INTRODUCTION

Contemporary social science has little to say about mechanisms of preference formation and preference change. In the case of beliefs, rational-choice theory, theories of motivated belief formation, and theories of conformism offer plausible accounts of how they emerge. As we shall see in the next chapter, Tocqueville anticipated some of these analyses. In the case of preferences, however, modern social science offers less to anticipate. When asked, “What does economics have to say about intrapersonal and interpersonal mechanisms of preference formation,” Kenneth Arrow replied, “The short answer is nothing.” The other social sciences do not have much more to say. Yet I believe they all have something to learn from Tocqueville.

Preferences are either formal or substantive. The latter are ordinary garden-variety preferences, such as preferring apples to oranges or Billie Holiday to Ella Fitzgerald. The former include notably attitudes toward risk and time preferences, which interact with substantive preferences to generate behavior. Tocqueville addresses the formation of both kinds of preferences.

Generally speaking, we may try to understand the formation either of stable and enduring preferences or of ephemeral and transient ones. The latter are not necessarily less important than the former, since actions taken on the basis of a short-lived preference may be impossible to undo when preferences return to their original state. In the present chapter I consider Tocqueville's views on the formation of stable preferences, the discussion of temporary preference changes being postponed until Chapter 4.