Papal patronage has often been limited to the question of whether this or that pope loved art. Yet, the pontiff was only one of several actors involved in the realization of artistic projects symbolizing the Church’s cultural, religious, and political power. Papal patronage, in the sense of conflating the roles of initiator, commissioner, and financial backer, only came into its own after 800. At the same time, a long-lasting debate, rooted in the Classical discourse on luxuria and magnificentia, focused on the legitimacy of spending Church money on material beauty. This was resolved around 1500 when papal patronage became framed as magnificentia and charity, in line with the concept of “evergetism,” or collective service to society. This led to an active papal policy to use the arts, in conjunction with Counter Reformation visual propaganda, to strengthen the Faith, with an important impact on artistic developments primarily during the early modern period.

This chapter suggests that the papacy dealt with Protestantism in various ways. It condemned the forty-one propositions of Martin Luther and then waited for the Council of Trent to condemn others. It used the institutions of preventive press censorship and of various inquisitions to check heresy. It sought the support of Christian rulers to prevent its spread, sending nuncios and legates to the rulers of the Holy Roman Empire, France, England, Scotland, Sweden, Denmark, and Poland–Lithuania to urge them to suppress heresy and to secure their loyalty by negotiating agreements on Church appointments and shared revenues and by offering military aid, efforts that had mixed success, or failed. Religious orders such as the Jesuits and Capuchins were also enlisted in the struggle. Leading Protestant reformers came to see the papacy as the Antichrist or foreign usurper.

This chapter analyzes the features, context, preparation, logistics, destinations, aims, and impact of papal travels throughout the centuries, with a focus on the contemporary papacy. It is mainly based on secondary sources. Interestingly enough, there is no monographic study of this topic. Throughout the centuries, even if not often, popes have traveled outside their territory. They did so for various reasons: if they were not forcefully abducted and exiled, some traveled for pastoral reasons, to solve theological or other disputes, and mainly for political and diplomatic motives. However, it is only since the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) that this traveling has become part and parcel of the papal job description.

This chapter examines the brief but formative pontificate of Benedict XV, the most important in the early twentieth-century history of the papacy: Benedict’s return to the policies of Leo XIII (r. 1878–1903) and, above all, his responses to the challenges of the First World War and its aftermath, transformed the scope and impact of Vatican diplomacy, restoring its prestige and influence on the international stage. More broadly speaking, Benedict set the agenda of the next two pontificates, those of his successor Pius XI (r. 1922–39) and Pius XII (r. 1939–58). They continued the policy of seeking to implement the new Code of Canon Law, and where possible by concordats with states, they would continue to seek reunion with the Orthodox Churches and Benedict’s postcolonial vision for the missionary outreach of the Church. They would also continue to follow the broad outlines of his initiatives in Vatican diplomacy through his commitment to seeking to play a role in international peace and security. Benedict’s policy of impartiality in war was not a passive one, but active and constructive, aimed both at providing humanitarian relief to victims and encouraging peace negotiations between the belligerents. His peace-making and humanitarian efforts reflected new forms of papal humanitarian diplomacy and have become a permanent feature of the papacy’s role in promoting international peace and security.

At an early time, the role of the laity in the Roman Church diminished as a body of clergy under the authority of a bishop became established as a separate caste. Its members resembled civil servants, as was implied by the word used for the procedure by which one joined them, “ordination,” that was familiar from Roman secular life. They manifested some of the characteristics of the members of a bureaucracy, in being prepared to pay for an office, a practice known as simony, and in being concerned for promotion. The clergy were divided into two streams with separate promotion structures, one of subdeacons, deacons, and archdeacons, and the other of acolytes, priests, and archpriests. Of these the former was more prestigious, and more likely to culminate in the office of pope, the bishop who exercised control over the other clergy. The body of clergy was by no means harmonious, and there were frequently tensions within it. While laypeople were excluded from the prominent position they had held when the church was established in Rome, the clergy continued to be connected from the families from which they came.

Violent conflict was a feature of the early papacy as theological factions or Roman families contested the Throne of Saint Peter and as popes responded to the collapse of Roman authority by assuming responsibility for the defense of Rome. By 1000 CE, popes were temporal rulers, and like their secular counterparts they considered military force a legitimate instrument. The papacy participated in the Crusades, principally as propagandist and financier, and engaged militarily in the “Italian Wars” (1494–1559). Subsequently, papal military capabilities declined and during the Napoleonic Wars the papacy offered little resistance against French armies that twice seized Rome. Under Pius IX, serious efforts to improve the papal military were insufficient to prevent the absorption of Rome and the Papal States into the kingdom of Italy. Reduced to a handful of palace guards, subsequent pontiffs abandoned any martial posture, although these household guards protected the Vatican during World Wars I and II.

The papal penitentiary was the highest office in the later medieval Church concerned with matters of conscience. It granted absolution in cases where this was reserved to the papacy, notably for grave sins such as assaults on clergy, and it issued other graces that were also a papal monopoly, such as dispensations, notably for marriages within the prohibited degrees of kinship, and special licences, especially to appoint a personal confessor. Laity and clergy across later medieval Europe petitioned the office for these favours. The papal penitentiary hence represented a significant point of contact between the papacy and individual Catholics. Its origins were obscure but partly lay in the long tradition of penitential pilgrimage to Rome. Minor penitentiaries heard confessions of penitent pilgrims at Rome’s major basilicas, including Saint Peter’s. By the early thirteenth century, the ‘major penitentiary’ in charge of the office was appointed by the pope from among the cardinals and received growing faculties to concede graces on the pope’s behalf. By the fifteenth century, the office that he headed was a major department of papal government and substantial source of revenue for the papacy.

The era of the Reformation profoundly changed the papal institution. In Italy, it allowed for the assertion of primatial authority and a greater oversight of the Italian Church as well as a capacity to influence popular and elite culture through the medium of the Inquisition and the Index. Rather than attempting to achieve Italian liberty, it now strove to protect the peace and religious orthodoxy of the peninsula. In the wider European sphere, during this period the papacy effectively lost contact with most of Protestant Europe, but through an articulated system of nunciatures and, from 1622, through Propaganda Fide, it remained an important influence throughout the Catholic world, projecting itself as a peacemaker among secular powers, the foe of heresy and Islam, the upholder of the decrees of Trent – conceived, however, as a prescriptive set of disciplinary and doctrinal norms – and the defender of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and privileges.

This chapter documents the complex relationship between the papacy and liberation theology. Prior to the explicit emergence of liberation theology, the papacies of Pius XII and John XXIII provided important institutional and theological conditions in which liberation developed and became influential. A relative harmony existed during the ministry of Paul VI, as liberation theologians often took positions influenced theologically by Vatican II and politically by Paul VI’s attention to global poverty and hopes for the underdeveloped world. This tenor changed dramatically under John Paul II and Benedict XVI. Their experiences of communism and reaction to perceived excesses in the implementation of Vatican II translated into great tensions between the Vatican and liberation theologians. The papacy of Francis signals that these tensions have passed, as his priorities align more closely to the work of liberation theologians with important implications for Church governance and in relation to pressing global issues.

The chapter takes stock of the major trends in recent scholarship of medieval heresy and ecclesiastical repression, identifies promising research avenues, and provides an overview of the way in which the papacy confronted the perceived menace of heresy in the central Middle Ages, considering the representations of and responses to religious dissent displayed by the official Church alongside its own motifs and transformations. The implementation of anti-heresy measures are thus observed in light of the main historical developments of the papacy in the central centuries of the Middle Ages: the eleventh-century reform and its institutional legacy; the zenith of papal monarchy; and the Avignon papacy and its political and intellectual developments. In all these different contexts, variously permeated by the ideal of papal theocracy, the Holy See fashioned apt legal and theological responses intended to contain what was featured as an enduring peril threatening the Church and Christendom.

The Jewish–Arab conflict and the fighting it engenders began before the establishment of the state of Israel and has been a constant of Middle-Eastern politics for over a hundred years. The intensity of the fighting has fluctuated but the variations have been like a jazz tune that plays around a common constant central theme. Because of the continuity and longevity of the conflict, as well as various short-term issues affecting it, each strategic event is analysed by the rival decision makers according to three separate time factors: the immediate – how to achieve the best result and terminate the specific event as quickly as possible; the medium term – how the current event results from the trend of the past few years and will affect that trend favourably over the next few years; and lastly the long term – how the results of the specific current event and the current trend it belongs to fits into the overall conflict and will favourably affect its future direction. Of course, the ‘best strategic result’ and ‘favourable strategic effect’ are different for each participant. The purpose of this chapter is to explore and describe the characteristics of the conflict as a whole and the major theme of the Israeli strategic responses to them, while touching on various shifts in trends or specific events that required fundamental changes in the melodies or temporary improvisations.

All too often, the terms terrorism and insurgency are used interchangeably, just like tactics and strategy. But terrorism is indeed a tactic while insurgency is a strategy, and the two concepts are far from synonymous. This chapter details the differences between terrorism and insurgency, and hence, terrorists and insurgents, by tracing the evolution of each of these terms and placing them in the proper context, while providing numerous examples of terrorist chieftains and insurgent leaders, and how these individuals thought about strategy over time. The chapter will also investigate the considerable overlap between terrorism and insurgency. After all, militants pursuing an insurgent strategy may seek to use terrorism as a tactic toward achieving their objectives. Size can be a useful distinguishing characteristic, because terrorist groups often consist of a small number of individuals. By contrast, insurgent organisations, such as Lebanese Hizballah or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), number in the thousands. Indeed, many of the most important ‘terrorist’ groups in the world – including Lebanese Hizballah, LTTE, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – are better described as insurgencies that use terrorism than as typical terrorist movements.

This chapter offers an overview of the strategic environment and grand strategies employed by the Ming and Qing dynasties. It discusses how they built upon pre-existing strategic traditions while also incorporating new technologies and tactics to expand the empire, creating a sophisticated state capable of responding to a dazzling array of challenges. The chapter not only delineates the nature of the strategic threats faced by the last Chinese empires, but also covers the extensive primary source materials demonstrating how imperial leadership and personal networks operated alongside institutions to create an effective grand-strategy paradigm allowing the Ming and Qing to retain their superiority in east Asia for some five centuries. Finally, this overview of late imperial grand strategy offers clues into how China still perceives the world and its strategic goals in Asia.