As a species of the so-called mathematics first view, Husserl’s view of mathematics and logic responds to changes in the foundations of mathematics. In this regard, the new developments of the 1930s are of great interest – to what extent was Husserl aware of them, and how was this reflected in his philosophical views? I have Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and the so-called Löwenheim-Skolem theorem in mind – both of which shook the foundations of mathematics. (To be sure, the latter theorem was first established in the 1920s, but it seems that Husserl only found out about it in the 1930s.) I will first (in Section 6.1) show how Husserl learned about Gödel’s incompleteness theorems as well as the general idea of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem (see Hartimo 2017b for more detail).