Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Institutions for Constitutional Justice in Latin America
- 2 Enforcing Rights and Exercising an Accountability Function
- 3 Strategic Deference in the Colombian Constitutional Court, 1992–2006
- 4 From Quietism to Incipient Activism
- 5 “Faithful Servants of the Regime”
- 6 Power Broker, Policy Maker, or Rights Protector?
- 7 Legalist versus Interpretativist
- 8 A Theory of the Politically Independent Judiciary
- 9 Courts, Power, and Rights in Argentina and Chile
- 10 Bolivia
- 11 The Puzzling Judicial Politics of Latin America
- Index
- References
7 - Legalist versus Interpretativist
The Supreme Court and the Democratic Transition in Mexico
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 June 2011
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Institutions for Constitutional Justice in Latin America
- 2 Enforcing Rights and Exercising an Accountability Function
- 3 Strategic Deference in the Colombian Constitutional Court, 1992–2006
- 4 From Quietism to Incipient Activism
- 5 “Faithful Servants of the Regime”
- 6 Power Broker, Policy Maker, or Rights Protector?
- 7 Legalist versus Interpretativist
- 8 A Theory of the Politically Independent Judiciary
- 9 Courts, Power, and Rights in Argentina and Chile
- 10 Bolivia
- 11 The Puzzling Judicial Politics of Latin America
- Index
- References
Summary
What renders courts powerful? Is the expansion of court policy-making powers solely driven by changes in the balance of power between the elected branches? Or do justices' philosophies about judicial interpretation and their visions about the role of the court in managing the constitutional order also play a role? We answer these questions by analyzing the role the Mexican Supreme Court has played during and after the transition to democracy.
Breaking with a long tradition of judicial subservience, the 1994 constitutional reform transformed the supreme court, in paper at least, into a constitutional tribunal. By establishing constitutional controversies and constitutional actions, the reform significantly expanded the court's power. Through constitutional controversies, the court can adjudicate disputes between different branches and levels of government. Through constitutional actions, the court can annul laws and acts deemed unconstitutional. We study court rulings on such actions and controversies from 1994 to 2007 to uncover the political factors that led the Mexican court to significantly expand its policy-making role in the system of checks and balances and serve as an arbiter of federalism.
The 1994 reform that preceded the transition to democracy had as its principal objective to provide an institutional channel for the resolution of political conflicts among subnational governments and government organs controlled by different political parties (Magaloni and Sánchez 2001, 2006; B. Magaloni 2008).
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- Courts in Latin America , pp. 187 - 218Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011
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