Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Series editors' preface
- Preface
- CHAPTER 1 REFLECTIONS ON THE COMMONS
- CHAPTER 2 AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND SELF-GOVERNANCE IN CPR SITUATIONS
- CHAPTER 3 ANALYZING LONG-ENDURING, SELF-ORGANIZED, AND SELF-GOVERNED CPRs
- CHAPTER 4 ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
- CHAPTER 5 ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND FRAGILITIES
- CHAPTER 6 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF SELF-ORGANIZING AND SELF-GOVERNING CPRs
- Notes
- References
- Index
CHAPTER 4 - ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Series editors' preface
- Preface
- CHAPTER 1 REFLECTIONS ON THE COMMONS
- CHAPTER 2 AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF SELF-ORGANIZATION AND SELF-GOVERNANCE IN CPR SITUATIONS
- CHAPTER 3 ANALYZING LONG-ENDURING, SELF-ORGANIZED, AND SELF-GOVERNED CPRs
- CHAPTER 4 ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
- CHAPTER 5 ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND FRAGILITIES
- CHAPTER 6 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF SELF-ORGANIZING AND SELF-GOVERNING CPRs
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
In the preceding chapter I examined institutions for governing CPRs in which appropriators have devised governance systems that have survived for long periods of time in environments characterized by considerable uncertainty and change. Although the particular problems involved in governing mountain commons vary from those involved in governing irrigation systems, all of these long-enduring institutional arrangements have shared commonalities. These cases clearly demonstrate the feasibility (but obviously not the likelihood) of robust, self-governing institutions for managing complex CPR situations, but the origins of these systems are lost in time. It is not possible to reconstruct how earlier users of Swiss alpine meadows, Japanese mountain commons, the Spanish huertas, or the Philippine zanjeras devised rules that have survived such long periods. We do not know who originated or opposed various proposals, or anything about the process of change itself.
A study of the origins of institutions must address the problem of supply raised in Chapter 2. As Bates (1988) points out, the presence of collective benefits as a result of designing new institutions is itself a second-order collective dilemma. A proposed new institution “is subject to the very incentive problems it is supposed to resolve” (Bates 1988, p. 395). Many questions need to be addressed. How many participants were involved? What was their internal group structure? Who initiated action? Who paid the costs of entrepreneurial activities? What kind of information did participants have about their situation?
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- Governing the CommonsThe Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, pp. 103 - 142Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1990