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12267 results in Cambridge Handbooks

Page 581 of 614

  • Chapter 6 - Innateness and the Situated Mind

  • from Part II - Conceptual Foundations
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 96-116

  • Summary

    Situated theorists have reached something approximating an antinativist consensus. The advocate of extended cognition urges us to focus on the traits of extended systems, and it is difficult to see how genes could encode such traits, for genes would seem to affect directly only the organism itself. Humans categorize, perceive, remember, use language, reason, and make sense of the actions of others; these and more are abilities of persisting systems. In contrast, most actual extended systems are short-lived. The embedded approach minimizes the amount of internal representation used to model the human performance of cognitive tasks. Theories of cognition must make some allowance for persisting, internal representations. Children employ amodal representations from early on, and concepts are used in abstract thought, when one is, for example, alone in the study. The wide range of theoretical possibilities opens with respect to nativism and the situated modeling of cognition.

  • Chapter 18 - Situativity and Learning

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 347-367

  • Summary

    The tension in rejecting modularity and yet treating the mind/brain as the locus of control for cognitive activity should be apparent. Modularity is rejected as failing to recognize the diverse components involved in performing a cognitive task, and advocates of situated cognition likewise maintain that many cognitive activities involve components outside the agent itself. Dividing the mind/brain into component systems or modules has been a common strategy in both philosophical and psychological theorizing. Turning to the whole organism, the traditional view, which treats the skin as the boundary of the organism and the mind as coterminous with the brain and central nervous system, is well motivated. The mind/brain itself and the organism as a whole are open systems and dependent on the environment; hence, the quest to understand how a cognitive agent together with its various cognitive mechanisms is situated in its environment is also well motivated.

  • Chapter 17 - Situating Rationality

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 322-346

  • Summary

    This chapter discusses the importance of dynamics to understanding cognition. The author turns to the issue of how dynamics have been integrated into various theories of cognition. The author describes strengths and weaknesses of three main contenders in cognitive science, in relation to their incorporation of time into their methods of model construction. The neural engineering framework (NEF) is a general theory of neurobiological systems. Neural dynamics are characterized by considering neural representations as control theoretic state variables. Thus, the dynamics of neurobiological systems can be analyzed using control theory. The model employs biologically realistic neurons to learn the relevant structural transformations appropriate for a given context, and it generalizes such transformations to novel contents with the same syntactic structure. The intent of the NEF is to provide a suggestion as to how we might take seriously many of the important insights generated from cognitive science.

  • Chapter 26 - Neuroethology

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 480-504

  • Summary

    Decision analysis is concerned with the development of prescriptive methods for improving difficult real-life decisions. The basic principle is to divide and conquer, a complex decision is broken down into small manageable parts, judgments are made with respect to each part, and small parts are recombined to form an overall evaluation. Sequential-sampling models such as decision-field theory can be viewed as dynamic extensions of the traditional decision theories. Therefore, sequential sampling models provide a theoretical bridge between traditional decision theories and naturalistic decisions. Three related programs of research have examined judgment or decision making through what could be called a situated cognition perspective. Dynamic theories of decision making have the power to explain the basic findings from laboratory experiments, such as context-dependent preferences, as well as new phenomena that arise in the study of naturalistic decisions.

  • Chapter 23 - Emotions in the Wild

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 437-453

  • Summary

    This chapter presents an overview of situated work on memory and remembering. It covers relevant movements in cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, the social sciences and social philosophy, and distributed cognition. One respect in which a thoroughly situated approach to memory can push the existing ecological focus on real-life or everyday memory phenomena further is in presenting constructive processes in remembering, and, more generally, memory's openness to various forms of influence as more mundane or natural than inevitably dangerous. The chapter merges these ideas about interpersonal memory dynamics with the postconnectionist picture of human beings as essentially incomplete machines, apt to incorporate what has become apt for incorporation. Some of the liveliest recent applications of situated cognition to the case of memory show that systems of exograms are not necessarily meant to be permanent or limitlessly transmissible, or turn out to be less stable in practice than in intention.

  • Chapter 10 - Embedded Rationality

  • from Part II - Conceptual Foundations
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 171-182

  • Summary

    This chapter provides an introduction to systems thinking and its application in systems theory. This is followed by a review of the historical context in which a non-systems-thinking perspective developed in the study of intelligence, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI) research. Then, the chapter reviews how systems thinking relates to and is manifested in the study of cognition. Next, it summarizes crosscutting themes that constitute the scientific antecedents of situated cognition. Finally, the chapter focuses on recent and continuing dilemmas that foreshadowed the acceptance of situated cognition in the fields of AI and psychology, and suggests prospects for the next scientific advances. The study of animal navigation and social behavior is especially profound for AI and cognitive science because it reveals what simpler mechanisms, that is, fixed programs with perhaps limited learning during maturation, can accomplish.

  • Chapter 5 - Why the Mind Is Still in the Head

  • from Part II - Conceptual Foundations
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 78-95

  • Summary

    Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. Coupling arguments are far and away the primary sort of argument given in support of transcranialism. What is common to these arguments is a tacit move from the observation that process X is in some way causally connected (coupled) to a cognitive process Y to the conclusion that X is part of the cognitive process Y. Transcranialism is regularly backed by some form of coupling-constitution fallacy and that it does not have an adequate account of the difference between the cognitive and the noncognitive. A more nagging worry is the motivation for transcranialism. The difference explains why even transcranialists maintain that cognition extends from brains into the extraorganismal world rather than from the extraorganismal world into brains.

  • Chapter 21 - Situated Semantics

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 401-418

  • Summary

    This chapter sets out how an account of vision in which the world is considered to form an external memory allows for explanation of the experienced continuity of vision. It shows how the hypothesis of the world as an outside memory is supported by findings in the change and attentional blindness paradigms, as well as by the study of vision in action. The change blindness paradigm has generated much research and can be observed in a variety of situations (when the image change occurs during e.g. eye blinks). Further empirical confirmation of the idea that we do not continually represent the entire visual field in all its richness comes from the inattentional blindness paradigm. Data obtained by studying vision in natural conditions have highlighted features that are strongly supportive of the hypothesis of the world as an outside memory.

  • Chapter 22 - Is Consciousness Embodied?

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 419-436

  • Summary

    Spatial thinking is essential for survival. Elementary to survival is knowing where to go to find food, water, and shelter and knowing how to return, as well as how to gather the food and water when they are located. Space for the mind is not like space for the physicist or surveyor, where the dimensions of space are primary and things in space are located with respect to those dimensions. The body is the first space encountered, even before birth. Experience of other spaces is channeled through the body, through perception and action. The space immediately surrounding the body is the space of actual or potential perception and action. The space we experience as we hike in the mountains or go from home to work or wander through a museum is the space of navigation. Gestures have benefits both for those making the gestures and for those watching them.

  • Chapter 19 - Language in the Brain, Body, and World

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 368-381

  • Summary

    Among the most common informal fallacies in reasoning are fallacies of ambiguity. These are mistakes that hinge on a word or phrase that has one meaning in some or all of the premises of the argument but another meaning in other premises or in the conclusion. Many modern theories describe concepts of individuals or kinds as though these thoughts were reducible to thoughts or judgments about complexes of properties and then ignore the question of what it is to think of a property. Abilities to identify and reidentify appearances of the same objective thing as appearances of the same constitute a substantial part of the possession of any empirical concept. One's rationality depends at every point on the complex causal and informational structure of the empirical world. Rationality is firmly embedded in the world outside the mind.

  • Chapter 2 - Scientific Antecedents of Situated Cognition

  • from Part I - Backdrop
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 11-34

  • Summary

    This chapter provides an introduction to systems thinking and its application in systems theory. This is followed by a review of the historical context in which a non-systems-thinking perspective developed in the study of intelligence, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI) research. Then, the chapter reviews how systems thinking relates to and is manifested in the study of cognition. Next, it summarizes crosscutting themes that constitute the scientific antecedents of situated cognition. Finally, the chapter focuses on recent and continuing dilemmas that foreshadowed the acceptance of situated cognition in the fields of AI and psychology, and suggests prospects for the next scientific advances. The study of animal navigation and social behavior is especially profound for AI and cognitive science because it reveals what simpler mechanisms, that is, fixed programs with perhaps limited learning during maturation, can accomplish.

Page 581 of 614