The right to freedom of thought occupies a dubious position in Brazil. It completely lacks explicit constitutional or legal protection, despite a strong implicit recognition through derivative freedoms like expression, press and privacy. This research addresses this paradox, examining constitutional and legal frameworks, scholarly jurisprudence, significant court cases, and international treaties to delineate Freedom of Thought’s status in Brazil. It also considers recent legislative initiatives and the challenges that regulating misinformation poses for the right. The findings indicate that the right to Freedom of Thought functions as a vital juris-philosophical criterion in Brazil, underpinning various fundamental rights and playing a key role in the Supreme Court’s legal hermeneutics. Nevertheless, the absence of explicit protection leads to several limitations in its safeguard. First, it lacks a clear definition of its content and a precise delimitation of what it entails. It is also not acknowledged as a standalone right, being often conflated with other rights. Finally, its legal interpretation fluctuates with Brazil’s unstable case law. Remarkably, the internal dimension of Freedom of Thought remains largely unprotected and overlooked. The research underscores the need for explicit constitutional amendments and clearer legislative definitions to safeguard the right comprehensively, ensuring consistent legal recognition and protection in Brazil.

The rapid development in neurotechnology raises significant human rights concerns. A normative analysis of this emerging technology’s ability to interfere with individual’s mental processes, highlights the lack of a clear human rights framework protecting the human mind. In this chapter, we will outline the interplay between neurotechnology and the right to freedom of thought, as well as the plea for new neurorights. First, we will examine how neurotechnology interferes with people’s mental sphere, and how this may put human rights – and the right to freedom of thought in particular – at risk. Second, we analyse how the international community addresses the disruptive impact of neurotechnology and which role the freedom of thought is attributed in these efforts. Third, we explore the impact on this freedom, its capacity to address the challenges emanating from neurotechnology, and how it may be reconceptualised to serve as an effective safeguard. Finally, we offer general remarks on the necessity of new neurorights and explore the current positions of various international and supranational institutions on this issue.

As interdisciplinary work inquires into the scope and content of the right to freedom of thought, we confront two crucial questions; for the purposes of this legal right, what should qualify as thought and what makes thought free? This chapter draws upon philosophical and psychological literature to suggest answers to these questions. First, we argue that thought does not only occur in a forum internum inside our heads. We propose that the right to freedom of thought should recognise and protect two types of what we call forum externum thought. Type 1 is ‘extended thought’. This occurs when we extend our mind using features of our body or environment, such as diary use and internet search (under certain circumstances). Type 2 is ‘thoughtspeech’. This occurs when we speak with others to think aloud together. We propose Type 1 and Type 2 forum externum thought should receive absolute protection only when they are employed for the purposes of self-government and truth-seeking respectively. We then turn to the question of what makes thought free. Here we focus on how the ‘trust and glue’ criteria for the extended mind can inform our consideration of what should count as impermissible alteration of extended thought. We conclude by pointing to the need for future transdisciplinary work to support the development of this right.

This chapter introduces the reader to the handbook with a particular focus on the methodology employed by contributors to the book. Drawing on the various contributions, the chapter presents a brief comparative overview of the right to freedom of thought before offering some reflections on the scope of the right.

This chapter analyses the right to freedom of thought in the Chilean legal order, considering its various juristic dimensions. Though historically rooted in the nation’s foundational charters, it remains ambiguously defined within its legal system, primarily interpreted through the lenses of freedom of conscience and expression. This chapter argues that whilst the right to freedom of thought has not yet been explicitly enshrined in the Chilean Constitution, it has been implicitly incorporated through international human rights treaties; however, due to recent technological advances, a pressing re-evaluation has arisen. The 2021 Constitutional Reform Act innovatively protected brain activities by resorting to the right to mental integrity, introducing a paradigm shift in juridical safeguarding of cognitive freedoms. This development, however, presents new conceptual and systematic challenges. The chapter focuses on the historical evolution of the right to freedom of thought, judicial interpretations, and scholarly perspectives, mainly concentrating on the emerging category of ‘neurorights’. It examines the implications of the 2021 constitutional amendment and argues for a more precise recognition and theoretical development of the right in response to neurotechnological progress. The analysis underscores the necessity of unambiguously defining cognitive freedoms and freedom of thought to provide adequate legal protections in an era of rapid technological change.

The right to freedom of thought is guaranteed by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, yet current jurisprudence interprets the right as a mere dimension of freedom of expression, also protected by Article 13. Contemporary neurotechnology research presents the possibility for human thoughts to be tracked, recorded, analysed and predicted. This applies pressure upon the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ current understanding of the right to freedom of thought. This chapter examines how Article 13 has been interpreted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at different stages of its jurisprudence. It then argues for an evolution in the interpretation of Article 13 whereby the right to freedom of thought is understood as a distinct right, separate from freedom of expression.

Focusing on the right to FoT in the digital age, this chapter sheds light on the societal dimensions of FoT by drawing on the broader and relational concept of thought. It discusses the societal dimensions in light of the four attributes of the right to FoT – the right not to reveal our thoughts; not to be punished for our thoughts; not to have our thoughts manipulated; and, the state duty to create an enabling environment for the fulfilment of the right. The societal dimensions of FoT are justified based on the necessity to nurture the emergence of a critical, reflective, self-determined and democratic society and for the realisation of social harmony.

The right to freedom of thought is not explicitly mentioned in the German Basic Law. This chapter examines whether and how freedom of thought might be implicitly protected in the Basic Law (GG), focusing on the right to freedom of belief, conscience and religion (Article 4 GG), the right to freedom of expression and information (Article 5 GG), the right to human dignity (Article 1(1) GG) and the general right of personality (Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) GG). Freedom of thought is sometimes mentioned in the literature in connection with freedom of belief, conscience and religion and freedom of expression and information as a necessary precondition for the formation of convictions and opinions. Inner freedom is an inherent aspect of human dignity, but only extreme forms of interference with the inner freedom of the person constitute a violation of this right. The general right of personality protects the prerequisites of personal freedom and self-determination and therefore could provide the most comprehensive protection for a person’s inner freedom. It is therefore argued that while freedom of thought is within the scope of protection of these four rights, it can be rooted in the general right of personality in particular.

Although section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifies the fundamental freedoms of ‘thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication’, only freedom of expression has been developed by the courts. These forgotten freedoms include freedom of thought. This chapter demonstrates how Canada’s own constitutional text and history supports a new recognition of freedom of thought that would overcome a recent history of forgetting this constitutional freedom. Canada’s own constitutional case law, read creatively, contains the seeds of a framework for freedom of thought, with upcoming potential to put arguments before the courts in cases where significant litigation efforts will be made. This chapter sets how the Canadian Charter protects specific elements of the right which are mental privacy, mental liberty and mental autonomy. The contemporary debate within the present international discussion generates an intellectual atmosphere and comparative case law that can support a remembering of the forgotten freedom of thought.

Liberty of thought is the first liberty that the Preamble to the Constitution of India aims to secure. Yet, one finds no mention of ‘thought’ as one of the protected freedoms under Part III of the Constitution, which safeguards fundamental rights. This chapter takes the first steps to address this riddle and locating the normative foundations for the right. It argues that while the Preambular ideal itself is insufficient to confer a substantive right, its role in judicial interpretation, along with the interrelationship between fundamental rights, provides a robust normative foundation for the right to freedom of thought in India. Specifically, the chapter discusses the development of the right to mental privacy in the context of brain-reading in Selvi, and later in Puttaswamy. The right to (mental) privacy read into dignity by the Supreme Court of India already takes steps towards constructing a forum internum, and on the other hand, the challenge of the vulnerability of the legal subject becomes evident in the context of the right to freedom of conscience. Regarding the absolute nature of the right, this chapter argues that only as a Preambular ideal is the liberty of thought absolute within the Indian legal framework.

France has been at the forefront of the philosophical reflection on freedom of thought, along with the related freedoms of opinion and of conscience. Today, freedom of thought is constitutionally protected under French law as affirmed in Article 11 which makes the ‘free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious rights of man’. However, freedom of thought has received limited attention in French legal scholarship and is seldom considered as a standalone and influential factor in legal disputes, some even suggesting that France may be falling behind other democratic states in terms of the effective affirmation and protection of freedom of conscience in particular. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate how the right to freedom of thought finds expression in French positive law, as well as how it has been used distinctively and practically by the courts, if at all. Following a concise examination of the underlying concept, this chapter considers the legal foundations of freedom of thought and its implementation within the judicial system, with particular focus on the Constitutional Council.

Article 19 of the Constitution of Japan, which states, “Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated,” guarantees freedom of thought, a historically significant right due to its absence in the previous 1889 Imperial Constitution and subsequent suppression of ideologies like communism and anti-imperialism. Post-Second World War reforms led to its explicit inclusion in the 1946 Constitution. Although there are not many lawsuits regarding whether government acts or statutes violate this right is into question, the Japanese Supreme Court (SCJ) has said something about the right. The SCJ has ruled that it primarily protects a person’s world vision or life view but does not cover all mental activities. The SCJ has identified both direct (e.g., compulsion to hold or confess specific thoughts) and indirect restrictions (e.g., a compulsion to school teachers to stand up and sing the national anthem at school ceremonies such as entrance and graduation), with some restrictions deemed constitutional if justified. In this sense, Freedom of thought is not absolute in Japan. The SCJ also addresses the balance of interests in private relations, acknowledging the indirect effect of constitutional rights.

The right to freedom of thought in Africa is governed by three frameworks. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not explicitly recognise this right but includes freedom of conscience and religion in Article 8. This provision covers both forum internum (absolute freedom of conscience) and forum externum (free practice of religion, subject to limitations). However, the African Commission and the African Court often conflate these rights, resulting in limited case law. Some cases suggest a broad interpretation of Article 8 to include various beliefs, implying freedom of thought, supported by related rights like freedom of expression. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child explicitly includes freedom of thought in Article 9, but its scope is unclear due to the lack of case law. This inclusion supports the extension of this right into adulthood under Article 8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ensuring individuals retain their freedom of thought beyond childhood. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa does not explicitly mention freedom of thought, but this right can be inferred from the rights to free development of personality and participation in political and decision-making processes.