We have argued that, as well as having general theoretical relevance for the study of politics, governance theory has particular relevance for comparative politics. By positing a set of requirements for governing, this approach provides the foundation for comparing how different political systems perform these functions. Very much like the older structural functionalist approaches to comparative politics, this model argues that by understanding how different political systems perform the tasks necessary for supplying governance, we have a clear foundation for comparison.

Unlike the structural functionalist approaches, however, we are more concerned with the processes of governing within the “black box” rather than the relationships existing between those “conversion functions” and their environment. The analysis of Almond and Powell (1966) focused much of its attention on the mechanisms for moving wants and demands from the environment into the political system, and somewhat less on how decisions were actually made within the system. Clearly, we do not ignore those connections with the socioeconomic environment of the public sector, nor would we want to, but we are more concerned with the choices that actors inside and outside the formal public sector make when attempting to steer economy and society. The study of governance has been to some extent been built around the link between the public sector and social actors (Torfing et al., 2012), but these relationships are about how governance is conducted rather than merely expressing wants and demands.

In this regard, the relationships between state and society in governance theory are often conceptualized in a more utilitarian and strategic manner than those that have appeared in Almond and Powell's (1966) analysis. For example, although the use of societal actors in networks and other interactive structures does to some extent involve the processing of their demands for programs from the state, the direct involvement in the construction of the programs tends to emphasize the actual performance of the governance tasks rather than a more remote “articulation of interests.” We are, of course, concerned with the legitimacy of governance arrangements but are perhaps more concerned with their effectiveness (see Przeworski, 2003) and the extent to which full legitimation of governance structures and processes enhances governing effectiveness.