Carruthers Reference Henderson and Carruthers2022).
24.4.1.3 Changes to MFLPP under Austerity
Austerity spurred retrenchment of international funding back to national causes. The ‘UK’s withdrawal in 2011 from the [European Centre of Modern Languages (ECML)] … was to switch the UK’s annual contribution to (unspecified) support for MFL at home’. But this inevitably blocked UK teachers from ‘the ECML’s international network … to help Europeans learn languages’ (Dobson Reference Dobson2018:79). Real-terms education spending in England and Wales trended downwards from 2010 onwards (Sibieta Reference Sibieta2018:11). Meanwhile a mismatch between ‘historical allocations’ of funding and its actual costs moved MFL (already optional) evermore into the crosshairs for schools to cut (Harnden Reference Harnden2019:14).
The de-funding of Ireland’s ‘Modern Languages in Primary Schools Initiative’ in 2012 (O’Connell Reference O’Connell2012) and Northern Ireland’s ‘Primary Modern Languages Programme’ in 2015 (Meredith Reference Meredith2015) left a vacuum of primary provision across the island (Carruthers and Nandi Reference Carruthers and Nandi2020). Ireland’s national ‘Languages Connect’ strategy (DES 2017) seemed to neglect MFL at primary level but laid the ground for their re-emergence (Fagan Reference Fagan2021). Perhaps Ireland will shrewdly grow its MFLPP as the EU’s main English language hub after Brexit; but it may pin this to long-lived neoliberal ideals. Time will tell.
Austerity saw private schools re-emerge as MFL havens (Henderson and Carruthers Reference Henderson and Carruthers2022; Ó Ceallaigh Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019). In England, putative devolution of MFL to local authorities (Parrish Reference Parrish2020) proved illusory, kneecapped by shortfalls of suitable qualifications and languages, and over-reliance on exams (Ayres-Bennett and Carruthers Reference Ayres-Bennett and Carruthers2019). In England and Northern Ireland, academic language skills have outranked vocational skills (Bowler Reference Bowler2020). There are some moves to counter this. For example, the vocational focus in the Scottish Baccalaureate in Languages explicitly equalises esteem for modern, indigenous, and community languages (SQA 2015; cf. Ayres-Bennett and Carruthers Reference Ayres-Bennett and Carruthers2019).
While MFL enrolments have sunk, STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) enrolments have soared: ‘good news’ in the UK government’s view, ‘important … to address the STEM skills shortage and support the UK economy’ (DfE 2021; cf. DEL 2010 for similar moves in Northern Ireland). The introduction of the EBacc (English Baccalaureate) prioritised post-fourteen MFL and saw MFL GCSE enrolments grow (Bowler Reference Bowler2020). There had also been a programme called ‘Asset Languages’, a qualification focused less on academic intricacies, more on practical applications of language skills (hold a conversation, give a presentation, etc.) in line with the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (UCAS 2008). This was a more accessible MFL qualification, achievable based on lived experience. But this was axed in 2014. Proposed replacements were not taken forward (Bowler Reference Bowler2020) and equivalent vocational qualifications were sidelined by the EBacc, overall amplifying built-in social inequalities.
Governments announce their intentions for both national and global audiences. The austerity era saw an emerging geographical split in MFLPP: in England and to a lesser degree Northern Ireland, a populist return to ‘standards’ (fondly embracing grammar drills and exams, based on sentiment over pedagogy); in Scotland, Ireland, and to a lesser degree Wales, a more coherent concern with communicative competence (Broady Reference Broady2020). But overall, MFLs have faced relative neglect amid heightened fervour for STEM.
24.4.2 Indigenous Languages
‘Indigenous language’ simply means one that originated within that polity. But as we cautioned earlier, this reflexively incurs othering of ‘community’ (immigrant) languages, some of which have been spoken in these isles for several generations. We return to that in Section 24.4.3. In Ireland, the Constitution holds Irish as principal, official and national language, a clear example of LPP coinciding with independence (Mac Giolla Chríost Reference Mac Giolla Chríost2005). In Wales, Welsh and English are at least in principle treated equally.
24.4.2.1 Indigenous LPP under Neoliberalism
The neoliberal years saw gradual recognition of indigenous minority languages, prefigured by more limited post–World War II interventions like the 1967 Welsh Language Act (Huws Reference Huws2006). But neoliberal indigenous LPP in the 1970s and 80s was relatively constrained, aiming only for ‘language maintenance … to keep the status quo for minority languages’ (Hinton Reference Hinton2003:45, orig. emphasis). Moreover, it was mostly driven by political pressure, not principle; and mostly just for Welsh (and Manx in the Isle of Man, given its autonomy). Writing in 1982, Madgwick and Rawkins note: ‘language policy in Wales [is] comparatively unsystematic … reactions to particular problems … marked by uncertainty’ (Reference Madgwick, Rawkins, Madgwick and Rose1982:71; cf. Stubbs Reference Stubbs and Coulmas1991:217; Ricento and Hornberger Reference Ricento and Hornberger1996:402). The 1970s Conservative government ‘focused on … reducing the … “Public Service State”’, favouring ‘devolution of decisions … to individuals and if necessary to local government’, in other words not to Wales as a distinct polity (Edwards, Tanner and Carlin Reference Edwards, Tanner and Carlin2011:533).
The Education Reform Act 1988 led to compulsory Welsh at ages five–fourteen. But as recently declassified contemporaneous political correspondence shows, what looked like ‘un-Thatcherite’ support was in fact an erratically piecemeal offer, irritably conceded after sustained campaigning, ‘cumulatively exposing a lack of vision’ (Edwards et al. Reference Edwards, Tanner and Carlin2011:538).
Meanwhile in Northern Ireland, a requirement for schools to deliver French, German, Italian or Spanish curtailed provision of Irish given insufficient resources (McKendry Reference McKendry2016).
In Ireland, by the mid twentieth century, despite muscular policies around Irish in education, interest was drifting away towards neoliberal goals: ‘by the mid-1960s and early 1970s a new cohort was coming to power … closely linked to business … [P]olitical support for language revitalisation measures began to diminish … [amid] the development of neoliberalism as the key economic policy’ (Ó Ceallaigh Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019:14). A ‘lack of concerted state support unsurprisingly saw Irish-speaking areas continue to shrink, with language shift continuing unabated’ (Ó Ceallaigh Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019:16).
24.4.2.2 Changes to Indigenous LPP under New Public Management
As late as 1988, Margaret Thatcher remained sceptical of state support for indigenous languages, characteristically favouring individual responsibility (Edwards et al. Reference Edwards, Tanner and Carlin2011:546). ‘It is only in the 1990s that we see communities and linguists in a last-ditch effort to save these disappearing languages’ (Hinton Reference Hinton2003:45). The 1981 and 1991 censuses showed dramatic drops in Welsh speakers, galvanising public support (Edwards et al. Reference Edwards, Tanner and Carlin2011:538, 547) and with it political consensus for Welsh and then other indigenous languages. But this was indelibly shaped by NPM, guided by managerialist targets. The Welsh Language Act 1993 established the Welsh Language Board, whose remit shone vivid NPM colours – ‘spreading best practice and supporting fresh developments’ (Edwards et al. Reference Edwards, Tanner and Carlin2011:543–4). ‘Best practice’ was routinely criticised for actually meaning an unimaginative and blinkered hollowing out of political priorities: ‘Policy makers seize on an initiative or approach that seems to work and that fits in with their assumptions at that time (in terms of cost, partnerships, joined up solutions, etc.) and promote it across the board’ (Paton Reference Paton1998). As we show below, this caused a range of unintended consequences that have gone largely unnoticed. Support for other indigenous languages similarly came with NPM strings attached: dedicated regulatory bodies, public consultations and multi-year strategies with pre-set targets.
Table 24.1 Some relevant language policies for indigenous languages in the UK and Ireland
| Polity | Laws, accords | Responsible agencies | Strategies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ireland | Official Languages Act 2003 | Irish Language Commissioner (state) 2003 | 2006 consultation leading to 20-Year Strategy for the Irish Language 2010 |
| Northern Ireland | Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement 1999, St Andrew’s Agreement 2006, New Decade, New Approach 2020 | Foras na Gaeilge, 1999 and Ulster-Scots Agency 1999, Proposed Language Commissioners for Irish and Ulster-Scots 2021 | Strategy to Enhance and Protect the Development of the Irish Language 2015, Strategy to Enhance and Develop the Ulster-Scots Language, Heritage and Culture 2015 |
| Wales | Welsh Language Act 1993, Learning and Skills (Wales) Measure 2009, Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011 | Welsh Language Board (QuANGO) 2003, Welsh Language Commissioner (state) 2012 (successor) | Iaith Pawb (Everyone’s Language) 2003, Iaith Fyw, Iaith Byw (A Living Language, A Language for Living) 2012, Cymraeg 2050 (Welsh 2050) 2017 |
| Cornwall | None | Cornish Language Partnership (cross-sector) 2009, Cornish Language Office (state) 2016 | Strategy for the Cornish Language 2004, Cornish Language Strategy 2015–25 |
| Scotland | Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005 | Bòrd na Gàidhlig (Gaelic Language Board) 2006 | Gaelic Language Plan 2010–15, 2015–20, 2021–26 |
Ireland’s Official Languages Act 2003 was modelled on the Welsh Language Act 1993 (Huws Reference Huws2006:147). While both were partially galvanised by favourable public opinion and organised lobbying (Edwards et al. Reference Edwards, Tanner and Carlin2011:531, 540–43; Bohane Reference Bohane2005:2), both also benefited from judicial intervention (Bohane Reference Bohane2005; Huws Reference Huws2006:155–156), in Ireland seeking to enforce constitutional provisions for language rights (Bohane Reference Bohane2005). It followed precisely the NPM script: an expanded state remit – with a beefed-up Department of Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht – but tightly scrutinised, each provision to be approved by the Minister of Finance (Bohane Reference Bohane2005; Ó Ceallaigh Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019:19–22). Ireland’s 20-Year Strategy for the Irish Language, published in 2010 after gestation during the NPM era (Government of Ireland 2010), is a textbook checklist of targets and performance measures (Ó Ceallaigh Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019:87; Ó Conchubhair Reference Ó Conchubhair, Fox, Cronin and Conchubhair2021).
Altogether, although NPM increased indigenous LPP, it did so by reducing language use to countable beans, ill-suited to complex sociolinguistic realities: ‘the celebration of multiplicity, hybridity and ambivalence is not a powerful discursive position. You do not get money, or books, or official recognition by claiming ambiguous relationships with several identities, and … multiple linguistic codes’ (Jaffe Reference Jaffe, Freeland and Patrick2004:278). To the inability to quantify and measure everything, ‘two logical solutions exist … One is to admit that the prerequisites for control approaches based on markets or hierarchies are inappropriate … The other, characteristic of … NPM, is to systematize the tasks in question and standardize the outputs, i.e. to reinvent the tasks … for the application of such logic’ (Broadbent and Laughlin Reference Broadbent, Laughlin, McLaughlin, Osborne and Ferlie2001:103).
Wales clearly illustrates these unintended consequences and their invisibility to target-minded politicians. The foremost target is to significantly increase the number of Welsh speakers, mostly through increased Welsh-medium schooling. Negative unintended consequences are many and varied. Schools revolve around tests, which favour standardised languages at the expense of traditional (non-standard) Welsh dialects (M. C. Jones Reference Jones1998). The growing number of children who attend Welsh-medium schools without previous exposure to Welsh get significantly lower grades than those with Welsh as a home language (Rhys and Thomas Reference Rhys and Thomas2013). Partly as a result, Welsh-medium schools have lower average grades overall than English-medium ones (Jerrim and Shure Reference Jerrim and Shure2016:120), despite equal or higher funding (Sibieta Reference Sibieta2020:10; Welsh Assembly 2013). Meanwhile, social rifts are fuelled between children at English- and Welsh-medium schools (Selleck Reference Selleck2013). Later in life, Welsh-medium school leavers go on to have lower geographical mobility (H. Jones Reference Jones2007:1) – whether that is a choice (they prefer to stay local) or a limitation (lower grades limit their options) is a pressing future research question. Our point here is not that promoting Welsh is inherently unwise, but that all these problematic outcomes could have been foreseen and mitigated, were it not for the fixation on a headline target to grow the raw tally of Welsh speakers (Sayers Reference Sayers, Lawson and Sayers2016). Indeed, all this brings to mind an old joke about NPM, that it ‘hits the target but misses the point’ (Radnor Reference Radnor, Van Dooren and Van de Walle2008).
These concerns are significant not only for Wales but across Britain and Ireland, since Welsh is a model for emulation ‘regarded with envy’ (Huws Reference Huws2006:147), ‘a rare and celebrated exception’ among minority languages (Coupland Reference Coupland, Jaworski and Thurlow2011:79–80).
24.4.2.3 Changes to Indigenous LPP under Austerity
Back in the late 1970s neoliberal era, LPP had little to lose and much to gain; but after the 2008 crisis, having grown under NPM, LPP had a lot to lose. Cornish saw the harshest cuts. From 2010 to 2015 Cornish had appeared to dodge austerity, but its modest £120,000 annual government funding vanished abruptly in 2016. In a remarkably candid 2017 TV interview, a former minister revealed that the 2010–16 funding was merely cynical horse-trading within the governing coalition, to unlock billions in other cuts (Sayers Reference Sayers2017). With a change to single-party Conservative rule in 2016, interest evaporated. Responsibility, though not money, was transferred to Cornwall Council. Cornwall Council has continued some revival activities, and the prior funding helped raise the profile of Cornish (see Davies-Deacon and Sayers, this volume), but austerity dealt a heavy blow.
Successive budgets of the Welsh Government throughout the 2010s showed steady or slightly growing funding for Welsh.Footnote 7 Available data for recent Scottish Executive budgets shows slight real-terms declines for Gaelic despite most other budget lines (and the overall budget) increasing each year.Footnote 8
Ó Ceallaigh (Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019) details post-2008 austerity LPP in Ireland, tracing an arc back to neoliberalism arising in the 1970s (p. 25; cf. Desai Reference Desai, Bellofiore and Vertova2014), and finding that ‘state withdrawal from the revitalisation project has intensified rapidly in the last decade’ (2019:42). The flagship 20-Year Strategy (Government of Ireland 2010; cf. Ó Conchubhair Reference Ó Conchubhair, Fox, Cronin and Conchubhair2021) ‘has not been implemented in any meaningful way’ (Ó Ceallaigh Reference Ó Ceallaigh2019:88). (See also Moriarty Reference Moriarty2014:469, on Irish language policy as cynically conferring ‘a Disneyesque status on the Gaeltacht communities’ for tourism.)
The institutions and targets developed in the NPM era have largely remained, but, as these cases show, stripped of the capacity to actually deliver, even on their own reductive terms. Aside from shrinking budgets, there is also a forbidding sense of what can only be called distraction – away from LPP and towards other pounding policy emergencies: political bombs going off locally, nationally, and globally, and fostering disarray in LPP. For example, by 2020 Scotland’s Bòrd na Gàidhlig (Gaelic Language Board) had gone through seven chairpersons in fourteen years, a burgeoning crisis either missed or ignored by ministers (Peterkin Reference Peterkin2020). Given the unenviable ministerial in-tray of recovery from economic meltdown, Brexit, a global pandemic, and a climate catastrophe eclipsing all of those trifling terrestrial concerns, perhaps one can begin to empathise. And on these measures, at time of writing, things seem likely to get worse.
24.4.3 Community Languages
We move on now to the languages of historically recent immigrant groups. Arthur and McPake (Reference Arthur and McPake2011, citing Clyne Reference Clyne1991) date the term ‘community languages’ to 1975 in Australia, used ‘to denote languages other than English and Aboriginal’. In the UK and Ireland, although immigration grew after World War II, still by 1995 immigrants represented only 3.4 per cent and 2.7 per cent respectively (Ó Riagáin Reference Ó Riagáin2002). But by 2001 the UK was ‘becoming more and more linguistically diverse, especially in urban areas’ (Lamb Reference Lamb2001:4). Attention grew towards plurilingualism (Ó Riagáin Reference Ó Riagáin2002). Many ‘community languages’ like Hindi and Arabic have now been present for several generations and have geographically broad and generationally deep usage. Their continued othering into the ‘community’ basket has ideological undercurrents. When will they become indigenous? Remember, Old English traces its roots abroad, later mixing with Norman French, Latin, and others (see Sayers Reference Sayers and Renkó-Michelsén2015). We simply remind the reader that our tripartite categorisation (MFL, indigenous, community languages) comes from policy, not linguistics or sociology. Improving the status of these languages would have many benefits (Alcalde Reference Alcalde, Gazzola, Templin and Wickström2018).
This demotion of community languages confined their teaching largely to voluntary and faith groups – for example Sunday schools – until close to the second of our three historical eras. For this reason, we omit the neoliberal era here.
24.4.3.1 Community LPP under New Public Management
Some community languages appeared in qualification frameworks in England from 1991 onwards, for example the National Curriculum MFL regulations (Anderson Reference Anderson and Field2000). Those resources were shared with Northern Ireland and Wales. But the actual teaching remained largely extracurricular as schools focused on English, MFL and indigenous languages.
In 2000, the Nuffield Foundation noted the value of community languages. A UK National Languages Strategy (DfES 2002) expanded international exchanges, and established Confucius Institutes for Chinese language teaching. But NPM requirements abounded: ‘the Strategy was characterised by … centrally set targets and timelines to be driven forward by … an extensive machinery of state’ (Steer Reference Steer2015).
Meanwhile, demographic changes made community languages increasingly visible, foremost Polish following Poland’s EU accession in 2004, facilitating increased migration. By 2011 the census recorded 546,000 Polish speakers, broadly level with the 562,000 for Welsh (see also Hawkins and Moses Reference Hawkins and Moses2016:4). But in the NPM era, in 2007, despite around one in ten high-school children in England speaking community languages, even when examination entries for these languages are bracketed together with lesser-taught MFLs for reporting purposes, the combined total comprised only one per cent of examination entries (Lanvers Reference Lanvers2011). When community-language-speaking schoolchildren study MFLs, they perform almost twice as well as English-dominant peers (Strand, Malmberg and Hall Reference Strand, Malmberg and Hall2015), so supporting community languages would actually facilitate existing MFL targets; but those targets are just too narrowly construed for that to happen.
Even when community language qualifications were offered, still NPM rationales prevailed. Simply put, children who already speak these languages are more likely to pass those qualifications – an easy win for overarching targets on qualifications per pupil. With targets in mind, almost 80 per cent of mainstream providers reported maintaining such provisions precisely for this reason (CILT 2005; see also Lanvers Reference Lanvers2011) – even more appealing since the largely extracurricular tuition placed no burden on school budgets. But those extracurricular providers often lacked formal accreditation (Anderson Reference Anderson and Field2000).
A potential turnaround came with the Languages Ladder scheme and associated ‘Asset Languages’ qualifications noted earlier. This spanned from absolute beginner through to adult learner in twenty-five languages (Steer Reference Steer2015; Tinsley Reference Tinsley2012), but, as above, struggled to find a place amid overarching priorities and targets.
In the NPM era the Republic of Ireland adopted a relatively positive approach to community languages (CoE 2005), although with familiar emphasis on economic benefits. We see similar policy direction in the Scottish context; this subsequently developed further than other contexts in Britain and Ireland, as we discuss below.
24.4.3.2 Changes to Community LPP under Austerity
Across Britain and Ireland, immigrant groups are generally encouraged towards English; and during austerity, minimum language requirements have risen (DJE 2008; Home Office 2016). Official terminology often discursively posits immigrant children as little problems, labelled ‘English as an Additional Language (EAL)’. Their multilingual credentials are devalued. Contrastingly, Scotland’s 1+2 policy acknowledges that value (Scottish Government 2012) and puts several community languages on a par with MFLs and Scottish Gaelic (Scottish Government 2019). Still, Moskal (Reference Moskal2016) finds decidedly mixed provision for children of Polish parents in Scotland, with policy emphasising integration into the mainstream. This bigger national inertia is crystallised in the haunting words of one of Johansson and Śliwa’s (Reference Johansson and Śliwa2016) adult Polish participants: ‘It is English and there is no alternative’ (p. 305).
In Ireland, several community languages are available as junior and leaving certificate options (Ireland’s main qualifications) (DES 2017). Across the UK and Ireland, a lack of school and community support discourages Polish use among children of Polish parents, regardless of parental Polish use (Miękisz et al. Reference Miękisz, Haman, Łuniewska, Kuś, O’Toole and Katsos2017). Irish teacher unions blame austerity for growing attainment gaps among immigrant children (ASTI 2014). Demie, McDonald and Hau (Reference Demie, McDonald and Hau2016) further note that a failure to disaggregate ethnic groups by home language and English proficiency obfuscates meaningful analysis.
The axing of Asset Languages had the negative consequences discussed above for MFL provision; but for community languages there were 472 Asset qualifications across 25 languages (Steer Reference Steer2015), in several subjects for which no alternative existed (Tinsley Reference Tinsley2012). That left only GCSEs and A-levels, but salt was rubbed in the wound when even those were mostly withdrawn in 2015 amid funding constraints. (Some were tokenistically reprieved in 2016 after protest loudened: ALL 2016.) All this immediately impacted Northern Ireland and Wales since they used the same English awarding bodies (DfE 2019). While the UK government rhetorically defended broad language provision including community languages (Long, Danechi and Loft Reference Long, Danechi and Loft2020), their own decisions led to withdrawal; so, they were either arguing with themselves or deploying smoke and mirrors, or both (Steer Reference Steer2015).
Ultimately, only a small minority of community-language-speaking children will ever gain formal accreditation in their language, instead being limited to lower-status, under-funded supplementary schools (Gaiser and Hughes Reference Gaiser and Hughes2015). The Asset withdrawal fiasco spoke to embedded deficiencies in LPP: ‘The challenges are systemic and the root causes are a mixture of cultural attitudes, failed infrastructures and policy failures over many years and different governments’ (Steer Reference Steer2015). Root-and-branch reforms were inadequately funded and politically botched. Austerity bites.
24.5 Languages and Varieties Overlooked by LPP
In many ways the languages we have discussed so far are the lucky ones. Many languages and language varieties used in Britain and Ireland fall largely outside the scope of LPP, passively neglected or actively rejected. This reveals as much as, perhaps more than, the policies that do exist. At the outset we discussed the historical growth of nationalistic prescriptivism. Non-standard dialects of the languages discussed above have long been targets of ridicule. Witness the irascible George Puttenham (Reference Puttenham1589: ch. 3), advising aspiring writers in English that their language be ‘rather that which is spoken in the king’s Court, or in the good towns and Cities … than in the marches and frontiers, or in port towns … or yet in Universities where scholars use much peevish affectation of words’. (That last one is a fair cop.) Even for otherwise well-meaning LPP, non-standard vernaculars remain hard to grasp. M. C. Jones’s (Reference Jones1998) dialectological analysis of Welsh reveals manifold pressures on dialect diversity, favouring standard Welsh. Standardisation remains something of a precondition for LPP, with dialect diversity a peculiar blind spot (Sayers and Láncos Reference Sayers and Láncos2017).
But this pecking order goes lower. At least traditional dialects are afforded some affectionate cultural fondness. No such love for new and emerging vernaculars with no clear lineage or pedigree, like Multicultural London English (MLE): ‘the traditional dichotomy of status and solidarity … does not manifest in attitudes towards MLE’ (Kircher and Fox Reference Kircher and Fox2018:847; Fox, this volume; cf. Sayers Reference Sayers and Renkó-Michelsén2015). That we as a society are unable to celebrate and promote new language varieties that are spoken nowhere else on earth, apparently simply because they are new, perhaps also because they are associated with unspecified ethnic minorities, does not speak highly of us in any transparent definition of minority rights. These new varieties are invisible to LPP, subject only to frequent ‘slang bans’ in schools (Cushing Reference Cushing2020). The modern Welsh Not.
Lastly, as noted at the outset, we have not discussed signed languages. These are officially recognised but less capably accommodated. Corker (Reference Corker2000) offers a searing account of the lived reality of deaf students in British schools, nominally included but spatially excluded. (See Schembri, Rowley and Leeson, this volume, for further critical insight here.) Much of our political critique comes alive in Corker’s account, not least the unimaginative corporatist approach to inclusion engendered by NPM, ostensibly including deaf kids but routinely separating and segregating them.
24.6 Conclusion
Overall, we have not painted a rosy picture. How to turn that frown upside down? There are some positives. First and most obvious, there is plenty to life beyond the remit of the state. Indigenous and community LPP especially began through voluntary effort, and will likely continue that way regardless of ministerial whims. The most extreme example is Cornish, whose central government funding vanished entirely, but which maintains many less-tangible benefits of its funded period: increased awareness and visibility, and customary usage in greetings, signage, and other set-piece aspects of civic life (Davies-Deacon and Sayers, this volume). Meanwhile, the least legitimised emerging vernaculars like Multicultural London English thrive perhaps precisely because they are deemed illegitimate. Too cool for school.
‘Community languages’, though demoted to date, may have a brighter official future. Scotland’s relative positivity (Section 24.4.3) echoes its broader friendliness to immigrants – which the Scottish Government candidly attributes to its low fertility rate (lowest in the UK and Ireland) and consequent urgent need for immigrant labour (Scottish Government 2021). As Bricker and Ibbitson (Reference Bricker and Ibbitson2019:215) write of Canada, another low-fertility immigrant-friendly nation: ‘Canadians embrace refugees and immigrants, not because Canadians are particularly nice, but because they have learned it is in Canada’s own interest … and the unintended consequence of an uncomfortable truth that, as nations go, Canada is pretty much a failure’. Continuing declines in fertility across Britain and Ireland may yet engender more welcoming policies (see Higham Reference Higham2020 on this potential in Wales; and Bowring Reference Bowring2016 in Ireland).
New and future technologies also hold promise. Youngsters have found new spaces to experiment and play around with minority languages, in instant messaging (Lytra Reference Lytra and Androutsopoulos2014) and social media (Cunliffe Reference Cunliffe, Hogan-Brun and O’Rourke2019). Proprietary language learning apps like Duolingo increasingly support minority languages, while open-source initiatives like Mozilla’s Common Voice are gathering data on a wide variety of big and small languages around the world, for automated voice recognition and speech production. These in turn could power a future of virtual language learning and use in less formal, more exploratory contexts. There will remain technological inequalities between languages for some time, especially for signed languages (Conama Reference Conama, De Meulder, Murray and McKee2019; Jantunen et al. Reference Jantunen, Rousi, Rainò, Turunen, Valipoor, García, Hämäläinen, Partanen and Alnajjar2021), but here too there is progress (Quandt and Willis Reference Quandt and Willis2021). Technology does have a habit of improving. (For more of these future scenarios, see Sayers et al. Reference Sayers, Sousa-Silva and Höhn2021.) As Lewis and Royles (Reference Lewis and Royles2018) find in Wales and Scotland, LPP is slow to adapt to technological change. Technology may gain new relevance as LPP loses its own. Moreover, Ó Murchadha and Ó hIfearnáin (Reference Ó Murchadha and Ó hIfearnáin2018) point to the potential for irreverent youngsters, increasingly ‘new speakers’, to fundamentally challenge classical notions of standard correctness. Times are changing.
But on the policy front, based on its first five decades, LPP is not exactly promising greatness. Anyway, as Nietzsche put it, hope is the worst of all evils, for it prolongs the torment of humanity. The latest 2021 census figures show continued declines of even Welsh and Irish speakers (the two best-supported minority languages above), so the policies are failing even on their own circumscribed targets. Perhaps we have been going about all this the wrong way. Perhaps we should not invest our hopes for language in politicians – like so many things in life. (In the ‘post truth’ era, their word is a thing of diminishing returns.) Our historical analysis also shows that whoever is in charge, things can go south one way or another – elections always deliver the same fate: more politicians, whose vision extends only to the electoral horizon. Future research will compare today’s rhetoric of ‘global Britain’ to the reality of British people’s ability to actually speak to that globe.
But who knows? Things may improve. Economic clouds are forecast to lift eventually. And as to our repeated heckle that governments are blinkered by New Public Management into missing unintended consequences (unequal grades and life mobility, social tensions, etc.), this too may change. ‘Doughnut economics’ (Raworth Reference Raworth2017) is a newish model initially designed to balance ecological limits against fiscal ambitions – each limit depicted around a doughnut-like circle. This powerful tool could well be adapted for language policy, to pre-empt and prevent erstwhile overlooked side effects.
At least, repeated disappointment to date can be comfortably numbing, and set a reachable low bar. British people may find themselves pleasantly surprised, even if only by small mercies from unexpected angles. Meanwhile, as we noted above, Ireland may find shrewd ways to cash in on its new role as the premier English language hub in Europe. All these possibilities and more lie in wait.
25.1 Introduction
The issue of the use in schools of ‘standard’ versus ‘non-standard’ English has been debated for decades by British academics, policymakers, teachers and parents. The debate has gained renewed prominence within the contemporary landscape of post-2010 education reforms, which include the introduction of a revised national curriculum for schools in England (DfE 2014) (see Cushing Reference Cushing2023 for a review). As part of this landscape, some schools have attracted national media attention with their ‘zero tolerance’ approaches to pupils’ spoken language. These include attempts to eradicate the use of regional dialect forms (such as ‘yous’ and ‘ain’t’) and/or the fillers and discourse markers characteristic of spontaneous speech (such as ‘like’). Behind these initiatives is the assumption that the use of non-standardised English in speech will impede progress towards fully-fledged literacy, and thus children’s spoken language becomes the object of educational scrutiny. I interrogate this assumption in this chapter and consider the consequences for pupils who speak non-standardised dialects.
I begin by reviewing the long-standing debate on how ‘standard English’ should be taught, considering the policies that have been proposed and implemented since the introduction of the National Curriculum in 1988. I then interrogate the key terms in this debate – ‘standard’ versus ‘non-standard’ – highlighting differences in approach not just between policymakers and academics but also within the academic community. Here, I introduce a language ideological framework that treats categories like ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ English as social constructions rather than linguistic fact. Next, I review the research evidence regarding children’s use of non-standardised English at school, before ending with some reflections on the role sociolinguists have played in debates about language in education, with suggestions for future work. Throughout, I argue for the importance of a language ideological approach that aims to expose and challenge the hierarchies and inequalities that standard language ideology (i.e. the belief that there is only one ‘correct’ way to speak) reproduces.
25.2 ‘Standard’ and ‘Non-standard’ English in Educational Policy
In the 1988 Education Act, the British government introduced a National Curriculum for England. Two committees were responsible for making recommendations for the new curriculum in English: the Kingman Committee and the Cox Committee (DES 1988, 1989). Both emphasised the need for greater ‘knowledge about language’ among teachers as well as students (as Bullock [DES 1975] had done before them). This included knowledge of historical and geographical variation in English, with students expected to be able to discuss ‘the systematic ways in which the grammar of some dialects differs from the grammar of SE [standard English]’ (DES 1988:30). Traditional grammar teaching was eschewed in favour of a descriptive approach designed to facilitate students’ understanding of ‘standard English’ while respecting the non-standardised dialects many of them spoke. The emphasis was on raising pupils’ awareness of grammatical differences and extending their language repertoires (rather than replacing non-standardised usages with ‘standard English’).
Neither the Kingman nor the Cox report was received with full approval by the Conservative government of the day, having failed to recommend the return to a prescriptive approach to grammar teaching that had been expected. The reports angered pro-grammar conservatives and were pilloried by the right-wing press for the perceived lax approach to grammar and standards of ‘correctness’ (see Cameron Reference Cameron2012, Ch.3, and Crowley Reference Crowley2003, Ch.8 for a review). Nonetheless, English in the National Curriculum was published in 1990, based on the attainment targets and programmes of study recommended in Cox (DES 1989). The government initiated the Language in the National Curriculum (LINC) project to develop materials that would advance teachers’ knowledge about language and help them to deliver the new curriculum. The materials built on the model of language recommended in Kingman and Cox, though Professor Ronald Carter, Director of the LINC project, noted that ‘greater emphasis than in Kingman [was] given to the variation of language in different social and cultural contexts’ (Carter Reference Carter and Carter1990:6). Regrettably (though perhaps not surprisingly), this sociolinguistic focus was rejected by the government. The project was scrapped in 1991 and publication of the materials was blocked by the Minister of State for Education. Then, in 1992, the Secretary of State for Education announced a further review of English teaching to be conducted by the National Curriculum Council under the chairmanship of David Pascall, a chemical engineer whose perspective on grammar and ‘standard English’ ran contrary to the expert linguistic advice that had underpinned Kingman, Cox and LINC:
It’s grammatically correct English … so that you can be understood clearly, so that you don’t speak sloppily, you use tenses and prepositions properly, you don’t say ‘He done it’ and you don’t split infinitives …. ‘He done it’ is speaking English incorrectly. That’s bad grammar. We think it important that our children speak correctly.
The new proposals replaced ‘knowledge about language’ with greater emphasis on grammar and the speaking of ‘standard English’ from the earliest years (DfE 1993), satisfying traditionalists within the Conservative government and right-wing media whose mission it had become to uphold standards of ‘correctness’. While the Pascall curriculum was never published, new statutory orders for English, which maintained the same focus on standardised English, were eventually issued in 1995 (with revisions in 1999, 2007 and 2014). Most recently, The National Curriculum for England: Framework Document (DfE 2014) states clearly: ‘Pupils should be taught to speak clearly and convey ideas confidently using Standard English’ (2014, 6.2:11). Significantly, by secondary school (Key Stage 3), pupils should be ‘using Standard English confidently in a range of formal and informal contexts, including classroom discussion’ (2014:86). Throughout, ‘standard English’ is assumed to apply to both speech and writing. There is little recognition of variation in dialect or in the way that spoken communication varies according to context; and there is thus little space for teachers and pupils to explore social variation, language attitudes, or the relationship between language and power.
The debates surrounding the introduction of the National Curriculum for English, and the rewrites that followed, are documented in more detail elsewhereFootnote 1. My aim in giving this brief introduction is to underline the point that the teaching of ‘standard English’ (and thus the treatment of ‘non-standard English’ in education) has long been a matter of intense political concern.Footnote 2 Cameron (Reference Cameron2012:93–4) characterised the debate on grammar in the 1980 and 90s as ‘a case of moral panic’ in which it became commonplace for ‘ignorance or defiance of grammatical rules [to be] equated with anti-social or criminal behaviour’. This seemingly irrational link makes sense only when we understand that traditional grammar had come to symbolise traditional values, such as respect for rules, hierarchies and authority. The panic about grammar was thus ‘the metaphorical expression of persistent conservative fears that we are losing the values that underpin civilisation and sliding into chaos’ (p. 95). Exploring post-2010 education policy, Cushing (Reference Cushing2020a) likewise makes the link between conservatism in language policy and increased emphasis on discipline, control and standards of behaviour in schools. He describes the methods used by some teachers to ‘police’ non-standardised grammar in their classrooms and suggests that this is encouraged and legitimised by current English curriculum policy, as well as media reporting that (re)produces misconceptions about language. In a comment piece, Richard Hudson (Reference Hudson2020) contests Cushing’s claim that government policy on language is prescriptive. He argues that revisions to the National Curriculum ‘consistently contrast Standard English with non-Standard English – not with “incorrect” or “bad” English’ (p. 454) and suggests that ‘when a school or teacher decides to “police” non-standard speech, this is in spite of the official government policy’ (p. 452, my emphasis). Cushing (Reference Cushing2020b), in turn, critiques Hudson’s ‘de-politicised stance’ and makes the point that policy on language in education goes beyond the guidelines offered in the National Curriculum, including, for example, statutory grammar tests (DfE 2019), writing assessment frameworks (STA 2018) and Teachers’ Standards (DfE 2013). He suggests that these de facto policy mechanisms serve ‘to propagate and normalise prescriptivism’ (Cushing Reference Cushing2020b:467). For example, to gain qualified status, the Teachers’ Standards dictate that trainee teachers be judged on their ability to:
demonstrate an understanding of and take responsibility for high standards of literacy, articulacy and the correct use of standard English, whatever the teacher’s specialist subject.
This benchmark clearly links ‘standard English’ with ‘correctness’ (and thus presupposes that other ways of speaking are ‘incorrect’). The link between standard English and correctness is regularly taken for granted in discussions about language in education (see, for example, the quotation from Pascall above), which is one of the reasons why Cushing (Reference Cushing2020b:465) argues that ‘language prescription, stigma and prejudice cannot be disentangled from any use of the phrase “Standard English”’ (my emphasis). Take, for example, the use of ‘standard English’ by Ofsted, the schools inspectorate, when giving evidence to the Oracy All-Party-Parliamentary-Group’s Speak for Change inquiryFootnote 3 on 14 July 2020:
What we [The Office for Standards in Education] mean [by standard English] is English that is correct, that enables you to become an active citizen, to gain entrance to the career professions and also what Geoff Barton calls ‘the language habits of those who wield power’.
As well as equating ‘standard English’ with ‘correctness’, this definition establishes a link with ‘those who wield power’. I take up this point in the next section, considering why attempts to define ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ English in spoken language so often draw upon the social characteristics of imagined speakers (in this case the ‘powerful’) rather than offering a precise linguistic description.
25.3 Problematising ‘Standard’ and ‘Non-standard’ English
It is clear that there have been differences in the way that ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ English have been defined and positioned by educational policymakers/arbiters on the one hand and academic linguists on the other. However, we must also acknowledge that there are disagreements within the academy too, with some linguists treating ‘standard English’ as a discrete entity that can be clearly identified and described and others arguing that ‘standard English’ is an idealisation that has been discursively constructed. The debate between Hudson and Cushing highlights another difference too, between linguists who seek to be politically neutral and those who believe it is not possible to be apolitical when dealing with language in education, which by its very nature engages with intensely political concerns regarding social inequalities. Before exploring these differences, it is useful to begin with a point on which most can agree.
When it comes to the medium of writing in the English language, it is widely accepted that standard English is ‘the dialectal variety that has been codified in dictionaries, grammars, and usage handbooks … [and] has been adapted by most major publishers internationally, resulting in a very high degree of uniformity among published English texts around the world’ (Biber et al. Reference Biber, Johansson, Leech, Conrad and Finegan1999:18).Footnote 4 Most would also agree that written standard English should be explicitly taught in schools. However, when it comes to speech, the concept of a ‘standard’ is far from straightforward. The ‘very high degree of uniformity’ that can be achieved in written language can never be achieved in spoken language, which by its very nature varies according to specific contexts of use. This leaves considerable scope for variation (and disagreement) when attempting to define something called ‘spoken standard English’.
In the grammar glossary that appears at the end of the current curriculum framework, ‘standard English’ is defined thus:
Standard English can be recognised by the use of a very small range of forms such as those books, I did it and I wasn’t doing anything (rather than their non-Standard equivalents); it is not limited to any particular accent. It is the variety of English which is used, with only minor variation, as a major world language. Some people use Standard English all the time, in all situations from the most casual to the most formal, so it covers most registers. The aim of the national curriculum is that everyone should be able to use Standard English as needed in writing and in relatively formal speaking.
This definition was authored by a linguist, Richard Hudson, and thus there is no slippage between ‘standard English’ and correctness, nor is there any stigma attached to ‘non-standard equivalents’; however, this passage demonstrates that it is difficult to give a precise linguistic description of ‘standard English’. As so often happens, standard English is defined negatively, as what it is not (i.e. it is not non-standard English; see Crowley Reference Crowley2003:260) and illustrated with just a small set of prescribed forms. Cushing (Reference Cushing2020b:465–6) critiques the definition further as ‘a highly de-politicised version of Standard English’ which ‘evad[es] any recognition of the standard language ideology and its power’.
This ideological sidestepping has been a deliberate strategy for some linguists.Footnote 5 In a chapter written originally for the edited collection, Standard English: The Widening Debate (but updated in a 2011 online version), Peter Trudgill states clearly that his characterisation of ‘Standard English’ ‘will be specifically linguistic: the word “ideology” will not appear in this paper’ (Trudgill Reference Trudgill, Bex and Watts1999:118), and in a parenthetical comment, he makes it clear that he does ‘not agree with the contention which is sometimes heard that “nobody speaks Standard English”’ (p. 120). He offers instead a confident characterisation of ‘Standard English’ as:
the variety of English normally used in writing, especially printing; it is the variety associated with the education system in all the English-speaking countries of the world, and is therefore the variety spoken by those who are often referred to as ‘educated’ people.
Spoken ‘standard English’ is defined here not in linguistic terms but in terms of the level of education of its speakers. Crowley (Reference Crowley, Bex and Watts1999, Reference Crowley2003) and Coupland (Reference Coupland2000) have outlined the problems associated with using the criterion of ‘educatedness’; and, indeed, the scare quotes suggest that Trudgill also recognises the need for some distancing from his use of the term. Nonetheless, the appeal to educatedness or related characteristics (e.g. power, professionalism) is often made in discussions about ‘standard English’.
Crowley (Reference Crowley2003) helps us to understand the historical processes through which the link between ‘standard English’ and characteristics such as ‘educatedness’ has been naturalised. He explains that by the mid nineteenth century, the term ‘standard language’ had achieved at least one clear use as ‘the uniform and commonly accepted national literary language’ (Crowley Reference Crowley2003:106). However, another use of the term was emerging and being applied to the spoken rather than the written language. Here the word ‘standard’ was used to refer to ‘a single form of speech that will replace diversity and variation’ (Crowley Reference Crowley2003:107). Clearly, this desired uniformity could not be achieved in practice because variation dominated spoken language in the nineteenth century as it does today. Crowley argues that it is for this reason that the spoken standard could not be defined in linguistic terms; it had to be defined instead ‘in terms of the social characteristics of its speakers’ (Crowley Reference Crowley2003:117). The spoken ‘standard’ thus came to be described as the language of ‘the educated’, the ‘well-bred’, the ‘civilised’ and the highest social class, and the term ‘standard’ took on a new meaning, ‘signifying a level of excellence to be reached and a quality to be emulated’ rather than a sense of uniformity (Crowley Reference Crowley2003:112). In reality, few (if any) speakers could realise this ‘standard’ perfectly in their everyday speech. Standard English in these terms was thus an ‘idealization of élite or at least establishment linguistic practice’ (Coupland Reference Coupland2000:624) (see also Levey, this volume, for further discussion).
While the spoken ‘standard’ was discursively constructed in England as the language of the highest social classes, non-standardised dialects were consequently associated with the lower classes. As I have argued elsewhere (Snell Reference Snell2018a), when particular linguistic forms are ideologised in this way, as representative of particular types of people, they may be further construed as depicting, quite naturally, the qualities conventionally associated with those people. Through this ideological process of ‘iconization’ (Irvine and Gal Reference Irvine, Gal and Kroskrity2000) so-called standard forms have come to be understood as emblematic of intelligence, competence, power and superior moral character, and non-standard forms of the converse. This is why it has been possible for prominent figures in the language in education debate to equate speaking non-standardised English with being ‘sloppy’ (Pascall, quoted above), ‘turning up filthy at school’ (Norman Tebbit, Radio 4, 1985, cited in Cameron Reference Cameron2012:94) and ‘joblessness’ (Michael Gove, speech delivered to an audience of teachers at Brighton College, 9 May 2013), as if these are natural consequences of failing to adhere to the ‘standard’.
James Milroy (Reference Milroy, Bex and Watts1999) has also argued that standard languages (indeed any delimited varieties) are idealisations to which no speaker can ever truly conform, and thus that no one actually speaks a standard language. He writes that the idea of the standard is kept alive in speakers’ minds through channels such as the writing system and education in literacy, which he argues ‘equate the standard language – or what is believed to be the standard language … with “correct” usage in that language’ (p. 18). For Milroy, this notion of correctness plays ‘a powerful role in the maintenance of the standard language ideology through prescription’ (1999:18). Likewise, Coupland (2000:624) points out that ‘[t]he centripetal ideology of SE [‘standard English’] today is based on the twin practices of publicly deprecating “incorrect” usage, and displaying and lobbying for “authoritative” usage, however selectively in linguistic terms’. This has been demonstrated in recent years in the letters sent home to parents by schools who have banned the use of non-standardised dialect forms. An example can be seen in Figure 25.1, which represents a letter sent to parents by a primary school in Teesside, reported in a national newspaper. The letter clearly proscribes eleven ‘incorrect’ usages and promotes alternative ‘correct’ usages. There is no explanation as to why these particular features of grammar and pronunciation have been selected and not others, but the overall message (reinforced by the opposing columns) is that some ways of speaking (those associated with the children’s own local dialect) are ‘incorrect’ while other ways of speaking (those associated with an educated ‘other’) are ‘correct’ (see Snell Reference Snell, Snell, Copland and Shaw2015 for further discussion). While blanket bans on non-standardised dialect have been documented in only a small number of schools (Cushing Reference Cushing2020a finds seven cases reported in the national media), these have been reported widely in the national press, thus reinforcing (as well as replicating) discourses of correctness and the standard language ideology.Footnote 6

Figure 25.1 Examples taken from a letter sent to parents of pupils at a primary school in Teesside.
Cushing’s (Reference Cushing2020a) notion that local school policies are influenced by national policy appears to be borne out in the Teesside case. When asked to comment on the rationale for the letter, the head teacher explained that ‘the literacy framework asks children to write in standard English’. This school’s policy was thus grounded in the requirements of the National Curriculum and the erroneous (though well intentioned) assumption that policing pupils’ spoken language will help to drive up standards of literacy (see Section 25.4). The head teacher also told reporters that ‘we would like to equip our children to go into the world of work and not be disadvantaged’. The notion that the prescriptive teaching of ‘standard English’ will provide children with employment opportunities (and thus the potential for social mobility) is commonly invoked in debates about language in education, especially when prevailing educational policy and practice is challengedFootnote 7 (see also Snell Reference Snell2018a). However, Milroy (Reference Milroy, Bex and Watts1999:21) argues that ‘[t]he effect of this “access to standard English” argument is not likely to be to benefit the underprivileged, but to maintain the authority of the canon of correct English’, and thus uphold existing power structures.
In summary, some linguists treat ‘standard English’ and ‘non-standard’ dialects as discrete entities that can be delineated and described. There are advantages to this approach. First, it clearly helps to draw boundaries around linguistic varieties for the purposes of formal linguistic description. Second, if linguists want to engage with educational policymakers and practitioners, it may make for a more productive relationship if we work with the same normative categories (such as ‘standard English’) that have currency in the educational domain; indeed, the aim of linguists such as Hudson has been to provide descriptions of ‘standard English’ that are useful and practical for policymakers, teachers and pupils. However, this approach reinforces the categories of ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ and their associated power structures without helping children to understand the social and historical processes that have created those structures (Pietikäinen Reference Pietikäinen and Coupland2016:268; Snell Reference Snell2018a). While it is true that the definitions of ‘standard English’ that appear in the current curriculum do not directly propagate a prescriptive stance, by being selective in linguistic terms, as well as silent about the wider politics of ‘standard English’, these definitions inadvertently contribute to the processes through which non-standardised English is seen as inferior. In contrast, linguists working within a language ideological framework treat categories such as ‘standard English’ as ideological processes rather than linguistic fact. Their aim is to expose, understand and challenge the forces and practices that have established, maintained and reinforced the ideology of the standard. These linguists (with whom I align) would argue that discussions of ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ language in educational policies should recognise the social and political dimensions of ‘standard English’ and why it has come to hold such power, thus educating (and empowering) pupils to understand language attitudes and biases and how language is implicated in the maintenance of social inequalities. It is for these reasons that I prefer to use the terms standardised and non-standardised English (and regret previously using the uninflected forms in earlier writing), thus foregrounding standardisation as a process that requires continual work, to which we (as academic linguists) can either contribute or resist.
25.4 Non-Standardised English in Educational Practice
The need for children to develop competence in written standardised English is indisputable. However, there is little agreement on how to help children negotiate the differences between the grammar of their spoken language and that of written standardised English. As already noted, some schools have initiated policies that ‘ban’ non-standardised grammar in pupils’ spoken language, on the assumption that this will improve literacy rates (Cushing Reference Cushing2020a; Snell Reference Snell2018a). Yet, there is no evidence that the policing of oral language will help children conform to the conventions of written usage in standardised English. It is also unclear to what extent non-standardised English in speech actually influences children’s writing.
Early research (based on data gathered before the implementation of the National Curriculum in English) indicated that the impact of non-standardised dialect in writing is relatively minor when compared with the mechanics of spelling and punctuation and the difficulties children have in negotiating the complexities of written (as opposed to spoken) structure (Williamson Reference Williamson1990, Reference Williamson1995; Williamson and Hardman Reference Williamson and Hardman1997a, Reference Williamson and Hardman1997b; see Snell and Andrews Reference Snell and Andrews2017 for a systematic review). This research also indicated that the use of non-standardised dialect in written work decreases as pupils progress through school (Williams Reference Williams, Cheshire, Edwards, Munstermann and Weltens1989a, Reference Williams1989b; Williamson and Hardman Reference Williamson and Hardman1997b). More recently, Constantinou and Chambers (Reference Constantinou and Chambers2020) compared the incidence of non-standardised grammar in the writing of sixteen-year-old students in 2004 and 2014 and found an increase over time, which they attribute to decreasing language awareness amongst students. Significantly, the six most common non-standardised features did not change between 2004 and 2014, and these also overlapped with the features highlighted in Williamson’s earlier work (e.g. Williamson Reference Williamson1990, Reference Williamson1995; Williamson and Hardman Reference Williamson and Hardman1997a, Reference Williamson and Hardman1997b). This suggests that there may be a persistent core of non-standardised forms that are more difficult to manage in writing (Williamson Reference Williamson1995:11; see also Hudson and Holmes Reference Hudson and Holmes1995). Non-standardised forms related to subject–verb agreement and past/past participle forms of irregular verbs were particularly intractable, and thus may warrant teachers’ focused attention (Constantinou and Chambers Reference Constantinou and Chambers2020:28; Harris Reference Harris and Mace1995:127; Williams Reference Williams, Cheshire, Edwards, Munstermann and Weltens1989a:185; Williamson and Hardman Reference Williamson and Hardman1997a:168).
However, these studies also highlight that some non-standardised forms occur only in speech, and thus should not be the focus of attention for teachers whose aim is to improve pupils’ written work. Constantinou and Chambers (Reference Constantinou and Chambers2020:29) highlight five non-standardised forms that did not occur at all in pupils’ writing in either the 2004 or 2014 corpus. Amongst these is the use of ‘ain’t’ (as in, ‘we ain’t got enough’). Williams’ study in Reading (Reference Williams, Cheshire, Edwards, Munstermann and Weltens1989a, Reference Williams1989b, Reference Williams and Britain2007) also found that working-class pupils who used ‘ain’t’ frequently in their speech did not use it at all in their written work. It appears that this form is clearly identified by young people as a feature only of speech and that these speakers are capable of switching between the standardised and non-standardised form at school. This calls into question the value of teacher oral corrections of ‘ain’t’ (as documented in Snell Reference Snell2013:121–2). A second feature found to occur only in speech is the ‘[u]se of “us” after the imperative of verbs such as give, let and show, i.e. “Give us!”’ (Constantinou and Chambers Reference Constantinou and Chambers2020:29). This is one of the eleven forms included in the Teesside letter (‘Gizit’ is a condensed form of ‘Give us it’, see Figure 25.1 and Snell Reference Snell, Snell, Copland and Shaw2015). A stated aim of this letter was to help pupils to develop their command of written standardised English, but, again, the likelihood is that ‘Gizit’ is exclusive to speech, and thus the ban will not help children to develop their writing. In addition, in my work with primary schoolchildren in Teesside, it became evident that singular ‘us’ was used only in very specific circumstances: when spoken commands/requests were issued amidst negotiations regarding status, hierarchy and inclusion/exclusion within the peer group (see Snell Reference Snell2013, Reference Snell, Snell, Copland and Shaw2015 for examples in context and further discussion). This form indexed meanings that were consequential to peer-group interaction, and thus it is unlikely that children would stop using it just because their teachers (or parents) tell them to.
Ian Cushing and I found spoken dialect grammar to be relatively infrequent in pupils’ writing in two schools in London and Leeds (Snell and Cushing Reference Snell and Cushing2022). We examined the English books of 65 nine-to-eleven-year-old pupils (approximately 140,000 words of writing) and found that non-standardised grammar occurred at an average rate of just over one instance per thousand words. As in previous research, we also found that some of the forms routinely corrected in pupils’ speech (such as ain’t) did not occur in their writing at all. Despite these facts, teachers we interviewed in the Leeds school felt that their pupils’ spoken language did affect the quality of their writing, explaining that they would correct their pupils’ speech as well as their writing, at least on some occasions. Pupil focus groups corroborated this, with pupils commenting on teacher corrective strategies, including one teacher who had instigated a ‘ban’ on words which were symbolic of spontaneous speech, such as ‘like’ and ‘basically’.
We argue that teachers are sensitive to non-standardised grammar in their pupils’ speech, as well as their writing, because it is highlighted as an issue in educational policy and evaluative mechanisms (Snell and Cushing Reference Snell and Cushing2022:205–6). One such mechanism is the schools inspectorate, Ofsted. In related work (Cushing and Snell Reference Cushing and Snell2023), we constructed a digital database of 3,000 Ofsted school inspection reports published between 2000 and 2020 and searched this for phrases that were representative of different attitudes and ideologies about spoken language (such as ‘speak clearly’, ‘correct grammar’, ‘fluent speech’). We found an overwhelming number of instances where inspectors made negative judgements about teacher and pupil speech they heard as ‘non-standard’. We also found that Ofsted reports often conflated speech and writing and promoted the unevidenced notion that talking in ‘standard English’ bears direct consequences on the development of pupils’ literacy. We suggest that teachers have internalised these views, understanding it to be their role to model and promote standardised English in speech and believing that correcting pupils’ oral language has pedagogical value in relation to developing their writing.
While existing research gives a good indication of the specific areas of non-standardised grammar that should be prioritised in developing written standardised English (e.g. the verb phrase), these studies do not offer guidance on grammar pedagogies, nor do they consider the nature and impact of teacher responses. This is a significant gap, given that researchers have called into question the efficacy of teacher corrections of non-standardised grammar in writing. The work of Cheshire (Reference Cheshire1982a, Reference Cheshire1982b) and Williams (Reference Williams, Cheshire, Edwards, Munstermann and Weltens1989a, Reference Williams1989b, Reference Williams and Britain2007) in Reading indicated that teachers did not have a clear concept of what constituted local dialect in Reading nor a ‘consistent policy for dealing with non-standard forms that occurred in children’s work’ (Williams Reference Williams, Cheshire, Edwards, Munstermann and Weltens1989a:194). Differences in approach were noted not just between teachers but also within a single teacher’s marking practices: non-standardised dialect forms were corrected in some cases but not others, leading to confusion for children. Williams (Reference Williams, Cheshire, Edwards, Munstermann and Weltens1989a:196) also found that teacher corrections often lacked explanation, which in some cases led to hypercorrection on the part of pupils. Further work is required in order to develop a consistent and transparent strategy in dealing with the use of non-standardised dialect in writing if we are to avoid creating unintended confusion and anxiety for the learner, which may extend into adult life (Harris Reference Harris and Mace1995). More productive and descriptive approaches to writing (e.g. Myhill Reference Myhill2021) have shown the power in conceptualising grammar as a series of choices to be made, as opposed to prescriptive rules.
Research has shown that pupils are capable of style-switching in their speech as well as between speech and writing. Crinson and Williamson (Reference Crinson and Williamson2004) studied the use of non-standardised English in the formal and informal speech of fifteen-year-olds from two schools in Tyneside. They found that the middle-class students used almost no non-standardised grammar in their speech in formal contexts. Significantly, the incidence of non-standardised forms in the formal speech of students from less privileged backgrounds was also very low (an average of 3.5 non-standardised grammatical features per 30 minutes of conversation). In informal contexts, this increased to around 8 or 9 features. The key point is that these pupils were capable of style-shifting in line with curriculum guidance which states that children should be able to distinguish between formal and informal contexts when choosing appropriate vocabulary and grammatical structures. However, it is important to acknowledge that the stylistic potential of non-standardised grammar extends beyond formality. Sociolinguistic research has shown that features of non-standardised grammar can index stances, attitudes and identities, in addition to social or regional category memberships (Cheshire Reference Cheshire1982a; Coupland Reference Coupland2007; Ioannidou Reference Ioannidou2009; Moore and Podesva Reference Moore and Podesva2009; Moore Reference Moore2012, Reference Moore, Hall-Lew, Moore and Podesva2021; Rampton Reference Rampton2006, Snell Reference Snell2010, Reference Snell2018b). Most sociolinguistic research on style has focused on the speech of adolescents, but research in Teesside has shown that nine-to-ten-year-old children are strategic in their style-shifting, using non-standardised grammar to negotiate relationships and peer-group identities (e.g. Snell Reference Snell2010, Reference Snell2013, Reference Snell2018b). Some of the non-standardised forms in these children’s repertoires conveyed specific social and pragmatic meanings not carried by the standardised alternatives (see Snell Reference Snell2010 on possessive ‘me’; Snell Reference Snell2013, Reference Snell, Snell, Copland and Shaw2015 on singular ‘us’; and Snell Reference Snell2018b on right-dislocated pronoun tags); and speakers selected the forms/meanings most appropriate to their immediate interactional goals. We must recognise, then, that children’s repertoires are complex and that children meaningfully switch between standardised and non-standardised forms.
Professionals and public figures also sometimes use non-standardised grammar strategically, even in formal speech. For example, during a televised interview about the government’s Brexit deal in 2019, Michael Gove, a government minister, told the interviewer: ‘That ain’t gonna happen … There ain’t gonna be no second referendum.’ Moore (Reference Moore2019) suggests that Gove’s use of non-standardised negation serves not only to emphasise his commitment to the point he is making, but also to communicate his desire to be seen as ‘straight-talking’ and ‘resilient’ (characteristics associated with the working-class speakers who typically use non-standardised grammar). As Moore points out, this example demonstrates the flexibility and utility of non-standardised grammatical forms, which ‘allow us to communicate our feelings or stances concisely’. In addition, Moore argues that the example calls into question the idea propagated by the National Curriculum that ‘Standard English … covers most registers’ (DfE 2014:104). Clearly, even those whose language is most closely associated with standardised English (such as the government minister who presided over changes introduced in the 2014 National Curriculum) sometimes find it useful to exploit the stylistic potential of non-standardised grammar.
In the classroom, non-standardised grammar is not typically recognised as a stylistic resource. As already noted, it is common practice for teachers to correct pupils’ use of non-standardised forms in speech as well as in writing. Cheshire and Edwards (Reference Cheshire and Edwards1991:230) argue that oral correction is ‘a waste of time and … likely to lead to confusion about the linguistic relationship between features of standard and non-standard English’, with persistent corrections potentially leading to ‘reticence in oral work and even, in extreme cases, to alienation from the school’ (see also Cox Reference Cox1991:32, 128). I have not found any UK-based research that has systematically analysed the function and impact of oral corrections, but work outside of the UK highlights issues associated with this pedagogic strategy. In Godley, Carpenter and Werner’s (Reference Godley, Carpenter and Werner2007) study of grammar instruction in an urban (and predominantly African American) tenth-grade English class, the focal students expressed discomfort with their teacher’s insistence that they speak only standardised English in class, and two of the eleven students interviewed said that they tried not to speak at all to avoid being corrected. In a study that explored the tensions between Standard Modern Greek and Greek Cypriot Dialect in Greek Cypriot primary classrooms, Ioannidou (Reference Ioannidou2009:275) noted that students ‘were interrupted, corrected and failed to be praised for providing the correct answer simply because they, either by choice or necessity, decided to convey the meaning in their own variety’ (see also Netz, Yitzhaki and Lefstein (Reference Netz, Yitzhaki and Lefstein2018) for corrections in Israeli classrooms).
Sociolinguistic research suggests that oral corrections and negative views about non-standardised dialects can produce feelings of linguistic insecurity and have detrimental effects on speakers’ confidence, motivation and participation in class discussion (Cheshire Reference Cheshire1982b; MacRuairc Reference MacRuairc2011a, Reference MacRuairc2011b; Snell Reference Snell2013; Trudgill Reference Trudgill1975; Williams 1989, Reference Williams and Britain2007). Where low value is accorded to non-standardised speech in the classroom, some pupils may become less confident in oral expression and thus reluctant to contribute to whole-class discussion (Snell Reference Snell2013, Reference Snell2019). This is a problem for teaching and learning across the whole curriculum because educational research has shown that participation in high-quality classroom discussion is crucial to learning and cognitive development (e.g. Alexander Reference Alexander2020; Mercer Reference Mercer2008; Lefstein and Snell Reference Lefstein and Snell2014; Resnick, Asterhan and Clarke Reference Resnick, Asterhan and Clarke2015; see also Section 25.5). In addition, there are consequences for pupils’ developing identities. Pupils who speak a non-standardised dialect may experience conflict in trying to be a ‘good pupil’ (where this requires displays of competence in standardised English) while also retaining other aspects of their identity (e.g. ‘popular boy’) and expressing loyalty to neighbourhood, family and peer group. This is significant because there is evidence from learning theory and studies of classroom practice that identity is of critical importance to the learning process (e.g. Wortham Reference Wortham2006). Some children will be successful in negotiating identity conflicts, but others may become alienated from school and the educational opportunities it offers (MacRuairc Reference MacRuairc2011b; Piestrup Reference Piestrup1973:170; Willis Reference Willis1977).
In summary, there is a widely held perception in educational policy and practice that non-standardised speech is a barrier to the development of literacy. However, research shows that this is not the case. The use of non-standardised grammar in writing is relatively insignificant compared with the difficulties all children face in developing command over the complexities of written compared to spoken structure; the incidence of non-standardised forms in writing is lower than in speech and decreases as speakers progress through school; some non-standardised forms commonly corrected in speech do not occur in writing at all; and, in spoken interaction, children are flexible language users who manipulate variation for strategic effect. Despite the research evidence, the narrative that non-standardised speech is a problem persists in educational policy and evaluative mechanisms, and this drives pedagogic practice that is detrimental to pupil confidence and classroom discussion.
25.5 The Role of Sociolinguists in Educational Debates
Since the 1970s, sociolinguists have sought to counter negative and ‘subjective’ evaluations of non-standardised dialects of English with ‘objective’ linguistic facts (Labov Reference Labov1982). Following Labov’s (Reference Labov1969) defence of African American Vernacular English (AAVE) in the US, British sociolinguists have argued that non-standardised dialects are as systematic, logical and rule-bound as standardised English; they simply have a different set of rules (e.g. Trudgill Reference Trudgill1975, Reference Trudgill, Bex and Watts1999). Thus, the different-but-equal approach has become the default mode for countering prejudice against non-standardised varieties, including in educational contexts. These arguments have been rehearsed in public forums like Twitter (now known as X), with linguists arguing against news stories and comments that marginalise non-standardised dialects and calling for attitudinal change. Nonetheless, negative perceptions of non-standardised dialects persist, despite almost fifty years of this kind of sociolinguistic advocacy.
A key issue is that different-but-equal arguments have tended to ignore (presumably strategically) the wider cultural and ideological politics of standardised English in a bid to stick to linguistic ‘facts’ and thus make claims for scientific objectivity (recall Trudgill’s [Reference Trudgill, Bex and Watts1999] insistence that he would not use the word ‘ideology’). But, as others have pointed out, this is a fallacy:
Of course, this [that all languages are equal] is not ‘a fact’, and it is not ‘scientific’: it is not possible to demonstrate empirically that forms of language are either equal or unequal, or even that ‘some are more equal than others’ purely as linguistic objects. A claim of this sort is ideological, just as the claims that are made against it are ideological, and it is unwise for linguists to make public claims about linguistic equality unless they are aware that such claims will be interpreted as ideological.
As Milroy indicates, members of the public tend to see through claims for ‘objectivity’ and ‘scientific detachment’ (Labov Reference Labov1982:166), especially as they know very well that non-standardised dialects are not socially equal to standardised English (Snell Reference Snell, Snell, Copland and Shaw2015, Reference Snell2018a). Efforts to address negative attitudes to non-standardised English that rely on different-but-equal arguments may thus appear disingenuous because they fail to acknowledge the social and political conditions under which the educational focus on standardised English and the policing of non-standardised forms makes sense to many teachers, pupils, and parents.
An ideological approach prompts us to reflect critically on taken-for-granted assumptions in our discipline and consider how these may actually constrain contributions to social change (Lewis Reference Lewis2018:339). Different-but-equal arguments are premised on the assumption that non-standardised dialects of English are discrete linguistic systems with their own set of rules. This presupposes that there is a spoken ‘standard English’ against which a variety called ‘Teesside English’, or any other ‘non-standard’ variety, can be evaluated. The focus on discrete language systems makes it difficult for us to then argue against those who suggest that for children to acquire standardised English they must first stop using features of their local dialect (as in the non-standardised dialect bans discussed above), because these initiatives are also premised on the assumption that ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ varieties are different linguistic systems which are thus in competition with each other.
Woolard has made the point that we can only counter misconceptions about language when we have understood how they are socially produced and accepted as convincing and effective (Woolard Reference Woolard, Schieffelin, Woolard and Kroskrity1998:10). A language ideological approach is useful in this regard because it helps us to uncover and challenge the ‘stock arguments’ (Blommaert Reference Blommaert and Blommaert1999:10) that have perpetuated standard language ideology, such as the notion that speaking ‘standard English’ will help working-class children achieve employment success and social mobility, which is as pervasive in education debates as it is misleading (see also Snell Reference Snell2018a). The link between language use and upward social mobility can only be made if we view standardised English as a set of objective linguistic practices that can be neatly delineated and thus acquired and exploited. As already noted, research has indicated that this is not the case. US scholars working within the field of raciolinguistics have made the case that institutional assessments of what constitutes ‘standard’ versus ‘non-standard’ language (or ‘school’ versus ‘home’) are really measures of how well a student is able to embody particular subject positions (e.g. ‘idealised whiteness’) rather than empirical linguistic practices (Rosa and Flores Reference Rosa and Flores2017:633; see also Alim, Rickford and Ball Reference Alim, Rickford and Ball2016; Baker-Bell Reference Baker-Bell2020; Rosa Reference Rosa2018; Smitherman Reference Smitherman2017). Flores and Rosa (Reference Flores and Rosa2015:150) argue that raciolinguistic ideologies work to position racialised bodies as linguistically deficient unrelated to any objective linguistic practice. Raciolinguistic and standard language ideologies thus work to privilege white middle-class speakers, who can deviate from language practices idealised as ‘standard’ or ‘appropriate’ without stigma, while discriminating against racialised speakers, who ‘can adhere to these idealised linguistic practices and still face profound institutional exclusion’ (Flores and Rosa Reference Flores and Rosa2015:165). From this perspective, it is nonsensical to suggest that modifying the language of marginalised speakers is the key to promoting social mobility. As Flores and Rosa put it:
Simply adding ‘codes of power’ or other ‘appropriate’ forms of language to the linguistic repertoire of language-minoritized students will not lead to social transformation [… because] they are still heard as deficient language users. Attempting to teach language-minoritised students to engage in the idealized linguistic practices of the white speaking subject does nothing to challenge the underlying racism and monoglossic language ideologies of the white listening subject.
In other words, while society demands that marginalised speakers learn standardised English to advance in education and the public domain, it continues to find their linguistic performances wanting while rewarding white middle- and upper-class speakers whose language does not conform to an idealised ‘standard’. It is in this sense that educational policies and prescriptions on ‘standard English’ become ‘gate-keeping mechanisms that reproduce both the experience and the social effect of stratification and inequality’ (Gal Reference Gal2016:459). The problem thus cannot be found and remedied within individual speakers, but rather within state structures and institutions.
In summary, a language ideological approach to challenging negative attitudes about non-standardised language in education would include interrogating our own disciplinary assumptions as well as addressing the wider cultural politics of ‘standard English’ and its role in masking the inequalities of race and class that are baked into our educational institutions. But, in addition, if we are to have real impact in the educational domain, we need to adapt our arguments in ways that are recognised as helpful by educational practitioners (Lefstein and Israeli Reference Lefstein, Israeli, Snell, Shaw and Copland2015:205). In this regard, Cameron (Reference Cameron2012:115) recommends that we should seek ‘not to deny the importance of standards and values but to focus critically on the particular standards and values being invoked and to propose alternatives’.Footnote 8 In other words, we must take care not to give the impression that we are opposed to standards of excellence in language education; rather we should replace the superficial focus on ‘correctness’ with more productive approaches that help children to cultivate their spoken and written repertoires. Related to this, I would suggest that we also need to make a distinction between ‘talk for performance’ and ‘talk for learning’ when discussing spoken language in education (Snell Reference Snell2019). The National Curriculum requires that pupils develop the skills necessary to give speeches and presentations and participate in structured debate. Within these formal and semi-scripted speech events (i.e. talk as performance) it may be appropriate to encourage pupils to minimise fillers and avoid grammatical forms stigmatised as ‘non-standard’, unless used for rhetorical effect (provided adequate explanation is given as to why these forms are devalued in the public domain). However, when it comes to talk for learning, the aim is to think aloud and contribute spontaneously to an evolving argument. There is no reason why such contributions should be made in standardised English (even if we could agree what this means when it comes to speech), because it is possible to express complex ideas in a variety of linguistic forms and styles. This an important point because educational research on talk-intensive (or ‘dialogic’) pedagogies has demonstrated that children who participate in rich and challenging classroom discussion make greater progress (based on performance in standardised tests) than their peers who have not had this experience (e.g. Alexander Reference Alexander2018; Resnick et al. Reference Resnick, Asterhan and Clarke2015). Moreover, a recent large-scale dialogic teaching intervention based in the UK has shown that the increase in achievement is even more dramatic for pupils on free school meals (used as a measure of relative socio-economic disadvantage) (Alexander Reference Alexander2018, Reference Alexander2020), thus highlighting the importance of classroom talk to social mobility. Drawing together sociolinguistic research on language variation with educational research on dialogic pedagogies, we can make the case that: (i) the obligation to use standardised English in informal classroom discussion (which is an official requirement at KS3) and the policing of non-standardised speech in the classroom will likely discourage some pupils from participating; (ii) pupils who do not regularly participate in classroom discussion will miss out on the dialogic exchanges that are crucial to learning and cognitive development; and (iii) this will disproportionately impact the most disadvantaged pupils, who are most likely to speak a local dialect and who also stand to gain the most by being given regular opportunities to participate in productive classroom discussion and thus to exploit the power of talk for learning.
25.6 Conclusion
The treatment of non-standardised language in education has been a focus of sociolinguistic attention for at least the last five decades. In this chapter I have highlighted some of the issues and tensions that have emerged as part of the debate, focusing in particular on the way ‘standard English’ is conceptualised either as a discrete entity that can be neatly delineated and described or as an idealisation of elite linguistic practice that is reinforced and maintained through the workings of standard language ideology. Clearly, careful linguistic analysis of children’s speech and writing is crucial to educational debates about language. However, it is not productive to attempt a purely linguistic, non-ideological approach in debates about non-standardised English in education, not least because standard language ideology is clearly dominant in the actions of politicians, Ofsted, and schools, and in the media reporting of these. We need a critical, ideological perspective in order to understand and challenge the ways in which language is implicated in the gate-keeping encounters that routinely reproduce educational inequalities. This includes educational prescriptions on spoken language, as well as class and racial bias embedded in curricula documents and high-stakes examinations (see, for example, Johnson Reference Johnson2015). Further, once we move away from the notion that discrete, bounded varieties of English exist as sociolinguistic ‘realities’, it becomes possible to show that children’s language repertoires already include forms that are conventionally associated with schools’ prescribed ‘standards’ alongside local dialect forms and a range of other semiotic resources (Snell Reference Snell2013, Reference Snell, Snell, Copland and Shaw2015), and thus that the focus should be on extending children’s repertoires.
It is clear that we need a more comprehensive and evidence-based approach to ‘standards’, style and language variation in the National Curriculum. Approaches to spoken language at school should recognise that it is not possible to achieve uniformity in speech and it is precisely that lack of uniformity that opens up opportunities for stylistic variation. Speaking always involves making choices; understanding the impact of these choices gives us control, enabling us to style ourselves linguistically in multiple different ways. Pupils should therefore have the opportunity to learn about their local dialect and its relationship to standardised English and be encouraged to reflect on their language choices and abilities. Teacher professional development should include ‘knowledge about language’ (as advocated some time ago by LINC). It is important that teachers and pupils gain an awareness of the full potential of spoken language, including an understanding of regional, social and stylistic variation, and the relationship between speech and writing. Valuing the language resources pupils use at home and making them a legitimate object of study is likely to develop pupils’ confidence and make them more likely to participate in class discussion, which will have benefits for their learning across the curriculum.
There is still a significant gap between the kind of robust and convincing research that can be reported in academic publications and significant impact within educational policy and practice. We thus need to continue to think seriously about how best to disseminate sociolinguistic research outside of academia and how we can work productively with educational practitioners and policymakers to shape the way non-standardised English is viewed and treated in education. While research which seeks to counter negative attitudes by validating and legitimising non-standardised language continues to be important, we must also take heed of scholars such Rosa and Flores (Reference Rosa and Flores2017) and Lewis (Reference Lewis2018) (see also Block Reference Block2014, Reference Block2018), who have argued that future work must also highlight and address the structural inequalities and injustices that are the true cause of educational underachievement in low-income, working-class and racialised pupils, if we are to effect real and lasting change.
26.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the way in which language education in England has engaged with migration and multilingualism over the last half century, drawing on comparable chapters in the two earlier editions of this book (Martin-Jones Reference Martin-Jones and Trudgill1984; Rampton, Harris and Leung Reference Rampton, Harris, Leung and Britain2007). Over the past fifty or so years, language education has been a significant site of ideological struggle regarding England’s position in the world, whether this is principally associated with decolonisation or globalisation, and over the last twenty years, we have seen intensifications in the assertion of English nationalism in central government. To explore this, we will refer to the closely fought Brexit referendum and elaborate on three omissions noted in our last contribution (actually written in 2002): the aftermath of 9/11, increasingly hostile media commentary about asylum seekers, refugees and economic migrants, and the setting-up of an English language requirement for British Citizenship.Footnote 1
We start with the development of multicultural language education in the 1970s and 80s, highlighting four factors that contributed to this: activist pressure from minority communities, educational philosophies valuing the ‘whole child’, educational decision-making embedded in local democratic structures, and a legislative strategy that combined the promotion of good community relations with restrictive immigration policies (Section 26.2). This began to change in the 1990s, with the curriculum centralisation and the sidelining of local authorities initiated by the Thatcher government. Efforts to regulate massively increased population movement also made borders and immigration status more of a priority than multiculturalism, and after 2001, security, social cohesion and the suspicion of Muslims started to dominate public discourse (Section 26.3). In Section 26.4, we address the connections between these developments and six areas of language education policy: standard English, English as an additional language for school students, English for adult speakers of other languages, modern languages, and community languages in mainstream and supplementary schools. Finally, in Section 26.5, we reflect on the role of universities in these processes.Footnote 2
26.2 From the 1960s to the 1980s and Multicultural Language Education
As a general frame for understanding language education in England, Martin-Jones suggests that ‘[t]he relationship between English and many minority languages in Britain, new and old, is embedded in a long history of colonisation, with English as the language of rule … In the English-speaking world, linguistic and cultural diversity has long been perceived as a “problem”’ (1984:427). Nevertheless, she notes, ‘[i]n some schools and local authorities, there has been a perceptible shift away from the exclusive emphasis on the teaching of English as a second language to a broad acknowledgement of the linguistic and educational value of developing a child’s home or community language’ (1984:432; see for example, also Marland Reference Marland1987). Her evidence of this includes: over a dozen local authorities establishing bilingual teachers, inspectors and multicultural support teams and resource centres (Martin-Jones Reference Martin-Jones and Trudgill1984:432–3); ‘[a] survey of library authorities in Britain carried out in 1979 [which] indicated that most areas make some provision available for adult readers among linguistic minorities’ (1984:437); and a number of large research and research-and-development projects and centres supporting the development of bilingualism in England, actually funded by central government as well as the Council of Europe, the EEC and the European Commission (1984:433).
Although it falls outside Martin-Jones’s main focus, the teaching of English as a second language was also characterised by growing contextual awareness and cultural inclusiveness during this period. Starting out ‘in the 1960s [when it seemed that] our total experience of teaching English as a second language in this country was new’, Derrick describes new materials for children that built in the sensitivity of ‘the social-worker-cum-reception-class teacher, alert to children’s emotional and social needs in their new surroundings’ (Reference Derrick1977:16,18), and reflecting on developments in the mid 1970s, Levine and McLeod advocate ‘letting children have their own voice’, arguing that ‘the circumstances faced by the children of families of overseas origin and their teachers are the circumstances faced by the majority of children and teachers in urban schools – only writ large’ (Levine and McLeod Reference Levine, McLeod and Rosen1975:37; Derrick Reference Derrick1977:24). In adult language teaching, the National Centre for Industrial Language Training (est. 1974) realised early on that the attitudes of majority monolinguals can contribute as much to communication problems as the proficiency of second language speakers, and it extended its work in multiethnic workplaces beyond English teaching to intercultural training for managers and union representatives (Gumperz, Jupp and Roberts Reference Gumperz, Jupp and Roberts1979); and the National Association for Teaching English as a Second Language to Adults (NATESLA, est. 1978) changed its name to National Association of Teachers of English and Other Community Languages to Adults (NATECLA) in 1989, in recognition of the multilingual nature of British society.
These developments were (and still are) vulnerable to sharp critique, and according to Martin-Jones, ‘the overall picture of provision [for community languages] within the mainstream education system is discouraging’ (1984:436). Even so, these examples illustrate the effort in language education in the 1960s, 70s and 80s to be ‘hospitable to [the] diversity’ resulting from Commonwealth immigration (Levine, cited in Meek Reference Meek1996:53). Indeed, from the vantage point of 2020, when the Black Lives Matter movement points to the continuing significance of long histories of slavery as well as colonisation (Hill Reference Hill2020), this period of educational provision stands out for its multicultural openness, inevitably raising the question: how did it come about?
(a) Martin-Jones points towards one major influence when she notes ‘growing concern among parents from linguistic minorities about the teaching of their languages, and literacy in those languages, to their children’ (1984:427). Taking action into their own hands, ‘[t]he bulk of provision for the teaching of the new minority languages in Britain, including preparation for public examinations, is organised [in supplementary schools] outside the education system’ (1984:436). Indeed, the educational concerns of minority ethnic parents extended beyond heritage language support to inequality and racism in mainstream schooling much more generally. As noted by John La Rose, a key figure in the development of black supplementary schooling and the Black Parents Movement (Harris Reference Harris1991:58–59; Alleyne Reference Alleyne2002:51–57; Gerrard Reference Gerrard2013:42; Hall Reference Hall2017:120–1),
[t]he generation of immigrants who came as a labour force to help reconstruct the battered European economies after the 1939–1945 war, from the Caribbean, African and Asia, had all either witnessed or participated in bitter struggles against class and racial domination. This new labour force … which had chafed at and loosened the chains of racial domination, from slavery to colonialism, were not going to accept this domination willingly and without a struggle here on British soil. Their battles in British society are an important part of the historical record of the last three decades.
During this period, supplementary schools varied considerably in purpose, focus, resources, size and stages of development, differing (as they still do) in the manner and extent of their emphasis on political, religious, cultural and/or linguistic issues (Martin-Jones Reference Martin-Jones and Trudgill1984:436; Abdelrazak Reference Abdelrazak2001:5; Burman and Miles Reference Burman and Miles2020:6,15; Section 26.4.6).Footnote 3 The development of core knowledge and skills in maths and English often played a part, and
[f]or those frustrated with the lack of language support in schools, stark disproportionate numbers of black children in lowest ability-streams … and schooling curricula that reflected little of the black experience of Empire … BSSs [black supplementary schools] became a vehicle of powerful agency. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, parents, community members and university students established BSSs in whatever time and in whichever premises they had available to them – lounge rooms, community halls, church halls, community centres, weeknights, after school, weekends.
Martin-Jones cites Polish and Gujarati schools with 200–300 students, and some were supported by embassies and high commissions (1984:436–7). But elsewhere, prevented from renting school buildings ‘on the grounds that we were teaching the children “black power”’ (Harris Reference Harris1991:58), classes took place in front-rooms at home. In fact, the more widely focused political activism with which these schools were often associated, also addressing racist violence, policing, the criminal justice system, employment and so forth, had an impact that extended well beyond the supplementary schools themselves. So for example in 1971, New Beacon Books (set up by La Rose in the 1960s) published How the West Indian Child Is Made Educationally Subnormal by Bernard Coard. Written for black parents rather than teachers or the education or political authorities, and with publishing costs covered by community groups (Coard Reference Coard2005), this ‘provided documentary proof of the oversubscription of black children in “Educationally Subnormal” (ESN) schools, and connected this to the cultural biases in IQ testing and racist presumptions of ignorance and incapability rife within British schools’ (Gerrard Reference Gerrard2013:33). Coard’s pamphlet gained very widespread publicity (Coard Reference Coard2005), and according to Carby, ‘many white, liberal teachers were shocked by the results of Coard’s research and the early seventies saw a rapid increase in the production of research projects, reports, policy documents and teaching materials focusing on the black child’ (Reference Carby1982:196; Coard Reference Coard2005).
Beyond the action of parents and minority ethnic communities, at least three other factors played a role in the emergence of multiculturalism during this period.
(b) The challenges to assumptions about the deficiency of immigrant children sketched in (a) chimed with growing commitment to child-centred pedagogy in mainstream schooling more generally (Bernstein Reference Bernstein1996; Rampton et al. Reference Rampton, Harris, Leung and Britain2007:431). Addressing English language and literacy across the education system, the Bullock Report (DES 1975) was one very influential expression of this, and among other things, it proposed that ‘[n]o child should be expected to cast off the language and culture of the home as he crosses the school threshold and the curriculum should reflect those aspects of his life’ (DES 1975:20.5, 20.17).
(c) Power in education was distributed very differently from how it is today. Central government delegated control over spending to Local Education Authorities (LEAs) and it had no direct powers over the curriculum. Curriculum decision-making lay in the hands of teachers and individual schools, who were usually provided with strong LEA guidance (DES 1985:221, 334). LEA services came under the auspices of local government – the metropolitan, county and borough councils – and accountability to the local electorate encouraged dialogue about education with the representatives of ethnic minorities in areas where they constituted a significant proportion of the local vote. Political arrangements like these made education policy development a matter of persuasion and dispute, and spurred on by the urban riots of 1981, one of the central objectives of the Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups (DES 1985) was to generate a consensual view of ethnic pluralism with which central and local government, teaching unions and minority communities could all concur.
(d) Last, over this period the tensions between racial hostility and liberal pluralism were managed in a ‘bifurcated’ legislative strategy that involved ‘tough external immigration controls coupled with an internal regime made up of citizenship rights, race relations legislation, and pluralistic accommodations for minorities’ (Ashcroft and Bevir Reference Ashcroft, Bevir, Ashcroft and Bevir2019:38). Along with a lot of the British public, many post-war political leaders had racist reservations about black and brown immigration, but their overt expression of these was inhibited by, for example, the ringing endorsement of democracy and human rights for all in the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Ashcroft and Bevir Reference Ashcroft, Bevir, Ashcroft and Bevir2019:28; Olusoga Reference Olusoga2019). So during the 1960s and 70s, anti-immigrant and anti-racist discourses were held in balance by (i) a series of immigration acts designed to limit the number of people from New Commonwealth coming into the UK alongside (ii) the Race Relations Acts that outlawed incitement to racial hatred and discrimination in housing, employment and public places and that set up a Commission for Racial Equality as well as local Councils for Community Relations and Racial Equality (Ashcroft and Bevir Reference Ashcroft, Bevir, Ashcroft and Bevir2019:30).
As well as the disputes and complexities within each, the relationship between these four elements – community activism, child-centred philosophies of education, devolved authority in educational decision-making, and liberal race relations legislation balanced against hardening borders – were far from straightforward. So, for example, the Black Parents Movement took a stand against the ‘Community Relations industry’, seeing it as ‘a kind of colonial office for the black community in this country, which seeks to undermine the independent organisational activity of the black population in dealing with its own struggles’ (Race Today, October 1978 p. 197). Without an examination of power relations and their own positionality, multicultural teachers could function like the ‘missionaries’, and Derrick’s ‘social-worker-cum-reception-class teacher’ could be seen as an extension of state control into minority homes, backed by theories about the pathology of immigrant families (Carby Reference Carby1982:199). In language education, colonial images of the Indian babu could be seen at work in influential theories suggesting that for young people with Asian backgrounds, the need for ESL teaching ‘is likely to continue for several generations, not only for pupils on entry to school, but in many cases throughout their schooling’ (Taylor and Hegarty Reference Taylor and Hegarty1985:279–80; Rampton Reference Rampton1988:512–5). And the incorporation of Creole into the English curriculum could be read as a limiting strategy of containment (DES 1981:25; Rampton Reference Rampton1983:24). To establish the validity of these concerns (and accusations), it would take a lot of nuanced case-by-case discussion involving different stakeholders (see for example, La Rose Reference La Rose2014:43). But the larger point is that there was vigorous ongoing dialogue around multicultural education, as well as shifts of position (such as, for example, NAME changing its name in 1984 from National Association for Multiracial Education to National Antiracist Movement in Education).
During the period in focus there was, however, also another current of opinion which was critical of the whole field, arguing for traditional standards and challenging egalitarianism both in education in general and in language in particular (e.g. Cox and Dyson Reference Cox and Dyson1969; Honey Reference Honey1983). This chimed with the politics of Margaret Thatcher, who was elected as Prime Minister in 1979. The multicultural and anti-racist trajectory that we have described obviously did not abruptly terminate with the advent of Thatcher’s Conservative government (Ashcroft and Bevir Reference Ashcroft, Bevir, Ashcroft and Bevir2019:33–4),Footnote 4 but over time, the Conservative Party refashioned the structures and content of education, and global events radically altered the tenor of debate, fundamentally changing the central directions of travel in language education in England.
Our analysis of these developments is presented in two stages, the first focusing on policies and global processes and events, and the second on their impact on language education.
26.3 Policy and Global Developments from the 1990s Onwards
In 1988, the Conservative government brought in the Education Reform Act (ERA), initiating a combination of free-market structures and curriculum centralisation that effectively closed down the pedagogic commitments sketched in (b) above, and the local arenas for debate in (c) (see Rampton et al. Reference Rampton, Harris, Leung and Britain2007:422–3).
The ‘local management of schools’– ‘LMS’ – was one of the cornerstones of the new policy, and it paved the way for a major shift of power away from LEAs to individual schools, with the result that by the year 2000, 82 per cent of the money spent on schools was controlled by head teachers and school governors, compared with around 5 per cent in 1990 (Audit Commission 2000). At the same time, responsibility for the design and specification of the curriculum for five- to sixteen-year-olds was centralised. Individual teachers and schools were no longer the principal curriculum decision-makers, and the local processes of persuasion and debate were replaced by central government legislation. A series of national working parties were set up for the ‘core’ curriculum areas of English, Maths and Science, as well as for a range of other subjects, and by the mid 1990s, a legally binding National Curriculum for 80 per cent or more of the school day had been established, together with a system of national tests for seven-, eleven- and fourteen-year-olds. These tests meant that the performance of children at different schools could be compared, and their publication in league tables was initiated and justified on the grounds that this was essential ‘consumer information’ for another new element in education policy, ‘parental choice’. Prior to the 1988 ERA, children in the public education system had been allocated to a particular school by their LEA, but parental choice now gave parents the right to choose which school their child went to, with state funding following the child. Similar structural changes were applied to the provision for adults: in 1992–93, further education and sixth form colleges were ‘incorporated’, removed from local council control, reclassified as ‘private sector’ institutions, and required to compete with each other for students (Cooke and Simpson Reference Cooke and Simpson2008:11; Staufenberg Reference Staufenberg2020). As sketched in our 2007 chapter, the 1997–2010 New Labour government continued the direction of these policies, and it further diminished the role of local authorities by introducing an academies programme which allowed state schools to be taken over by private organisations without losing central government funding, a policy that subsequent Coalition and Conservative governments intensified (Roberts and Danechi Reference Roberts and Danechi2019). Admittedly, unlike the maintained institutions (which now represent the majority of primary but not secondary schools),Footnote 5 academies and free schools no longer need to follow the National Curriculum, but this has not led to a wide resurgence in child-centred pedagogies and curricula, or to a reinvigorated multiculturalism. Academies and free schools are still monitored by the centralised inspection regime set up in 1992 (Ofsted), and in, for example, the current inspection framework, the brief mention of an ‘understanding and appreciation of diversity’ is flanked on both sides by references to ‘respectful, active citizens’, ‘fundamental British values’, and ‘what we have in common’ (Ofsted 2019:para. 28).
As we will show in the next section, these educational policy developments redrew the terms and parameters of provision and debate in language education. But they were also very substantially affected by globalisation and the migration associated with, among other things, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ‘Eastern Bloc’ in 1989–91 and freedom of movement across the European Union from 2004, as well as by processes connected to 9/11 and the ‘War on Terror’.
Between 1993 and 2015 the UK population born outside the country more than doubled from 3.8 million to 8.7 million (Simpson Reference Simpson, Cooke and Peutrell2019:25). This amounted to the ‘diversification of diversity’ that Vertovec has called ‘superdiversity’, involving
a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything … previously experienced … a dynamic interplay of variables including country of origin … migration channel … legal status … migrants’ human capital (particularly educational background), access to employment …locality … and responses by local authorities, services providers and local residents.
The plurality of countries of origin is one dimension of this: in the early 2000s, there were individuals from 179 countries in London, with groups of over 10,000 people from 42 of these (Vertovec Reference Vertovec2007:1029). But the multiplicity of their legal positions and migration statuses is another crucial feature, covering, inter alia, people moving freely within the EU, highly skilled workers in finance, special visa holders such as domestic workers, workers coming for seasonal agriculture on special schemes, students, spouses and dependants joining their families, refugees, asylum seekers and people without official documents. This multiplicity is intimately related to government efforts to define and regulate mobility in the neoliberal global economy (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy Reference Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy2019:13), and according to senior judges, these efforts have generated ‘an impenetrable jungle of intertwined statutory provision and judicial decisions’.Footnote 6 This has massively complicated the process of determining someone’s status, working out not only whether or not they are entitled to be in the UK but also what they are or aren’t allowed to do when they are actually here. Indeed, this constitutes (one part of) a major shift away from the ‘bifurcating’ legislative strategy of the 1960–70s that we described in (d), in which tough external immigration controls were coupled with an internal regime promoting citizenship rights and community relations (Ashcroft and Bevir Reference Ashcroft, Bevir, Ashcroft and Bevir2019): today, ‘[i]nstead of being found at the edge, separating and connecting one state to another, borders have now spread so as to be everywhere’ (Yuval-Davis et al. Reference Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy2019:17).
Far from promoting citizenship rights and community relations, this pervasive internal re-bordering has also been accompanied by government-wide policies promoting a ‘hostile environment’ for people who have ‘no right to be here’, an approach initiated in 2007 and very substantially intensified in 2012 (Liberty 2019). This has been orchestrated, among other things, in a series of immigration acts that threaten heavy fines and criminal sanctions for any person or organisation (landlords, teachers, doctors, etc.; banks, hospitals, universities and so forth) that provides work, facilities or services for migrants without the legal right to them (Liberty 2019:103). As a result, ‘[i]n different and new contexts, citizens are required to become untrained and unpaid border guards’, ‘more of us are falling under suspicion as illegitimate border crossers’, and, in Yuval-Davis et al.’s overall assessment, ‘everyday bordering has come to replace multiculturalism as the hegemonic governance technology for controlling diversity’ (Reference Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy2019:17; also Liberty 2019).
The 9/11 and 7/7 attacks in New York and London in 2001 and 2005, ‘the War on Terror’ and the growth of Islamist Jihad were a third element contributing to the change in political climate. Linked to these geopolitical events and developments, ‘security’ and ‘social cohesion’ became central concerns in political discourse, British Muslims have been abnormalised as a suspect community of potential ‘enemies within’, and a comprehensive counterterrorist programme, CONTEST, has been initiated. This includes an ideological strand, Prevent, which aims to safeguard against people ‘being drawn into terrorism and to ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support’, working ‘with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation’ (HMG 2015:5). The institutions identified for partnership include local authorities, all levels of education, health services, prisons and the police (HMG 2015), and there is Prevent Awareness Training for many of their staff. In short, securitisation now complements the hostile environment for unlawful immigrants as another officially sanctioned discourse that promotes suspicion and surveillance of ethnic difference in everyday life and public institutions.
These developments are certainly not uncontested. The opening ceremony of the 2012 London Olympics and the success of Team GB fronted by mixed-race Jessica Ennis and Somalia-born Mo Farah were widely recognised and celebrated as an assertion of British multiculturalism (Meer and Modood Reference Meer, Modood, Ashcroft and Bevir2019:47). In another vein, the trade union for Further Education and Higher Education emphatically stated that ‘the Prevent agenda will force our members to spy on learners, is discriminatory towards Muslims, and legitimises Islamophobia and xenophobia, encouraging racist views to be publicised and normalised in society’ (UCU 2015:4; Khan Reference Khan, Arnaut, Karrebæk, Spotti and Blommaert2017). Indeed, the outcome of the 2016 Brexit Referendum, in which the UK voted by 52 per cent to 48 per cent to leave the EU, is perhaps the strongest indication of the depth of the divisions around these issues, as well as their geopolitical consequentiality. In terms of front-page coverage, immigration was the most prominent campaign issue in the run-up to the vote (Moore and Ramsay Reference Moore and Ramsay2017), and according to an exit poll of 12,000 people, ‘[b]y large majorities, voters who saw multiculturalism, feminism, the Green movement, globalisation and immigration as forces for good voted to remain in the EU; those who saw them as a force for ill voted by even larger majorities to leave’.Footnote 7 The distribution of votes was also significant: the proportion of remain-voters was much greater in Scotland and IrelandFootnote 8 and in major cities and university towns,Footnote 9 as well as among younger age groups,Footnote 10 and people with ethnic minority backgrounds.Footnote 11 If Dorling and Tomlinson are right that the EU Referendum reveals ‘the last vestiges of empire working their way out of the British psyche’ (Reference Dorling and Tomlinson2019:3), the result suggests that the process is still incomplete, although there are also glimmers of a post-imperial horizon in the voting splits.
But how far and in what ways have all these developments found expression in language education?
26.4 Language Education from the 1990s
26.4.1 Standard English in the National Curriculum
The ties between language, identity and home culture were stressed in a good deal of educational thought in the 1960s–80s, and ‘mother tongue’ was a key term.Footnote 12 But more or less in synchrony with the development of a national curriculum, mother tongue was replaced by standard English as the central concern, and over time, grammar, text and discourse came to be seen as the dimensions of linguistic knowledge most relevant for teachers, downgrading educational interest in pupil voice, sociolinguistic variability and the contextual links between language, culture and social identity. Standard English fitted a range of ideological commitments – national heritage, getting ‘back to basics’, meritocratic individualism and the needs of industry – and when seen as a well-defined code that can be broken down into parts and imparted to everyone in the mainstream curriculum, it complemented the turn towards what Bernstein (Reference Bernstein1996) calls ‘performance’ models in education, putting the emphasis on product rather than process, on carefully graded inputs from the teacher, on the specific texts and skills the learner was expected to acquire and produce, and on the extent to which the learner matched these in assessment (Cox Reference Cox1991; Rampton et al. Reference Rampton, Harris, Leung and Britain2007:430–3).
26.4.2 EAL in a Restructured Schooling System
The teaching of English as an additional language at school (EAL) was profoundly affected by the marketisation of the education system. With the local management of schools, the responsibility for spending on pupils who needed EAL support was shifted from LEAs to schools, and in most LEAs specialist English language support teams were disbanded. Rather than being able to call on an LEA service that was provided free of charge, schools had to plan for EAL support in their own budgets, and as EAL provision wasn’t mandatory and there were many competing financial priorities, there were inevitable pressures on schools to reduce EAL expenditure. In addition, in so far as they could adversely affect a school’s position in competitive league tables influencing parental choice and thence income, pupils with limited English could be seen as threats to a school’s performance profile. At the same time, there was no engagement with the needs of migrant children new to English in the National Curriculum, and instead, the official approach since the late 1980s has been ‘mainstreaming’, placing these children in age-appropriate mainstream classes, keeping to a minimum the provision of separate induction programmes and transitional classes for early-stage learners of English. Within this de facto immersion policy, there has been no specification of teaching content or learning outcomes for EAL (see DfE 2014:para. 4.6), and by extension, no need for any specialist qualification in initial teacher education. Unsurprisingly, this laissez-faire approach has led to a variety of responses, with schools and teachers doing what they can with the resources at their disposal. So while, for example, the home languages of pupils are often used to make them feel welcome, there is little consensus on their use in the subject classroom (Arnot et al. Reference Arnot, Schneider, Evans, Liu, Welply and Davies-Tutt2014; https://naldic.org.uk/about-naldic/get-involved/eal-bilingual/).
Migration itself now means that at publicly funded schools, more than 21 per cent of primary students (more than 1 million) and c. 17 per cent of secondary (approx. 562,000) are reported as having English as an additional language, with the overall EAL school population increasing by c. 1 per cent a year over the past decade (DfE 2019b). EAL students are widely dispersed across England, but they are more concentrated in urban areas,Footnote 13 and the proportion of students assessed as having lower proficiency is higher in areas of highest socio-economic deprivation (DfE 2020:3).
26.4.3 Teaching English to Adults
During the 1990s, classes of English for speakers of languages other than English (ESOL) changed in composition, with superdiversity increasing the number of refugees and asylum seekers and the range of locations diversifying, extending beyond cities to smaller town and rural areas (NIACE 2006:2.7; Baynham et al. Reference Baynham, Roberts, Cooke, Simpson, Ananiadou, Callaghan, McGoldrick and Wallace2007). But the policy and global developments sketched in Section 26.3 started to impact most forcefully on adult ESOL at the start of the millennium. In 1999, a major review of literacy and numeracy in the adult population called for a national strategy for basic skills, but left out learners of English (Moser Report, DfEE 1999; Simpson Reference Simpson, Cooke and Peutrell2019:27). Following lobbying, ESOL teaching was included, and it subsequently received a very large funding injection from central government. This produced a statutory Adult ESOL Core Curriculum (tuned to the National Curriculum for schools as well as other frameworks; DfES 2001), a new suite of assessment instruments, new teacher qualifications and a national research centreFootnote 14 (Rosenberg Reference Rosenberg2007:225; Cooke and Simpson Reference Cooke and Simpson2008:7). ESOL for adults received, in short, something of an overhaul.
At roughly the same time, ‘citizenship’ was becoming a much more salient concept in public discourse. From the 1960s–80s, citizenship was little more than a statutory category in the immigration laws of the period (Cooke and Peutrell Reference Cooke and Peutrell2019:4–5), but in 1997 the New Labour government pledged to strengthen education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy, set up an Advisory Group on Citizenship (Crick, DfEE 1998), and subsequently introduced citizenship education as a statutory subject in the National Curriculum for English schools in 2002.Footnote 15 These developments initially sought to promote a political and participatory approach to citizenship, separated from questions of nationality and immigration (Cooke and Peutrell Reference Cooke and Peutrell2019:8; Meer and Modood Reference Meer, Modood, Ashcroft and Bevir2019:52; Ashcroft and Bevir Reference Ashcroft, Bevir, Ashcroft and Bevir2019:34–5), but this changed after 9/11 and the 2001 riots in three northern cities involving (mainly Muslim) British Asians, far-right extremists and the police. Instead, ‘community cohesion’ became a dominant concern in public discourse, and leading politicians started to attribute riots and the risk of terrorism to inadequate English within British Asian families (Blackledge Reference Blackledge2005; Cooke and Simpson Reference Cooke, Simpson, Martin-Jones, Blackledge and Creese2012:125; Khan Reference Khan, Arnaut, Karrebæk, Spotti and Blommaert2017). The following year, the Home Office White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven (Home Office 2002) stipulated that immigrants and would-be citizens should have a knowledge of English, and that this should be secured either through ESOL with citizenship classes or through a new test, Life in the UK, focusing on the English language and British culture (Home Office 2002). In this way, rather than simply seeking to support adult participation in British society as before, the agenda of adult ESOL was extended to security and bordering much more explicitly than in any other area of language education.
Detailed accounts of subsequent developments in ESOL’s relationship with discourses of social cohesion, securitisation and citizenship can be found elsewhere (for example, Cooke and Simpson Reference Cooke and Simpson2008, Reference Cooke, Simpson, Martin-Jones, Blackledge and Creese2012; Cooke and Peutrell Reference Cooke and Peutrell2019: Part I; Khan Reference Khan, Arnaut, Karrebæk, Spotti and Blommaert2017; Leung and Lewkowicz Reference Leung, Lewkowicz, Ari Huhta, Erickson and Figueras2019). There was a substantial cut in funding for ESOL in 2007 (NIACE 2006), followed by a c. 60 per cent reduction in central government support from 2009/10 to 2016/17 (Foster and Bolton Reference Foster and Bolton2018),Footnote 16 and there is now quite complex variation in whether and how much students now need to pay for ESOL classes (DfE 2019a:33, 82). The demand for classes outstrips provision,Footnote 17 which takes place in three types of setting. Further Education colleges tend to run courses tied to the formal certification frameworks developed in the Adult ESOL Core Curriculum. These are audited and held accountable to their central government funders, giving rise to the concerns about inflexibility and bureaucratisation that also trouble teachers in the school sector (Cooke and Simpson Reference Cooke and Simpson2008:38–9; Cooke and Peutrell Reference Cooke and Peutrell2019:8; DfE 2019a:38). There is also a good deal of provision in non-governmental, non-profit ‘third-sector’ organisations, funded from a wide range of sources, including charities. Classes here tend to be non-accredited, more informal and more flexibly focused on people in the early stages of learning English, and the technological resources supporting them are generally more limited (DfE 2019a:8, 9, 38). Third, there are classes provided by local authorities, and according to DfE (2019a), these tend towards a mix of formal and informal, accredited and non-accredited, sometimes also using local community venues.
Overall, then, contemporary adult ESOL is only partly regulated by a national curriculum, but its ideological association with integration, borders and security makes it a salient public and political issue. So although it is certainly not well resourced (Simpson Reference Simpson, Cooke and Peutrell2019:28), ESOL can draw on additional government funding beyond the main adult education budget (for example, the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme; the Controlling Migration Fund), and a long tradition of volunteer teaching also increases its value as a low-cost investment, flexibly reaching into a plurality of community settings (MHCLG 2013; Gooch and Stevenson Reference Gooch and Stevenson2020). Many ESOL practitioners oppose this ideological framing, but as a result, it is much better resourced by government than community languages, to which in fact it is sometimes explicitly counterposed: ‘We plan … a sharp reduction in translation services and a significant increase in the funding available for English’ (Theresa May, Home Secretary 23 March 2015; Casey Reference Casey2016:173).Footnote 18
Indeed, it is to languages other than English that we should now turn.
26.4.4 Modern Languages in Mainstream Schools
According to Hawkins (Reference Hawkins1981:ix), ‘language teachers in the 1960s could look forward hopefully to the opportunities offered by Britain’s entry into the European Community’, and ‘by the late 1970s, some 85% of pupils in comprehensive schools were starting a modern language’ like French, German or Spanish (Hawkins Reference Hawkins1981). In the National Curriculum between 1992 and 2004, the majority of pupils were entered for a school leaving exam in another language (Hagger-Vaughan Reference Hagger-Vaughan2016:363), and languages are currently a mandatory part of the National Curriculum for children from ages seven to fourteen, being optional in the last two years of schooling (Hagger-Vaughan Reference Hagger-Vaughan2016:361; Long, Danechi and Loft Reference Long, Danechi and Loft2020). And yet the word ‘crisis’ has been applied repeatedly throughout this period to the learning of languages in education (for example, Hawkins Reference Hawkins1981:19; Coffey Reference Coffey2018:462).
Comparisons with Europe are invariably unfavourable, in terms of both achievement and recruitment – ‘only 1% of foreign language students in England [are] able to follow complex speech … compared with a Europe average of 30%’ (Long et al. Reference Long, Danechi and Loft2020:12); ‘only 5% of [UK] students study … two or more languages, compared to the EU average of 51% … and [England has] the highest percentage of students in upper secondary education (57%) who do not learn a language at all’ (Hagger-Vaughan Reference Hagger-Vaughan2016:360).Footnote 19 Discussing whether this crisis is a symptom of widespread Europhobia (of a kind that produced Brexit), Lanvers, Doughty and Thompson also suggest that ‘systemic and policy issues, rather than learner characteristics pertaining to attitudes or ability, could explain the United Kingdom’s language learning lag’: ‘few teaching hours, compared to EU averages; low syllabus demands; and exam-focused systems’ (Lanvers, Doughty and Thompson Reference Lanvers, Doughty and Thompson2018:776). Another potential factor generating nationally low levels of engagement is the long-established equation of modern language learning with ‘an elite of “academic” pupils’ (Hawkins Reference Hawkins1981:ix; Hagger-Vaughan Reference Hagger-Vaughan2016:363; Coffey Reference Coffey2018:463), a pattern that has continued:
[o]nly 20% of state schools make a language compulsory for all pupils aged 14–16; in the (fee-paying) independent sector, the figure is 74%. Within the state sector, the uptake of MFL [modern foreign languages] strongly relates to indicators of levels of social deprivation of a school’s intake: schools with high percentages of students entitled to free school meals (an indicator of degree of social deprivation of a school’s cohort) have low participation rates on MFL study beyond the compulsory phase.
Despite almost near-universal recognition that ‘languages are essential for employability, trade, business and the economy, security, diplomacy and soft power, research, social understanding and cohesion’ (British Academy 2019b:1), ‘the notion of languages as “academic”’ rather than vocational subjects was consolidated in ‘the removal of languages from the compulsory subjects to be studied [by 14–16 year olds] in 2002’ (Hagger-Vaughan Reference Hagger-Vaughan2016:362).
26.4.5 Community Languages in Mainstream Schools
The view of modern languages as an elite academic subject overlooks the fact that an estimated ‘15% of pupils in state-funded secondary and 19.4% in state-funded primaries in England speak a first language other than English’ (British Academy 2019b:2). Indeed, perhaps somewhat ironically, the fall in the number of students graduating with foreign-language degrees has given the multilingualism of the UK’s ethnic minority population extra strategic significance for the British security and intelligence services. Both GCHQ and the British Army have made concerted efforts to recruit more Muslims, not just because of their diversity targets, but also for their linguistic skills (British Academy 2013; Khan Reference Khan, Arnaut, Karrebæk, Spotti and Blommaert2017), even though the task is complicated by their portrayal as a ‘suspect community’, subjected to high levels of surveillance, scrutiny and distrust (Section 26.3).
In fact, in 1985, the teaching of minority ethnic languages within the mainstream modern language curriculum at school was recommended in the Swann Report, as long as the classes were open to all students, not just to heritage speakers (DES 1985:406–10) (see also Sharma, this volume). Consistent with this, there was work in the 1980s on pedagogies and curricula capable of addressing students who were new to a language alongside those who used it at home (Broadbent Reference Broadbent and Reid1984; Marland Reference Marland1987), and even though their position is precarious due to low uptake and only very modest support from secondary schools (British Council 2019:11,4), GCSE and A Level assessment are still available in around fifteen languages.Footnote 20 In fact, at the peak of the scheme, there were twenty-five languagesFootnote 21 covered by the ‘Asset Languages’ assessment framework developed with support from the 1997–2010 New Labour government by Oxford, Cambridge and RSA Examinations (OCR) (Steer Reference Steer2015). This flexible scheme was suitable for primary, secondary and adult learners and it gave recognition to language skills running from ‘beginner level to a standard which sits alongside GCSE, A Level and NVQs’ (Steer Reference Steer2015). Eventually, though, it closed ‘after a survey of the dwindling customer base’ in 2012, in which respondents ‘consistently said that the nail in the coffin was the withdrawal of almost any route to the funding of community languages and the new (Conservative/Liberal Coalition) government’s decision that Asset Languages would not count towards school performance tables because they were “smaller” than a GCSE’ (Steer Reference Steer2015).
26.4.6 Community Languages in Supplementary Schools
The uptake of any formal assessment scheme depends in large part on the provision of language classes, underpinned by a steady supply of teachers, and the 1985 Swann Report also recommended that LEAs ‘should offer support for community-based language provision’ (DES 1985:772). The reduction in the budgets and influence of LEAs obviously undermined this (Burman and Miles Reference Burman and Miles2020:7, 17), but in the late 1990s, the Resource Unit for Supplementary and Mother-Tongue Schools was set up with significant funding from government and the National Lottery Board, seeking to ‘contribute to the performance enhancement of these schools’, also operating as an advocate and link between community projects and mainstream bodies such as the DfES, LEAs and schools, targeting, inter alia, the ‘obvious mismatch between rhetoric that celebrates multiculturalism and multilingualism and the resources and action made available’ (Abdelrazak Reference Abdelrazak2001:x–xi). The Resource Unit became the National Resource Centre for Supplementary Education (NRCSE) in 2006, and it established a Certificate in Teaching in the Supplementary Education Sector that was taken by over 1,300 people between 2013 and 2020, as well as an NRCSE Quality Mark, with around 500 organisations completing basic safeguarding standards and 180 moving on to a higher award.Footnote 22
But it would be a mistake to overestimate the mainstream institutionalisation of these schools, estimated to be between 3,000 and 5,000 in number (Evans and Gillan-Thomas Reference Evans and Gillan-Thomas2015:8). According to Burman and Miles, less than 1 per cent of the 200 supplementary schools in Brent have achieved an NRCSE quality award (Reference Burman and Miles2020:7), and the British Academy laments the
disconnect between mainstream education and community-based language learning. The language-learning that goes on in thousands of complementary (or supplementary) schools in the UK has little public visibility. It is scarcely ever connected up with the learning done by the same children in mainstream schools.
Some supplementary schools continue to receive funding from high commissions and non-UK governments, and there is still some local authority support,Footnote 23 even though local government spending power fell by c. 30 per cent between 2010/11 and 2017/18 (including a c. 50 per cent reduction in central government funding).Footnote 24 Indeed, a few have taken advantage of the free schools programme to become full-time government-funded free schools (Burman and Miles Reference Burman and Miles2020:11). But many depend on volunteer teaching, working with piecemeal funding, temporary teaching spaces and insufficient storage facilities (Burman and Miles Reference Burman and Miles2020:7), maybe also preferring their independence to the regulations and accountabilities associated with many funding sources, seeing the strings attached as potentially ‘militating against the dynamic impact and influence of supplementary schools in … urban communities’ (Harris Reference Harris1996; Mirza and Reay Reference Mirza and Reay2000; Burman and Miles Reference Burman and Miles2020:7; Gerrard Reference Gerrard2013:49–50). Prejudice about supplementary school teaching being outmoded and/or inexpert may be awkward to deal with (Burman and Miles Reference Burman and Miles2020:7–8; contrast Kenner and Ruby Reference Kenner and Ruby2012), and as in the experience of black supplementary schools from the 1960s and 70s (Gerrard Reference Gerrard2013:47), there is also often the challenge of security surveillance, with a counter-extremism unit focused on supplementary schools in central government’s Department for Education, as well as Prevent staff posted in local authorities by the Home Office (Tolley Reference Tolley2015; Burman and Miles Reference Burman and Miles2020:18).Footnote 25
26.4.7 Summary with Caveats
If ‘monolingualism is the illiteracy of the 21st Century’ (British Academy 2019a:3) and linguistic diversity is potentially an asset, then we can perhaps summarise this fifty-year trajectory of language education in England as one step forward, three steps back – a shift towards multilingualism in the 1970s and 80s, succeeded by increasingly top-down regulation and performance management in assimilationist language policies focused on standard English and social cohesion; a neglect and devaluation of the linguistic capital of home-grown multilinguals (leaving this capital to be concentrated among elites); and open suspicion of difference.Footnote 26
Admittedly, our one-step-forward, three-steps-back encapsulation overlooks local communities and their continuing commitment to education in other languages, as well as some initiatives supporting them like the Asset Languages scheme and the NRCSE, both set up during the New Labour government. Indeed, more generally, our discussion of developments in the six areas covered in this section has been cursory, for the most part passing over the complex of opportunities and constraints, pros and cons, associated with each one. In this way, we have neglected the scope for turning any area of language policy in heterodox directions, as well as the potentially counter-hegemonic reworking that can happen in everyday classroom practice, an ever-present potential intrinsic to the process of policy enactment (Ball, Maguire and Braun Reference Ball, Maguire and Braun2012). So in the last section, we address a few of the missing complications and nuances by discussing the part that university research has played in these processes, in no way suggesting that universities have been the sole or primary source of counter-currents, but recognising that their role can still be significant.
26.5 The Contribution from Universities
Universities have of course also been affected by marketisation, bordering and securitisation, often giving their support to government policy (Section 26.3; UCU 2015; Rampton et al. Reference Rampton, Charalambous, Mangual Figueroa, Zakharia, Levon and Jones2019:45). Indeed, academic linguists played a significant part in, for example, the turn to standard English in the schools National Curriculum and in the development of the Adult ESOL Core Curriculum (Section 26.4.1 and Rampton et al. Reference Rampton, Harris, Leung and Britain2007:432; Section 26.4.3), making contributions which some have later come to regret, at least in part (Cox Reference Cox1992; Cooke and Simpson Reference Cooke and Simpson2008:7–8). On the other hand, academics and universities have, overwhelmingly, been opposed to Brexit, and researchers have produced a good deal of critical work on issues like language and citizenship policy (Blackledge Reference Blackledge2005; Khan Reference Khan, Arnaut, Karrebæk, Spotti and Blommaert2017; Cooke and Peutrell Reference Cooke and Peutrell2019).
Looking back to our discussion of the influence of university research in the second edition of this book (Rampton et al. Reference Rampton, Harris, Leung and Britain2007:435 [2002:16]), we highlighted a number of weaknesses and oversights that limited the counter-hegemonic potential of work in linguistics, but since then, at least three of these have been addressed.
First, in the 1980s and 90s, there was a strong current of essentialism in linguistic research, characterised by the assumption that a person’s ethnolinguistic identity was fixed in place during their early years at home and in their local community, and that this home-based ethnicity was likely to be the most important aspect of their identity. This provided very little purchase on the cultural and demographic dynamics of globalisation – flows and mixing, diaspora and deterritorialisation – and it legitimated the policy of Welsh being promoted by the Welsh state, English by the English state, and minority languages being largely left to the minority communities. Since then, there has been a surge of work on language and superdiversity (for example, Blommaert and Rampton Reference Blommaert and Rampton2011; Arnaut et al. Reference Arnaut, Blommaert, Rampton and Spotti2015), on heteroglossia (for example, Blackledge and Creese Reference Blackledge and Creese2014) and on translanguaging (for example, Garcia and Wei Reference Garcia and Wei2014). This work treats named languages as ideological constructs rather than natural entities, and it sees languages like ‘English’, ‘German’ or ‘Bengali’ as shallow and restrictive representations of how people actually communicate. Instead it emphasises ‘repertoire’ as a concept that captures much better the ways in which the particularities of our biographies and situations give shape to our use and identification with a range of linguistic resources, a range that includes bits of nameable languages, styles, genres and a lot of other ways of speaking (Blommaert and Backus Reference Blommaert and Backus2011). This repertoire perspective breaks the link between language and nation, and invites us to explore, for example, ‘the … marked difference between, on the one hand, seeing ESOL students as non-citizen outsiders, who we assist to acquire the language and cultural norms of their adopted homeland, and on the other, as diasporic locals, with their own linguistic, cultural, social, affective and other resources, whose very presence reshapes the locality they live in’ (Peutrell and Cooke Reference Peutrell, Cooke, Cooke and Peutrell2019:229).
Second, since the turn of the millennium, there has been significantly more empirical work on community-run supplementary schools (also often referred to as ‘complementary’ schools). Again, heteroglossia and translanguaging figure prominently, showing that ‘children of immigrant and ethnic minority backgrounds do not, as it is often assumed, view their languages as being tied to any one particular culture or ethnicity’ but instead ‘use their multilingual resources strategically to identify with several overlapping cultures including classroom, school, family, heritage and popular youth cultures’ (Wei 2006:80–1). This fracturing and destabilisation of hitherto monolithic images of language and ethnicity creates two openings. First, a ‘named’ language like Spanish or Urdu no longer looms so formidably as an almost impenetrable edifice with only two means of access, either birth and early childhood socialisation already inside, or the long (and tediously) regimented path of the textbook and schoolroom. Instead, this account of what Creese and Blackledge (Reference Creese and Blackledge2010) call flexible bilingualism underscores the diversity of entry points, and further undermines the association of modern language learning with academic elites (Sections 26.4.4 and 26.4.5). Second, there is a challenge to the influential official claim that ‘bilingual education and mother tongue maintenance can only be relevant to mother tongue speakers of languages other than English i.e. to pupils from certain ethnic minority groups’ (DES 1985:406–7). With this pluralisation, multiethnic participation in community language learning moves into view, either in mainstream classes or in supplementary schools in ‘settled, hybrid communities’ (Burman and Miles Reference Burman and Miles2020:8; Rampton Reference Rampton1988; Li Reference Li2006:80).
Third, the need we identified for more research on ‘the new multiethnic vernaculars’ has also been addressed, both in the UK and in Europe. This work has now shown, inter alia, that local urban dialects of English influenced by immigrant languages have been an established feature of the UK linguascape for the last fifty years (for example, Rampton Reference Rampton2011; Sharma Reference Sharma2011). In addition, several of these studies have given serious consideration to the role that social class positioning has played in the formation of these vernaculars, thereby contradicting the ideological erasure of class in the language education policies from the late 1980s on (Rampton et al. Reference Rampton, Harris, Leung and Britain2007:425 [2002:7]). Overall, the wider significance of this work lies in the detailed portrait it provides of ‘a multiculture’ in civic life -‘an unruly, convivial mode of interaction in which differences have to be negotiated in real time’- that goes ‘largely undetected by either government or media’, but that generates ‘more positive possibilities’, signifying not ‘the absence of racism [but …] the means of racism’s overcoming’ (Gilroy Reference Gilroy2006:39–40; Hall Reference Hall2017:138).
These three developments in university research provide an authoritative challenge to the conceptual and imaginative horizons that have dominated language education policy for the last thirty years or so, and they stress the normality of practices that might otherwise be easily derogated. These counter-hegemonic insights are passed on to cohorts of university students who move into, or come from, a range of professions, teaching included, and their dissemination beyond the academy has been encouraged by the growing emphasis in higher education policy on ‘impact’ and relevance – on university research and teaching making a(n auditably) practical contribution to the economy, society and well-being (Goddard and Puukka Reference Goddard and Puukka2008; Rampton, Cooke and Holmes Reference Rampton, Cooke and Holmes2018: section 7).
The range of these outreach initiatives is substantial, and it extends to teaching programmes in which active local links are built into undergraduate projects and assignments, as in the exemplary Multilingual Manchester programme (http://mlm.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/; Matras Reference Matras2023). Productive collaborations are likely to involve third-sector, local and community organisations, perhaps with charitable funding and the participation of local rather than central government, and this makes it difficult to provide a comprehensive overview. But just to illustrate this with work of our own (which we have also sometimes tried to theorise as ‘linguistic citizenship’ (Rampton et al. Reference Rampton, Cooke and Holmes2018)), we have developed multilingual pedagogies for adult ESOL in a project linking Leverhulme-funded research to the non-profit organisation English for ActionFootnote 27 (Cooke, Bryers and Winstanley Reference Cooke, Bryers and Winstanley2018; www.ourlanguages.co.uk); we have made efforts to coordinate the plurality of projects and organisations exploring multilingualism’s creative potential among young people (working among others with the Free Word Centre and Gulbenkian; Holmes Reference Holmes2015); and we have produced and disseminated a comprehensive assessment and teacher-development framework for EAL in collaboration with the Bell Foundation and Cambridge University (Leung, Evans and Liu Reference Leung, Evans and Liu2021). There are many other cases of work along similar tracks – the collaborations, for example, between Goldsmiths and supplementary schools (Kenner and Ruby Reference Kenner and Ruby2012; Anderson, Macleroy and Chung Reference Anderson, Macleroy and Chung2014; Lytra et al. Reference Lytra, Ros i Solé, Anderson and Macleroy2022).Footnote 28 Without central government support, sustainability is a major challenge for all these efforts. But there is unlikely to be a decline in grassroots commitment to maintaining multilingualism, and the more we can build this dialogue and collaboration into the core university activities like undergraduate and MA teaching, the greater the scope for envisaging an England that really is open to other languages.


