This chapter of the handbook asks whether, and in what ways, emotions can be designated as “moral”. Several emotions have been shown to be associated with moral judgments or moral behaviors. But more than association must be shown if we label some emotions characteristically moral. The author guides the reader through a voluminous literature and applies two criteria to test the moral credentials of emotions. The first criterion is whether the emotion is significantly elicited by moral stimuli; the second is whether it has significant community-benefiting consequences. This second criterion, less often used in past analyses, tries to capture the fact that moral norms, judgments, and decisions are all intended to benefit the community, so moral emotions should too. From this analysis, the author concludes that anger clearly meets the criteria, contempt and disgust less so. Guilt passes easily, and shame fares better than some may expect. Among the positive candidates, compassion and empathy both meet the criteria but are somewhat difficult to separate. Finally, elevation and awe have numerous prosocial consequences, but awe is rarely triggered by moral stimuli.

This chapter of the handbook tackles the question of how first-person moral judgments and moral behavior are conceptually linked. The authors frame their discussion in terms of a philosophical puzzle known as “Hume’s Problem.” The puzzle arises from the conjunction of three ideas: Humeanism, the idea that beliefs alone do not suffice to motivate action; internalism, the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating; and cognitivism, the idea that moral judgments are beliefs. These three ideas are jointly inconsistent, so at least one of them must be false. But which one? The authors focus their attention on two possible solutions to the puzzle: the externalist solution, which denies that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating (rescinding internalism); and the noncognitivist solution, which denies that moral judgments are beliefs (rescinding cognitivism). Based on the psychological and neuropsychological evidence bearing on these proposals, however, it appears that neither of these solutions to Hume’s Problem has solid empirical support.

This chapter of the handbook discusses the role of mind perception in the categorization of individuals as moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are defined as individuals that can commit morally wrong actions; moral patients are defined as individuals that can be morally wronged. It is generally agreed that the attribution of moral agency and moral patiency is linked to the attribution of mental capacities and traits. The chapter surveys a variety of models of mind perception, some of which focus on the representation of mental capacities, some of which focus on the representation of mental traits. The dominant model of mind perception in moral psychology is the experience-agency model, which divides the space of mindedness into experiential capacities like sentience and self-awareness, and agentic capacities like deliberative reasoning and self-control. Reviewing the empirical literature on moral categorization, the author argues that neither the experience-agency model nor any of the major alternatives to it captures all the factors to which everyday attributions of moral agency and moral patiency are sensitive.

This chapter of the handbook tackles a frequently discussed topic in moral psychology: moral dilemmas. The authors offer a normative characterization of moral dilemmas as a situation in which every available course of action involves a difficult moral trade-off and it is morally appropriate for the agent to feel conflicted about the choices available. The authors then explore different empirical accounts of why some moral trade-offs are experienced as difficult or impossible to resolve. Among the most influential of these accounts is dual-process theory, which traces the experience of moral dilemmas to a conflict between a value backed by automatic emotional processes and a value backed by reflection. The authors argue against the dual-process account, and review empirical research bearing on the psychological mechanisms underpinning a person’s experience and resolution of moral dilemmas, as well as the phenomenon of “moral residue.” They argue that further empirical work is needed to understand how people weigh competing values against one another and that such understanding requires expanding the range of moral dilemmas to include cases beyond those targeted in recent research.

This chapter of the handbook compares the major moral sanctioning behaviors of blame and punishment from two perspectives: their cultural history and their underlying psychology. The author draws a dividing line between two phases of human evolution – before and after human settlement – and proposes that, before that watershed, moral sanctions were informal, nonhierarchical, and often mild, akin to today’s acts of moral blame among intimates. Soon after settlement, hierarchies emerged, in which punishment took hold as a new form of sanctioning, typically exacted by those higher up in the hierarchy, and eventually by institutions of punishment. The author reviews the empirical evidence on the cognitive and social processes underlying each of these sanctioning tools and proposes that their distinct cultural histories are reflected in their psychological properties we can observe today. Whereas blame is, on the whole, flexible, effective, and cognitively sophisticated, punishment is often more damaging, less effective, and can easily be abused – as in past and modern forms of institutional punishment.

This chapter of the handbook reviews empirical research on moral character, which has only recently attained a prominent role in psychology, in contrast to long traditions in ethics and education. A person’s moral character comprises their dispositions to think, feel, and act morally, and these dispositions are cross-situationally and temporally fairly consistent. Against a long-standing belief in psychology that the personality disposition of warmth most strongly influences people’s impressions of one another, the evidence suggests that moral character occupies this central position. Moral character exerts its influence on impressions quite independently of other personality traits, and it features prominently in people’s representations of their own personality as well. Moral character is also a central element in a person’s perceived identity – who the person is perceived to be “deep down.” The authors close by charting some of the features from which people infer another’s moral character, including their actions but also, critically, their mental states such as their goals and intentions.

This chapter examines the extent to which e-commerce platforms may be held liable for problematic goods sold by third-party sellers on their websites. Several courts have hesitated to find e-commerce platforms liable under products liability and warranty law for products sold on their marketplaces by third-party sellers. This chapter argues that the increasing shift from in-person sales of goods to online sales necessitates a shift in current interpretations of key principles under state products liability and warranty law under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to better protect consumer interests. E-commerce platforms should, upon meeting certain criteria, be viewed as sellers and merchants for purposes of Article 2 warranties and products liability law. This chapter also highlights the role of state consumer law mandating product warnings and the federal Communications Decency Act, which, in some cases, may pose a hurdle to successful consumer claims against e-commerce platforms. The chapter concludes by offering a path forward.

3D printing, or additive manufacturing, has consequences for intellectual property (IP) law and for business models. The mechanical and digital technology of 3D printing enables the creations of a three-dimensional object from a digital 3D software model in a Computer-aided Design (CAD) file. The 3D printing platforms for creating, modifying, and transferring CAD files can take place in digital form easily and quickly, which presents opportunities for copying and raises new IP law protection considerations. 3D printing’s proliferating use by hobbyists and in new industries transforms traditional methods of creation, distribution, and sale of goods through the use of CAD files, and, in so doing, raises questions about the scope of IP legal protection and necessitates reevaluation of IP statutes. 3D printing’s technological advancement may require IP laws to evolve and respond to the nature of the technology. In addition, 3D printing raises new considerations for business models and for the supply chain due to the technology’s ability to provide complexity, customization, efficiency, expansive range of applications, and modularization. Moreover, the digital nature of CAD files, which embody physical objects in digital form, transforms design, modification, and transfer of objects and parts, reallocating production of objects to be more nimble and more flexible. As such, 3D printing can enable a new way to mass customize and can replace mass production in ways that allow new business entities to capture a new way of creating value.

Quantum technologies are promising to become one of the most impactful emerging technologies of the century. As governments and the private sector race to achieve quantum supremacy, it is crucial for the legal community to understand and analyze how these technologies will influence societies and shape consumer experiences. This essay offers an overview of the potential impacts of Quantum Information Science and Technology (QIST) on privacy as we know it today. It reviews quantum computers, quantum internet, quantum encryptions, and quantum sensing to offer a brief introduction of these fields for the legal community. This essay then proposes a novel analytical framework for future scholarly work on QIST privacy impacts. It concludes that QIST could have primary and secondary effects on privacy that would both improve and undermine privacy. Understanding the challenges that privacy scholars may soon face and having a robust framework to work with is a crucial step for future research in this emerging area of study.

The right to repair not only has important consumer value by preserving the useful life of existing products, but it also has additional and important social value by conserving natural resources and reducing pollution. However, the consumer right to repair in recent years has come under threat through the overextension by intellectual property (IP) doctrines that avoid current limits on antitrust liability by leasing or licensing rather than selling products to avoid “exhausting” IP rights and by applying IP rights to smaller portions of overall sold products, thereby treating parts rehabilitation or parts supply as prohibited acts of making or importation. Constitutional conflicts preemption might address some of these concerns, but federal legislation also is needed to protect consumers’ right to repair their purchased products.

This chapter explores the intersection of property law and consumer protection in the digital age, particularly in the context of purchasing technological or digital goods. The unique nature of transactions involving autonomous vehicles, drones, robot-chefs, smart appliances, and eBooks raises questions about the traditional understanding of property rights. While existing critiques often rely on contract law and consumer protection regulations, this chapter argues for the affirmative use of property law in addressing the challenges posed by the restricted usability and alienability of digital products. The prevailing assumption that property law is unsuitable for such issues is challenged, and the chapter advocates for a theoretical and normative shift. By analyzing the regulation and management of technological property through a property law lens, the chapter proposes a new perspective and outlines a roadmap for understanding and addressing the property challenges inherent in the digital consumer landscape.

The EU is attempting to indirectly regulate the Internet of Things by improving access to data through a cross-sectoral data governance framework. On the face of it, recent EU data governance laws – Data Governance Act, Digital Markets Act, Digital Services Act, AI Act – go in the direction of more open, accessible, and reusable data. However, they tend to balance that ethos with provisions that IoT big tech can use to retain and strengthen data enclosures. This chapter aims to critically assess whether the attempt to balance openness and IP results in the prevalence of closed IoT systems, thus ultimately preventing smart data from reuse that would otherwise benefit society at large.

The auction of Bored Ape #8817 for $3.4 million in October 2021 marked a watershed moment in the escalating trend of non-fungible tokens (NFTs). This chapter ventures into the core of the tokenization phenomenon, scrutinizing the legal implications of creating digital representations (tokens) of diverse assets. Amid the burgeoning NFT market, a pivotal question emerges: What precisely are the property rights conferred upon those acquiring these tokens? Beyond the staggering sales figures, the chapter dissects the tokenization process, emphasizing the NFT minting process and blockchain technology. It explores claims that NFTs herald the future of digital property, challenging traditional governmental powers. Anticipating legal challenges, the chapter navigates critical inquiries about token holders’ rights, the tethering (or not) of tokens to underlying assets, and the impact of the 2022 Uniform Commercial Code revisions. This chapter seeks to provide a nuanced perspective, unraveling legal realities from the fervor surrounding tokenization’s transformative potential in the digital era.