This chapter shows how factional divisions in FECODE shaped electoral mobilization and ideological rigidity. It links the repertoire of leftism to competition among rival factions in internal union elections. Contrary to the Argentine tendency toward ongoing and disruptive protests, protests by FECODE were easier for the government to manage owing to the political priorities of union factions. The next section shows how factionalism and ideological rigidity produced rival negotiating strategies that limited the influence of union leaders on the policy process. The final section shows that leftism remained the central tendency of political mobilization for the union throughout the 2010s.

This chapter details cycles of silence theory explaining how criminal groups constrain citizen cooperation with the police. Criminal group violence not only reduces cooperation by heightening retaliation risk to cooperators but also by making community norms favoring cooperation appear weaker than they are to citizens. Due to violence- induced retaliation risk, citizens who support cooperation are forced to keep that support private. The potency of social norms in driving human behavior means that this suppression of norms that favor cooperation ultimately reduce witnesses’ willingness to come forward with information. The chapter also interrogates the theory’s central premise that underlying support for cooperation exists in communities. Perceptions of police and criminal group legitimacy are an important driver of support, so cycles of silence dynamics primarily operate in communities where criminal groups have failed to gain legitimacy. The chapter then theorizes why criminal groups’ primary goal of illicit economic gain undermines their legitimization efforts.

This chapter argues that the organizational structure of the Argentine teachers’ confederation (CTERA), with power rooted in provincial and municipal actors, is crucial for explaining why teachers engaged in ongoing protests. It examines the process of union rebuilding in the wake of democratization, after harsh repression during the military regime. Even if newly elected leaders offered little support to the union because of the debt crisis, union leaders made some progress in consolidating CTERA through their own initiatives. The chapter then turns to decentralization under President Carlos Menem as a point of inflection. This undermined national union leaders, weakening their hold on the base. Once organizational hierarchies were weakened, movementism became the union’s political strategy.

This chapter discusses the concept of wage labour and its history and proposes a definition of wage labour that includes the provision of remuneration in exchange for labour power, but also emphasizes the labourers’ continued free status and their concomitant ability to influence the price of their labour power, and thus the level of their wages – thereby allowing the price of labour power to be set on the market. From this follows discussion of the role of wage labour in debates on the ancient economy – in part asking which workers can be seen as wage labourers – and, further, of how paid military service can constitute a form of wage labour. It is argued that for soldiers to constitute wage labourers, their service needs to be voluntary, of temporary nature, and remunerated in coin or in kind.

Hired soldiers had to be incentivized to enlist, and subsequently induced to continue their service. Hence, together with the growing reliance on paid, voluntary tropps, we see the development of increasingly sophisticated systems of remuneration, comprising rewards in both coin and kind. Enlistment across all ranks of the royal armies was incentivized and, indeed, made possible via the provision of armour and equipment, or via grants of land to those recruited into elite divisions. Coined payments going beyond mere rations, as well as occasional bonuses, formed the bulk of the remuneration attested in both the textual and numismatic record. Additional benefits and privileges – such as the occasional right to plunder, tax breaks, legal protections, and family support – were also sometimes granted. Together, these incentives seem to have offered soldiers of the royal armies an above-average standard of living, as indicated by the qualitative and (sparse) quantitative evidence.

This dossier, included for ease of reference, contains the texts and translations of a selection of inscriptions cited in this volume, presented in chronological order. In each case, the text is accompanied by core information on the stone and bibliographical details of editions; the edition printed is indicated in bold. This is followed by the date, and discussion where major controversy exists. Abbreviations follow SEG and the Liste de Sigles of L’Année Philologique ; for all other publications, see the Bibliography.

In the early stages of the Iliad, an enraged Achilles famously questions the purpose of his presence at Troy: why are he and his soldiers risking their lives on the battlefield, when they have no stake in the war at hand and gain no share in the rewards of battle? Achilles, of course, had knowingly joined the deadly expedition in pursuit of eternal glory and yet, in doing so, he had forced his men to do the same.

The Homeric hero’s desire to acquire status on the battlefield was not merely a literary trope but also the expression of a harsh reality of elite society in the Archaic and Classical Greek world, whose members’ position of authority was based on their military service and status.1

In this concluding discussion, key aspects of Hellenistic economic development are discussed and related to the presence of military wage labourers. In particular, the presence of paid soldiers and a market for labour are connected to the increased production of goods and services for the market, to the period’s rapid and significant monetization, and to the apparent rise in private wealth generation and profit-seeking behaviour. As a key part of this argument, military wage labourers are discussed as the driving force behind the Hellenistic world’s budding market economy.

This chapter provides the historical and scholarly context to the book’s main argument, and hence treats the military and economic developments that engulfed the Greek world in the late Classical and early Hellenistic periods. arguing that these should be seen as intrinsically connected. Following discussion of scholarly approaches to the economic transformation of the Greek world at this time, paying special attention to the old formalist–substantivist debate, the chapter advocates a closer look at the types of markets available, especially the market for labour. This market, the book contends, first appeared in a full form in the military sphere; accordingly, the chapter questions scholarly approaches and attitudes towards paid military service, debating especially the notion of ‘mercenary’ soldiers, who should better be conceived of as military wage labourers.

To ascertain soldiers’ potential status as wage labourers, this chapter discusses the process of initial enlistment and the ensuing terms of service, questioning especially whether soldiers enlisted of their own accord and retained their free status. It emerges that, from the reforms by Philip II of Macedonia onwards, political circumstances dictated a strong drift towards greater and at times complete reliance on so-called voluntary troops, who enlisted in exchange for pay. Thus, while the bulk of troops under Philip and Alexander were conscripts, these armies from the outset encouraged the enlistment of hired, voluntary troops in both elite and ordinary divisions. The lines between different troop types were blurred significantly under Alexander, whose conscript forces re-enlisted as hired men mid-way through his campaign. The Successors, whose often fickle claims to territory complicated the conscription of troops, were almost wholly reliant on voluntary troops. Accordingly, it is at this point that the epigraphic record attests military contracts, in which soldiers’ continued freedom of movement is guaranteed, alongside other terms of service. In the subsequent Hellenistic kingdoms, we see a return to conscription, especially in times of greatest need, alongside an enduring preference for professional, hired soldiers to man the standing armies.