This chapter examines how the interlocutors articulate more fully Critias’ conception of temperance or self-knowledge as a ‘science of science’. Also, it highlights features of the text designed to remind us of Socrates’ pursuit of self-knowledge through the cross-examination of himself and others about ‘the most important things’. Next, the analysis focuses on Socrates’ twofold puzzle motivating the investigation that will follow. The latter will be centred on two problems, one having to do with the possibility or conceivability of a ‘science of science’, the other with the benefit that such a science might bring.

In non-narrative contexts, the use of the present to refer to past events is supported by the idea that these events are currently accessible through some kind of record. In references to mythological events, the implied record is mythographical or iconographical. In references to historical events, the implied record is chronographical, such as the Parian Marble. In references to transactions in the legal and business spheres, the implied record is a document from the corresponding sphere, such as a sales contract. The implication conveyed by the construal of the designated past event as being 'on record' is that this event is well-documented and of some importance in recorded history.

The introduction discusses the relationship between grammatical tense and the conceptualisation of time. It then presents an overview of the argument of each of the book's chapters. A discussion follows of aspects of Mental Spaces Theory, with special attention paid to the concepts of the 'ground' and of 'representation'. Points of the Classical Greek tense and aspect system are discussed.

In this study, I have put forward a cognitive account of tense-switching, that is, an account that is based on the presupposition that the meaning behind the variation between the past and present tenses lies in the particular conceptual structure evoked by each. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.2, many scholars have thought that the flexibility of use of the present tense forces the linguist to drop the entire assumption that the present tense designates present time reference. For example, Fludernik (1991: 386) argued that ‘specific uses of the present tense (such as the historical present tense) cannot be explained as “signifying present relevance”, “lifting past events into the present of the speaker’s reporting” and the like’. I hope to have made a convincing argument that not only is it theoretically possible to explain the use of the present tense to refer to the past in terms of present time reference but that such an approach yields a deeper understanding of the phenomenon than one that focuses purely on functional aspects and ignores the conceptual dimension.

The chapter examines Charmides’ first definition of temperance as ‘a kind of quietness’ and Socrates’ refutation of it. It reconstructs the argument by which the definition is refuted and argues that, if we pay attention to the details and nuances introduced by Socrates, we find that the refutation is more successful than it has been commonly believed to be.

This chapter offers a comprehensive overview of the main issues raised by the Charmides and debated in the secondary literature. In addition to an interpretative summary of the dialogue, it discusses the historical context, contends that the main characters are systematically ambiguous, surveys the rival interpretations of the dialogue’s subject and strategies, and explores its intertextual dimensions. Importantly, it outlines the interpretation that will be defended in the following chapters, which pivots on a distinction between two rival conceptions of self-knowledge at play in the dialogue, one attributable to Socrates and consisting in finding the limits of human knowledge, the other advanced by Critias and transcending those limits. The latter is Critias’ conception of the ‘science of science’, which, the commentary contends, is the sole direct object of refutation occupying the second part of the dialogue.

The chapter addresses the second horn of the puzzle articulated by Socrates, i.e. whether, assuming that a ‘science of science’ is possible, it is beneficial for us. The Argument from Benefit suggests a negative answer to that question and conducts a devastating attack against Critias’ conception of temperance as a science only of science itself. Even though the Argument from Benefit raises conceptual and psychological issues, its main focus is ethical and political. In particular, Critias’ ideal of the rule of the ‘science of science’ is suggestive of an incongruous society run by technocrats rather than statesmen, under the guidance of a science revolving solely around itself and oblivious to the common good. Socrates’ critique is particularly relevant in light of contemporary populist tendencies away from politics and towards a technocratic and managerial model of governance.

This chapter as well as the next lie at the heart of the interpretation defended in this monograph. Chapter 10 focuses on the Argument from Relatives, which addresses the first horn of the puzzle raised by Socrates, namely whether a ‘science of science’ is possible. While this argument is commonly believed to deliberately undermine its own point, on the account offered in this chapter the Argument from Relatives is both dialectically effective and philosophically legitimate. Notably, it makes a perfectly plausible philosophical point, namely that strict reflexivity is a phenomenon both psychologically implausible and conceptually problematic. The commentary takes on board recent advances in the interpretation of Platonic relativity and shows Plato venturing into the domains of epistemology, metaphysics, and logic.

The topic of this chapter is Charmides’ final attempt to define temperance: temperance is ‘doing one’s own’. Dramatically, this is a turning point in the dialogue, since, after Charmides is refuted, he withdraws from the forefront of the action and is replaced by Critias, who will undertake to defend the definition anew. Philosophically, the twofold discussion of temperance as ‘doing one’s own’ links the first part of the search, in which Socrates and Charmides aim to discover whether there is temperance in Charmides’ soul, to the second part, in which Socrates and Critias explore the relation between temperance and self-knowledge. In addition to reconstructing and assessing the refutation of Charmides by Socrates, this chapter also includes a discussion of the sociopolitical context in which ‘doing one’s own’ was considered a virtue.

The use of the present tense to refer to past events may depend on two conceptual scenarios. First, the speaker may be mentally displaced to the past. Second, the speaker may pretend that the past events are currently accessible in the form of a representation. This 'representation' scenario is generally the most economic conceptual explanation for the use of the present tense to refer past events. Examples are discussed to illustrate the argument: passages from the novels of Alexandre Dumas and from Thomas Hughes' Tom Brown's schooldays; narratives accompanying security camera footage; a narrative by a character in an episode of Seinfeld; and passages from Thucydides. In all these cases the use of the present tense to refer to past events can be made sense of in terms of a conceptual representation scenario, where the difference lies in the exact nature of the representation. The more concrete the representation, the stronger the tendency for the speaker to use the present tense to designate the described events.