The medieval distinction between the official and the personal bodies of the state sovereign played out before the International Criminal Court in fairly dramatic action. This scenario involved the President of the Republic of Kenya willingly submitting to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, but only in his personal capacity and not as president. Essentially this argument is based on the medieval doctrine of the ‘King’s two bodies’. The distinction of describing two bodies united in one inits origins sits at the crossroads of legal theory and political theology. As such, it draws from a rich heritage of these traditions that are of necessity developed through reconciling practical imperatives with theoretical niceties. Seeing the ancient doctrine of the King’s two bodies manifested in a contemporary context thus provides the opportunity to observe a longstanding (if dormant and obscure) legal theory applied to a novel factual situation. It demonstrates that this legal fiction remains stubbornly useful and effective in navigating between political imperatives and legal strictures. Moreover, that unusual irruption of an arcane legal and political practice into a modern-day international courtroom shows thatthe practice still bears the unmistakeable signature of its mystical foundation.

On 8 October 2014, Uhuru Kenyatta the President of the Republic of Kenya became the first sitting Head of State in history to appear voluntarily in response to a summons before any international criminal court or tribunal. Or not.This chapter examines whether, and if so how far, his claims of attending in a personal capacity were sustainable as well as what its implications would be for sovereigns elsewhere. The charges against Kenyatta stem from the post-electoral violence that swept Kenya between the years 2007 to 2008 following the national elections. An International Criminal Court (ICC) Pre- Trial Chamber found that ‘crimes against humanity had been committed on Kenyan territory’.