1. Introduction

For a mid-sized, linguistically and ethnically homogeneous East Asian nation surrounded by vastly more powerful neighbors, the emergence of South Korea as a significant player in the Gulf region runs counter to received wisdom on the ingredients of international success in the concert of nations. But contractors, energy companies and cultural institutions alike have had to recognize South Korea (also referred to as the Republic of Korea or ROK) in recent years as a significant regional competitor.

This chapter assesses the political and strategic dynamics of the South Korean role in the Gulf region, with particular emphasis given to the strategic “games” the country has engaged in since the end of the Cold War, and with greater intensity over the last decade. Like other East Asian nations, South Korea relies on the Gulf region for most of its fossil energy, in particular petroleum products and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Unlike other OECD members, it is a relative newcomer to the region, which it first entered during the construction boom of the 1970s and 1980s. After a lull in the 1990s, South Korean decisionmakers have over the past 10 years cooperated closely with the country's business community to upgrade the relationship. As a result of this, relations between Korea and its GCC partners have become more comprehensive than before. This chapter seeks to document and explain the relationship, providing a systematic overview which can explain both the astonishing successes and the limits of South Korea's role in the Gulf.

Three overarching theoretical themes will be pursued throughout this chapter. First, the means whereby a country that is firmly inserted in a regional environment where it constitutes a weaker partner can devise autonomous strategies to pursue its interests outside this area are examined. Second, the dichotomy between planning and emergent spontaneous development is discussed, focusing on the extent to which South Korean engagement is planned and coordinated. Third, the interplay between the soft power of public diplomacy and interest-driven traditional realpolitik is traced in a region where such coordinated efforts have been the exception, rather than the rule.