Human medical experimentation is profoundly haunted by moral ambiguity. On the one hand, prominent Nazi doctor Eduard Pernkopf ’s book of anatomy based on unlawful experimentation on concentration camp inmates – despite being out of print and commanding thousands of pounds sterling in price – is still in current use by surgeons. On the other hand, although the scientific utility of the knowledge gleaned might well be clear, it nonetheless depended upon utterly dehumanising its subjects due to the absolute power that was wielded over them. Thus, human experimentation sits right at the junction of Michel Foucault’s inseparable power/knowledge dyad. Indeed, Holocaust survivor Olga Lengyel observed first hand that ‘Since they [Nazi doctors] were free to do whatever they wished, they decided to experiment on these [human guinea pigs at Auschwitz Birkenau] people’. As will become increasingly clear below, these two competing axes invariably coincide in unlawful experimentation, and law is at a loss to sever them. Xavier Aurey notes law’s failure ‘to address one of the most difficult issues in clinical trials and human experimentation: the almost unavoidable context of exploitation of any situation where a person is used as an object for the good of others’.