On 25 June 1950, North Korea launched a surprise attack on South Korea, commencing the Korean War and aiming to unify the country by forces. On 7 July, when the UN adopted a resolution calling for all possible means to aid South Korea, President Truman announced he was sending in US forces to stop the Communists and expanding his Cold War containment to East Asia. The Korean War became a conflict between China and the United States. To drive UNF out of Korea, Mao sent in 33 divisions, which was only the beginning of Chinese involvement. In April 1951, CPVF launched its spring offensive against UN troops, which put up a strong defence. After the Chinese failure in the battle, the war settled into a stalemate and a more conventional pattern of trench warfare along the 38th Parallel. The Korean stalemate became the longest positional warfare in world military history. This military impasse, from June 1951 to July 1953, has become the most forgotten phase of the ‘forgotten war’. About 45 per cent of all US casualties occurred after truce talks began in July 1951. By 1952, Chinese forces in Korea had grown to a record high of 1.45 million. Realising the huge gap between Chinese objectives and means, Mao became willing to accept a settlement without total victory.

This chapter examines the strategic history of the British seapower state, the last great power to rely on naval power as its primary strategic instrument in peace and war. Maritime strategies reflect the reality that seapower states need to control maritime communications for security and prosperity: that control allows them to attack the shipping, overseas possessions and, critically, the economies of their rivals as an alternative to a land invasion. Military great powers have responded to the maritime threat by building military navies to secure command of the sea, to facilitate the invasion and overthrow of a seapower rival. If that option fails they use naval resources to attack floating trade of a seapower adversary. The Navy become central to national identity.

Between 1688 and 1945 Britain developed and used a unique maritime strategic model that linked strategic decision-making to policy aims, political structures, and economic realities. This strategy enabled Britain, a small offshore island, to act as great power in the European, and later global systems, but it was a fragile asset. Naval power had limited strategic impact, even the purely naval Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century were settled by economics, not sea battles. The combination of insularity and powerful financial instruments enabled Britain to wage long wars of limited mobilisation, but it needed allies to defeat great power rivals. Securing such allies cost money, and restricted war aims. The key strategic concerns were naval dominance, the security of the Low Countries and the legal basis of economic warfare. Whenever possible the Navy was used to maintain peace through deterrence and suasion, war with other great powers was always unwelcome because it would be long, costly and bad for business. There was no short-war strategic option. In war the British Army supported maritime strategy, it was not a ‘continental’ force, and was never committed to that role in peacetime while Britain remained a great power. Britain’s rivals employed a variety of naval strategies to counter or limit the impact of this maritime strategy, an invasion of Britain, arms racing, fleets in being, coastal defences and commerce raiding, but the only method that succeeded was the United States attack that broke the British economy between 1939 and 1945, backed by the construction of an immense fleet. Although no longer a great power after 1945 Britain’s global maritime interests and insular location remained critical aspects of national security.

The strategy of the Mongol Empire underwent four basic phases. The first centered on the rise and creation of the Yeke Monggol Ulus (Great Mongol State/Nation) by Chinggis Khan and the Mongols’ irruption from the steppes. The second phase was the formulation of a coherent strategy of conquest during the reign of Ögödei Qa’an. While this was derived from the campaigns of Chinggis Khan, it sought to maximise the deployment of the empire’s military on multiple fronts while simultaneously not overextending the resources of the empire. This further evolved into a third phase during the reign of Möngke Qa’an, who, through a series of reforms, allowed the Mongols to marshal more resources. In doing so, the Mongol strategy altered as they no longer had concerns of overextending themselves. During Möngke’s reign, the Mongols truly became a juggernaut. The final phase of strategy came into formulation with the dissolution of the Mongol Empire after Möngke’s death in late 1259. As the empire split into rival states often embroiled in internecine conflict, each new state had to develop its own coherent strategy, but without the massive resources of a united empire. The Mongols conceived of pragmatic grand strategy that was viable, if not always successful, rather than simply theoretical plans.

King Frederick II (‘the Great’) of Prussia (r. 1740–1786) led his armies personally into a series of wars that doubled the size of his state during his reign. Frederick’s invasion of Silesia, and his subsequent attempts to hold onto it and expand his dominions further, reflected his risk-taking personality. Frederick enjoyed a much greater variety of strategic options than his predecessors because of the large army and well-stocked treasury bequeathed to him by his father, and this reflected the steady growth of states in this period and their increasing capacity to mobilise resources for war. The Hohenzollerns had for generations operated within a strategic context defined by the Holy Roman Empire, which covered all the German lands and within which a variety of princely dynasties competed for prominence under the overall hegemony of the Austrian Habsburgs. Successful Hohenzollern mobilisation of resources, however, made Frederick II the first German ruler in the early modern period to challenge the Habsburgs from a position of relative military parity. His successful gamble created a bipolar Germany, in which the two great powers of Austria and Prussia raised ever greater resources for their struggle against each other, far outstripping the other German states.

"This chapter will examine the practice of strategy – the relationship between available resources, competing aims and geopolitical realities – by focusing on the Habsburg dynasty in the period from 1500 to 1650. The Habsburg monarchies brought together a diverse series of different concerns focused on dynasty, geopolitics and religion, within a framework of planning, prioritisation and opportunism. I will also seek to examine changes in practice over time. How do strategic conceptions and the pursuit of strategic aims shift in the century between the reign of Charles V and the Spanish and Austrian Habsburg rulers at the time of the Thirty Years War? How did changing political and military circumstances over this century alter the aims and dynamics of strategy? Or were there fundamental continuities in, for example, the constraints on mobilising financial and human resources, sustaining warfare or achieving desired outcomes through war or diplomacy?

The chapter will be based on two case studies. The first of these examines the strategic implications of the transformation to the dynasty enabled by the extraordinary inheritance of Charles V, and the vast European monarchía that this brought into existence. It will look at Charles’s strategic aims and goals; the resources, both material and ideological, that could be mobilised in pursuit of these goals; the enemies that he faced; and the way in which they forced him to prioritise and compromise. Ultimately the largest compromise was the decision to divide his inheritance between two branches of the family. The account will pass over the later sixteenth century and resume with the strategies, priorities and resource mobilisation of the Austrian and Spanish branches of the family during the Thirty Years War. The account will look at the way in which they sought to re-create a strategy based on close family co-operation, and mobilising resources that were significantly different from those of Charles V. The comparison raises a number of themes, both structural and contingent, that I hope will contribute to the larger discussion of the volume.

As noted by Richard Reid, African military history remains ‘perhaps the last bastion of the kind of distorted Eurocentric scholarship that characterised African studies before the 1960s’. This is especially true of the pre-colonial period, on account of both the dearth and the inherent limitations and biases of the sources available for study. The purpose of this contribution is to show that, in both tactical and strategic terms, African pre-colonial warfare was as complex as warfare in any other historical setting. We propose to substantiate our argument by exploring a number of regional case studies organised in a loose chronological order: warfare in the medieval empires of the Sahel, Asante warfare in the context of the Atlantic slave trade, Zulu and Ngoni warfare in southern Africa and east-central African warfare in the age of warlords. The driving questions that the collection proposes to address will be briefly explored in these different contexts, each of which highlights specific strategic dynamics and priorities.

This chapter describes the origin of the idea of an American way of war. That idea began with the publication of historian Russell Weigley’s classic, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, in 1973. For Weigley, a way of war essentially came down to habits of thought. America’s way of war, thus, had to do with the habits of thought of Americans with respect to armed conflict. This chapter also provides a brief survey of America’s armed conflicts, from its War of Independence to its interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This survey describes the major war aims in each of these conflicts as well as the type of military strategy employed.

Napoleon is widely admired as a military strategist who embraced the violence of modern war and understood the potential of mass armies. Yet he wrote little about the practice of strategy beyond a few rather bland maxims, claiming to rely on offence and opportunism on the battlefield. But these offensive tactics had a strategic purpose. He sought to crush his opponents in decisive battles, not just to destroy enemy armies but to impose his will in the peace talks that followed. As First Consul and later as Emperor he channelled the resources of the state to the cause of military success and imperial expansion. His goal was political as much as it was military, mobilising all the resources of the Empire in its pursuit. Napoleon conscripted mass armies in the lands he conquered, imposed French-style administrative systems, and imposed taxes and customs duties. He was focused on Europe, where the other powers developed their own strategies to counter him, repeatedly forging alliances to defend their sovereignty and to thwart his imperial ambitions. Each country had its own war aims. Russia looked to expand into the Balkans, Prussia to conquer Poland, and Britain to consolidate its colonial presence overseas.

In this chapter Soviet strategy in practice is viewed through the lens of Soviet interventions within the Soviet bloc: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Kremlin’s struggle for justifying interventions within the socialist bloc provides an interesting analysis of the decision making, objectives, priorities and means of Soviet intervention, while also allowing an examination of the extent to which the Soviet leadership learnt from previous mistakes. The interventions illustrate an interesting kind of progression from unilateral decision making in 1953 to consultation of Soviet allies within the Warsaw Pact, and beyond in 1956 to a so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ of five Warsaw Pact countries, which collectively intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Concerns for the security and integrity of the Soviet bloc as well as fears for a domino-effect of unrest spilling over into neighbouring Warsaw Pact countries informed Soviet decision making. This chapter accordingly also argues that the Kremlin was increasingly reluctant to intervene, as shown in the Solidarnosc trade union crisis in Poland in 1980–1981. The chapter concludes with a brief comparison with the motives and methods of Russian president Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine in 24 February 2022.

The strategies of Louis XIV were shaped both by France’s position as one of the largest powers in Europe and by the Sun King’s domineering personality. After his succession to the French throne in 1661, Louis XIV gradually asserted control over his state, to launch a series of wars against his neighbours, particularly the disconnected Spanish Habsburg territories which encircled France. Commanding one of the largest standing armies in Europe, he used diplomatic and military intimidation to effect rapid conquests of smaller neighbouring states (1660s–1680s). His initial successes led to opposing coalitions which further blunted French advances. By the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1679), his hopes for short wars were dashed, and the rest of his reign would see attritional struggles on land and at sea. Each time Louis sought to expand his frontiers through force, more belligerents joined the anti-French coalition, expanding the number of contested theatres, and increasing the duration of each conflict. Louis’s early victories in the War of Devolution (1667–1668) and the Franco-Dutch War benefited from French numerical superiority, from strategic surprise, and from the capacity of great captains such as the marshals Turenne and Condé. By 1701 Louis’s strategy aimed defensively to retain Spanish territories he had seized in the name of his grandson. His wars were costly, but France provided Louis the resources to pass a larger kingdom on to his successor.

From the sixth to fourth centuries BCE, the Persian empire under the Teispid and Achaemenid dynasties ruled most of western Asia and neighbouring regions, from the Indus river to Egypt and the coasts of the Aegean Sea. Despite the sources’ disproportionate emphasis on the failures of military expeditions against the overseas Greeks, the Persians enjoyed a lengthy period of military success and overall stability due in part to their rulers’ skill in the formulation of strategy. In the initial conquests, Persia absorbed peer competitors such as Babylon and Egypt; most subsequent conflicts pitted the empire’s superior forces against localised rebellions. Persia’s control stretched to vital subject communities in frontier zones and they also projected influence over external allies and clients. Persian kings rarely campaigned in person after the early expansionist phase, but relied on an exemplary communication system to manage satraps and other delegates tasked with provincial and frontier operations. To carry out military objectives, they relied on networks of provincial recruitment, supported as necessary by elements of a standing army associated with the royal court. Persian military activities were augmented by diplomatic outreach, most notably in Persia’s Greek relations after the failed invasion of mainland Greece. Persia’s strategic capabilities remained formidable until they were caught off guard by the tactical superiority of Alexander’s Macedonian invaders.

Air power, with its capability for mass destruction, changed the face of twentieth-century inter-state warfare and redefined what power means. Having had limited impact on the First World War, the unique characteristics of air power – speed, height and reach – were immediately recognised as were its attributes: ubiquity, agility and concentration. Theorists explored the potential of this novel instrument for future wars, with one school emphasising strategic utility while another school explored its potential in the context of continental land warfare. Theory directly influenced the creation of air power capabilities and air warfare during World War II. While military technologies – in particular due to precision munitions – and societal attitudes concerning the use of force have changed, the theoretical foundations of the interbellum and the debates about the utility of air power still resonate. Today air power has become the icon of Western-preferred style of warfare, having demonstrated its potential utility not only in inter-state wars but also during humanitarian interventions and irregular warfare. Air power can pose or counter threats simultaneously, across a far wider area than surface capabilities, and quickly switch the point of application within and between operational theatres to create tactical and strategic effects.

Europe across the period from 1000–1500 was characterised by a multiplicity of polities, but the majority were unified by membership of the Catholic Church. Indeed Latin Christendom (those polities that recognised papal authority and followed the Latin liturgy) doubled in size by the end of the twelfth century, as frontiers were pushed forward in the Holy Land, Sicily, the Iberian peninsula and the Baltic. This was generally achieved by extraordinary multi-polity coalitions loosely under the direction of the papacy, which confronted enemies of another faith and culture who seemed to present a military and existential threat to Christendom itself. Inter-polity conflict was nevertheless waged within Latin Christendom throughout the period, and especially after the collapse of Latin power in the Holy Land in 1291. As rulers focused more attention on nearby adversaries, they increasingly raised armies by contract for pay, aided by systems of credit, enabling the professionalisation of armies, to a limited extent. Meanwhile, throughout the period, securing divine support was considered important as military means in achieving strategic goals. The strategy and means of political–military elites are revealed through an increasing abundance of sources, notably chronicles and, particularly from the turn of the thirteenth century, an abundance of government records.

A history of the military strategy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) involves in part China’s use of force around its periphery; whether that is the Korean War (1950–1953), the Sino-Indian border clash (1962), the Sino-Russian border clash (1969), China’s seizure of islets in the Paracels from South Vietnam (1974), the Sino-Vietnamese border clash (1979) and finally China’s seizure of islets from Vietnam in the Spratlys (1988). A close examination of these campaigns reveals a mixed pattern of strategic signalling, military opportunism, punishing adversaries and bolstering buffer zones around China to accomplish China’s long-term strategic objectives with minimal risk to China itself. Curiously, the PRC embarked on a multi-decade period in which the Chinese did not use large-scale force and initiated a concerted effort at defence modernisation and economic development. This has led to a dramatic transformation of the People’s Liberation Army from a backward force into one of the most modern militaries on the planet.

Nuclear strategy as a concept defies easy characterisation. It is a contradiction in terms: such is the destructive power of many nuclear weapons that to employ them would not bring any tangible benefit, especially if the adversary could threaten nuclear retaliation. They hold so little political appeal that since 1945 nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict and are therefore effectively unusable as weapons. Moreover, the idea of a war in which only nuclear weapons are used might exist in theory but would be a remote possibility. Instead, the practice of nuclear strategy has been dominated by ideas and plans in which nuclear weapons might be used in the course of a war alongside conventional weapons. Thus, rather than a concept of ‘nuclear strategy’, a more accurate formulation would be a ‘strategy with a nuclear component’. Yet there remained utility in thinking in terms of ‘nuclear strategy’, particularly in relation to deterrence. This chapter will explore these complex dynamics in several ways. First, it will examine the strategic ideas underpinning use of the atomic bomb at the end of the Second World War. Second, it will discuss the different strategies nuclear states have devised in relation to other nuclear states. Finally, the strategies of non-nuclear states and nuclear aspirants when confronted with nuclear adversaries will be analysed.