This chapter (together with the next one) introduces probably the highlight of the book, i.e. it attempts to answer the important question: what can we now do with the quantum-physics like stance? An immediate, almost obvious, discussion centres around the analogies with the famed double-slit experiment. We set ourselves the task of answering how we can begin to enumerate, quite precisely, analogies between electrons and agents. As the reader will find out, we will need to move over several (important) hurdles, one of them being the perennially difficult analogy we need to make with the Planck constant. We then proceed in shaping the idea of two-preference interference, a concept of paramount importance in our quest to properly define the quantum physics–like research direction.

This chapter provides for a summary overview of some of the great movements in economic science. We discuss theory falsification and the historical role of the observable in economics. We provide for a brief overview of behavioural and experimental economics, as well as computational and neuroeconomics. We conclude the chapter with some ideas on the value of information in the price process.

Standard economic reasoning makes a compelling case for taxing on a lifetime (or even multigenerational) scale, instead of annually. But, in addition to practical problems, lifetime accounting raises serious philosophical challenges and objections. The question of the relevant time period over which to distribute tax (and other fiscal) benefits and burdens is fundamental in a number of areas. Among them are the longstanding debate about income versus consumption taxation, the equity of retirement programmes, and the progressivity of various countries’ fiscal systems.

In this chapter we provide simulations of Bohmian trajectories and probability distributions for a variety of linear potentials. We also discuss the possible physics-analogous interpretations of the model parameters from the previous chapter, in terms of which these simulations are shown. We hope this chapter can be inspirational to all those readers who also believe that the quantum physics– like research orientation is really the next important step to take.

This chapter discusses important notions which aid in formalizing how prices move toward equilibrium. We tackle the concepts of price discovery and price formation. The Kyle and Glosten and Milgrom models are discussed. We also go into some detail on the Rosenow model.

Transformative constitutions – which have been described as bringing about more than reform but less than a revolution – steer countries towards democracy, participation, and egalitarianism. The interpretation and enforcement of such transformative constitutions by courts and public institutions, such as tax administrations, deliver radical social change. A core aim of a transformative constitution is to promote greater democracy and participation in governance and, thus, state-building. Relying on case studies from Kenya, this chapter asks how citizens contribute to state-building by participating in the national tax policy, administration, and legislative processes and considers the roles of transparency and inclusivity on such public participation.

This chapter starts with the idea of a quantized version of supply and demand. We also provide for a discussion why quantum probability is useful in both option pricing and investment choice decisions. We also discuss briefly quantum-like Bayesian networks within the setting of missing financial data. We also hint toward the usefulness of open systems in social science and then dive into the very important observation that Black–Scholes Hamiltonians are non-Hermitian. Toward the end of the chapter, we give an overview of models (with and without memory and (a)symmetry between past and future times). We give some examples and then conclude the chapter with thoughts on the limitations of mathematical modelling.

During times of crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers and the public reveal a strong preference for fairness in pricing even when that would reduce efficiency. For example, they support the application of price gouging laws that prevent prices for necessities from skyrocketing but probably also dampen incentives for firms to produce more and alleviate the shortage. More generally, a growing body of research reveals that consumers have a strong preference for fairness over wealth maximization. This suggests that in making price policy, governments should abandon neoclassical economics and its wealth maximization criterion in favor of an approach that treats fairness in pricing as a first principle and paramount value. The chapter considers the implications of this "neo-Kantian" approach to price policy for antitrust law and policy in particular.

This chapter critiques private property on four grounds. First, private property pushes resources into the hands of those who have more at the expense of those who have less. This arises because wealthier people are willing to pay more for normal goods so they tend to bid successfully for them, and because their wealth allows them to hold out for a larger share of the gains from trade. Second, private property is, in fact, allocatively inefficient. This is because the use of willingness to pay as an allocational technology means that the allocation of property is partially driven by ability to pay rather than a purchaser’s greater productive efficiency. Private property is also allocatively inefficient due to the monopoly power that it places in the hands of owners. Third, the regressivity of private property creates a powerful propertied class that can come to dominate the political system. Finally, both the regressivity and the inefficiency of private property have become even more stark in the internet era because markets which already have strong network effects and are vulnerable to domination by monopolists exacerbate both features.

Contemporary interest among American progressives in using antitrust law to address wealth inequality lacks a firm intellectual foundation. Indeed, both the original American progressives of a century ago and Thomas Piketty, whose work sparked contemporary interest in inequality, agree that inequality’s source is scarcity, rather than monopoly, and so inequality will persist even in perfectly competitive markets. The only real solution is taxation, not a potentially destructive campaign of breakup. Why, then, is antimonopolism so popular among American progressives today? There are two reasons. The first is American anti-statism, which has closed off tax policy as a viable political solution to inequality, forcing progressive scholars and activists to seek a second- or third-best workaround in antitrust policy. The second is the American press, which is actively promoting antimonopolism as a way of fighting back against Google and Facebook, two companies that have badly outcompeted the press for advertising dollars in recent years.

The US corporate tax is over 100 years old, and many academic observers have doubted its value. The standard explanation for why we tax corporations is that it is an indirect tax on shareholders, but that is not a valid reason to have a corporate tax because (a) shareholders can be taxed directly and (b) many shareholders are tax-exempt and should not be taxed at all. However, there is another reason to tax corporations, which was in fact the original rationale why we adopted the corporate tax in 1909: to limit the power of large monopolistic corporations and regulate their activities. If that is the reason for the corporate tax, the US should have a different tax structure than the current 21 percent flat tax. The corporate tax should be set at zero for normal returns and at a sharply progressive rate for supernormal returns (rents).