Legal futurists have urged judiciaries to experiment with automated legal systems. However, for many aspects of legal systems, there is a common sense that their translation into computation would be inappropriate. The simultaneous malleability of legal systems and prevalence of constitutive practices within them, should lead to a two-level consideration of (1) what aspects of a liberal legal order are crucial, and (2) for those that are crucial, what is lost when that aspect is either partially or fully automated. In legal decision-making, some patterns of action are merely instrumental to achieving ends, while others are essential, or constitutive: the activity should no longer even be considered part of a liberal legal order when the practice ceases. Administrative processes that are simply incidental and instrumental to the legitimate resolution of a case are well primed for automation. Other practices are essential and intrinsically important, and properly resist being converted into machine-readable code. Distinctions between incidental and constitutive, or instrumentally and intrinsically important, aspects of law, should both bound and guide legal automation.

Can AI adjudicative tools in principle better enable us to achieve the rule of law by replacing judges? This chapter argues that answers to this question have been excessively focused on ‘output’ dimensions of the rule of law – such as conformity of decisions with the applicable law – at the expense of vital ‘process’ considerations such as explainability, answerability, and reciprocity. These process considerations do not by themselves warrant the conclusion that AI adjudicative tools can never, in any context, properly replace human judges. But they help bring out the complexity of the issues – and the potential costs – that are involved in this domain.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has started to make its way into Spanish court practice, especially in criminal justice. Furthermore, this trend has been accompanied by two new regulations: the EU AI Act, the world’s first comprehensive law on the topic, and the Spanish Royal Decree-Law No. 6 of 2023. At present, there are already several AI-based tools used by Spanish courts and the application of them proves highly beneficial, in particular in certain areas of criminal justice. Nevertheless, AI use can pose serious problems related to conflict with different fundamental rights of the accused. Therefore, its use should be considered with great caution.

Artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly intersects with judicial processes, raising new challenges for courts and judges. One significant concern linked to this development is the ability of judges and court personnel to understand, evaluate, and critically engage with AI systems. The EU Artificial Intelligence Act adopted in 2024 addresses this directly, requiring public bodies using AI to ensure their staff possess a ‘sufficient level of AI literacy’. This chapter argues that enhancing AI competence among judges and court personnel is essential to safeguarding the right to a fair trial, legal certainty, and the rule of law in an increasingly digitalised legal environment. After providing a brief overview of AI literacy obligations in the EU AI Act, the chapter offers insights into how national judicial training institutions could integrate AI literacy into their curricula.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into judicial decision-making presents both opportunities and challenges, particularly in balancing legal certainty and judicial discretion. While AI-driven tools are designed to enhance consistency and efficiency, their growing influence may subtly reshape judicial reasoning, potentially narrowing judicial discretion. This chapter examines how algorithmic recommendations – rather than merely assisting adjudication – can become dominant reference points, steering judicial outcomes toward standardisation over case-specific interpretation. Drawing on empirical psychological research, behavioural law, and economics, and the works of Richard Posner, Aharon Barak, and other legal theorists, the chapter explores the psychological mechanisms underlying this shift, particularly phenomena known as ‘automation bias’ and the ‘anchoring effect’, which may unconsciously influence judicial decision-making. The analysis highlights these psychological and structural challenges, inviting reflection on how AI-driven legal certainty impacts judicial discretion and the space for individualised legal reasoning in modern adjudication.

This article offers an assessment of the current state of scholarship on animal ethics in Islam. It first discusses a group of texts that share the preoccupation of demonstrating the superiority of Islam’s animal teachings, thus exhibiting a clearly apologetic tone. Then it turns to the debate on animal ethics in Western academia. By raising challenging questions, the latter holds the promise of delving deeper into the subject, but at its current stage much of it is still hampered by factual inaccuracies and methodological flaws. In conclusion, the article explains why the subject of animal ethics in Islam is particularly deserving of careful study.

This chapter focuses on AI and its impact on transparency in judicial decision-making. Transparency is one of the core values of the rule of law, and essential for maintaining the trust and accountability of the judiciary and justice system as a whole. Drawing upon semi-structured expert interviews with members of judiciary and legal profession, case law and real-life examples of AI tools, the chapter considers four questions: why transparency matters in the context of judicial decision-making; the information that judges must have and communicate to satisfy the demands of transparency; whether they have access to this information; and, if not, what we might do about this deficit. We argue that two complementary solutions can strengthen judicial transparency in the age of AI: (1) a regulatory framework that mandates disclosure of specific information pertaining to the code and variables used in AI tools; and (2) robust use of the due process duty to provide adequate reasons for a judicial decision that depends upon the output of a predictive tool. These steps are essential to reconcile judicial use of AI with the need for transparency, as a foundational aspect of justice and rule of law.

International human rights courts and treaty bodies are increasingly turning to automated decision-making (ADM) technologies to expedite and improve their review of individual complaints. These tribunals have yet to consider many of the legal, normative, and practical issues raised by the use of different types of automation technologies for these purposes. This chapter offers an initial assessment of the benefits and challenges of introducing ADM into international human rights adjudication. We weigh up the benefits of introducing these tools to improve international human rights adjudication – which include greater speed and efficiency in processing and sorting cases, identifying patterns in jurisprudence, and enabling judges and staff to focus on more complex responsibilities – against two types of cognitive biases – biases inherent in the datasets on which ADM is trained, and biases arising from interactions between humans and machines. We also introduce a framework for enhancing the accountability of ADM tools that mitigates the potential harms caused by automation technologies in this context.

Chapter 15 provides a biographical analysis of Manley O. Hudson’s role as a networker between the League of Nations and American elites during the interwar period. As a professor at Harvard Law School, Hudson played a pivotal role in advancing the League’s agenda in the United States. Through his extensive travels and engagements with American elites, Hudson circulated information, offered advice, and forged connections that helped to shape the American perspective on international law. The chapter examines how Hudson’s life and profession shaped his development into a prominent figure in a transatlantic network formed around the League of Nations system. Drawing on Hudson’s private papers and other archives, the chapter situates his intellectual and professional work within its social and historical context. By exploring Hudson’s intersecting roles as practitioner, advocate, and academic, we gain insight into his evolution as a leading American international lawyer. This examination allows us to understand the self-perception and worldview of one of the key figures in the development of international law and the complex relationship between the League and the United States. The chapter contributes to the trend in international and transnational history that uses biography to portray transnational spaces and experiences beyond national frameworks.

Say an AI program passes a Turing test because it can converse in a way indistinguishable from a human. And say that its developers can then teach it to converse – and even present an extended persuasive argument – in a way indistinguishable from the sort of human we call a ‘lawyer’. The program could thus become an AI brief-writer, capable of regularly winning brief-writing competitions against human lawyers. If and when that happens, this chapter argues, the same technology can be used to create AI judges, judges that we should accept as no less reliable than human judges, and more cost-effective. If the software can create persuasive opinions, capable of regularly winning opinion-writing competitions against human judges, we should accept it as a judge, even if the opinions do not stem from human judgment.

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the history and developments of AI in courts. In particular, through the lens of legal informatics, we explore four phases in the development and evolution of AI in courts: judicial information retrieval, human-made models of judicial reasoning, machine learning for judicial prediction, and large language models for courts. For each of these, we explore the opportunities and challenges in their implementation and adoption within the judicial system.

The Nordic countries became members of the League of Nations in 1920. This changed the international position of the five Nordic states considerably and also had legal reverberations. During the League’s function, a substantial number of jurists from the five Nordic states contributed to the diverse discourses on the legal dimensions of the organization, its character, and its many functions. The legal expertise on international law grew out of the nineteenth-century inter-Nordic union conflicts that prepared the Nordic jurists formodern international law at the beginning of the twentieth century. The legal scholars were often both jurists and politicians and their legal reasoning and political considerations were intimately intertwined. This chapter studies for the first time the many contributions from over thirty Nordic lawyers that were involved with the legal issues of the League system.

The judiciary must reflect the diversity of the population it serves to ensure justice is both impartial and perceived as fair. This chapter examines how AI in courts influences judicial diversity and legitimacy. While AI can uncover unconscious biases and enhance case analysis, judicial diversity remains essential to prevent AI from reinforcing existing prejudices. The chapter also explores identity awareness and institutional legitimacy. Like other democratic institutions, courts using AI must uphold representativeness. AI can foster collaborative constitutionalism by incorporating diverse perspectives in constitutional debates, helping address concerns about judicial legitimacy when unelected judges overturn decisions by elected representatives. Finally, the chapter considers how judges’ engagement with AI- driven social media affects transparency and public trust. As these technologies shape perceptions of the judiciary, they must be carefully managed to support judicial diversity and legitimacy. This is particularly important for judges from diverse backgrounds, who face greater risks of digital harassment, potentially undermining institutional trust and judicial integrity.

Chapter 20 explores the role of the League of Nations frameworks in the internationalization of human rights, with a focus on refugees, stateless individuals, and minorities. The League Covenant did not explicitly address human rights, but it did consider some humanitarian issues, such as the rights of populations in Mandated territories, stateless refugees, and minorities in specific regions like Danzig or Upper Silesia. Despite this, human rights were not a significant factor in shaping international law during the interwar period. Jurists, who were mostly male and aligned with national interests, favoured other issues like state sovereignty, international peace, and collective security. However, in 1929, the Institute of International Law (IIL) adopted a ’Declaration of International Rights of Man’, based on a project by the exiled Russian jurist André N. Mandelstam, that integrated gender equality. The aim was to submit it to the General Assembly of the League in 1933 in order to conclude a ’World Convention on human rights’. These efforts aimed to universalize human rights at a time dominated by colonialism, civilizational discourse, and inequality. The chapter delves into these initiatives within the IIL and their attempts to push for broader human rights legislation in the League of Nations.