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2 - Belief Formation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Jon Elster
Affiliation:
Collège de France
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Summary

INTRODUCTION

We have “beliefs” about many kinds of issues. There are factual beliefs (regarding, for example, the number of piano tuners in Philadelphia), causal beliefs (regarding, for example, the impact of minimal wage legislation on unemployment), religious beliefs (regarding, for example, the existence of the afterlife), and political beliefs (regarding, for example, whether affirmative action is acceptable). Except for the last-mentioned (which is more a preference than a belief), all these beliefs presuppose that there is a fact of the matter, some feature of the universe by virtue of which the belief, if true, is true. All beliefs, also the last mentioned, can serve as premises for action. Some, however, mainly serve as consolation for misery. As we saw in Chapter 1, this is how Tocqueville explained why the mass of the people in aristocratic societies believed in the afterlife.

How do people come to have the beliefs they have? One answer, mainly relevant for factual and causal beliefs, is that people form rational beliefs in order to achieve their aims as well as possible. The process involves both the optimal gathering of information and the correct processing of information. Another answer, which may apply to all sorts of beliefs, is that they are subject to motivated belief formation: people gravitate toward the beliefs they would like to be true. In many cases, these two processes yield different results. If I am a rational smoker, I will realize the health dangers of smoking.

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  • Belief Formation
  • Jon Elster
  • Book: Alexis de Tocqueville, the First Social Scientist
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800429.005
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  • Belief Formation
  • Jon Elster
  • Book: Alexis de Tocqueville, the First Social Scientist
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800429.005
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Belief Formation
  • Jon Elster
  • Book: Alexis de Tocqueville, the First Social Scientist
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800429.005
Available formats
×