America’s war in Vietnam was almost without historical precedent. Aside from the insurgency in the Philippines, the United States had not ever fought a war without any fronts. Although the American military had engaged in several “small wars” over the course of American history, nothing matched the challenge and scope of what was then known as the Vietnam “conflict.” Unlike Britain, the United States had little experience in colonial policing, as these irregular wars were often known. Coming on the heels of Korea, the United States was reluctant to get fully involved in a traditional ground war in Asia. The atomic bomb was briefly considered as a possibility to stop communist expansion in Vietnam, but the Eisenhower Administration ruled out this option since it thought that it would ultimately be counterproductive. This left the United States with limited options. Yet, the Americans felt that something had to be done as the “domino theory,” which held great sway in Washington, argued that the expansion of communism could not be left unchecked.

The story of the United States at war is a tale of a country greatly influenced by its liberal political culture, geographic position and history. The United States uniquely adapted a specific Western way of war, starting in the early days of the republic, to wage war in a manner compatible with its liberal norms. Isolated geographically, and with a history of military engagements conceptualized as “all or nothing struggles,” the American people, American politicians and the American military developed a view of war as an aberration – a necessary struggle to be won quickly, but to also be won in a more or less humane way. A liberal nation, enthralled with science and technology, it has sought to apply its technological prowess to achieve this goal. This has worked in some cases, principally where the opponent fights by the same normative standards, but it has failed spectacularly in others, mainly those that are inter-cultural in nature. Today’s challenges, and those of the medium term, are no different.

Although the early American officer corps drew on the common canon of writings of great European military leaders when the country fought for independence against the British Crown, and the US military continued to engage with the development of military science in Europe post-independence from Great Britain, the American experience in war in the New World of the North American continent differed from that of the Old World. The American historical experience beyond continental Manifest Destiny reinforced a uniquely American approach to Western warfare. To understand how Americans fight war, it is necessary to understand how Americans view war. This is because how a country conceptualizes and understands war directly impacts how that country instrumentalizes war as a tool of policy.

The particular American preference for decisive, overwhelming conflict becomes apparent when one takes into consideration three factors. First, historically the Western way of war is driven to decisive victory by economic constraints that go back in history to the Greek city-states discussed in the previous chapter. Second, the United States, as a contemporary liberal power, considers war an aberration – thus it views conflict as the suspension of civilized politics to engage in a dirty task that should be accomplished as quickly as possible. Finally, and again historically in line with the Western way of warfare, the democratic nature of the contemporary United States necessitates that wars are fought in a timely matter. Just like in ancient Greece, the public will only fight for a certain amount of time before domestic affairs and political infighting consume attention that was hitherto directed, in a somewhat unified manner, on a common war effort.