The online environment has proven over the last thirty years to be a crucible for the study of legal authority, legitimacy and reception. The overlapping claims of local and global lawmakers are now magnified beyond the scope of what was possible before this global, virtual telecommunications space was opened to individuals and communities. Law is a mix of the local and the regional. We have come to recognise the transnational nature of law with decentred sources of authority claims such as the European Union. What the online digital environment has opened is a digital ‘right to roam’.

This chapter examines some ways in which human agency might be affected by a transition from legal regulation to regulation by AI. To do that, it elucidates an account of agency, distinguishing it from related notions like autonomy, and argues that this account of agency is both philosophically respectable and fits common sense. With that account of agency in hand, the chapter then examines two different ways – one beneficial, one baleful – in which agency might be impacted by regulation by AI, focussing on some agency-related costs and benefits of transforming private law from its current rule-based regulatory form to an AI-enabled form of technological management. It concludes that there are few grounds to be optimistic about the effects of such a transition and good reason to be cautious.

This chapter argues that care must be taken when considering whether law reform is essential in light of new technologies and their applications. The application of each new technology raises its own issues, and not all of these will invariably require legal change – but some undoubtedly will because the issues raised are beyond the reach of existing laws. In line with this argument, a sketch is presented of a methodical approach for determining whether and how consumer protection law should be reformed in the face of technological developments. Focusing on the need to determine the precise challenges the new technology poses invites an open mind to the legal reform response, and it is important to test each option (tweaking existing rules, creating of analogous rules attuned to the digital and technological advances, or new models of regulation including solutions focused on technological applications rather than consumer rights) to find the best mix of responses, subject to the overriding requirement to ensure that consumer protection is not diluted. This approach is then tested in respect of two areas, the reform of the EU’s Product Liability regime and the arrival of digital assistants which will enable algorithmically automated contracting.

Legal ‘regulatory escape’, ‘regulatory disconnection’ or ‘regulatory disruption’ on the part of particular regulatees or commercial practices has been observed across diverse regulatory environments, ranging from environmental protection to provision of gambling services. Instances of legal regulatory escape appear particularly prevalent with the introduction of novel technology products and services. Evaluation of technology-related legal regulatory escapes provides examples of deliberate, even overt, evasion of legal constraints, as well as avoidance via practices such as regulatory mimicry or differentiation. This chapter identifies examples of recent legal technology-related ‘regulatory escape’, discusses key reasons why legal regulation may fail to effectively cater for complications arising from specific technology practices, products or classes of regulatee and considers possible regulatory responses to address the risks, or capture the benefits, of technological advances.

This chapter explores the potential and limitations of AI in the legal field, with a focus on its application in legal research through tools like Lexis+ AI. It critically evaluates Lexis+ AI’s capability in case retrieval, a crucial function for legal professionals who rely on accurate and comprehensive legal sources to inform their work. The study provides an empirical analysis of Lexis+ AI’s performance on cryptocurrency-related legal queries, revealing that while the tool can generate accurate responses, it often falls short in terms of relevance and completeness. This chapter concludes by discussing the implications for legal professionals and legal tech companies, emphasizing the need for ongoing refinement of AI technologies, the importance of keeping legal professionals involved in decision-making processes, and the necessity of further collaboration between the legal and tech sectors.

This chapter discusses the default mode network (DMN), a set of anatomically distinct and functionally correlated brain regions robustly active during the resting state. Once considered the “task negative” network, the DMN is now appreciated as integral to a variety of higher-level, goal-directed skills that are bidirectionally linked to language. Such abilities are dependent on optimal interaction of the DMN with other brain networks. We first review the DMN’s association with cognition and language in the healthy brain, as well as how these change with aging, stroke, and neurodegeneration. Next, we survey existing research describing changes in DMN activation and functional connectivity in post-stroke and primary progressive aphasia as they relate to language impairment. While this connection remains poorly elaborated, we propose that current evidence supports a potential therapeutic role for the DMN, such as through offering targets for noninvasive brain stimulation that support domain-general skills and are also better structurally preserved in post-stroke and primary progressive aphasias compared to the language regions primarily impacted by these disorders. Greater understanding of the DMN’s role in language disruption, decline, maintenance, and recovery could ultimately help to improve outcomes for individuals with aphasia due to stroke or neurodegeneration.

Antimicrobial resistance is a multidisciplinary issue that has been high in the global agenda since the 2015 WHO Global Action Plan (GAP) and the 2016 UNGA Declaration. The Quadripartite Coalition has set up a consolidated global governance structure to coordinate AMR responses, including a Global Leaders Group, an Independent Panel of Experts and a stakeholders’ platform. At the national level, countries have set up more or less formal mechanisms to coordinate AMR management, develop and implement National Action Plans.

This chapter will draw on these pilot experiences to identify options for broader One Health governance and regulation. The chapter will examine global and regional governance and regulation of AMR – focusing on the EU as a case study – to explore possible applications to other priority areas such as zoonotic diseases.

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) agreed to ‘draft and negotiate a WHO convention, agreement or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response’ (Pandemic Treaty).

Proposals for a Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) System were included from the earliest drafts of the Pandemic Treaty. Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) is a transactional mechanism with its origins in international environmental law, where access to genetic resources for use in research and development is provided in exchange for a share of the benefits associated with their use. The purpose is to generate benefits that can be channelled into environmental conservation and sustainable use activities in countries where the genetic resources originate.

The PABS System could be a mechanism for incorporating One Health considerations into the Pandemic Treaty, but this will depend on its design and implementation. This chapter analyses the proposed PABS System in the Pandemic Treaty negotiating texts to determine whether it constitutes a genuine attempt to apply a One Health approach to pathogen ABS.

The relationship between One Health and human rights is both symbiotic and antagonistic. The objectives of One Health align with human rights to the extent that they advance specific rights, particularly the rights to life and health. One Health also promotes human dignity, the foundation of human rights, by improving environmental conditions and addressing threats to health that impact people’s lives. Yet the inherent anthropocentrism of human rights sits uneasily with One Health’s commitment to human, animal, and environmental health. The growing field of environmental human rights may offer some way forward for resolving this tension and advancing the legal framework for One Health, while also highlighting some of the potential pitfalls along the way. Early environmental human rights positioned the environment as a precondition for the enjoyment of human rights. More recently the right to a healthy environment has been recognised more widely, expanding the potential for human rights objectives to include protection of environmental health, and perhaps also animal health. This chapter will explore the lessons that human rights law might offer and the potential for the right to a healthy environment to temper the anthropocentrism of human rights in a way that better promotes the triple objectives of One Health.