We have previously analyzed five key functions of governance; decisionmaking, goal-selection, resource mobilization, implementation, and feedback, evaluation, and learning. The same principal argument which was developed in Chapter 2 can also serve as a framework for understanding variations in patterns of governance between (and at) different institutional levels of government. Functionalist analyses of governing rarely address this aspect of government. We argue, however, that a full understanding of the performance of a political system as a whole is not possible without considering the degree to which different levels of contribute to systemic functions. For instance, the extent to which systemic goals and means of resource mobilization is controlled by the political center or dispersed across institutional levels is a fundamental aspect of the political system's coherence and, by extension, its capacity to provide governance.

We also put forth that many governance failures have their origin in malfunctioning and/or contested institutional relationships to deliver key functions of governing. Our argument here is not so much that the design of intergovernmental relationships harbors pathologies that cause the system to perform poorly. Rather, we suggest that these institutional arrangements and relationships have drifted from the original constitutional design, so much so that they now increasingly often cause governance failure. We see a growing tendency toward collective action problems and a tragedy of the commons in the relationship between the institutional levels of government.

The problems arising in governance at different institutional levels are compounded by the commitment of many international organizations, and many scholars, to a process of decentralization. Moving functions out of the center of government has become almost an ideology for many actors involved in designing systems of governance, but the assumed benefits are often unexamined, and the costs of such structural change are often ignored. Therefore, we will consider decentralization very carefully as we assess the role that intergovernmental structures play in governance.

This analysis of governance at different levels is, however, more complex than it might appear since institutional governance roles and functions are frequently contested, negotiated, and unstable. This means that assigning functions like resource mobilization or decisionmaking or even tasks to specific institutional levels becomes a much less technical and objective exercise than could be expected.