Following the success of Operation Desert Storm to oust Iraq from Kuwait, the US establishment felt that they had finally rid themselves of the dreaded body-bag syndrome that had haunted US policy-makers since the Vietnam War. Technology and the law had come together to wage a war so effective that the US military had managed to topple their adversary in a matter of days. The victory came with the loss of few American lives, the objective quickly met and the international coalition was successfully maintained. The campaign was critiqued from a number of angles, but the sum total of America’s engagement was seen within the establishment as an unmitigated success. This experience would fuel those in the military establishment and the civilian policy world who felt that by harnessing newly emergent technology they could eliminate the “fog or war” identified by Clausewitz, giving the United States the ability to see the entire field of battle and to dominate it with high-end technology resulting in similar successes in future wars.

The defeat in Vietnam, it can be fairly said, was an outcome that the US military essentially would choose to forget in the 1970s and 1980s. Abandoning the difficult lessons of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency in the jungles and deltas of Southeast Asia, American military leaders and service chiefs instead wanted to return to “proper,” conventional warfare that, in their minds, would be fought in Cold War Europe against the USSR. Further, frustrated with what they saw as interference by civilian “Whiz Kids” during the war, military leaders sought to reform civil–military relations as they changed from a conscripted to a professional force. However, there were other lessons of Vietnam that could not be ignored: the mistakes and errors caused by service infighting, a poor chain of command and weak military advice would continue to affect US military operations into the 1980s. Future US military operations were clearly in jeopardy unless urgent reforms to the Department of Defense were undertaken, despite objections from the military establishment. Although the reforms mandated by Congress were not always welcome, they transformed the US military into a much more efficient and effective military force. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the effectiveness of these reforms as the armed forces seamlessly blended superior military technology, law and their new, streamlined command structure into a lethal fighting force that utterly annihilated the Iraqi Army. Finally, it seemed, the US military had achieved a balance between annihilation and restraint in a perfect liberal war.

A visitor from foreign lands to the American capital city of Washington D. C. is immediately struck by the classical design of the city and its monuments. From the ionic columns of the Jefferson Memorial set on the Tidal Basin, to the thirty-six fluted Doric columns of the Lincoln Memorial perched upon high ground overlooking the reflecting pool and the singular column of the Washington Monument, the architecture of America’s capital city reflects a bygone era. The city recalls a vision of Imperial Rome, itself a copy of the magnificent Greek city-states of the fourth and fifth centuries BC. While the architecture of the US capital recalls these ancient civilizations, the very idea that Washington embodies – democracy – is a more important link to these ancient civilizations. The members of the US House and Senate, duly elected by free citizens, to create laws to order society, laws that in turn are upheld by an independent judicial system, act in a cultural fashion shaped first by the ancient Greeks and later by ancient Rome.

In the dark of night the vehicle bumped along the uneven ground as it sped along in the outskirts of Khasaf in Northwestern Yemen. Small rocks and debris hit the undercarriage of the truck, making for an irregular beat against the steady hum of the engine. Al-Awlaki peered out the window, surveying the dark desert landscape. He cocked his head upwards, toward the sky – it was empty.

Al-Awlaki was pushed back in his seat, bouncing up and down as the truck raced over a large rut in the road. Next to him sat the young blogger Samir Khan, the co-editor the English-language Al Qaeda web magazine, Inspire. Traveling at night was often the best defense against observation and al-Awlaki had good reason to avoid detection. At 40, al-Awlaki, relatively unknown outside of intelligence and specialist circles, had become a household name after President Barack Obama placed him on the CIA capture or kill list in April 2010. As the head of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula he used his flawless English to inspire global jihadism against America and her allies and now he had become a major target for the United States.

Between annihilation and restraint

Since its foundation as a republic in the eighteenth century, the United States has faced two broad imperatives: to be an example of liberty to the world and to maintain this role and protect itself by achieving absolute security. How the United States tries to balance these imperatives and the resulting tensions, particularly when it is engaged in armed conflict or perceives an immediate threat, is the purpose of this book.

We argue that the United States has often relied on science, especially applied science, to reconcile these two ends. As Auguste Comte wrote, “from science comes prevision, from prevision comes control.” Taking this maxim to heart, science has been seen as the key to controlling war, allowing the United States to achieve overwhelming and quick military victories, which are nevertheless relatively humane and worthy of its core liberal values. This is a reflection of America’s Enlightenment roots, with its faith in rationality and science to solve complex problems through understanding the natural world.