It is now opportune to look at the second objection to Hume's case, and then to consider further Humean responses to the attempted wholesale elimination of Hume's check.

Hume argued that the improbability of an event, simply as the sort of event it is, is by itself determinative of the probability that a report of that event is true. It is time to examine this issue first for its own sake, but secondarily because at this stage of the enquiry someone might take me to be holding, implausibly, that the fact that it reports something contrary to natural law should never be allowed at all to cast any doubt upon some report that a putative miracle has occurred. As a first step towards a correct view about this question, it is helpful to see that Hume's view is incorrect, and why it is. He holds that the improbability on inductive grounds, of some state of affairs, of itself obviously counts against the likelihood that a report which alleges that that state of affairs has obtained is true. So ‘the incredibility of a fact … might invalidate so great an authority’ (that is, as Cato was).

Might it not be, however, that some people (and Cato perhaps one of them) will take particular care over what they say precisely when what they say seems surprising, questionable or unexpected. Edinburgh solicitors are alleged to be cautious about agreeing, even when flaming June has touched Edinburgh, that it is a fine day; and over points which might possibly be regarded as questionable (if only by the most bizarrely ingenious) a categorical statement from an Edinburgh solicitor will be rare.